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Preserving the Revolution : civil-military relations during the American War for Independence, 1775-1783.

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PRESERVING THE REVOLUTION

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE 1775-1783

A Dissertation Presented

By

JAMES GREGORY BRADSHER

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History

PRESERVING THE REVOLUTION

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To the memory of

Jonathan Bradsher
Eighth North Carolina Continentals
1777-1778

and

James William Bradsher
United States Air Force
1935-1965

PREFACE

"Our army has quietly melted away into peaceable citizens," Benjamin Rush wrote several months after the American war for independence. They have, he wrote, "returned to their former occupations and now form a part of the yeomanry of our country." Unlike many revolutionary struggles, the American Revolution did not end in military tyranny, with the military subverting the civilian governments or undermining the revolution. For the most part, the American military forces upheld Congress and the state governments, as well as the goals of their revolution, thereby preventing what the American revolutionaries feared most--anarchy and military tyranny. "Perhaps no Army in the world," William Livingston observed early in 1783, "has ever paid a more sacred regard to the civil authority than the American Troops have done throughout the whole course of the war." Several months later, William Gordon wrote George Washington that he was rejoicing the war was ending "without my ever hearing or knowing, that you have in any one instance set at defiance or encroached upon the civil power."[1]

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[1]Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp, April 27, 1784, L. H. Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American Philosophical Society, 1951), 1:330; William Livingston to

The reasons why the American military forces did not subvert the civilian governments and undermine the American Revolution are varied and inter-related. In this dissertation I have attempted to explain and analyze them by focusing primarily on the civil-military relationship. It is by understanding the dynamics of that relationship that we can better appreciate why Benjamin Rush, William Livingston, William Gordon, and the other American revolutionaries were pleased with the conduct of their military forces during the war, and the fact that they had peacefully disbanded. So, to a large extent, this dissertation is a study of the civil-military relationship, especially with respect to the most important aspect of it. That aspect is the process by which the civil and military revolutionary leaders kept their revolution from being undermined by anarchy and military tyranny--how they preserved the American Revolution. Thus, this dissertation is primarily an analysis of how the revolutionary leaders controlled their military forces and why those forces remained subordinate to civilian control.

In each chapter I have explained and analyzed, in the context of the civil-military relationship, the various ideological, institutional, organizational, political, and

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Ephraim Harris, February 16, 1783, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #8); William Gordon to George Washington, June 18, 1783, "Letters of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930): 492.

personal factors that contributed to keeping the military subordinate to civilian control. In doing so, I have attempted to explain why civil supremacy was so important to the revolutionary leaders, especially with respect to preventing anarchy and military tyranny.

Basic to understanding the civil-military relationship is an understanding of the ideological basis of the American Revolution. At the ideological heart of the American Revolution was the fear of power.[2] Because the military possessed the ultimate physical power, they were feared and distrusted by the American revolutionary leaders throughout the war. The basis for this fear and distrust is explained in the first chapter. The next two chapters discuss how the fear and distrust was translated into policy, particularly with respect to the size and length of service of the Continental Army, reliance on the militia, selection of military leaders, and insistence on civil supremacy.

Because of their fear of military power, the American revolutionaries developed an institutional structure that allowed them to control and direct their military forces. This structure, at both the national and state levels, is detailed in the fourth and fifth chapters.

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[2]Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes on the American Revolution: An Interpretation," Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1973), p. 27.

The sixth chapter presents an assessment of the way the military leaders kept the army under control. They realized that a well-disciplined army was not only necessary to defeat the foreign and domestic enemies, but would be less likely to threaten the lives, liberties, and properties of their fellow citizens.

Despite the efforts to keep the military under control, there were times during the war when they not only challenged the civilian authorities but also posed a threat to the success of the Revolution. This was due, to a large degree, because the military came to be dissatisfied with the American governments and people, for a variety of reasons. These reasons are discussed in the seventh chapter.

In the eighth chapter I have explained how the military's dissatisfaction often resulted in their threatening and violating the lives, liberties, and properties of the American people. Additionally, as is discussed in the ninth chapter, the military, often as a result of their lack of faith in the civilian governments, frequently interfered with or involved themselves in civilian affairs. These actions by the military had their negative aspects, as they raised the specter of military tyranny; but, as is frequently explained in this dissertation, the military's participation in civilian affairs also had a positive side.

The real testing of the civil-military relationship took place during the summer and fall of 1780 and the following winter, and again during the winter of 1782-1783 and the following spring. It was during those periods, as is discussed in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that the civilian governments were most threatened by the military, as certain civil and military leaders believed the military should play a larger role in national affairs. These leaders believed that Congress and the state governments were incapable of marshalling the necessary resources of the continent to ensure military victory, as well as to compensate the military and other public creditors. Why the military did not undermine the civilian authorities during these critical times is analyzed in the last three chapters. Also discussed in those chapters is how the military forces were used by the civilian leaders to uphold the civilian governments, as well as to ensure their peaceful re-establishment at the end of the war.

One would think that two hundred years after the American war for independence ended that this dissertation would not be necessary, in that the question why the American military did not undermine the Revolution by subverting the civilian governments would have been fully addressed and answered. But it has not been. Neither has the civil-military relationship been adequately covered. In part,

this lack of analysis of the civil-military relationship accounts for the lack of explanations given for the success of the American Revolution. And by success, I do not mean only winning the war. The American revolutionaries believed their revolutionary struggle could only be judged successful if it was conducted and concluded without the military subverting the civilian governments, even if such military action ensured military victory. As Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph Trumbull, "It is the fixed Determination of Congress to preserve the civil above the military and the authority of that will not be surrendered, should it be necessary to disband the army in preserving the same."[3]

Until about twenty-five years ago most books dealing with the American war for independence addressed civil and military themes separately. And when the two themes were combined the focus was primarily on the question of why America achieved military victory. Rarely did they address the question of why the American Revolution was not undermined or subverted by the American military forces. Those scholars who attempted to answer this question did so in terms of explanations involving the conservative American revolutionary ideologies. Rarely was the role and importance

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[3]Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777, Joseph Trumbull Papers, CSL.

of the civil-military relationship acknowledged except in a cursory way.[4]

During the past twenty-five years scholars have begun to analyze the American war for independence in ways rarely, or not fully, attempted earlier. In doing so, they have provided us with many valuable insights into both civil and military aspects of the Revolutionary War. With respect to the civil-military relationship, scholars such as Walter Millis, Samuel P. Huntington, Daniel Boorstin, Arthur A. Ekrich, Jr., and Louis Smith, during the 1950s began discussing the war from a standpoint of the relationship of the country's armed forces and its government and people. Although they raised important questions about that relationship during the war, pointing out its importance to understanding the war and the revolution, they did so in a general way, not going into specifics, other than to detail the American fear of standing armies and their reliance on the militia.[5]

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[4]John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on The Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. xi, xiii; James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1982), pp. 210-212.

[5]Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956); Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1957); Arthur A.

During the 1960s, scholars continued to acknowledge the importance of the civil-military relationship in understanding American history, but that relationship during the Revolutionary War remained virtually ignored. Marcus Cunliffe's book on civilians and soldiers in early American history, for example, only devoted two pages to the Revolutionary War.[6]

A new military history school developed during the 1970s and with it came more attention to the civil-military relationship during the Revolutionary War. This school can be traced back to Don Higginbotham's 1971 work The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789.[7] According to John Shy, Higginbotham's work, more than any previous general account of the Revolutionary War, attempted to relate the military and non-military segments of the war.[8] Subsequent works by John Shy, John

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Ekrich, Jr., The Civilian and the Military: A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Random House, 1958).

[6]Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 40-41.

[7](New York: Macmillan Company, 1971).

[8]John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution, p. 122n.1.

Ellis, John Todd White, Charles Royster, Jonathan Gregory Rossie, Lawrence Delbert Cress, James Kirby Martin, Mark Edward Lender, Richard H. Kohn, and Higginbotham addressed aspects of the civil-military relationship during the Revolutionary War.[9]

For the most part, these historians continued to discuss the civil-military relationship in terms of the standing army controversies and the reliance on the militia. But they also began discussing the actual dynamics of the civil-military relationship in terms of civil supremacy and

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[9]Ibid., pp. 3-31; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence, op. cit.; John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); John Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice during the American Revolution." Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1978; Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979); Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, op. cit.; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975); Don Higginbotham, "Military Leadership in the American Revolution," Leadership in the American Revolution, Library of Congress Symposia on the American Revolution (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1974), pp. 91-111; Don Higginbotham, "The Debate Over National Military Institutions: An Issue Slowly Resolved, 1775-1815," William M. Fowler, Jr., and Wallace Coyle, eds., The American Revolution: Changing Perspectives (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), pp. 149-168; Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975).

military subordination. Their efforts, nevertheless, were limited in both scope and depth. As John Shy wrote in 1973, referring to the civil-military relationship, "basic research in this direction has hardly begun." In 1976, he wrote "the debated questions are not very good ones, and truly good questions are yet to be debated seriously." Martin and Lender, in 1982, wrote that the new military history of the Revolutionary War has addressed many new subjects, but "there is still much left to be learned." "Thus," they added, "all of us have an obligation to keep raising new questions and working with extant documents."[10]

I hope this dissertation has raised and answered important questions regarding the civil-military relationship during the American war for independence, and has contributed to a better understanding of why that war was conducted and concluded without the American Revolution being undermined by military tyranny. There are more questions to be asked and answered, however, before we finally have a firm grasp on why the American Revolution, unlike so many other revolutions, did not succumb to military tyranny.

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[10]John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," op. cit., p. 122n.1; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on The Military Struggle for American Independence, p. xiii; James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, p. 222; see also ibid., p. 211.

To a large degree, this means analyzing the civil-military relationship more fully from an institutional, organizational, and personal perspective, particularly at the state and local level. This dissertation, I believe, can be the starting point for others to evaluate further this important subject.

This dissertation, which has taken longer to write than it took the American revolutionaries to win their Revolutionary War, would not have been completed without the help and encouragement of many people. Particularly meriting my thanks are my colleagues at the National Archives and Records Service, especially Mr. Jack Saunders, Dr. Michael Kurtz, Dr. Sharon Gibbs Thibodeau, the members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Appraisal Task Force, and the staff of the Accession and Disposal Branch of the Washington National Records Center, all of whom encouraged me to finish this dissertation. A special note of thanks is due Mr. John P. Butler, compiler of the index to the papers of the Continental Congress, who kept alive my interest in the American Revolution.

I owe a debt of gratitude to the staffs of the various manuscript repositories and libraries where I did my research, especially the inter-library loan staff and Miss Melinda McIntosh of the University of Massachusetts library. A special debt of gratitude is owed Miss Mary M. Wolfskill of the Library of Congress, who was of great help

and encouragement during the latter stages of completing this dissertation.

My mother and step-father, Lexie and Thomas McCraney, warrant more thanks and gratitude than words can express. I am sure finishing this dissertation will be thanks enough for them. Also warranting my thanks is my typist, Mrs. Mary Ann Steed, who saved me from making many errors of omission and commission. Needless to say, any remaining errors are my responsibility.

I could not conclude this preface without thanking my dissertation committee, especially Dr. Winfred Bernhard, who patiently guided me through the doctoral program, and Dr. Hugh Bell, who, among other things, suggested the title of this dissertation.

ABSTRACT

Preserving the Revolution

Civil-Military Relations During

The American War for Independence

1775-1783

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Explained and analyzed, in the context of the civil-military relationship, are the reasons why the American Revolution was not undermined by an American military tyranny. The early chapters are devoted to explaining the ideological and historical background of the American revolution with respect to American fears of power, anarchy, standing armies, and military despotism; the American's faith in their militia; and their insistence on civil supremacy being the guiding principle of the civil-military relationship. Also detailed is how the Continental Army was created, structured, and maintained so as to minimize the possibility of it subverting the civilian governments. Additionally addressed in the early chapters are the personal and political dynamics of the civil-military relationship. How the

Continental Congress and state governments controlled and directed their military forces, as well as how the military controlled themselves, is detailed in the middle chapters. Also included in these chapters is an analysis of the military's often critical opinion of the civilian governments and the American people; explanations for those instances when the military threatened and violated the lives, liberties, and properties of their fellow citizens; and a discussion of the military's frequent involvement in and interference with the civilian governments and the political process. The last chapters are devoted to an analysis of the civil-military relationship during the last four years of the Revolutionary War, when it was most severely tested, and when the American Revolution was most susceptible to being undermined by a domestic military tyranny. Special attention is given in these chapters to the factors which prevented the Continental Army from subverting the civilian governments, particularly during the last year of the war. Also included, in the last chapter, is an analysis, in the context of several contemporary works on civil-military affairs, of the reasons for the American Revolution not being undermined by the American military forces.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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C H A P T E R I

A CONSERVATIVE AND JEALOUS GENERATION

At the time of the American war for Independence there was no definable 'American mind,' as Americans shared no common ideology; nor one set of political, social religious, or economic beliefs. They lived in different geographical regions, which were in some respects, more closely tied to England than to one another. The American colonists, nevertheless, particularly those identified as Whigs, on the eve of the revolutionary struggle, found the "things that divided them were negligible and the things that united them were fundamental."[1] Understanding what the fundamental things that united them were, will enable us better to understand not only the nature of the American Revolution, or at least how the Whigs perceived it, but will also enable us to understand the operation of the civil-military relationship during the war and how the American military forces were controlled and directed during

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[1]Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realized the Enlightenment (Garden City, New York Anchor Books, 1978), pp. 138-139.

the war, and how and why the revolution did not result in a military tyranny.

Probably the most fundamental belief shared by the American Whigs in 1775 was, in James Burgh's words, that "the people can never be too jealous of their liberties."[2] This idea was not limited to the American Whigs but could be found also in some American Tory circles, as well as among the English Whigs. So pervasive was it during the era of the American Revolution that Samuel Adams was prompted in 1783 to observe that his was an "Age of Jealousy." "Jealousy," stated Adams, who was one of the greatest proponents of jealousy as a public virtue, "is the best Security of publick Liberty." His cousin, John Adams, also acknowledged the importance of jealousy in the political arena. Preparing notes for an oration in the spring of 1772, he wrote "The only Maxim of a free Government, ought to be to trust no Man living, with Power to endanger the public Liberty" and that "Liberty, under every conceivable Form of Government is always in Danger."[3]

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[2]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 3:311.

[3]Samuel Adams to John Adams, November 4, 1783, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:288; Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, April 23, 1783, ibid., 302; John Adams Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:59, 58.

Americans during the era of the American Revolution were constantly reminded about the misuse of power. Additionally, they were warned not to undervalue their liberty. Eternal vigilance, Patrick Henry told them, was the price of their liberty. Americans were indeed vigilant, so much so that their vision was often limited, particularly with respect to actions by the British ministry after 1765. Their belief in the misuse of power by the British ministry was a major factor in the development of the conviction that they were conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives, liberties, and properties. This conviction (and, by the early 1770s, a fear) is important to the understanding of the ease with which many Americans in 1775 turned out to defend their liberties. This fear of conspiracy, as well as jealousy of power, also is important to understanding the mental framework under which the revolutionary leaders operated. It is especially crucial to explaining how the revolutionary governments and military forces were organized and functioned during the war.[4]

The conviction that the British ministry was conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives,

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[4]Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire 9:846; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [ ] Bradshaw, December 8, 1765, Field, Unpublished Letters of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, p. 101; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1969), pp. 41-42.

liberties, and properties, began around the time of the Stamp Tax debate, and increased with each successive ministerial action.[5] According to Gordon Wood, "By the 1770's there was hardly a piece of Whig writing, . . . that did not dwell on this obsessive fear of a 'Conspiracy.'"[6] The British ministers were not plotting to overthrow the liberties of the Americans during the decade before Lexington-Concord. Their policies, however, were seen in that light by many Americans. It is not essential to recite all the British policies and the American responses to demonstrate how and why Americans came to their point of view, for there have been numerous works written on that subject. The special relationship between the British ministry and army, as it was perceived in America, particularly in Massachusetts, however, needs to be discussed. This is because the ten year observation and reflection upon the perceived conspiratorial design to overthrow their liberties by force of arms, left a deep impact on the American Whigs, especially with regard to how they controlled their own military forces during the war.

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[5]John Adams Diary, March 6, 1774, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:90; John Adams Autobiography, ibid., 3:290; John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 6, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:125.

[6]Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 39.

Despite warnings between 1766 and 1768 that, if the ministry sent an army to enforce unconstitutional legislation, Americans would regard the move as an infringement of their rights and a serious grievance, an army was sent to Boston late in 1768 to protect the Customs Commissioners.[7]

To many American Whigs the sending of an army was substantial proof of a conspiratorial plan on the part of the ministry to have a "standing army and swarms of crown officers, placemen, pensioners and expectants, co-operating to subdue America to the yoke" and "to keep the whole continent in subjection."[8] Already they had witnessed what the army had done in New York City, where periodic battles had

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[7]Speech of Benjamin Franklin before the House of Commons on February 13, 1766, Leonard W. Labaree et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 21 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959-1978), 13:142; A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1758 to 1769 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1886), p. 263; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [Edmund Jennings?], September 28, 1765, Rowland, The Life of Charles Carroll of Carrollton 1737-1832 with his Correspondence and Public Papers, 1:73; Same to same, September 30, 1765, in ibid., 74; Thomas Cushing to ?, May 9, 1767, MHSC, 4th ser., 4:348; The New-Hampshire Gazette, August 5, 1768.

[8]Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule, pp. 13 and 64; see also ibid., p. 6; John Wentworth to Dr. Becham, August 9, 1768, Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 1; The Massachusetts House of Representatives to Dennys De Berdt, January 12, 1768, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 1:146; "Determinatus" is The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, August 8, 1768; The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, September 26, 1768; Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faith, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics 1689-1775 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 288.

taken place during 1766 and 1767 between soldiers and citizens. Before 1768 ended, they would also learn of the death of two citizens in Annapolis at the hands of the Royal Marines and of the St. George's Field massacre outside King's Bench Prison in London where a pro-Wilkes crowd was fired upon by British regulars.[9] It is not surprising then to find a Boston town meeting in June 1768 declaring "every person soliciting or promoting the importation of troops should be pronounced an enemy to the town and province, and a disturber of the peace and good order of both."[10]

The British army arrived in Boston during the late summer of 1768 to Mather Byles's pun that the colonist's grievances had been "red-dressed."[11] Within months, the army had become a nuisance and a threat, as guards were placed about the town, the Boston neck fortified, and the

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[9]The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser, October 23, November 6, 20 (supplement), 1766, March 26, 1767 (supplement); The New-York Gazette, June 5, August 14, September 25, 1766; Elihu S. Riley, "The Ancient City." A History of Annapolis, in Maryland. 1649-1887 (Annapolis: Record Printing Office, 1887), p. 164; and John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 395.

[10]John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts: The Provincial Period (Boston: Henry Barry, 1857), p. 356.

[11]John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:289.

citizenry challenged at night by the guards.[12] Many Bostonians questioned whether the use of force was a very suitable means of changing their sentiments, believing the insolent use of military power always had been despised by people who retained a just sense of liberty; believing also, with James Burgh, that "Good government is a surer way to keep the peace, than keeping up a formidable and expensive army."[13] John Lathrop, minister of the Old North Church, preached that government established by the sword should fall, and "in its stead another might be established, more agreeable to the great nature of man, and constant with the great ends of society."[14] As to the charge by the Customs Commissioners that Boston was ruled by a mob, an editorial in The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal on September 12, 1768, denied their existence, warning that "in a free country I am afraid a standing army rather occasions than prevents them."

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[12]Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule, pp. 11, 16, 34; Richard Cary to ?, July 24, 1769; A. L. Elwyn, Papers Relating to Public Events in Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolution (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Collins for the Seventy-Six Society, 1856), p. 122.

[13]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:348; see also Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule, pp. 29, 34, 62; "Vindex," The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, December 5, 12, 1768; "Shippen," in ibid., January 30, 1769; Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, November 6, 1779, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 1:446.

[14]Cited in Ola E. Winslow, Meetinghouse Hill 1630-1783 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 277.

Mobs did exist before the army arrived, but not in the numbers and frequency as they did once the army arrived. These mobs, generally gathered to taunt the soldiers during 1769 and 1770, created an explosive situation. Thomas Pownall told Parliament in February 1769 that "The people of that country and the King's troops are . . . set in array against each other." The sword was yet to be drawn, he told them, but the hand was upon it. "The word for action is not, indeed, yet given; but mischief is on tiptoe, and the slightest circumstance" he predicted, "would in a moment throw everything into confusion and bloodshed."[15] His prediction of bloodshed came in the form of the "Battle of Golden Hill" in New York City in January 1770 and the "Boston Massacre" in March 1770.[16]

This shedding of blood convinced many Americans that the ministry intended to enslave them, even though the troops were removed from Boston and the Townshend Acts repealed. After all, as it was frequently emphasized, the

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[15]Cited in John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts: The Provincial Period, pp. 380-381.

[16]The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser, January 18 (supplement), January 25, February 8, March 1 (supplement), March 26, 1770; Parker's New-York Gazette: or, the Weekly Post Boy, January 22, February 5, 1770; The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, February 19, 1770 (supplement); Lee R. Boyer, "Lobster Backs, Liberty Boys, and Laborers in the Streets: New York's Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots," NYHSQ 57, no. 4 (October 1973): 281-308; Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 22.

British army still remained in force on the continent, out of Colonial control, and ready for the next step in the conspirator's plans.[17] One American Whig, who in particular went to great lengths after 1770 to convince others of the danger posed by the army still remaining in the colonies, and of the existence of a ministerial plot, was Samuel Adams.[18] Besides writing letters to other Whigs and establishing a committee of correspondence in the fall of 1772, he carried on a newspaper campaign under the name of "Candidus" in The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal.[19] Perhaps the most important source for publicizing the belief of a conspiracy and the dangers of a standing army during the decade before the war were the annual Boston Massacre sermons, which were begun in 1771.[20]

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[17]Thomas Cushing to Benjamin Franklin, November 6, 1770, A. L. Elwyn, Papers Relating to Public Events in Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolution, p. 171; "Vindex," The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, December 5, 12, 19, 26, 1768; Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule, p. 29.

[18]Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, July 31, 1771, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 2:190; Same to same, October 31, 1771, ibid., 266-267; Same to same, September 27, 1771, ibid., 235; Samuel Adams to Henry Marchant, January 7, 1772, ibid., 308.

[19]August 19, September 23, October 7, 1771.

[20]John Adams Diary, March 5, 1773, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:79; Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774; Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:104; John Adams to Jedidiah Morse, January 5, 1816, Adams, Works of John Adams, 10:230; "Mentor" in The Boston Evening-Post, February 11, 1770; A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of

Referring to the whole Whig arsenal of literature against standing armies and citing contemporary instances of tyranny, the first three sermons, given by James Lovell, Joseph Warren, and Benjamin Church, detailed how the British army in their midst was a threat to their liberty. The fourth sermon, delivered by John Hancock and most probably drafted by Samuel Cooper, was perhaps the best example of bringing together the two themes of standing armies and conspiracies. By the time the fifth sermon was given by Joseph Warren in March 1775, it was not very difficult for him to demonstrate that the military in their midst was truly the sword of a conspiracy.[21] Printed sermons, appeals from the pulpit, pamphlets, and letters to editors augmented the massacre sermons in the propaganda war the five years previous to the war.[22]

Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), pp. 47-48.

[21]Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 17-38; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 197.

[22]John Adams' notes for a Braintree oration sermon, Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:58; Alice Baldwin, The New England Clergy and the American Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928), pp. 113-114; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783, pp. 194-245; John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts: The Provincial Period, p. 439; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain 1764-1776 (New York: Vintage Books, A Caravelle Edition, 1965), pp. 103-106; T. W. A. Bostonian [Charles Chauncy], A Letter to a Friend, Giving a Concise but just, representation of the hardships

Boston town meetings, the Boston Committee of Correspondence, and the Massachusetts House of Representatives during 1772 and 1773 also insisted the army in America was the result of a conspiracy to undermine their liberties.[23] In May 1773 the town meeting informed their representatives to the General Assembly that "standing armies have forever made shipwreck of free states and no people jealous of their liberties ever patiently suffered mercenary troops to be quartered and maintained within their populous cities" and "We cannot therefore but resent those standing troops within our capital cities, appointed executioners of tyranny, and prepared instruments to massacre the defenceless citizens, at the nod of any master who may have authority to appoint or discharge, reward or punish them." This armed force they argued was going to be used by the ministry to complete "their infernal plan of enslaving America."[24]

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and sufferings of the late act of the British-Parliament (Boston: Greenleaf's Printing Office, 1774).

[23] A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777, pp. 84, 101, 106; Boston Committee of Correspondence to Elijah Morton, June 19, 1773; Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:42; Massachusetts House of Representatives Petition to the King, June 23, 1773, in ibid., 47.

[24] A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777, p. 133.

This "infernal plan" appeared all that more apparent when the Ministry responded to the dumping of the tea in Boston harbor by a series of coercive measures, culminating in the appointment of General Thomas Gage as Governor of Massachusetts and the arrival of additional military forces to support him. Shortly after their arrival during the first week of September 1774, Gage had the Boston neck fortified and began seizing gunpowder and cannon from colonial magazines. Bostonians reacted much the way they had in 1768, as they were, in Samuel Adams's words, once again "threatened with that great evil," a standing army. Hannah Winthrop believed "the dissolution of all government gives a dreadful prospect" and expressed her fear that "the troops give an horrid prospect of an intended battle." Agreeing, Joseph Warren reported "the troops are availing themselves every opportunity to make themselves more formidable, and render the people less able to oppose them" and stated "the treatment which we receive from the soldiery makes us think they regard us as enemies rather than as fellow subjects."[25]

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[25]Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:104; Hannah Winthrop to Mercy Warren, September 27, 1774, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 72 (1917): 33; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams, September 29, 1774, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1865), pp. 381-382; see also John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 5, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:125.

Conventions held in Massachusetts during August and September expressed their fears that Britain was attempting "to execute their wicked designs by military force."[26] The best known convention, held in Suffolk County produced, by the pen of Joseph Warren, the Suffolk Resolves, which explained how Boston came to have her streets "thronged with military executioners" and set forth the workings of the perceived British conspiracy.[27] The Reverend Gad Hitchcock of Pembroke, Massachusetts, in a May 1774 election sermon, stated "Our danger is not visionary, but real; our contention is not about trifles, but about liberty and property." "If I am mistaken in supposing plans are formed and executing, subversive of our natural and chartered rights and privileges, and incompatible with every idea of liberty, 'all America is mistaken with me.'"[28] Indeed, the Massachusetts Whigs were not alone in their fears of a conspiracy and the belief the army was to be the sword of that conspiracy. Their beliefs and fears were also shared by others in New England.

In New Hampshire, John Sullivan, as "A WATCHMAN," in a broadside addressed "To the Inhabitants of British

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[26]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 657; see also ibid., pp. 612, 616, 620, 624, 644-645.

[27]Ibid., pp. 602, 603-604.

[28]Cited in J. T. Headley, The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), p. 30.

America" on the day before Christmas 1774, warned that a standing army had been sent to enslave America.[29] Earlier that year a town meeting in Coventry, Connecticut, expressed its belief that "by coercive measures, and military force," Boston would be dragooned into compliance "with the arbitary will of the British ministry."[30] The clerk of the Connecticut Committee of Correspondence believed the acts against Boston were "part of the general System, as one Operation of the general plan long since concerted, for Subjugating the Colonies, and rendering their Lives, and properties, subservient to the Will & Pleasure, of a British Parliament, or rather of their Ministry."[31] This prospect was not limited to New England. In Alexandria, Virginia, on October 24, 1774, Nicholas Cresswell recorded in his diary that "The New Englanders by their canting, whining, insinuating tricks have persuaded the rest of the Colonies that the Government is going to make absolute slaves of them."[32]

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[29]Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, p. 51.

[30]Hinman, A Historical Collection, p. 75.

[31]Silas Deane to the Committee of Correspondence of Boston, June 13, 1774, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:28; see also Deane's letter to the various colonial committees of correspondence, dated June 4, 1774, ibid., 1:25.

[32]Nicholas Cresswell, Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777 (New York: Dial Press, 1924), p. 44.

With respect to Virginia, Cresswell's observation had great validity. George Washington, for instance, believed the ministry was "pursuing a regular plan at the expense of law and justice to overthrow our constitutional right and liberties." "Is not the attack upon the liberty and property of the people of Boston," he asked a Tory neighbor, "a plain and self-evident proof of what they are aiming at?"[33] Many Whigs in Virginia shared Washington's feelings concerning what they considered, in Richard Henry Lee's words, "a Systematic plan of despotism."[34] Elsewhere in the colonies belief in a conspiracy, aided by a standing army, was just as strong.[35] In September 1774, as the first

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[33]George Washington to Bryan Fairfax, July 20, 1774, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:321; and Same to same, July 4, 1774, ibid., 228.

[34]Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, April 24, 1774, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:108; see also Same to same, June 23, 1774, in ibid., 111; Edmund Pendleton to Joseph Chew, June 20, 1774, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:93; Adam Stephen to Richard Henry Lee, August 27, 1774, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 2:208; Broadside of An Association signed by 89 members of the Late House of Burgess [May 27, 1774] in Schreevan, Revolutionary Virginia, 1:97; Resolution of Fairfax County, July 18, 1774, ibid., 129.

[35]Baltimore Committee of Correspondence to Committee of Correspondence at Norfolk and Portsmouth, June 17, 1774, Purviance, Baltimore Town during the Revolutionary War, p. 153; Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge, July 13, 1774, [Anne Izard Deas, ed.], Correspondence of Mr. Ralph Izard, of South Carolina, from the year 1774 to 1804; with a short Memoir (New York: Charles S. Francis and Company, 1844), p.203; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:52; Stephen E. Lucas, Portents of Rebellion: Rhetoric and Revolution in

Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to discuss the colonial fears and concerns, Thomas Willing a resident of Philadelphia and future member of the Continental Congress, wrote "I am no great Politician but as an American I both See and feel the chains which are prepared for me."[36]

The first Continental Congress shared and expressed the fears and concerns of the American colonists, particularly with respect to the sword of the conspiracy, the standing army in their midst. Thomas Jefferson, one of the Virginia delegates, had already during the summer written A Summary View of the Rights of British America, which served as instructions for the Virginia delegates to the Congress. Jefferson stated that "single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidential opinion of the day; but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and pursued unalterable thro' every change of ministers, too plainly a deliberate, systematically plan of reducing us to slavery."[37] Congress, agreeing with Jefferson's

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Philadelphia, 1775-76 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), pp. 96-125.

[36]Thomas Willing to General Frederick Haldimand, September 20, 1774, Thomas Willing Balch, ed., Willing Letters and Papers edited with a Biographical Essay of Thomas Willing of Philadelphia (1731-1821) (Philadelphia: Allen, Land, and Scott, 1922), pp. 43-44.

[37]Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:125.

interpretation of events, declared their belief in a conspiracy to overthrow their liberties by a standing army.[38]

General Gage, understanding the feelings of the colonists towards his occupation of Boston, attempted to minimize the presence of his army, assuring the Provincial Congress that "Britain can never harbor the black design of wantonly destroying, or enslaving, any people on earth."[39] Nevertheless, Boston was considered an armed camp and suffered many of the ill effects of the occupation, much as it had between 1768 and 1770.[40]

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[38]Ford, JCC, 1:63-73, 82-101.

[39]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 20; see also Abigail Adams to John Adams, October 16, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:173.

[40]Same to same, September 14, 1774, ibid., 151-152; Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, [January 25, 1775], ibid., 179-180; Abigail Adams to Edward Dilly, May 22, [1775], ibid., 201; Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, September 27, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS, Same to same, October 16, 1774, ibid.; Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, March 21, 1775, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:206-206; John Andrews to William Barrell, August 1, 1774, Winthrop Sargent, ed., "Letters of John Andrews, Esq., of Boston, 1772-1776," PMHS (1864-1865), 8:333-335; Same to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 371; Same to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 381; Same to same, January 2, 1775, ibid., 392-393; Same to same, January 21, 1775, ibid., 395-396; Philip Padleford, ed., Colonial Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert Honyman's Journal for March and April (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1939), p. 41; [John Boyle], "Boyle's Journal of Occurences in Boston 1759-1778," NEHGR 35 (January 1931): 7; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 12.

Boston alone did not feel the presence of the British army during the six months previous to the outbreak of the war, as Gage frequently sent troops into Boston's environs. These forays caused great alarm and provided more fuel to the Whig argument that Britain intended to rule by military might.[41] The Massachusetts Provincial Congress protested what they considered Gage's aggressive actions, believing that if he did not cease he would find himself embroiled in a civil war. They did not have great expectations of Gage relenting, as they were convinced the army was garrisoned upon them with the "express design" of executing "acts of the British parliament utterly subversive of the constitution of the province" and "enforcing submission to a system of tyranny." A December 30, 1774, Boston town meeting echoed similar beliefs, being utterly convinced the army, the tool of the ministry, was set on overthrowing the liberties of America. So did John Adams, as "Novanglus," in The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal on February 6th and 13th, 1775. In a pamphlet published in Boston late in 1774, Charles Chauncy stated the design of Britain to enslave Massachusetts and the North American

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[41]Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the American Revolution 1775-1776 (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 185-186; Elwin L. Page, "The King's Powder, 1774," NEQ 18, no. 1 (March 1945): 83-92.

colonies was "so obviously visible."[42] Many, if not a majority of Americans, agreed with Chauncy. Many more would be convinced after Lexington and Concord.

About two months after the war began, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, responding to Gage's proclamation of pardon, stated the British ministry had for several years been executing a plan to enslave America, adding it "is a proposition so evident, that it would be an affront to the understanding of mankind to adduce proofs in support of it."[43] Other legislative bodies and individuals were, however, more willing to elaborate the steps by which the ministry had intended to enslave them, and thereby justified war and eventual independence.[44]

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[42]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 31, 69; A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777, pp. 209-212; T. W. A. Bostonian [Charles Chauncy], A Letter to a Friend, Giving a Concise but just, representation of the hardships and sufferings of the late act of the British-Parliament, p. 24; see also ibid., p. 26.

[43]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 344.

[44]Oration given by Peter Thacher on March 5, 1776, at Watertown, Massachusetts, Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, p. 24; Resolution of Malden, Massachusetts, May 27, 1776, ibid., p. 157; Charge to Charleston's Grand Jury on October 15, 1776, by Judge William Henry Drayton, ibid., p. 82; Charge to Charleston's Grand Jury on April 23, 1776, by Judge William Henry Drayton in Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 2:187-188; Proclamation by Governor Jonathan Trumbull, June 18, 1776, Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 15:451; Hinman, A Historical Collection, p. 175;

American jealousies of their liberties had helped to conjure up a conspiracy during the 1760s and events during the first half decade of the 1770s confirmed it, especially after the introduction of the Coercive Acts during the summer of 1774. By that time most Americans were asking fundamental questions regarding what the conspirators desired of them, their status within the Empire, and how to prevent the conspiracy from coming to fruition.

Timothy Matlock, when asked during the summer of 1783 why he had fought during the revolutionary war, responded simply, "Liberty and Property."[45] Liberty, for most Americans, as well as Englishmen, was understood in the Lockean sense, that is, liberty was equated with the right to life and property. These were the things the

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Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, p. 43; Moultrie, Memoirs of the Revolution, 1:52-53; Preamble of South Carolina's March 26, 1776 Constitution in Hemphill, Extracts from The Journals of the Provincial Congress of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 257; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:388; Fourth New Hampshire Provincial Congress to Governor Wentworth, June 8, 1775, in Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 7:509-510; Virginia's Constitution of June 1776, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:378; The Declaration of Independence as adopted by the Continental Congress, July 4, 1776, ibid., 430-431; Benjamin Rumsey to William Rumsey, June 3, 1776, in James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian, eds., "'A Jurisdiction Competent to the Occasion': A Benjamin Rumsey Letter, June, 1776," MHM 58, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 152.

[45]Cited in Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation [1783-1784], Alfred J. Morrison, trans. and ed., 2 vols. (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), 1:65.

American Whigs desired from society, and these were the things they believed the British ministry was attempting to deprive them of, particularly so by the end of 1774. By that time, according to Theodorick Bland, the colonists had the choice of contending for their liberties or giving them up to "arbitrary Power."[46] Philip Schuyler, shortly after the war had begun, wrote the Americans had a choice of being ruled by a military despotism, or fighting for their rights and freedom.[47] Throughout the war it was repeatedly stated the goals of the colonists were to protect their liberties and properties.[48]

Four years into the war, in Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, or, the General Advertiser, on July 3, 1779, Benjamin Rush, as "Leonidas," wrote that liberty was the initial goal of the American struggle, not independence. Independence, however, he believed was necessary now to

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[46]John Adams Diary, September 6, 1774, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:125.

[47]Philip Schuyler to John Cruger, April 29, 1775, Tuckerman, Philip Schuyler, p. 85.

[48]John McKesson to George Clinton, June 7, 1775, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:195; General Association of Goshen, New York, April 29, 1775, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 1:5; Association of the 2d Brookhaven [New York] Company, June 8, 1775, ibid., 48; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Books, p. 158; Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 38; Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania During the Revolution (Harrisburg: R. L. Meyers and Company, 1901), p. 46.

ensure that liberty was obtained. Rush was correct about independence not being an initial goal of the revolutionary struggle. In his autobiography, he wrote that "Not one man in a thousand contemplated or wished for the independence of our country in 1774."[49] Most Americans in 1775--certainly before the outbreak of the war, and to a large degree afterward--enjoyed and basked in their place within the British Empire, as they were perhaps the freest and wealthiest people in the world. Despite their decade long dispute with the mother country, Americans, for the most part, were proud to call themselves subjects of the crown.[50] A constitutional dependence they accepted; however, what they took to be the undermining of that dependence and the replacement of it by unconstitutional subjugation, they opposed, actively so beginning in the 1760s.[51]

Just as independence was not desired by most Americans in 1775, neither was war. "The Idea of taking up Arms against the parent States," Samuel Ward reported late in 1774, "is shocking to Us." That fall, George Washington stated "it is the ardent wish of the armest

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[49]Corner, Autobiography of Benjamin Rush, p. 119.

[50]Baron De Kalb to Duc de Choiseul, March 2, 1768, Kapp, Kalb, p. 64.

[51]Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [Edward] Jennings, May 29, 1766, Field, Unpublished Letters of Charles Carrollton, p. 117.

advocate for liberty, that peace and tranquility upon constitutional grounds, may be restored, and the horrors of civil discord prevented."[52] Americans hoped for peace during the winter of 1774-1775, many still believing that it was not too late to accommodate their dispute with the ministry.[53]

This desire for a peaceful accommodation was due primarily to the fear many Americans had that with war would come two things they greatly feared: anarchy and military despotism, both of a domestic variety. We must remember the Whig leaders, who for the most part were members of the colonial elite, did not desire a change in either their social or political environment. They were basically conservative men, content with their deferential society. They were planters, doctors, lawyers, well-to-do artisans and farmers, and college graduates.[54] They were

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[52]Samuel Ward to John Dickinson, December 14, 1774, Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the American Revolution 1766-1775, pp. 176-177; George Washington to Robert MacKenzie, October 9, 1774, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:246-247.

[53]Joseph Warren to Arthur Lee, February 20, 1775, Lee, Arthur Lee, 2:265.

[54]J. M. Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolution, with a brief History of the Medical Department of the Continental Army, Containing the names of Nearly Twelve Hundred Physicians (Philadelphia: Collins, 1876), p. 131n.1; David Humphrey, From King's College to Columbia 1746-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 210; Howard Peckham, "Collegia Ante Bellum: Attitudes of College

the conservative ruling class, many of whom sat in the colonial assemblies.[55] War for these men meant the possibility of change in their status. "The Powerful People" observed one Maryland merchant-planter, "love Ease and are not fond of Change, especially those that are uncertain and tend with danger."[56] War also meant the possibility of a Cromwell imposing a government upon them worse than that they labored under. A war also meant a mob might be unleashed--a mob who, if not creating a state of anarchy, would at least undermine the stable political and social structure of colonial America.

The farthest thing from the Whig's minds in 1774-1775 was that of undermining the domestic political order. There was no real "who should rule at home" debate in most of the colonies, and even where such debate took place, it was relatively insignificant, as the American Whig leaders

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Professors Toward the American Revolution," PMHB 95, no. 1 (January 1971): 70.

[55]David Ammerman, In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974), p. 110; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. 36, no. 2 (New York: Columbia University, 1910), pp. 111, 111n.1; Schreevan, Revolutionary Virginia, 3:304; Gerlach, Prologue to Independence, pp. 266-267.

[56]Stephen West to ?, January 10, 1776, David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 152.

were, at least until the war began, satisfied with their place both in America and within the Empire. They simply desired a return by the British ministry to the salutary neglect that dominated the colonial relationship prior to George III assuming the throne. According to a convention in Westmoreland County, Virginia, "That so far from endeavouring or desiring to subvert our ancient, and to erect a new form of government, we will, at the risk of our lives and fortunes, support and defend it as it existed, and was exercised until the year 1760." Justifying their meeting, the First South Carolina Provincial Congress stated they desired neither innovation, alteration, or independence. Their concern was only with stopping the repeated arbitrary acts of a wicked British ministry. "The universal claim is," Joseph Reed told the Earl of Dartmouth, "to be restored to the state we were in 1763, though a line drawn at that period includes some of those laws to whose principles and binding authority we are now opposed."[57]

It is understandable, therefore, that these Whig leaders desired a peaceful resolution of their dispute with the ministry. It is also understandable that they would

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[57]Richard Barksdale Harwell, ed., The Committees of Safety of Westmoreland and Fincastle: Proceedings of the County Committees 1774-1776, Virginia State Library Publications, no. 1 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1956), pp. 40-41; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 52; Joseph Reed to the Earl of Dartmouth, [October 15, 1774?], Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:83.

employ moderate means to achieve a redress of their grievances. Thus, beginning in the 1760s, a carefully controlled and directed protest, put forth in constitutional terms, was utilized by the Whig leaders.[58] The protest, beginning with the non-importation associations formed as a result of the Stamp Act, and continuing with the establishment of committees of correspondence during the early 1770s, was generally led by a relatively conservative group of Whigs. They believed that by orderly means, within a framework of political association, their grievances could be safely redressed.

Some forms of mob protest, if not necessarily encouraged, was acceptable to the Whig leaders, if they had part in directing the actions of the mob.[59] This form of protest was, however, little used, for it frequently got out of control and resulted in the destruction of property. Additionally, many Whigs opposed mob actions, since mobs only served as an excuse for the ministry to send more

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[58]Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution," in Leadership in the American Revolution: Papers presented at the Third Library of Congress Symposia on the American Revolution, May 9 and 10, 1974, introduction by Elizabeth Hammer Kegan (Washington: Library of Congress, 1974), pp. 63-88.

[59]Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), pp. 3-48.

troops to America. As the colonial protest escalated after the announcement of the Coercive Acts, concern about mob violence increased.[60] John Adams, although calling for the people to arm themselves, nevertheless desired they remain peaceful in their protest.[61] "Brutus," in Virginia, raised a voice against rashness and unchecked violence, arguing prudence and moderation would give greater weight to their protest. Anthony Benezet, a Quaker leader in Philadelphia, also argued for moderation, stating they should protest "as reasonable men[,] as Christians." Joseph Warren desired the Whig leaders to "restrain everything which tends to weaken the principles of right and wrong, more especially with regard to 'property.'"[62]

The Whig leaders responded to Warren's plea by calling on the people to restrain themselves in their protest.[63] Even the creation of the Continental Congress

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[60]Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, October 10, 1774, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:41-42.

[61]John Adams to Richard Cranch, September 18, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:160; John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 7, 1774, ibid., 165.

[62]The Virginia Gazette (Purdie), July 14, 1775; Anthony Benezet to Elias Boudinot, April 17, 1775, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams, May 26, 1775, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 495.

[63]James Russell Trumbull, History of Northampton, Massachusetts from Its Settlement in 1654. 2 vols. (Northampton: Press of Gazette Printing Company, 1902), 2:351; The Essex Gazette, September 20, 1774; Lincoln,

was a move by the Whig leaders towards controlled and moderate protest.[64]

During the summer of 1774, despite the calls for a non-violent response to the Coercive Acts, random and organized acts of violence against both persons and property took place, particularly in Massachusetts, where Tories and Whigs sparred with one another, as well as the soldiers and citizenry.[65] These confrontations were not limited to Massachusetts. In New Hampshire in mid-December, upon learning that British troops were on their way to garrison Castle William and Mary, the fort at Newcastle, well organized and directed mobs assaulted the fort, removing gunpowder and cannon. A similar seizure of powder was made in Charleston, South Carolina, in April 1775, about three weeks before news arrived regarding the war having begun in Massachusetts. Mob activities also took place at the Westminster Court House in the New Hampshire Grants

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Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 70, 650-651; Walker, New Hampshire's Five Provincial Congresses, p. 15; Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York, 5 vols. (Rochester: Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, 1906), 1:51-53.

[64]Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, September 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 26, 34-35.

[65]The Massachusetts Gazette; and the Boston Weekly News-Letter of February 23, 1775, discusses the mob activities in Massachusetts between August 1774 and February 1775.

as Tory Vermonters who supported New York's claim to that land fought New Hampshire Whigs. Violence occurred in other colonies as well, thereby contributing to the unsettled state of affairs in the colonies.[66]

This unsettled state of affairs prompted John Adams to describe the times as "very discouraging."[67] His wife, Abigail, late in August 1774, described the colonial situation as being unsettled, stating "The Rocks and quick Sands appear upon every side."[68] As 1775 began, Whigs found themselves with a very volatile situation, as mobs and anarchy reared themselves from the unrest, and the threat of war loomed as a real possibility with each British army excursion into the Boston hinterlands.[69]

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[66]Theodore Cracket and Martin Andresen, "Fort William and Mary: A Case Study in Crowd Behavior," HNH 29, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 215, 217-220; Elwin L. Page, "The King's Powder, 1774," NEQ 18, no. 1 (March 1945): 83-92; Theodore Chase, "The Attack on Fort William and Mary," HNH 18, no. 1 (April 1963): 20-34; David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina, 4 vols. (New York: American Historical Society, 1934), 2:120-121; Henry W. Bellows, Historical Sketch of Col. Benjamin Bellows, Founder of Walpole: An Address, on Occasion of the Gathering of his Descendants to the Consecration of his Monument, at Walpole, N. H., Oct. 11, 1854. With An Appendix, containing an account of the family meeting (New York: John A. Gray, 1855), pp. 47-48.

[67]John Adams to William Tudor, July 24, 1774, William Tudor Papers, MHS.

[68]Abigail Adams to John Adams, August 19, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:142; Same to same, September 2, 1774, ibid., 147.

[69]Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, September 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS; Philip

Many Americans believed a peaceful solution could be found to end their grievances with the mother country. But most Whigs believed the conspirators in England had no thought of compromise or accommodation with the colonies. These Whigs agreed with John Adams, that by the time of the Tea Party the die had been cast and the "people have passed the river and cut away the bridge."[70] With the arrival of the army during 1774 and early 1775, the Whig belief in the intentions of the ministry was confirmed.

It was not only the American Whigs who believed a conspiracy had begun. Many Tories and British officials believed that a few radical Whigs were responsible for all the unrest, and that they were conspiring to have the British North American colonies independent. These American conspirators, it was believed, had begun agitating for American independence as much as twenty years beforehand, sowing the seeds of rebellion primarily in Massachusetts. One British officer, in Boston during the summer of 1774, suggested that it would "require a great length of time, much steadiness, and many troops, to re-establish good

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Padleford, ed., Colonial Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert Honyman's Journal for March and April, p. 41.

[70]John Adams to James Warren, December 17, 1773, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:333.

order & government" in the colonies as a result of the damage done by radical Whigs.[71]

Thus, as 1775 began, many Americans and Englishmen believed the other was attempting to subvert the English constitution, and that war was a real possibility as a result. These beliefs were most deeply held in Massachusetts, particularly in Boston, which by the fall of 1774 had become a fortified garrison, and a powder keg, much as it had during the winter of 1769-70, prior to the massacre. Gage had attempted to calm the people, by keeping military movements and actions to a minimum. He realized, as did one Bostonian, "The spirit of the people want calming."[72] Nevertheless, he also realized that the presence of his army needed to be maintained, if the radical leaders were to be awed into submission. To do this he periodically sent the army into the hinterlands, both as exercise and to familiarize them with the terrain should war begin. One such foray in September almost resulted in war, as thousands of militia, believing that war had indeed begun, converged on Cambridge and Worcester, ready to retaliate,

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[71]Hugh Earl Percy to Edward Harvey[?], August 21, 1774, Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York 1774-1776 (Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed, 1902), p. 36.

[72]Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, September 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS.

should that be necessary. This demonstration of force by the Americans led one British officer to remark "this country is now in as open a state of rebellion as Scotland was in the year '45." This officer suggested affairs in Boston were "in the most Critical Situation imaginable." "Nothing less," he believed, "than the total loss or conquest of the Colonies must be the End of it. Either indeed is disagreeable, but one or the other is now absolutely necessary."[73] Gage, agreeing, early in 1775 called on Lord Dartmouth to request the ministry take decisive action, suggesting a respectable force be put into the field and the most obnoxious radical Whig leaders seized.[74]

About the time Gage was making his request, the Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, called for the removal of the British army from Massachusetts because, he argued, "the very first drop of blood will make a wound that will not easily skinned over."[75] On the other side

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[73]Hugh Earl Percy to the Duke of Northumberland, September 12, 1774, Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York 1774-1776, p. 37; Hugh Earl Percy to Thomas Percy, October 27, 1774, ibid., p. 40.

[74]Thomas Gage to Lord Dartmouth, January 17, 1775, John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts: The Provincial Period, 2:498.

[75]Cited in ibid., 502.

of the Atlantic in Boston, Joseph Warren agreed. "If once General Gage should lead his troops into the country, with design to enforce the late acts of Parliament," he predicted, "Great Britain may take leave, at least of the New-England colonies, and, if I mistake not, of all America."[76]

Once Gage's soldiers tightened their grip on Boston and began venturing into its hinterlands, the Whig belief in a conspiracy increased, as did their belief that a war would soon take place.[77] On January 17, 1775, The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser carried a letter from Boston, dated December 8, 1774, stating "This country is now in open rebellion; but we have not yet come to the last act, that of fighting."[78]

With war a real possibility, the conspiracy all that more apparent, Americans during the summer of 1774 began preparing for armed conflict. The Continental Congress, in mid-September, endorsed the Suffolk Resolves,

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[76]Joseph Warren to Arthur Lee, February 20, 1775, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 418.

[77]Joseph Reed to Mr. DeBerdt, September 26, 1774, Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:81; Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, [February 3, 1775], Butterfield, AFC, 1:183; William Eddis to ?, March 13, 1775, Aubrey C. Land, ed., Letters from America: William Eddis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 100; Extract of a letter from Boston, November 8, 1774, in The London Chronicle, January 12, 1775, cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard, ed., Letters on the American Revolution, 1774-1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), p. 6.

[78]Ibid., p. 6.

which suggested Americans begin military preparations, and at Richard Henry Lee's urging, on the third of October, recommended the individual colonies attend to the organization and discipline of their militia. Even if war did not take place, it was argued, a disciplined militia was needed to quell the domestic convulsions which grew with intensity and number during the fall and winter of 1774 and 1775.[79]

Many colonies and individuals, congressional endorsement notwithstanding, began turning their attention to military preparations particularly with respect to forming independent military organizations, as well as organizing and/or disciplining their militia. During the late fall of 1774 and throughout the winter most colonial provincial conventions and congresses encouraged and made preparations for war.[80] Even where the provincial bodies did not formally encourage military preparations, such

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[79]Ford, JCC, 1:31-36; 39, 53-54, 54n.; John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 7, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:165.

[80]The Newport Mercury, November 7, 1774; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:262-264; Schreevan, Revolutionary Virginia, 2:374-375; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 33, 41, 71; Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War: A Compilation from the Archives, 17 vols. (Boston: State Printer, 1896-1908), 1:x-xii; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 1:1031-1033, 1118, 1182; Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the American Revolution 1766-1775, p. 178.

preparations took place, as militia units began improving themselves and independent military bodies were formed.[81]

These military preparations reinforced ministerial and Tory beliefs that the radical Whig leaders desired a

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[81]The Pennsylvania Journal, and Weekly Advertiser, December 28, 1774; ibid., March 29, 1775; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 74-75; Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776. Publications of the University of Pennsylvania Series in History, no. 1 (Boston: Ginn and Company for the University of Pennsylvania, 1901), pp. 210-212; William P. Clarks, Official History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania from the Earliest Period of Record to the Present Time (Philadelphia: Charles J. Hendler, 1909), pp. 83, 91-92; Graydon, Memoirs, pp. 122-123, 122n.; Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," PMHB 79, no. 1 (January 1945): 15; W. A. Dorland, "The Second Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry," ibid., 45, no. 3 (1921): 259; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth, pp. 66, 106-107, 117, 131; Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:251-252; Richard Cecil Garlick, Jr., Philip Mazzei, Friend of Jefferson: His Life and Letters, The Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages, extra vol. 7 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), p. 42; Howard R. Marraro, trans., Memoirs of the Life and Peregrinations of the Florentine Philip Mazzei: 1730-1816 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 209; Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 1:210-211, 229-232; The Maryland Gazette, December 22, 1774; ibid., January 5, 12, 19, 1775; "The Baltimore Independent Cadets," MHM 4, No. 4 (December 1909): 372-374; A. A. Gunby, Colonel John Gunby of the Maryland Line: Being Some Account of his Contribution to American Liberty (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Company, 1902), p. 27; Mary Carson Darlington, Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier (Pittsburgh: J. R. Weldin and Company 1892), p. 201; J. G. Rosengarten, The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1886), pp. 13, 33; William Eddis to ?, March 13, 1775, Aubrey C. Land, ed., Letters from America: William Eddis, p. 100; Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 40; Frank Greene Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. 10, no. 2 (New York: Macmillan Company for Columbia University), p. 56n.2; William Staples, Annals of the Town of Providence, From Its First Settlement, to the Organization

military solution and, therefore, they must be stopped before a full-scale revolutionary war began. On April 16, 1775, Gage received a letter from Lord Dartmouth telling him to act decisively with the "rebels." Gage interpreted this to mean he was authorized to seize the main colonial military stores at Concord, as well as prominent radical Whigs, such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams.[82] Therefore, on the nineteenth of April, Gage marched a large portion of his army to Concord. At Lexington they were greeted by the militia, who sttod their ground before them. Shots were fired, men fell dead in greater numbers than had in the streets of Boston five years previously. It was not a massacre, it was war; the American Revolution which had begun in the minds of many Americans during the 1760s as they came to believe the British ministry was conspiring to undermine their liberties and properties, became now a war for the preservation of their lives, liberties, and properties, and eventually, their independence.

Joseph Warren, by the evening of the nineteenth, in his capacity as head of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, with the assistance of General William Heath, was

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of the City Government, in June, 1832 (Providence: Knowles and Vose, 1843), pp. 248-249; Paul Francis Gleeson, "The Newport Light Infantry," RIHSC, 33, no. 1 (January 1940): 1.

[82]John R. Alden, "Why the March to Concord?" AHR 69, no. 3 (April 1944): 446-454.

attempting to give direction to what was a chaotic situation, as thousands of militia poured into eastern Massachusetts.[83]

By the evening of the twentieth, approximately twenty thousand militia had formed themselves into a loose chain around Boston. Not all these men were under control of military or civilian leaders, as they had simply appeared on the scene in small groups or as individuals. The Committee of Safety compounded this problem that evening by calling on towns to send more men, not specifying particular units. On the twenty-first, realizing the need to organize and control the military force in Massachusetts, the Committee of Safety formally created an army of eight thousand Massachusetts militia to serve until the end of the year. On the twenty-second, the Provincial Congress resolved that a voluntary army of almost twenty thousand be raised to serve until December, and the next day, the Provincial Congress decided a combined colonial force of thirty thousand would be needed. Joseph Warren, who was already in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Safety, attempting to give direction to the assembled military forces, was on the twenty-second, elected President of the Provincial Congress. To assist him, Generals Ward and Thomas were

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[83]Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), p. 48.

named senior major generals. A month later, Artemas Ward was appointed commander-in-chief of the assembled colonial forces, and during mid-June, Massachusetts appointed three more major generals, John Whitcomb, Joseph Frye, and Joseph Warren, to assist in controlling the military forces.[84]

The other New England colonies during late April and May responded to Massachusetts' call for assistance. Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire sent twenty-three thousand soldiers, under the capable direction of Nathanael Greene, Joseph Spencer, Israel Putnam, and John Stark, to the seige of Boston.[85]

This enthusiasm and support was not confined to New England. A martial spirit, which had risen during the winter, increased in intensity throughout the colonies, with the result of thousands rushing to arms.[86]

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[84]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 148, 520; Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 27; Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 468; John Cary, Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, Patriot (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 187; Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War, 1:xiv; Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution, pp. 72, 73.

[85]Ibid., pp. 77-78, 77n.5; Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution, p. 27.

[86]John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 29, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:207; John Adams to Issac Smith, Jr., June 7, 1775, ibid., 213; John Adams to William Tudor, July 6, 1775, William Tudor Papers, MHS; Robert Hooper, Jr. and Reuben Haines to John Lowdon, August 13, 1775, in Charles Henry

Another result of this martial spirit was several unwanted armed confrontations. In New York City, for example, in June, when the Royal Irish Regiment was attempting peacefully to leave the city, Marinus Willett and an armed mob stopped them and carried off their supplies and arms, maintaining the city committee's permission for them to leave peacefully did not include the removal of their arms. Earlier Willett, John Lamb, and Isaac Sears had a mob break open the city's arsenal without proper authorization. A similar incident occurred in Connecticut, where, at New Haven, late in April, Benedict Arnold, at the head of the Second Company of the Governor's Guard, forced the city's selectmen to turn over the city's powder and ball to him, or else have it taken by force. In Virginia, during April, the militia took matters into their own hands and attempted to force the issue of the Governor's authority

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Hart, "Colonel Robert Lettis Hooper: Deputy Quarter Master General in the Continental Army and Vice President of New Jersey," PMHB 36, no. 1 (1912): 66; Benjamin Rush to Thomas Ruston, October 29, 1775, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:91; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 16; David Ramsey, The History of the American Revolution, 2 vols. (Trenton: James J. Wilson, 1811), 1:253; Report by M. Bonvouloir in Philadelphia, December 28, 1775, Durand, New Materials for the History of the American Revolution, pp. 2, 9; George Gilmer to Thomas Jefferson, [1775], "Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778, of George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle County, Va.," VHSC, new series, 6:103; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston, May 11, 1775, Saunders, NCCR, 9:1246.

over the colony. They were persuaded from the use of arms at the last moment by the intervention of Edmund Pendleton and other Whig leaders.[87]

These military related activities frightened many, if not most, colonists who hoped for a peaceful resolution of their grievances. "Why raise a military spirit," asked one prominent Tory, "that may furnish unmanageable adventurers on this side of the water unfriendly to a province in which you and I have something else to lose?"[88] The North-Carolina Gazette on the twelfth of May raised a question that was frequently asked when it stated "The 'Sword is now drawn' and God knows when it will be sheathed." In Massachusetts, where thousands of armed men

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[87]Malcolm Decker, Brink of Revolution: New York in Crisis 1765-1776 (New York: Argosy Antiquarian, 1964), pp. 192-193; "Colonel Marinus Willett's Narrative," in [Henry B. Dawson, intro.], New York City During the American Revolution. Being a Collection of Original Papers (Now First Published) from the Manuscripts in the Possession of the Mercantile Library Association, of New York City (n.p.: Privately Printed for the Association, 1861), pp. 53-65; Decker, Benedict Arnold, pp. 45-46; Wallace, Traitorous Hero, pp. 36-37; G. H. Hollister, The History of Connecticut from the First Settlement of the Colony to the Adoption of the Present Constitution, 2 vols. (New Haven: Durrie and Peck, 1855), 2:165n.; The Virginia Gazette (Purdie), April 23, 1775, supplement; Edmund Pendleton to George Washington, April 21, 1775, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:102.

[88]William Smith to Philip Schuyler, May 16, 1775, Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York 1773-1777 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), p. 174.

from various colonies had gathered, Whig leaders were quite concerned about military-civilian confrontations and about the possibility of a Cromwell rising from out of the ranks. Samuel Adams was most concerned, primarily because his colony was the seat of war. From Philadelphia he reminded one Massachusetts Whig leader that "It is always dangerous to the liberties of the people to have an army stationed among them, over which they have not control." "History," he observed, "affords abundant instances of established armies making themselves the masters of those countries, which they were designed to protect." Most Massachusetts Whig leaders shared Adams's concerns, especially because so many of the troops in their colony were not under their control, and because the army, "if it deserved the name," according to John Trumbull, "was an assemblage of brave enthusiastic, undisciplined country lads," with "officers in general quite as ignorant of military life as the troops."[89]

So as to get a better hold on the military forces in their colony, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on May 15, 1775, ordered that a committee be appointed to

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[89]Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:230; John Trumbull, Autobiography, Reminiscenses and Letters of John Trumbull, from 1756 to 1841 (New York and London: Wiley and Putnam, 1841), p. 18.

prepare an application to the Continental Congress desiring that body to take some measure for "directing and regulating the American forces." The following day their report to that effect was adopted, and an appeal was formally made to Congress requesting they assume responsibility for the control and direction of the army gathered around Boston. In making this appeal, Joseph Warren reminded Congress of the various reasons for the necessity of such a measure, stating "as the sword should, in all free States, be subservient to the civil powers; and as it is the duty of the Magistrates to support it for the people's necessary defense, we tremble at having an Army (although consisting of our own countrymen) established here, without a civil power to provide for and control them." Ten days later, in a personal appeal to a member of Congress, he wrote that "unless some authority sufficient to restrain the irregularities of this army is established, we shall very soon find ourselves involved in greater difficulties than you can well imagine."[90]

Congress, receiving Massachusetts' appeal on the second of June, did not immediately act upon it, as other

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[90]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 224; Joseph Warren to the Continental Congress, May 16, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:621; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams, May 26, 1775, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 495.

questions regarding the war itself had to be answered first. On the fourteenth, Congress authorized the first Continental troops: ten companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, who were to serve one year. Ethan Allen and Seth Warner, representing Vermont's Green Mountain Boys, appeared before Congress later in June and, although that body did not adopt them as a separate Continental unit, nor endorse their plan for an invasion of Canada, recommended to the New York Convention that these troops be employed by them under officers of their own choosing. As Congress was now taking an active role in directing military affairs, it was suggested they remove themselves from Philadelphia to Boston to give immediate direction and control to the military forces there. Realizing this was neither practical nor necessary, Congress rejected the suggestion. They did, however, on the fifteenth of June, resolve to appoint a commander-in-chief of the Continental forces, who would take direct control of the Continental Army.[91]

Because the main body of the army apparently was to be in Massachusetts at the seige of Boston, most New England delegates to Congress preferred a New Englander

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[91]Ford, JCC, 2:76, 89, 91, 104, 105; Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:139-140; James Benjamin Wilbur, Ira Allen: Founder of Vermont 1751-1814. 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 1:65-67.

be appointed commander-in-chief. Their first choice was Connecticut's Israel Putnam, a well-known veteran of the French and Indian War and currently active at the seige of Boston. Another New Englander considered a likely candidate, if by no one other than himself, was John Hancock. Philip Schuyler of New York, who, like George Washington of Virginia, served on all four military committees of Congress during May and June, was considered by many northerners as a good choice.[92]

Not all New Englanders were so narrow in their provincial loyalties that they could not conceive of appointing a southerner commander-in-chief of a mostly northern based and soldiered army. Elbridge Gerry, Joseph Warren, and James Warren, realizing the importance of demonstrating that the colonies were indeed bound by the same cause, agreed they could accept a non-New Englander, such as the professional soldier Charles Lee, or George Washington, a southerner with military experience.[93] Lee, the preceding year, had been, with Israel Putnam, named one of the two "greatest military characters of the present

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[92]Ford, JCC, 2:53, 79-80, 90.

[93]James Warren to John Adams, May 7, 1775, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 47; Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts Delegates to Congress, June 4, 1775, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:79.

age."[94] Thus, by mid June when a vote was taken for the commanding general, three men stood the highest in the estimation of the delegates. They were: Washington, Lee, and Putnam.

Putnam, though thought of highly by many delegates, suffered in their estimation because at age fifty-seven he was considered too old for active campaigning. Additionally, Putnam suffered because of his lack of presence in Philadelphia where he would be able to lobby personally, as Lee and Washington were able to do. Lee, a pensioned British officer, was generally liked by most of the delegates. However, many considered him too politically radical to be trusted with command of a revolutionary army. Another factor hindering Lee's chances of selection for the top post was the fact he was not a native. Nevertheless, Lee made certain his presence was felt by the delegates, as he frequently drilled regiments of Pennsylvania militia.[95] As the time approached for voting, it appeared that Washington had the fewest disadvantages, and most probably, the greatest advantages.

Washington was known to many of the delegates, in one of his numerous roles in colonial society, such as

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[94] The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, August 22, 1774.

[95] George Cuthbert to John Dalling [1776], "Notes and Documents," PMHB 64, no. 2 (April 1942): 209.

soldier, squire, planter, legislator, and member of the First Continental Congress. One of his early champions, Benjamin Rush, when Congress met, quickly made certain that more was known about him, by having reprinted in Philadelphia's newspapers, part of the Reverend Samuel Davies's 1755 sermon which predicted the then Virginia militia major Washington would serve his country substantially in the future. To demonstrate his willingness to serve in a military capacity, Washington attended every session of Congress in his militia uniform. Additionally, he was placed on all four military committees appointed during April and May.[96] At forty-three, Washington was just the right age, neither too old for field duty, nor young enough to be foolish. He seemed perfectly mature enough for the responsibility that must surely be that of the man selected to command the colonial military forces. He was modest, discreet, amiable, virtuous, and as a Connecticut delegate observed, "Sober, steady, and Calm." Being a southerner was an important consideration for the southern delegates who preferred one of their own, as well as some

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[96]David Freeman Hawke, Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970), p. 130; John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 29, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:207; Ford, JCC, 2:53, 78-80, 90.

northern delegates, who desired to demonstrate the cause of New England was the cause of all America.[97]

Washington's name was the only one offered in nomination, and he was unanimously elected.[98] The following day, the sixteenth of June, having been officially informed of his selection, Washington appeared before Congress and told them he did not want the five hundred dollars a month salary that had been voted him, as he did not wish to profit from the cause of liberty. He asked and received, however, the promise he would be reimbursed for his expenses, which he would present at the termination of hostilities.[99]

After the selection of Washington, Congress proceeded to the selection of his major subordinates. Although some desired Charles Lee to be his chief deputy, it was believed that a New Englander should have second place. But instead of selecting Putnam, Artemas Ward,

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[97]Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, June 17, 1775, Joseph Trumbull Papers, vol. 1, CSL; see also John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11[-17], 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:215; John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:358-359; John Adams to Benjamin Rush, March 19, 1812, John A Schutz and Douglas Adair, eds., The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813 (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1966), pp. 211-212.

[98]Ford, JCC, 2:90.

[99]Acceptance of Appointment as General and Commander in Chief, [June 16, 1775], Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:292-293.

then commanding the troops at the seige of Boston, was chosen. Charles Lee, because of his experience, was given the third spot. Putnam was chosen next, because Connecticut had supplied so many soldiers and Philip Schuyler was chosen fifth to stimulate a patriotic spirit in New York.[100]

On the twenty-second of June, eight brigadier generals were selected. Seven of them were from New England, and the eighth, Richard Montgomery, was from New York. Horatio Gates, a retired British major on half pay, and a resident of Virginia, was selected Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier general.[101]

Although only Gates, Lee, and Montgomery could actually be called veterans, John Adams wrote his wife that "Our Army will have a Group of Officers, equal to any service." She responded a month later from Braintree that the appointments of Washington and Lee gave universal satisfaction. Another Braintree resident reported that everybody applauded the appointment of Washington.[102]

On the twentieth of June, Washington was directed by Congress to enforce discipline, to retain as Continental

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[100]Ford, JCC, 2:97, 99.

[101]Ibid., 103, 97.

[102]John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 18, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:224; Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 16, 1775, ibid., 246; John Thaxter to John Adams, June 27, 1775, ibid., 234.

troops those soldiers that had already enlisted, and authorized him to increase his army to a number not exceeding twice the size of the enemy.[103] The army was now under some direction and control. Congress and the colonies now turned their time and attention to the direction and form of governments.

Besides voicing their concern about an unchecked military force in their midst and a desire for continental control and direction of the military forces in their colony, the Massachusetts Whigs also expressed their concern about the collapse of the hitherto legitimate governmental authority. This concern was not exclusively that of Massachusetts, as it was voiced throughout the colonies, for it was all too well known from the Whig understanding of history, that in the confusion accompanying revolutions, mobs and the military often gained the upper hand and established their own forms of tyranny over life, liberty, and property. It was partially because of these fears and the desire to keep the colonial protest moderate during 1774 and 1775, that the leading Whigs attempted to control the protest by directing it by and through the committees, conventions, and provincial congresses. Although these bodies were of an indefinite tenure, vague in their authority, and irregular in their mode of functioning, they

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[103] Ford, JCC, 2:100.

represented, for the Whigs at least, a responsible means of controlling and directing their protest. War, however, necessitated strengthening these revolutionary bodies so as to prevent a governmental vacuum. Therefore, there was great interest expressed in legitimizing the revolutionary authorities in their assembled bodies. It must be remembered that the Whigs saw government as the ultimate guarantee of social order, which was something they, for the most part, desired to remain unchanged; and believed that liberty could only prevail within the context of stable political institutions. Liberty, their desired goal, required order; order, law; and law, government. Government, legitimate and stable, therefore, was the key to not only waging a successful war with Great Britain, but also preventing domestic anarchy and military tyranny.

Domestic anarchy and military tyranny were indeed great concerns to most American Whigs during the early stages of the war, particularly with respect to the need for establishing legitimate governments. John McKesson, of New York, worried that unless the New York government began properly to function, the mob would direct matters "at their pleasure," and that happening would induce the Continental Congress "to put the Colony under military government, directed by a Major-General and an army." Another New Yorker expressed similar fears. "I fear Liberty," wrote Alexander McDougall, "is in danger from

the licentiousness of the people on the one Hand, and the army on the other." "The former," he believed, "feel their own Liberty in the extreme, and we are too fond from our Zeal to encourage the latter, for the advancement of the Public Safety, to connive at many undue exertions of their Power, which may in the end be fatal to us."[104]

Even more than the fear of military tyranny early in the war, was the fear of anarchy; a fear that had been ever present from the first colonial protests of the early 1760s. It is not surprising then to find many Whig leaders calling for the establishment of stable and legitimate governments as a means of limiting the possibility of anarchy taking place.[105] "The great necessity of going into matters of government as soon as possible," according to John Langdon, was to do so "before the people's minds are too much poisoned with that levelling spirit, and while subordinating to the Powers that Rule (more especially as

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[104]John McKesson to Deputies of New York Albany, Dutchess, Westchester, Ulster and Suffolk, December 1, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1755; Alexander McDougall to John Jay, March 20, 1776, Morris, John Jay, p. 237.

[105]John Jay to Alexander McDougall, April 11, 1776, ibid., p. 254; Caesar Rodney to John Haslet[?], May 17, 1776, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, pp. 79-80; Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York, 1774-1777, p. 140.

it's of the people themselves) is put in their minds."[106] In New York, "A Free Citizen" in the Constitutional Gazette on April 24, 1776, stated is government was not firmly established the "ungovernable fury of a mob" would be unleashed upon them. Several weeks earlier, John Adams wrote General Heath that "Government must be assumed or anarchy reign, and God knows the consequences."[107]

The consequences, as was earlier mentioned, was the fear that eventually the military would be forced to do that which the civil government was originally designed for and therefore result in the loss of liberty by all Americans, much as it had happened in England the previous century under Cromwell and the Major-Generals. This belief was constantly stated between 1774 and 1776.[108]

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[106]John Langdon to Josiah Bartlett, June 24, 1776, in "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection," HM 6, no. 8 (August 1862): 240; for similar view see James Daune to Robert Livingston, Jr., June 7, 1775, Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York, 1773-1777, p. 174.

[107]John Adams to William Heath, April 15, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:10.

[108]"A Free Citizen," Constitutional Gazette, April 24, 1776; Caesar Rodney to John Haslet[?], May 17, 1776, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 80; Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, May 1, 1776, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:176; Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" in Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 2 vols. (New York: Citadel Press, 1945), 1:36-37; Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York, 10 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933-1937), 3:265.

Probably the colony most concerned about forming a government was Massachusetts, whose leaders were anxious about being occupied by an army not completely of their own making, as well as being concerned about the potential for mob violence. Besides appealing to Congress in May to assume control and direction of the army, the Provincial Congress asked Congress what type of government they should establish. Congress debated the question of forming governments for a week before recommending on June 9, 1775, that Massachusetts adopt a provincial assembly and council based on their old colonial charter. Acting upon this recommendation, Massachusetts, during July, adopted such a government.[109] New Hampshire and South Carolina also asked Congress for advice, and were told during the first week in November to go ahead and establish a form of government suitable to the people of their respective colonies.[110] Because of the concern expressed during the winter of 1775-1776 by the other colonies about their respective forms of governments, Congress, after long debate, on May 10, 1776, told the

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[109] Ford, JCC, 2:76-78, 83-84; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 230, 359.

[110] Meshech Weare to the Continental Congress, July 8, 1775, Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 7:561; Josiah Bartlett and John Langdon to Matthew Thornton, November 3, 1775, ibid., 641; Ford, JCC, 3:298, 307, 319, 326-327.

provincial governments that where government was insufficient to exigencies of affairs, they were to adopt such governments "best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and America in general." A preamble, penned by John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard Henry Lee, explained the resolution was necessary for the "preservation of internal peace, virtue, and good order, as well as for the defence of their lives, liberties, and properties."[111]

With congressional approval for government forming in May and a declaration of independence proclaimed in July, Whig leaders eagerly turned their energies and attention to forming new governments. The first task in each colony was the agreement upon a constitution or acceptance of the existing colonial charter, for by doing so they would legitimatize the governments which would give direction and control to the war effort. The desire to form governments quickly under new constitutions or existing charters was not unanimous amongst the Whig leaders, for some believed that since the war would be either won or lost on the battlefield, their energies could better be directed to the use of the sword rather than the pen.[112] When Robert Morris

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[111] Ibid., 4:342, 357-358.

[112] Speech of William Livingston of New Jersey before the New Jersey Council and Assembly at Princeton on September 11, 1776, as reported in The Pennsylvania Gazette,

learned that the Maryland delegates to Congress returned to their colony to help draft a constitution, he wrote Gates that all America seemed to be much too caught up in constitution making, calling it the fruit of a premature declaration. "We are disputing about liberties, Priviledges, Posts, and places, at the very time we ought to have nothing in View but the securing those objects and placing them on a footing as to make them worth contending for amongst ourselves hereafter."[113] Most Whigs, however, believed that formally forming governments would not only help prevent anarchy and military tyranny, but would enable them to better direct military affairs, thereby enhancing the chances of winning the war. "Nothing will tend more to Endure Success in the prosecution of the War," argued Caesar Rodney, for "there is nothing so conducive [to] . . . War, as a well Regulated Government."[114] Therefore, many colonies proceeded to establish governments on sure political foundations by adopting written constitutions. By the summer of 1777, ten states had adopted constitutions,

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October 1, 1776; Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, November 3, 1776, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:224.

[113]Robert Morris to Horatio Gates, October 27, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:135.

[114]Caesar Rodney to John Haslet[?], May 17, 1776, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 79.

and two had agreed to retain their colonial charters. It is somewhat ironic that the state most concerned about government forming--Massachusetts--did not adopt its constitution until 1780. During the interim it had relied on its colonial charter as the basis for its revolutionary government.

These relatively hasty fashioned constitutions, and the governments elected under them, were not, as a rule, referred to the people as a whole for approval. Although a democratic impulse had been awakened during the decade and half before the war, as many people became involved in the political arena for the first time and gained confidence in themselves to govern, most Whig leaders, with their fears of anarchy and mob rule as well as their heritage of deferential politics, were not too enthusiastic about widespread popular participation in government. The Whig leaders, even before the war, had attempted to keep all control and direction of all protest in their hands. But with the establishment of committees, conventions, and congresses during 1774 and 1775, the base of political authority and participation was greatly broadened. By the spring of 1775, at least seven thousand men had served on those bodies; thereby, as a result, giving the revolutionary

governments a good stable manpower pool from which to draw once the war began.[115]

For the most part, the Whig leaders were able to keep political power in their hands and to write constitutions and form governments under them much as they desired, despite the governmental process becoming slightly more responsive to public opinion and the geographic shift of power in some states. Government may have gone from a basis upon the King's will to that of the people, but that did not mean the people could be trusted. They were not, during the American war for independence.[116]

The constitutions for the most part were relatively conservative in nature and content. In many instances colonial charters were simply rephrased to reflect the changed political condition. Rhode Island and Connecticut did not even bother to write new constitutions, simply

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[115]Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Penn, May 20, 1774, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 1:342-343; John Adams to John Lowell, June 12, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:393; John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, ibid., 378; James Kirby Martin, Men in Rebellion, Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), pp. 10-11; Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York: New Viewpoints, Division of Franklin Watts, 1973), pp. 116-117, 22, 448-449; David Ammerman, In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774, p. 109; Gerlach, Prologue to Independence, p. 233.

[116]Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties Before the Constitution (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1974), p. 245; Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783, p. 450.

forming new governments under their existing colonial charters. Similarly, the whole legal system was held intact in several states, as colonial laws and English common law remained in force where it did not conflict with the newly framed constitutions.[117]

Just as continuity with the past was held with respect to the forms of government established under the constitutions and the laws remained basically the same, so did much of the leadership, as many of the colonial elite took positions in the new governments. Even many fundamentally conservative leaders, some of whom became Tories eventually, early in the war accepted election to the revolutionary governments on the theory that, as Governor Franklin stated, "It is, perhaps, best that Gentlemen of

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[117] Ibid., p. 212; William C. Morey, "The First State Constitutions," AAAPSS 4 (July 1893-June 1894): 201-232; William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," ibid., 9 (January-June 1897): 380-420; W. F. Dodd, "The First State Constitutional Conventions, 1776-1783," APSR 2, no. 4 (November 1908): 545-561; Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, pp. 258, 267; Dorothy Rita Dillon, The New York Triumvirate: A Study of the Legal and Political Careers of William Livingston, John Morin Scott, and William Smith, Jr., Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public-Law, no. 548 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 146; Deborah Downs, "The New Hampshire Constitution of 1776: Weathervane of Conservatism," HNH 31, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 164-175; Ethel K. Ware, A Constitutional History of Georgia, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, no. 528 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 53-54; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey (Trenton: Naar, Day and Naar, 1879), pp. 557-558.

Property and Sense should mix among these People, as they may be a means of preventing their going into some Extravagances."[118] In Delaware, for instance, the Assembly, attempting to represent both the Whig and Tory complexion of the state, selected John McKinly their first chief executive.[119] Although the upper houses did become somewhat more representative in both function and composition, the membership of most of them remained much in the hands of the elite who had held positions in the colonial governments. This was, in part, in keeping with the desire to maintain an aristocratic representation, thereby providing for a better balance in the newly established governments.[120] The other branches of government remained to a large extent in the hands of the people, or the same class of people, who had held political office before the war. It has been estimated that over 20 percent of men holding higher office during the colonial period assumed positions in the

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[118] Governor William Franklin to the Earl of Dartmouth, June 5, 1775, New Jersey Archives, 1st ser., 10:604.

[119] Thomas Rodney to Caesar Rodney, February 16, 1777, Ryden, Letters to and From Caesar Rodney, p. 128.

[120] Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783, pp. 195-197; Jackson Turner Main, The Upper House in Revolutionary America 1763-1788 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 236; James LaVerne Anderson, "The Virginia Councillors and the American Revolution: The Demise of an Aristrocratic Clique," VMHB 82, no. 1 (January 1974): 56-74.

revolutionary government. Similarly, it has been estimated that of the higher officials elected during the revolutionary war--that is, the governors, lieutenant governors, secretaries, treasurers, attorney generals, judges of superior courts, and councillors--at least 50 percent had held seats in the lower houses of the colonial governments.[121] Even in Pennsylvania, which probably had the most radical change in personnel, 30 percent of the men elected to its various bodies in 1776 had prior office-holding experience.[122]

For the most part, the change from colonial status to statehood was effected with order and regularity, as a great continuity was maintained with the past.[123] During the 1790s, Alexander Hamilton supposedly told a French visitor that "In Europe they always speak of the American Revolution, but our separation from the mother country cannot be called a revolution. There have been no changes

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[121]James Kirby Martin, Men in Rebellion, Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution, pp. 13, 14, 16, 36, 40, 52; Patrick J. Conley, "Revolution's Impact on Rhode Island," RIH 34, no. 4 (November 1975): 122.

[122]Robert Gough, "Notes on the Pennsylvania Revolutionaries of 1776," PMHB 96, no. 1 (January 1972): p. 101.

[123]David Ramsay, Ramsay's History of South Carolina from its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808, 2 vols. (Newberry, South Carolina: W. J. Duffie, 1858), 1:148.

in the laws, no one's interests have been interfered with, everyone remains in his place."[124]

Although forming governments and creating an army were of major importance in the minds of the Whig leaders, particularly as constructing each carefully would prevent anarchy and military tyranny, just as important to many was the necessity of not only keeping the government and military virtuous, but the people themselves. Virtue, meaning the willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest to the greater good of society, was widely believed by the Whigs to be the essence of the republicanism they sought to obtain.[125] "Virtue, my young Friend," John Adams wrote William Tudor, "Virtue alone is or can be the Foundation of our new governments, and it must be encouraged by Rewards, in every Department civil and military." "The only foundation of a free Constitution," he wrote a minister, "is pure

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[124]Cited in Robert B. Douglas, trans. and ed., A French Volunteer of the War of Independence [Charles Albert More, Chevalier de Pontigibaud] (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 147.

[125]John Warren, "An Oration, Delivered July 4th, 1783...in Celebration of the Anniversary of American Independence," in Gordon S. Wood, ed., The Rising Glory of America 1760-1820 (New York: George Baziller, 1971), p. 56; M.A. thesis title at Harvard: "Is Public Virtue, the Best Security of Republican Liberty?" referred to in Edward J. Young, "Subjects for Master's Degree in Harvard College from 1655-1791," PMHS 18 (1880-1881): 127; Richard Henry Lee to Colonel Martin Pickett, March 5, 1786, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 2:70.

Virtue, and if this cannot be inspired into our People, in a greater Measure than they have it now, They may change their Rulers, and the forms of Government, but they will not obtain a lasting Liberty,-they will only exchange Tyrants and tyrannies." The Reverend Samuel McClintock certainly agreed. "Virtue," he wrote a member of Congress, "is the basis of a republic." "Without it," he added, "we shall be in a worse state than if we had remained as we were." Samuel Adams, agreeing, wrote late in 1775 that "Virtue is our best Security."[126]

These beliefs about virtue were shared by just about all Whig and Tory political leaders in America, particularly the former. The revolutionary generation, well-read in classical and Whig literature, were ever conscious of the role of virtue in history, especially in Roman history, but even more so in their recent history. By the 1750s many Americans, particularly those visiting Albion, believed the government, and to a lesser extent, the people, of England had lost their virtue and had become corrupted. This belief

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[126]John Adams to William Tudor, November 14, 1775, William Tudor Papers, MHS; John Adams to Zabdiel Adams, June 21, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:21; Samuel McClintock to William Whipple, August 2, 1776, Jere R. Daniel, Experiment in Republicanism: New Hampshire Politics and the American Revolution, 1741-1794 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 123; Samuel Adams to James Warren, November 4, 1775, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:235.

grew during the 1760s and, by 1770, it was a generally held view in America that England was so corrupted that the process of the dissolution of the Constitution and the Empire had begun. The presence of the standing army in America was just another evidence of that taking place for, after all, James Burgh had told them that standing armies always grow where there is an increase in corruption and decrease of attention to liberty.[127]

Just as the Puritans one hundred and fifty years before them, Americans in 1775 to a large extent believed England had gone too far down the road of corruption, particularly because of the conspiratorial designs of its leaders, to be returned to a state of virtue. Therefore, to most Whigs it was only a matter of extricating America from the yoke of tyranny, by the most peaceful means possible. War, however, changed the peaceful means into those of military conflict. In either case, by 1774, American Whig leaders had become more concerned about

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[127] Ernest Cassara, The Enlightenment in America (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p. 170; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [ ] Bradshaw, November 21, 1775, Field, Unpublished Letters of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, p. 97; James Bowdoin to Samuel Adams, December 9, 1775, "Correspondence between Samuel Adams and James Bowdoin," PMHS 12 (1871-1873): 228; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 32; Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:343.

keeping the American people from becoming corrupted and losing their virtue, than trying to save England from herself.

John Adams in the spring of 1772, preparing notes for an oration, noted that it was an unalterable truth "that the People can never be enslaved by their own Tameness, Pusillanimity, Sloth or Corruption." "The Preservation of Liberty," he wrote, "depends upon the intellectual and moral character of the People." His young friend, as noted earlier, William Tudor, also learned this lesson. Before a Boston audience on March 5, 1779, he reminded them that before a nation is completely deprived of freedom, "she must be fitted for slavery by her vices." This view was widely held by most Americans. General Greene, for instance, noted in his journal during the summer of 1783 that morality and religion were the great pillars of good government. "Ruin the morals and corrupt the manners of any people," he wrote, "and they will soon become the fit instruments of tyranny and despotism."[128]

More was just done than talking about the need for virtue. Beginning during the summer of 1774, as conflict with England seemed all the more likely, besides often

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[128] John Adams Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:58; Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, p. 37; Nathanael Greene's Journal for September 3, 1783, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:504.

putting the debate in moral tones, efforts were made to fortify the people's virtue. The Association established by the First Continental Congress, for example, urged the colonies to adopt provisions to discourage extravagance, dissipation, and to ban such things as horse racing, gambling, billiards, dances, places, and any type of frivolity. Committees and conventions throughout the colonies complied, many having previously done so. During the winter of 1774-1775, these bans were so generally adhered to, that by the time the war began, one colonist reported Americans were under a great influence of moral rectitude. During the war itself, as will be discussed later, great interest and concern was constantly expressed about the state of the virtue of the American people. The Whig leaders knew that good government, a virtuous people, and a well-directed and controlled army were necessary for victory over both domestic and foreign enemies. It was assumed that if any of those three factors faltered, anarchy and military tyranny would result; the things they feared even more than a military defeat at the hands of the British army.[129]

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[129]Ford, JCC, 1:75-80; The Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), July 21, 1774; Saunders, NCCR 9:1025; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 17; Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 14:440; Leora McEachern and Isabel M. Williams, eds. Wilmington-New Hanover Safety Committee Minutes 1774-1776 (Wilmington: Wilmington-New Hanover County American Revolution Bi-centennial Association, 1974), pp. 13, 14, 20; Abigail Adams to John Adams, October 31, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:307.

C H A P T E R II

FEAR OF STANDING ARMIES AND FAITH IN THE MILITIA

After the initial adoption and organization of the army in Massachusetts, and the selection of the commander-in-chief and his subordinate general officers, Congress, as discussed earlier, turned its attention to the political arena. This concern about politics, however, was not long lasting nor complete, as serious questions about the army had not been sufficiently addressed or answered. For the most part, these involved the nature of the army and its length of service. Both related directly to the nature of the conflict and to the colonial fear of standing armies, even those of their own making. It was a generally accepted belief that too small a force would be defeated before the colonists had a chance to petition for redress of grievances, and too large a force had the disadvantage of making the ministry believe that the colonists were unwilling to compromise and desired a full-scale war and independence. Too large a force also had the disadvantage of making the impression on most Americans that Congress

desired a full-scale war and independence. Another important consideration concerning the size of the army was the belief held by most Americans that a large army would pose a threat to American liberty, particularly if the soldiers, long enlisted, thought of themselves as, and indeed became, professionals. Thus Congress initially decided upon a relatively small army, not to exceed twice the size of the enemy, to serve a year. The colonial governments also limited their military enlistments, in most instances to the end of 1775, in the belief, and apparent hope, that the war would be peacefully resolved by then.

Washington, by September, realizing that the war would probably not be resolved by the end of the year and that his army would soon disband on him, began urging Congress to provide for a new army before the time of enlistments of his present army expired. He preferred a sizeable army, enlisted for a long enough period so he would not constantly have to recruit and train it. However, after meeting with a committee of Congress who came to camp in October, and receiving the advice of his general officers, as well as civilian leaders who frequently visited the army, Washington agreed to the one year enlistments, accepting the arguments that it was not safe to enlist an army for a longer period, nor would it be likely he could find men who

would enlist for a longer period.[1]

Congress, after talking to the committee after its return from Washington's camp, provided in November for an army of slightly over twenty thousand, to be enlisted for one year beginning January 1, 1776.[2] Congress believed they were doing the right thing in limiting the size of the army, and its length of service for it was widely believed that a large, long enlisted army would bring with it more disadvantages than advantages.

By 1775, most Americans believed standing armies, long enlisted and not subject to proper restraints, to be a threat to liberty. They agreed with Samuel Adams that "A standing Army, however necessary it may be at sometimes, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the people" and "that standing Armies are formidable Bodies in civil Society & the Suffering them to exist at any time if from Necessity, & ought never to be of choice."[3] This attitude had developed first in England during the seventeenth century, expanded upon and codified in Whig literature during the

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[1]George Washington to Hugh Mercer, September 26, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:121.

[2]Ford, JCC, 3:321-322.

[3]Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776, in "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 197; Samuel Adams to John Scollay, April 30, 1776, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:287.

eighteenth century, and transported to America as part of the intellectual baggage.[4] Americans, by 1775, like their English kinsmen, had a long heritage of fearing standing armies and a wealth of literature upon which to draw to justify and reinforce their fears.

Fears and concerns about standing armies began in England early in the seventeenth century, as the soldiers of James I and Charles I were perceived as a serious threat to English liberties. Parliament responded to the fears and concerns by providing in the 1628 Petition of Right prohibitions against the peacetime quartering of troops in private homes and martial law trials of citizens. During the Civil War concern about standing armies increased, especially after the introduction of the New Model Army, Pride's Purge, and rule by the Major Generals. Concern about the military continued during the Restoration period. When Clarendon was impeached in 1667, the first charge levelled against him was that he desired a larger standing army. Between 1674 and 1677 Parliament adopted numerous checks against a standing army, and during the Exclusion Crisis (1678-1681) attempted to disband the army. James II's apparent interest in using the army as a tool to coerce his

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[4]"Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new Constitution, recommended by the late Convention," by Marcus [James Irdell] (Newbern, North Carolina: Hodge and Willis, 1788), in Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution, p. 363.

subjects renewed intense opposition to the standing army, especially after he had given command to Irish Catholics and diverted funds from the militia. This concern about the standing army was one of the factors causing the Glorious Revolution in 1688.[5]

This revolution was for many Americans in 1775 the central event in English history. Besides establishing Parliamentary supremacy, Parliament established the principle in the Declaration of Rights that "the raising or keeping a standing army within this kingdom in the time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament is against law." This principle was reaffirmed by Parliament in the 1689 Mutiny Act. This principle was not lost on the Americans, especially during the 1760s, as their concerns grew about a standing army in their midst.[6]

Interest in standing armies continued during the 1690s, as a whole body of anti-standing army literature flourished. Among the most notable were Sir William Temple's Observations on the United Provinces (1690) and Viscount Robert Molesworth's Account of Denmark, An Account of Denmark as it was in the year 1692 (1693). The debate,

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[5]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:355, 426; Lois G. Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!", pp. 3, 18-32, 62-63, 71-72, 95, 136, 146.

[6]Ibid., pp. 137, 147, 152.

and thus the literature, increased after peace was concluded with France in 1697 and the size of the peacetime army was decided. Between the fall of 1697 and the spring of 1699, England was engulfed by a pamphlet war on the need for and size of a standing army in peacetime.[7] John Trenchard wrote the best-known pieces against standing armies in a pamphlet, co-authored with Walter Boyle, entitled "An Argument Showing That a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government, and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy" (1697), and in his "A Short History of Standing Armies in England" (1698).

Although not as intense as during the late seventeenth century, debate continued frequently in England during the eighteenth century, producing a wealth of anti-standing army literature by Andrew Fletcher, Catherine Macaulay; Henry St. John, first Viscount Bolingbroke; William Blackstone; and James Burgh. Perhaps the best known works produced during the eighteenth century against standing armies were those by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, particularly their "Cato's Letters" which were published in The London Journal between November 5, 1720, and July 27, 1723; and Joseph Addison's play, Cato, A Tragedy (1713),

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[7] Ibid., pp. 4, 155-187; Lois G. Schwoerer, "The Literature of the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1699," HLQ 28, no. 3 (May 1965): 187-212.

which opened in America in 1749 and in book form went through fourteen editions between 1767 and 1787. Probably the best known work in America was that of James Burgh. His Political Disquisitions: or, an Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects, and Abuses. Illustrated by, and established upon Facts and Remarks, extracted from a Variety of Authors, Ancient and Modern, was published in three volumes in Philadelphia in 1775 and was frequently cited in colonial newspapers and pamphlets.[8]

It was not only from the English writers Americans developed their interest in and concern about standing armies. They also had in their possession a wealth of literature regarding the military produced by the classical writers such as Scipio and Livy. A good number of Americans were aware of the conspiracies of Tarquin and Cataline, and even more, of those of Julius Caesar, as well as of

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[8]Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!" pp. 190-196; Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:344; Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770, "Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis," MHSC, fourth series, 4 (1858): 452; H. Trevour Colburn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 24; Frederic M. Litto, "Addison's 'Cato' in the Colonies," WMQ, third series, 23, no. 3 (July 1966): 440-477; John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:351; Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776, pp. 230-231; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, "James Burgh and American Revolutionary Theory," PMHS 73 (January-December 1961): 38-57.

the fact that more than half of the Roman emperors were overthrown by the military.[9]

Americans also developed their own literature against standing armies during the eighteenth century although, for the most part, this literature relied upon the seventeenth century English Whig literature of Harrington, Coke, and Sidney, as well as that of Machiavelli.[10]

Contemporary history also played an important part in conveying Americans to the belief, expressed by Burgh, that "When a country is to be enslaved, the army is the instrument to be used."[11] The example of Sweden in 1772 being taken over by the military was well known in America.[12]

The best source Americans had to draw upon to convince them of the danger of standing armies was the British army in their midst after 1768. It was this army which convinced many Americans that England intended them

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[9]Louis B. Wright, Tradition and the Founding Fathers (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 106-116; Charles F. Mullett, "Classical Influences on the American Revolution," The Classical Journal 35, no. 2 (November 1939): 97; Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:430.

[10]Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!" p. 196.

[11]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:349.

[12]Ibid., 370.

ill-will and helped focus the constitutional debate with England.

As early as December 1766, after a temporary visit by British troops to Boston the previous month, concern was expressed about a more permanent body of troops being introduced into that, or any, metropolis. "Virtue and liberty," Samuel Adams wrote, would be threatened and the body politic would be greatly injured if indeed any army came to Boston on a permanent basis.[13]

Large numbers of British troops did come to Boston in 1768 and, by the summer of 1769, had become the source of heated debate, as they were viewed as an unnecessary evil.[14] At the time of the general election, May 31, 1769, a committee headed by James Otis remonstrated the Governor, stating the Council had declared the military unnecessary, reminding him that "the experience of ages is sufficient to convince, that the military power is ever dangerous, and

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[13]Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, December 10, 1766, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 1:112; see also Samuel Adams to Christopher Gadsden, December 11, 1766, ibid., 108-111.

[14]Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, May 11, 1769, Frederick Tuckerman, ed., "Letters of Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, 1769-1777," AHR 8, no. 2 (January 1901): 307; Same to same, July 12, 1769, ibid., 314; Notes prepared for an oration during the spring of 1772 by John Adams in his diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:58; Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule, pp. 39, 43, 47, 79.

subversive of free constitutions," and asking the fleet and soldiers be removed from their city, especially during the session of the Assembly.[15] In June, when Governor Bernard did not remove the army, the House adopted a set of resolutions declaring the establishment of a standing army in peace without their consent was "an invasion of the natural rights of the people" and its continued presence was "unconstitutional" and a "dangerous innovation, manifestly tending to enslave the people."[16] The troops nevertheless remained, suffering physical and verbal harassment throughout the winter of 1768-1769 as passions about their presence increased unabated.[17] The result was the Boston massacre of March 5, 1770.

The day after the massacre, the Boston town meeting asked Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson to remove the troops, stating they were "obnoxious to a free people and

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[15]The Massachusetts House of Representatives to Governor Francis Bernard, May 31, 1769, in Bradford, Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts 1765-1775, pp. 166-167; The House of Representatives Resolution of May 31, 1769, is in ibid., p. 168.

[16]Resolution of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, June 29, 1769, ibid., p. 178; a similar resolution was adopted on June 21, 1769, ibid., p. 174.

[17]Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, January 1, 1770, Frederick Tuckerman, ed., "Letters of Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, 1769-1777," AHR 8, no. 2 (January 1901): 314.

abhorrent to a free constitution."[18] The troops were removed, leaving behind reinforcement to the belief that living in peace with a standing army was impossible.[19] "Let it be the DETERMINED RESOLUTION of every Man," wrote 'Consideration' in The New-Hampshire Gazette on March 23, 1770, "that a standing Army shall 'never' be permitted in AMERICA, without the free consent of the House of Commons, in the province where they reside." The line over which the ministry could not cross was now drawn in the mind of many colonists. A determined resolution did indeed greet the next occupation of an American city, Boston, in 1774.

When large numbers of British troops were introduced into Boston during the summer of 1774 to enforce the Coercive Acts, a great protest was raised. The Provincial Congress quickly informed Gage of their displeasure. He must surely know, he was told, "that barely keeping a standing army in the province, in time of peace, without consent of representatives, is against law, and must be considered as a great grievance," and that their "lives,

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[18] A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), pp. 3-4.

[19] Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770, "Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis," MHSC, 4th ser., 4:452; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 376.

liberties, and properties" were greatly endangered whilst under the cannon of his standing army.[20]

The Massachusetts Whigs were not alone in protesting the occupation of Boston. Throughout the colonies many individuals and legislative bodies expressed opposition, generally reminding the ministry and its royal representatives in America that keeping a standing army in the colonies during peace, without the consent of the legislatures, was unconstitutional.[21]

Concern about standing armies did not end with the shots fired at Lexington and Concord. Two months into the war, when a negotiated settlement seemed possible, resolutions and statements regarding standing armies were incorporated into such documents as the Virginia Resolutions on Lord North's Conciliatory Proposal and the Rules and Orders of Rhode Island's Army of Observation.[22] Fears and concerns about standing armies were codified during the war in the colonial declarations of independence, constitutions

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[20]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 42-43, 43.

[21]Richard Cresswell Journal, September 16, 1774, Saunders, NCCR 9:1067; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:49; J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: L. J. Richards and Company, 1888), 1:217.

[22]Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:172; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:340.

and bills of rights, which frequently contained prohibitions on peacetime armies without the consent of the legislature.[23] Fears and concerns were also frequently expressed in wartime orations, sermons, and pamphlets, including the annual Boston Massacre orations.[24] Nor did this concern cease with war's end. Richard Henry Lee, early in 1784, discussing the possibility of a standing army during peace, wrote James Monroe that he agreed with the latter's observation that the consequence of standing armies was the termination of liberty. "It is really unfortunate for human freedom, safety, and happiness," he wrote, "that so many plausible arguments are ever at hand to support a system which both reason & experience prove to be productive of the great

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[23]Proceedings of the Convention of Delaware State Held at New-Castle on Tuesday the Twenty-Seventh of August, 1776 (Wilmington: James Adams, 1776), p. 20; Minutes of the Convention of 1776, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, third series, 10:770; Saunders, NCCR, 10:1004; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 9:856; Walton, Records of Vermont, 1:95; Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 1:288; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1941), pp. 107, 110; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, eds., The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 446; Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest Virginia, 1776-1786, Washington County 1777-1870 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1903), p. 401.

[24]Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 23, 27-34, 55; Jonas Clark, A Sermon Preached Before His Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; Governor; ... May 30, 1781. Being the First Day of General Election, ... (Boston: J. Gill and B. Edes and Sons, 1781), p. 65.

human evils-Slavery."[25] The Confederation Congress agreed with Lee, establishing in June 1784 only an eighty-man army, stating that in time of peace standing armies were inconsistent with principles of republican government, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism.[26]

The revolutionary generation continued the debate on the necessity of standing armies during the 1780s and 1790s before finally resolving in 1796 to rely henceforth on the militia, the bulwark of the republic. This policy would remain in force, during peacetime at least, until the twentieth century. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, as well as at its drafting, the size and role of the military were carefully scrutinized and the resulting debate produced numerous proposed amendments as many ratifying conventions and individuals believed the military should be more carefully checked.[27] Standing

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[25]Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5, 1784, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:287.

[26]Ford, JCC, 26:524, 538-540, 551-553.

[27]Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, 1:328, 336; 2:545, 552; 3:112, 379, 380, 381, 401, 588, 611, 660; 4:244; Luther Martin to the Maryland Legislature, January 27, 1788, ibid., 1:371; Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 2:329, 640; Richard Henry Lee to George Mason, October 1, 1787, Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 3:998; Richard Henry Lee to William Shippen, Jr., October 3, 1787, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:442n.; "Brutus" in The New-York

armies, "Brutus" wrote in The New-York Journal, and Weekly Register on January 17, 1788, were dangerous to the liberties of the people, "but I presume it would be useless to enter into a labored argument, to prove to the people of America, a position which has so long and so generally been received by them as a kind of axiom."

A major part of the axiom was that if standing armies were to exist, they be enlisted for only a short period.[28] American Whigs, for the most part, in 1775 were

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Journal, and Weekly Register, January 10, 1788; "Federalist #41," by James Madison, Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist [by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton] (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 271; "The Objections of the Hon. George Mason to the proposed Federal Constitution. Address to the Citizens of Virginia." A broadside printed by Thomas Nicholas, n.d., in Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution, p. 331; "An Examination into the leading principles of the Federal Convention proposed by the late Convention held at Philadelphia. With Answers to the principal objections that have been raised against the system. By a citizen of America" (Philadelphia: Prichard and Hall, 1787), in ibid., p. 52; "Observations On the new Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot," (Boston: n.p., 1788), in ibid., p. 10.

[28]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:344; Robert Morris to George Washington, December 23, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:186; Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, July 17, 1776, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:208; March 4, 1782, Boston massacre oration by George Richards Minot in Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, p. 55; "Hints for the consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such others of the Hon[ora]ble Congress as he Shall judge proper to advise with thereon," by Joseph Hawley, [January 1776], Paul Fullman and George M. Elsey, intro., Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 34 (1937-1942): 401; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth, pp. 141, 143.

convinced their safety rested in an army enlisted for a limited period, generally meaning one year. Two decades after the war David Humphreys, reflecting on this limited enlistment period, wrote that the "honest, but unexperienced rulers, were so much more alarmed at the very name of a standing army to be raised from their own countrymen, than they were at the ravages of the enemy, as to neglect levying soldiers for the war until our cause was reduced to extreme danger."[29]

Humphrey's observation was indeed accurate, as the military were greatly hampered by limited enlistments early in the war.[30] Montgomery's unsuccessful attack on Quebec was unadvisedly attempted on the night of December 31, 1775, simply because his army's term of enlistment was up the next day.[31] Washington and the other generals complained about Montgomery's defeat and the fact that their own army, in the middle of a seige, would be soon disbanding, stating

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[29]David Humphreys to Governor Trumbull, September 23, 1803, David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of David Humphreys (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1804), p. 362.

[30]Pierce Butler to [Arthur Middleton?], March 21, 1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 140.

[31]Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, December 5, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:188-190; George Washington to President of the Continental Congress, February 9, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:315.

they knew of no other example in history of such a thing happening.[32] Washington also complained that short enlistments were hurting his attempts to discipline his army, which in turn hampered any attempt to take Boston or prevent defeat should the British army attack.[33]

Montgomery's defeat and Washington's complaints about the size and state of his army prompted some members of Congress to contemplate the possibility of extending the term of enlistment, or at least, making military service more attractive, thereby getting one year re-enlistments at the beginning of the year. In January 1776, the subject of enlistments was raised in Congress, with the suggestion of three years or for the war enlistments being made. The northern colonies, adamantly opposing either suggestion, caused the debate on enlistments to be curtailed. But debate on the pressing subject of enlistment could not be put off for long, and in late February in was renewed with vigor. Some delegates wanted an army enlisted for the war; others for a year; still others for a limited period, generally set at three years. John Adams was not opposed

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[32] Same to same, January 4, 1776, ibid., 208; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, Box 1, WLCL.

[33] George Washington to Joseph Reed, February 1, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:300; George Washington to President of the Continental Congress, ibid., 316.

to some soldiers being enlisted for the war, but did not believe the whole army should be. Roger Sherman was opposed to any soldiers being enlisted for the war, believing it not only dangerous, but putting those enlisted into a state of slavery. James Wilson, realizing that compromise was needed, suggested the least dangerous system be adopted, which he stated to be the fixing of the number of men needed for each campaign be enlisted only, and only for that campaign.[34] This debate produced no system, as no agreement could be reached among the delegates as to the safest means of enlisting their army. Learning that no decision had been made, and quite disappointed about Congress's apparent lack of backing the military in their needs, Charles Lee wrote Washington that the New England delegates believed that "by means of a shorter engagement the whole country would be soldiers. A curious whim this. Who the d-l can fill their heads with such nonsense?" He suggested Washington impress upon Congress the absolute necessity for longer enlistments.[35]

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[34]Richard Smith Diary, January 19, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:319; James Duane, Notes on Debates, February 22, 1776, ibid., 360-361; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:371, 388.

[35]Charles Lee to George Washington, February 29, 1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:158; cf. John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 46.

Washington had no immediate reason to make such a request, because in mid March the British evacuated Boston, and the need for a large, long enlisted army disappeared. This situation was short-lived, however, as a large British army arrived off New York late in June and American forces in Canada were forced to retreat. Interest in the state of the army was thus renewed both in and out of Congress, as many believed that the war was to be prolonged and therefore a large, long enlisted army would be needed. This became even more necessary once the resolution for independence had been introduced in Congress in June and declared in July. Debate was renewed on the enlistment question, and late in June Congress agreed to offering a bounty of ten dollars to induce men to enlist, and provided for a three year enlistment. Congress did not rely completely on longer enlistments to improve America's military capacity, deciding earlier in June that temporary troops could be raised for limited periods to meet emergencies. Thus, a ten thousand man "Flying Camp" was authorized by Congress to serve until December 1, 1776. This force, under an officer appointed by Washington, was designed to protect New Jersey and Philadelphia, while Washington and the main army remained in New York.[36]

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[36]Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, June 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:506; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, June 22, 1776, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 45; Ford, JCC, 4:412-413; 5:418, 483, 508.

On August 27, 1776, Washington's army was soundly beaten on Long Island and within weeks Manhattan fell. Enlistments waned, as the American forces retreated. A ten dollar bounty was all but meaningless as an inducement for enlistments, particularly with inflation making substantial state bounties seem all that more attractive. Washington, who had been somewhat hesitant and circumspect in his appeals to Congress for a more permanent and regular army, in September appealed for a longer enlisted army, one that could be enlisted for the war, thereby making it subject to the discipline needed to defeat the British army in what was increasingly appearing to be a protracted struggle.[37] "The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote," he wrote Congress, but for the lack of one ruin would result.[38] His general officers expressed similar beliefs, as they began their own lobbying campaigns. Mercer, who Washington appointed commander of the "Flying Camp," wrote Congress that "Enlistments for a short period is the bane of military

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[37]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:5-6; Same to same, September 24, 1776, ibid., 109; George Washington to Philip Schuyler, September 4, 1776, ibid., 11; George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776, ibid., 137.

[38]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, ibid., 112.

service," maintaining that "numbers and discipline must prevail." Heath wrote one member of Congress that victory would only happen when America had a regularly enlisted and disciplined army, which, he stated, could not be achieved as long as Congress and the states relied upon the militia and short enlistments. Similarly, Greene argued that with an army engaged for the war, disciplined, and properly officered, "everything is to be expected."[39]

Many members of Congress sympathized with the plight of the generals, particularly after the report of a committee of Congress placed the blame of the Canadian setback on short enlistments, and as Washington retreated before the enemy, with his force diminishing in size on a daily basis.[40] Yet, John Adams reported that Congress, because of the fear many members had of a large, long enlisted standing army, would not provide for a large, well-disciplined, long-enlisted, and well-compensated army; at least not at the

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[39]Hugh Mercer to the Continental Congress, Sepgember 4, 1776, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:158; William Heath to John Adams, July 20, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:11; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene [?], September 28, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:303.

[40]Ford, JCC, 5:617.

present time.[41] Adams underestimated, somewhat, the willingness of his fellow congressmen to compromise their principles and fears to practical realities, especially after the declaration of independence. Treason, after all, was punishable by death. Thus, during the late summer of 1776 more delegates were willing to accept, and in some cases demand, that Congress adopt three years or for the war enlistments, with proper inducements to assist recruiting.[42] One delegate, shortly after learning of the Long Island defeat, explained that it might have been a good and proper idea at the beginning of the war to have had long enlistments, but they did not because they had no money, provisions, nor government. Now they had all three, and it was, he suggested, necessary to have a long-enlisted army.[43] Noticing the change of attitudes of his fellow delegates, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph Trumbull that

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[41]John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 46; John Adams to William Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:14-15; John Adams to Henry Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:61.

[42]North Carolina Delegates of the Continental Congress to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 10, 1776, Saunders, NCCR, 10:740; Arthur Middleton to William H. Drayton, September 14, 1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton: Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 144.

[43]Josiah Bartlett to [Nathaniel?] Folsom, September 2, 1776, "Declaration of Independence," HM, 2d ser., 5, no. 5 (November 1868): 213.

"Congress seems now determined to have an Army of some Duration and to give sufficient Bounties for the purpose; I wish it had been sooner acceeded to, but We must move with the Waters."[44]

Early in September, a committee of the whole suggested raising ninety regiments for a five year period unless sooner discharged by Congress.[45] One delegate, believing this necessary, wrote the Governor of his state that "the liberties of the country . . . cannot be established but by a large standing army." Another wrote his Governor that "a powerful army of regular troops must be obtained, or all will be lost."[46] After two weeks of debate, Congress on September 16, 1776, decided to raise eighty-eight battalions to serve for the war.[47] The President of Congress, in a circular letter to the states, explained this

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[44]Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, September 12, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:84.

[45]Josiah Bartlett to William Whipple, September [ ], 1776, [Alfred Langdon Elwyn], Letters by Josiah Bartlett, William Whipple, and Others. Written Before and During the Revolution (Philadelphia: Henry B. Ashmead, 1889), p. 44.

[46]William Ellery to [Nicholas Cooke], September 7, 1776, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 84; Richard Henry Lee to Governor Patrick Henry, September 15, 1776, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:215.

[47]Ford, JCC, 5:762; Robert Morris to George Washington, March 5, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:348.

decision, stating that "Without a well disciplined Army, we can never expect success against veteran Troops; and it is totally impossible we should have a well disciplined Army, unless our Troops are engaged to serve during the war."[48]

Before this enlistment policy could be implemented, Forts Washington and Lee were captured and Washington's army suffered defeat at White Plains. Morale declined and with it, so did recruits, despite the encouragements and efforts by Congress, the States, and individuals to spur men to the colors.[49] Also hampering enlistments was the bounty war waged between Continental and state recruiters. The state recruiters had a decisive advantage, as they were able to offer higher bounties for less time in service than their Continental counterparts. Additionally, Congress had cut the avenue off for those who desired to enter the Continental Army for a short time, when they only provided for the war enlistments. To ameliorate this latter difficulty, Congress offered an option of a three year enlistment,

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[48]President John Hancock to the Several States (Circular), September 24, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:99.

[49]John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 8, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:140; President John Hancock to the Rhode Island General Assembly, October 9, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:31, 32; Nicholas Cooke to William Ellery, November 30, 1776, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 102.

with all the benefits earlier offered except the one hundred acres of land.[50] The other difficulty, that of the bounty war, was not subject to such quick solution, as the states were adamant in their desires to protect themselves first before concerning themselves with the safety of the continent as a whole.

The states, besides maintaining a regular militia establishment, also raised what were known as State Troops. These soldiers were generally raised to defend the state where they were raised. They were paid and equipped by the states; engaged for full-time service for a fixed period of time, ranging from three months to three years, depending upon the state and the time during the war in which they were raised. Unlike the militia, they often received a bounty for their service; and they took orders from the state governments, not from the Continental Congress or Continental officers. Not all state troops fit this composite description, for some were not paid, but lived off plunder; some served under Continental officers; some were not required to serve full time and some served outside their state. Very few state troops, indeed, fit the description just given; but neither do they fit either the description and definition of militia or Continental soldiers. The exact number of such troops that served

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[50] Ford, JCC, 6:944-945.

during the war is unknown. However, the figure must have been considerable for many states provided for such troops as a regular part of their military establishment.[51]

While the states bolstered their own defense at the expense of the common good during 1776, Washington faced a very critical situation as the year came to a close, as his army was almost non-existent. A week before Christmas he wrote his brother that unless every nerve was strained "the game is pretty much near up."[52] He placed the blame for this state of affairs on short enlistments and the insistence of the states upon relying on the militia.[53]

Washington did more than just complain to his brother. He set about planning some sort of an offensive to catch the British off guard, thereby giving some credence to hopes of eventual victory. Additionally, he began lobbying the civilian leaders for a larger, more permanent army.

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[51]Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments and Independent Corps (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1972), pp. 117-119; Albert E. Van Dusen, Connecticut (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 150; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1883), 2:281; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 3:25; Peele, Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians, p. 63.

[52]George Washington to John Augustine Washington, December 18, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:398.

[53]Ibid., 398; George Washington to Lund Washington, December 10, [-17], 1776, ibid., 347.

He informed them that he did not lust for power but needed more troops, enlisted for the war, because short enlistments and the militia were not remedies for the critical situation in which the new states found themselves. He was joined in his lobbying by General Greene, who informed one Governor that "Short enlistments has been in a great measure the Source of all the misfortunes that we labour under." Greene realized that Congress in the beginning of the war "by attending to speculative principles rather than real life their maxims in War have been founded in folly." However, he believed that Congress "in time will be as able Politicians in military matters as they are in civ[i]l Governm[e]nt."[55]

Their complaints fell on deaf ears, particularly after Washington's successes at Trenton and Princeton, for it appeared Washington, supported by temporary forces, would be able to win the war that spring. Besides, it was frequently argued, large, long enlisted, armies were ever dangerous, and expensive. Thus, rather than taking active measures to assist Washington with his forthcoming spring

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[54]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, ibid., 402; George Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:113.

[55]Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:375.

campaign, Congress resorted to expedients, which they believed were safer and cheaper.

The major expedient was calling on the states to draft their militia to fill up the Continental battalions, something that General Lee had suggested during the fall of 1776, when the army was desperate for men. Congress in April 1777 suggested a militia draft and the following year recommended that such drafts be for nine months service. By the time Congress had made their recommendation about a draft, both Massachusetts and New Hampshire had already adopted procedures for drafting militia.[56]

Many believed that a draft would cause many to join the Continental battalions and receive a bounty, rather than being drafted and receiving nothing.[57] This did not happen, as men refused to serve, even if drafted, or, if they did serve, were more willing to join a state unit for a larger bounty and a shorter term of enlistment. "Drafting

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[56]Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776, "The Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 323-324; Ford, JCC 7:262-263; 10:200; John Henry, Jr., to the Speaker of the Maryland House of Representatives, H. R. Nicholas, March 6, 1778, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:528; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:760; Jonathan Smith, "How Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS 15 (October 1921-June 1922): 350, 350-351, 357.

[57]Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, April 29, 1777, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 2:38.

in any shape is so unpopular a measure," Washington was informed late in 1778 by Edmund Pendleton, "that our Assembly have laid it aside and depend for recruiting our Regiments upon high bounties only, which I fear will fail, as 'tis difficult to reach the Point of avarice now in fashion."[58]

Besides being unpopular with most Americans, it was also disappointing to Washington and the other military leaders. Most states were unwilling to draft for more than a year, and several states only required three months service.[59] Additionally, another complaint lay with the fact that some drafted militia were not incorporated into Continental battalions and thus served under their own officers, frequently of their own choosing. Despite the shortcomings of the militia drafts, a system of which Washington called a waste of time, men drafted often provided the strength the army needed to get through another campaign, particularly in the south late in the war. Even

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[58]Edmund Pendleton to George Washington, December 22, 1778, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:276-277.

[59]George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 96; Clark, NCSR 12:574-577, 661-663; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 246; Jonathan Smith, "How Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS 55 (October 1921-June 1922): 354.

Greene, who generally opposed using militia in any form, urged the southern states to fill up their Continental battalions by the militia draft.[60]

In addition to calling for a draft, Congress also requested, as they had no authority to require, the states to send militia to the assistance of the Continental forces. Often Washington and other general officers were delegated the authority to make such calls. These calls usually requested service for a limited period, generally three months. In several instances, the states complied, sending their militia where they were needed for periods ranging from one month to a year.[61]

Another expedient Congress resorted to was calling for volunteers, either individually or by units. Throughout the war voluntary or independent military units were formed in most states, often at the suggestion of state authorities, but generally as a result of military necessity.

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[60]George Washington to William Livingston, June 18, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:28; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:88.

[61]Ford, JCC, 3:324, 414; 8:666-667, 711-712; 10:88, 309-310; 11:684; 15:1108, 1331; 20:58, 635, 720. Circular to the States from Washington and the Congressional Committee at Camp, June 2, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:468-470; James B. Jackson, "Our Forgotten Regiment: The Second Delaware Militia, 1780," DH 9, no. 1 (April 1960): 7-8, 10, 13, 18, 44; Jonathan Smith, "How Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS 55 (October 1921-June 1922): 349-350, 356-361.

Congress in the spring of 1778 called on "young gentlemen of property and spirit" to form volunteer troops of light horse to serve until the end of that year.[62] Volunteer light horse units were frequently employed during the war, as young men established such units in Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland.[63] Volunteer infantry units were also formed, frequently for frontier defense, but they also saw duty during major campaigns, such as in Rhode Island in 1778.[64] Besides the volunteer units, many individuals served as volunteers, frequently as aides-de-camp, such as

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[62] Ford, JCC, 10:213-215.

[63] The Virginia Gazette (Dixon-Hunter), April 20, 1776; The Maryland Gazette, May 28, 1779; The Maryland Council to General George Washington, July 10, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 43:218; [Amos Blanchard], The American Biography: Containing Biographical Sketches of the Officers of the Revolution, and of the Principle Statesmen of the Period. to which are added the Life and Character of Benedict Arnold, and the Narrative of Major Andre (Wheeling, Virginia: F. Kenyon, 1833), pp. 291-292; Peele, Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians, pp. 60-61; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 615; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1902), p. 13; Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army, p. 187.

[64] Ezekiel Price Diary, August 4, 5, 7, 1778, "Items from an Interleaved Boston Almanac for 1778, Being a Diary of Ezekiel Price," NEHGR 19, no. 4 (October 1865): 334; Patrick Henry to George Washington, March 29, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:361; Thwaites, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777, p. 225; Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 73-77; Coleman, St. George Tucker, p. 49.

James Monroe and St. George Tucker.[65] Members of Congress, as will be shown in a later chapter, also served as volunteers.

While Congress relied on expedients as the safest and cheapest means of waging war, Washington suffered military setbacks during 1777 and 1778. He and the other generals blamed these setbacks on the civilian leaders who preferred to rely on short term enlistments and short term troops, rather than filling up the Continental battalions.[66] General Wayne told the chief executive of Pennsylvania that the salvation of his state depended upon filling up their Continental battalions and not relying upon substitutions. Similarly, General Greene told John Adams that in order for Congress to be feared, loved, and respected both at home and abroad, the army must be established in its full force.[67] Washington often wrote public officials about the problem

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[65]Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 33, 33-34; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:130.

[66]Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, December 25, 1777, Kapp, Kalb, pp. 138-139; William Heath to George Washington, March 21, 1778, Wade, This Glorious Cause, p. 127; Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24, 1780, "Letter of Genl. Gist to Col. Munford," MHM 4, no. 4 (December 1909): 369.

[67]Anthony Wayne to Thomas Warton, February 10, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:251; Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 7, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52.

of temporary expedients and short enlistments, telling the chief executive of Pennsylvania, for example, that "No man dislikes short and temporary inlistments more than I do. No man ever had greater cause to reprobate and even curse the fatal policy of the measure than I have."[68]

Washington was realistic enough to realize that Congress did not intend for him to lose the war, but at the same time he knew Congressional policies based on fear of standing armies and military tyrannies might result in military defeat. He believed Whig jealousies of standing armies and fears of military conspiracies were, under proper limitations, proper because "standing Armies are dangerous to a State." However, as he reminded a friend, America was at war, where the American soldiers were "Citizens having all the Ties, and interests of Citizens, and in most cases . . . totally unconnected with the Military Line." Therefore, he believed, "We should all be considered, Congress, Army, &c. as one people, embarked in one Cause, in one interest; acting on the same principle and to the same End." The army, he maintained, was not aiming at unreasonable powers in calling for a larger, longer

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[68]George Washington to Joseph Reed, August 22, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16:152; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, November 18, 1779, ibid., 17:127.

enlisted army, nor were they "making strides, dangerous, or subversive of Civil Authority."[69]

Many civilian leaders agreed with Washington and his generals that the army should be made more numerous and permanent, because the army and its leaders, had demonstrated they could be trusted.[70] Besides, as one member of Congress wrote the chief executive of his state, "the danger of meeting an enemy disciplined and hardy with new troops every campaign is alarming."[71] Yet, opposition to a large, long-enlisted army, remained strong. Throughout the war the figure of a Cromwell with a well-disciplined army at his command lurked in the imaginations of many Whigs.[72] "I should despair of our cause," wrote one of those who feared the army, "if our country contained 60,000 men abandoned enough to enlist for three years or during

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[69]George Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, ibid., 10:290, 290-291, 291, 292.

[70]John Page to Arthur Lee, March 12, 1778, Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, 2:323; Robert Morris to the Commissioner for American affairs in Europe, March 28, 1777, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC 20 (1888): 34; James Madison and Theodorick Bland to Thomas Jefferson, [January [23?], 1781], Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:436.

[71]Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 25, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:100.

[72]Boston massacre oration of March 5, 1779, by William Tudor, Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 37-40.

the war."[73] If the militia and other temporary expedients were not sufficient to assist Washington, it was argued, certainly the French army would once it arrived in force.[74]

Washington, who was somewhat unwilling to make an issue out of the size and duration of his army during 1779, began to vigorously lobby in 1780, hoping he could persuade the civilian leaders of the necessity of giving him a more permanent and well-supported army. In 1779, he had not done so because Congress, he realized, needed to get its own house in order before it could properly respond to his pleas. Additionally, Congress in 1779 was making some attempts on their own to get men to enlist, although not for as long as Washington would have desired.[75] But in 1780, with the appearance of the French army, Washington believed that with a well-disciplined American army, the allied forces would be able to defeat the British.

Using all the old arguments in 1780, he explained that short enlistments were expensive; hurt prisoner of war exchanges; resulted in military setbacks; and that discipline was hampered as the officers were forced constantly

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[73]Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:157.

[74]Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 12, 1780, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:306.

[75]Ford, JCC, 13:388.

to be drill instructors, spending half the year getting the troops into the field, and the other half in discharging them. With a raw and undisciplined army, engaged for a short period of time, he believed America was neither ready for the purposes of offense or defense, and that the British would continue to be tempted to keep fighting.[76] Only "Regular troops," he told Congress, "are equal to the exigencies of modern war."[77] "In a word," he believed, "short enlistments has been the primary cause of the continuance of the War, every evil which has been experienced in the course of it."[78]

Greene joined Washington in lobbying for a more permanent army.[79] He told Governor Burke that "Short

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[76]George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, July 18, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:195; George Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31, 1780, ibid., 481-482; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 10, 1780, ibid., 143-149; Same to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 408-410.

[77]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 15, 1780, ibid., 20:49.

[78]George Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31, 1780, ibid., 19:482; see also George Washington to Fielding Lewis, May 5 [-July 6,], 1780, ibid., 31.

[79]Nathanael Greene to William Greene, September 5, 1780, RIHSC 6 (1867): 266; Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 468; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sim Lee, November 10, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives 45:176; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 2 (December 1823): 374.

enlistments are the bane of service," and Governor Nelson that "Short enlistments are dangerous, and can give no permanent security." "Don't be deceived, and trust your liberties to a precarious force," he told Governor Nash.[80] "Nothing can save this country but a good permanent army," he wrote Knox, as well as the President of the Continental Congress and Governor of North Carolina.[81] This observation seemed all the more valid after the defeat at Camden.

Washington believed if Congress would support him by drafting the militia into the Continental Army to serve the remainder of the war, or at least three years, he would be able, with the help of the French, to subdue quickly the British forces on the continent. A shorter period, particularly less than a year, he called "inadmissible."[82]

Washington had civilian support in his desire for a more

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[80]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Burke, April 8, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1), Nathanael Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr., [1781], Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:183; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:88.

[81]Nathanael Greene to Henry Knox, December 1781[80], ibid., 3:545; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 7, 1780, ibid., 547; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, ibid., 88.

[82]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:408, 411.

permanent army.[83] Even Samuel Adams, a prime mover in the process of conjuring up fear of standing armies, believed it was wrong to carry on the war with temporary and expensive drafts of militia.[84]

Congress, on October 3, 1780, adopted a wide-ranging program to reorganize the army. Besides reducing the army to fifty regiments of infantry, Congress called on the states to fill up their lines for three years or for the war, but stated that one year enlistments were acceptable. The program was sent to Washington for his comments, which he immediately provided. He was understandably upset.[85] Two months earlier he had told Congress short enlistments, particularly one year enlistments, were "inadmissible." Besides informing members of Congress and friends of his opposition to congressional encouragement and acceptance of

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[83]Nathaniel Peabody to Josiah Bartlett, August 6, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:313; William Gordon to Horatio Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930): 440; John Hancock inauguration address of October 25, 1780, reported in The Independent Chronicle. And the Universal Advertiser, November 4, 1780.

[84]Samuel Adams to James Warren, November 20, 1780, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:221.

[85]Ford, JCC, 18:893-897; Samuel Huntington to George Washington, October 4, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:404; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, October 11, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:157-167.

short enlistments, he sent a circular to the states giving reasons why he opposed short enlistments. He explained to Jefferson that "While we preserve in the system of short enlistments we shall experience misfortune and disgrace, and ultimately, if it is persisted in we shall most probably, lose the cause in which we are engaged."[86] He confided in John Mathews that his appreciation of congressional jealousies of standing armies had previously kept him from expressing his sentiments, but his silence would now be "criminal" as "we are tottering on the brink of a precipice."[87] Mathews and Duane explained to Washington that Congress had given great weight to his views in their deliberations, but the desire for economy and the necessity of having short enlistments to enable those whose enlistments would end on January 1, 1781, to re-enlist under terms

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[86]George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, October 10, 1780, ibid., 186; Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 205, 207-208; George Washington to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 117; General George Washington to John Mathews, October 4, 1780, ibid., 113-114; George Washington to Horatio Gates, October 8, 1780, ibid., 137; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, October 22, 1780, ibid., 246-247; George Washington to George Mason, October 22, 1780, ibid., 242.

[87]George Washington to John Mathews, October 4, 1780, ibid., 115.

favorable to them, had prompted Congress to encourage one year enlistments.[88]

Initially, Washington hoped Congress and the states would reject one year enlistments in favor of three year or for the war enlistments. By the end of 1780, this seemed unlikely. Benjamin Lincoln reported from Massachusetts, where he had gone to lobby, that the state would raise troops for three years, but not for the war.[89] Reports from other states were just as discouraging, if not more so. Congress would not change their policy either. Washington, instead of complaining, resigned himself to work with what he had and hoped the French army could bail America out of the critical situation they found themselves in 1781. Washington did not push Congress on the issue of the army because Congress, much to his approval, was attempting early in 1781 to improve itself in its executive functions, which he believed would enable them to better provide for the army. Washington, it is true, did not complain to Congress, but he was nonetheless displeased

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[88]James Duane to George Washington, October 10, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:414-415; John Mathews to George Washington, October 17, 1780, ibid., 422-423; Same to same, October 30, 1780, ibid., 432.

[89]Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, November [ ], 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, vol. 2, p. 51, BPL.

with congressional policy regarding the army, and frequently shared his displeasure with family and friends.[90]

By limiting the size and duration of the army, the civilian leaders believed that the likelihood of a military tyranny would be lessened. They also adopted two other measures to ensure that they would not be faced with a Cromwell. The first was reliance upon the militia. The second was the insistence upon civilian control of the military, be they militia or Continentals.

The first American troops at Lexington and Concord were the militia and minutemen of the surrounding area. Within several days, they were joined by militiamen from Massachusetts and the neighboring colonies. Initially, it was assumed that they would, numbering over twenty thousand, be sufficient for a seige of Boston until the British ministry withdrew the soldiers and Coercive Acts once they realized the resolution on the part of the colonies to resist both. The militia, it was also assumed, were adequate to prevent domestic anarchy and to keep the Tories in their place. Additionally, it was believed the militia were the safest and cheapest means by which to fight the British, as

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[90]George Washington to John Parke Custis, February 28, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:319; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25, 1781, ibid., 375; George Washington to Fielding Lewis, June 28, 1781, ibid., 22:283; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1781, ibid., 384.

well as the internal enemies.[91] "The sword, in the hands of free citizens," Jonas Clark stated in the 1781 Massachusetts election sermon, "is the protection of society; and the safety and defence of a people truly brave, truly free,"[92] Echoing a similar belief several years earlier, Benjamin Rush expressed the desire of many by stating, "The militia began, and I sincerely hope the militia will end, the present war."[93]

Americans during the eighteenth century were reared in the belief that a well-regulated militia, composed of the so-called gentlemen freeholders, was not only the natural strength but the only stable security for a free state.[94] Even Greene, who came to be highly contemptuous

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[91]Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:250; Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775, ibid., 230; George Mason to Martin Cockburn, August 5, 1775, Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 1:245; George Mason to George Washington, October 14, 1775, ibid., 255-256; Hemphill, Journals of the General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780, pp. 64, 67-68.

[92]Jonas Clark, A Sermon Preached Before his Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; Governor;...May 30, 1781, p. 65.

[93]Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:157.

[94]The Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), February 2, 1775; The New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury, December 26, 1774; Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 (Dover: James Kirk and Son, 1886), p. 470; March 23, 1775 resolve of the Virginia Convention, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:161n.; Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!", p. 194.

of the military ability and character of the militia, admitted to Jefferson that the militia were the "Great Bulwark of Civil Liberty."[95] Benjamin Rush believed the militia, when "properly commanded and led" were "the best troops in the world, especially in a war and country like ours."[96] So strong was this belief in the safety and strength of the militia, it was codified in most state constitutions and other fundamental declarations, as well as in the Articles of Confederation.[97] It was a faith that existed just as strong after the war, codified not only in the Constitution, but was the premise upon which the American military establishment was based for over a century.[98] Forty years after the war, John Adams stated

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[95]Nathanael Greene to Governor Thomas Jefferson, November 20, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:130-131.

[96]Benjamin Rush to Horatio Gates, February 4, 1778, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:199.

[97]Proceedings of the Convention of the Delaware State, p. 19; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, p. 436; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 9:856; Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York, 1:186; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution, p. 110; Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5, 1784, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:287.

[98]Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 54-138; "A Democratic Federalist" in The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser, October 23, 1787; William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,

that "neither schools, nor colleges, nor town meetings have been more essential to the formation and character of the nation than the militia."[99]

This faith in the militia developed early in America. From the first settlement, the primary organized defense against external and internal enemies was the militia.[100] This was more so during the seventeenth than the eighteenth century, before the British regulars had appeared in any significant numbers. The early militia organizations were developed in each colony on much the same lines as those they had left behind in England.[101] By 1671 almost every colony had a formally organized militia. These militia were adapted to the peculiar environment and circumstances of each colony; although in

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1957), p. 9; Luther Martin to the Maryland Legislature, January 27, 1788, Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, 1:371; for debate in Virginia, see ibid., 3:380, 384, 400, 588; for proposed amendments concerning the militia, see ibid., 1:328, 335; 3:659; 4:245.

[99]John Adams to W. H. Sumner, May 19, 1823, [William H. Sumner], Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth: In a Letter from William H. Sumner,...to John Adams...with His Answer (Boston: Cummings and Hillard, 1823), pp. 69-70.

[100]Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 3-12; Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973), pp. 1-41.

[101]Lois G. Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!", p. 14.

most colonies they were subject to royal authority in the form of the Governor who, acting as commander in chief, issued commissions and directed the disposition of the militia in his respective colony. Generally, militia service was compulsory for all males between 16/18 and 45/60, depending upon the colony and the time. Training usually consisted of muster days: two to four days in the spring on a compnay level basis and two to four days in the autumn on the battalion level. As a rule, during peacetime, these musters were not taken seriously. Besides a few short drills and musketry practice, most muster time was spent in food and drink as many viewed these gatherings as social events. Actual service was usually limited to duty within the colony, keeping with the English precedent of not allowing trainbands to be taken outside of their counties except if England was under actual invasion.[102]

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[102]Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), 2:375-400; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), pp. 496-526; Leon de Valinger, Jr., Colonial Military Organization in Delaware 1637-1776 (Wilmington: Delaware Tercentenary Commission, 1938), pp. 22-23, 34-42; W. Roy Smith, South Carolina as a Royal Province 1719-1776 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1903), pp. 171-182; William P. Clark, Official History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania, From the Earliest Period of Record to the Present Time, 1:1-16; John W. Shy, "A New Look at Colonial Militia," WMQ, 3d ser., 20, no. 2 (April 1963): 175-185; H. Telfer Mook, "Training Day in New England," NEQ 11, no. 4 (December 1938): 675-697; Douglas Edward Leach, "The Military System of Plymouth Colony," ibid., 24, no. 3 (September 1951): 342-364; Robert W. Kenny,

With the introduction of British regulars into the colonies in greater numbers during the wars of the eighteenth century, reliance on the militia declined. During the Seven Years War, however, there was a revival in militia training and utilization, and the development of "Alarmist" companies, which were the progenitors of the minutemen. With peace in 1763, interest in the militia declined once again, but a decade later, the militia once again regained popularity, as it appeared the militia were America's first line of defence against the British should war begin. Once the war began, it became a rather quickly established belief amongst most Whigs that the American militia were among, if not the best soldiers in the world. This belief became fixed in the minds of many Americans, and remained relatively undisputed for over a century.

"The Beginnings of the Rhode Island Train Bands," RIHSC, 33, no. 2 (April 1940): 25-38; Jack S. Radabaugh, "The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts,"MA 18, no. 1 (Spring 1954): 1-18; Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," ibid., 22, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 75-82; Allen French, "The Arms and Military Training of Our Colonizing Ancestors," PMHS 57 (October 1941-May 1944): 3-21; Louis D. Scisco, "Evolution of Colonial Militia in Maryland," MHM 35, no. 2 (June 1940): 166-177; E. Milton Wheeler, "Development and Organization of the North Carolina Militia," NCHR 41, no. 3 (July 1964): 307-323; The Essex Gazette, January 31, February 21, 1769; Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775," MA 37, no. 4 (December 1973): 125; Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 1607-1763, p. 23; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 13-28.

At a meeting of citizens in a park in New York City on August 10, 1814, Marinus Willett told the gathering that he was living witness to the fact that the American militia were equal to the contest with British regulars. With the militia he stated, "I have met them when their numbers were double mine; and I have routed and pursued them."[103] To a degree these were the exaggerated words of an old man reflecting on past glories, hoping they would spur on a patriotic spirit in the current generation to meet the British regulars again as confident militiamen. There was a touch of truth, however, to his statement, as Willett was a relatively successful officer leading the militia during the Revolutionary War. Other officers also had successes with the militia, as at times the militia fought well, although it was generally in conjunction with Continental troops.

The militia behaved admirably at the battles of Bennington, Oriskany, Saratoga, King's Mountain, Cowpens, Springfield, and during numerous minor encounters during the southern campaigns.[104] Thus, to a degree, faith in the militia was justified. Nevertheless, problems existed in

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[103] Willett, Marinus Willett, appendix 10, p. 152.

[104] Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 704; Robert C. Pugh, "The Revolutionary Militia in the Southern Campaign," WMQ, 3d ser., 19, no. 2 (April 1957): 154-175.

using the militia. Some of the more obvious, i.e., plundering, lack of discipline, and the quality of the militia officers, will be discussed in a later chapter; the others, involving their worth, real and imagined, need to be discussed here in order that we may understand the militia in the context of their time, not as Marinus Willett had, forty years after the fact.

A major problem with the American militia during the Revolutionary War was that they often operated under inadequate, narrow, and provincial laws that made it very difficult to even mobilize the militia. Even when a mobilization was called for, that was no guarantee the militia would turn out, particularly when such calls were made at times when the militia preferred to protect their own homes or during the planting season.[105]

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[105]Silas Newcomb to William Livingston, October 4, 1777, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Philemon Dickinson to William Livingston, September 16, 1777, Sedgwick, William Livingston, pp. 244-245; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:125; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 331; William P. Clark, Official History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania from the Earliest Period of Record to the Present Time, 1:25; Benjamin Lincoln to James Lowell, April 12, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); James Innes to Thomas Jefferson, October [21?], 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:55; Lachlan McIntosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:132.

It was also difficult, once the militia responded to mobilization calls, to force them to remove from their local area.[106] The militia laws additionally made it difficult, if not impossible, for the militia of one state to come to the assistance of another state.[107] And even

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[106]David A. Bernstein, "William Livingston: The Role of the Executive in New Jersey's Revolutionary War," in William C. Wright, ed., New Jersey in the American Revolution II, Papers Presented at the Fourth Annual New Jersey History Symposium, December 2, 1972, Held by the New Jersey Historical Commission at the State Museum Auditorium (Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1973), p. 15; Pierre Van Cortlandt to George Clinton, August 13, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:218; Robert Benson to George Clinton, August 20, 1777, ibid., 232; Petition of the Non-Commissioned Officers of the 1st Battalion of Minutemen of New York on behalf of themselves and privates, January 30, 1776, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 1:225; Ward, The War of the Revolution, 2:715; James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke), The Rear Guard of the Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889), pp. 287-288.

[107]Patrick Henry to Henry Laurens, November 23, 1778, Henry, Patrick Henry, 3:205; Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Greene, January 21, 1782, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:132; Benjamin Harrison to William Irvine, August 21, 1782, ibid., 301; Drury Ragsdale to Nathanael Greene, February 3, 1782, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:79; Thomas Stone and J. Rogers to the Maryland Council of Safety, June 15, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 11:492; Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution (Cleveland: Winn and Judson Press for the Western Reserve University, 1904), pp. 100, 103; John Archer Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland," pp. 26, 42; Allen Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Public Affairs, 1943), p. 114n.1; Saunders, NCCR, 10:196-208; 12:347; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, June 27, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:555-556.

when the militia were mobilized, and allowed to leave their states, a problem existed with respect to their length of service. Most states limited field duty to a fixed number of days per tour of duty, often as few as ten days at a time.[108]

Because of the limitations placed upon them by these restricting militia laws, military leaders constantly complained they could not always use the militia when, where, and how they were needed most.[109] Often at crucial times the militia enlistments or terms of service terminated and

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[108]Mathias Williamson to William Livingston, September 15, 1776, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executives of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786 (Newark: Newark Daily Advertiser Office for the New Jersey Legislature, 1848), pp. 9-10; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 401; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 347; The Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to George Washington, May 15, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:481; Circular of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to the County Lieutenants, October 13, 1779, ibid., 7:748.

[109]Lachlan McIntosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, ibid., 132; John Stark to George Washington, June 5, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p. 160; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene[?], September 28, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:303; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 4, 1776, ibid., 363; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, December 1776, ibid., 366-267; Opinion of Nathanael Greene given George Washington, December 3, 1777, Worthington C. Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1897), p. 252; Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 2:330.

they departed the field, despite the pleas of those that remained behind.[110]

But even when the militia were used, many times they were quite deficient as they were generally not well prepared for battle, nor well lead into it. As was stated earlier, the colonial militia were, for many decades, regarded as more of a concept of defense than a regular system. Most colonies did not seriously train their militia. Nevertheless, great faith was placed in them as the proper and sure means of defense, even when they demonstrated they were inadequate in the field, and examples of them being so were numerous. Washington and others blamed the disastrous campaign of 1776 on the militia. The militia were also faulted for the failings of the Rhode Island campaign of 1777, the American defeat at Minisink in 1782, the losses at Boundbrook in 1777, and Norwalk in 1779, where, in the latter two instances, the militia deserted in the face of the enemy. The militia also fared poorly during the Danbury raid in 1777, and during the

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[110]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, February 10, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:310; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, March 31, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:213.

southern campaign, most notably at Camden, Guilford Court House, and Blue Licks.[111]

Governor Jefferson was informed that the militia in the south had one goal in mind, that being to avoid action, as "Their greatest Study is to Rub through their Tower [tour] of Duty with whole Bones." General Lincoln told the President of South Carolina that the militia were undependable, as they spent all their time trying to get out of service. Washington complained late in the summer of 1780 that "'No Militia' will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force." Richard Henry Lee earlier observed that "for sudden exertions the militia

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[111]Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, September 17, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:300; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 18, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:198n1; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:110; George Washington to William Heath, July 14, 1779, ibid., 15:423; William Gordon to Horatio Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930): 440; Pierce Butler to [Arthur Middleton?], March 21, 1776, Joseph W. Bernwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 140; Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, September 15, 1776, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:215; Bodley, Our First Great West, p. 208; Vernon Leslie, The Battle of Minisink: A Revolutionary War Engagement in the Upper Delaware Valley, 2d and enl. ed. (Middletown, New York: T. Emmett Henderson, 1976), p. 148; Benedict Arnold to Alexander McDougall, April 27, 1777, Wallace, Traitorous Hero, p. 188; Nathaniel N. Shipton, "General Joseph Palmer: Scapegoat for the Rhode Island Fiasco of October, 1777," NEQ 39, no. 4 (December 1966): 498-512.

certainly do well, but they cannot bear the continued discipline of Camps and campaigns."[112]

Yet faith in the militia persisted. Besides the belief in the dependability and safety of the militia, many civilian leaders believed they were cheaper to use than a regular military establishment.[113] Military leaders constantly complained to these civilians of the high cost of keeping the militia in the field.[114] Greene complained

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[112]Edward Stevens to Thomas Jefferson, February 8, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:562; Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 15, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 15, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:50; Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, January 9, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:248.

[113]Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, June 16, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:354.

[114]Nathanael Greene to George Washington, September 11, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:211; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 19, 1780, ibid., 343; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:402; Same to same, March 26, 1777, ibid., 7:319; George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, July 4, 1780, ibid., 19:119; George Washington to John Parke Custis, February 28, 1781, ibid., 21:319; Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, July 24, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 7 (1876): 468, 469; Lewis Morris, Jr. to Lewis Morris, Sr., December 29, 1780, ibid., 475; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 12 (December 1823): 374; Thomas Conway to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, August 17, 1777, "Letters Colonial and Revolutionary," PMHB 42, no. 1 (1918): 79-80.

that the militia, "like the locusts of Egypt, have eaten up everything, and the expense has been so numerous, that it has ruined the currency of the State." He told one southern governor that "I think it an endless task to attempt to arm and equip all your militia. Such a waste of arms and ammunition as I have seen in different parts of this state, is enough to exhaust all the arsenals of Europe."[115]

Greene believed the use of militia was more than just a waste of money. He believed it "the greatest folly in the world to trust the liberties of a people to such a precarious defence."[116] Other officers shared this opinion, particularly after the disastrous campaigns of 1776 and 1777.[117] General Wayne and his chief subordinates called the militia a mere "passing cloud" that should not be

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[115]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:345; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, February 9, 1781, Hugh Talmage and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 226.

[116]Nathanael Greene to James Varnum, [1781?], William Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:397.

[117]Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 6, 1776, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 442; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 11, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:78; Same to same, July 22, 1777, ibid., 2:86; Thomas Conway to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, August 15, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:523; Arthur St. Clair to The President of the Continental Congress, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:428.

relied upon.[118] General Stark, although successfully commanding militia forces during 1777, stated he could not put any dependence upon them.[119] Heath told Washington "It is vain to trust the militia."[120] Washington had come to this opinion very early in the war and became one of the more outspoken critics of the militia system as it existed during the war.

By the summer of 1776, Washington believed, as he told Congress, the militia should not be relied upon, because "To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff." "To attempt to carry on the War with Militia against disciplined Troops," he later told Congress, "would be to attempt what the common sense and common experience of Mankind will pronounce to be impracticable."[121] To the states he sent a circular during the fall

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[118] Anthony Wayne, Daniel Brodhead, James Chambers, Richard Humpton, Francis Johnston, Walter Stewart, Thomas Hartley et al. to the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Assembly, October 30, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:724; Anthony Wayne to Richard Peters, April 12, 1778, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 124.

[119] John Stark to Meshech Weare, June 8, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p. 172.

[120] William Heath to George Washington, December 28, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:49.

[121] George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:110, 110-112; Same to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 19:412.

of 1780 telling them the idea of carrying on the war with militia was "chimerical," declaring "I never was witness to a single instance that can countenance an opinion of Militia or raw troops being fit for the real business of fighting."[122] He told his brother "the dependence which the Congress has placed upon the militia has already greatly injured and I fear will totally ruin our cause."[123]

General Lincoln joined Washington and Greene in lobbying the civilian leaders to stop relying on the militia and to put their faith and money, as well as their enlistment energies, in regularly enlisted Continental soldiers.[124] It would be misleading, however, to suggest that most critics of the militia wanted to do away with them. From the beginning of the war, the militia were seen by many whigs as a useful force, serving as escorts, guards,

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[122]Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:209.

[123]George Washington to Jack Washington, September 22, 1776, ibid., 6:96; also see his letters to Lund Washington, December 10[17], 1776, ibid., 347; to same on September 30, 1776, ibid., 137; to John Augustine Washington, December 18, 1776, ibid., 398; to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, ibid., 402; and to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid., 15:25.

[124]Benjamin Lincoln to the President of the Continental Congress, February 13, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to President Rawlins Lowndes, January 12, 1779, ibid.

and in other limited duty, as well as, when trained adequately, serving in conjunction with Continental troops.[125]

Because of the apparent usefulness of the militia, as well as the reality of the states being unwilling to not rely on them, some Continental officers believed the militia should be better prepared for the tasks they should be expected adequately to handle. One officer, Baron von Steuben, took an especial interest, primarily because of his general interest in the discipline in the Continental Army. In April 1779, he informed the executives of several states he had devised a plan of general principles and rules, which he enclosed, whereby, if adopted and applied, would enable the militia to be more effective, particularly upon those occasions when they acted in concert with the Continental troops.[126]

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[125]George Washington to Robert Howe, August 9, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16:67; Washington's Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:209; Robert Carter Nicholas to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, November 25, 1775, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:268; Elbridge Gerry to [Samuel Adams], October 9, 1775, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:117; Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:251.

[126]Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, April 20, 1779, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Baron von Steuben to Jonathan Trumbull, April 20, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:389-390; Baron von Steuben to Joseph Reed, April 20, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:325; Baron von Steuben to George Clinton, April 20, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:738-739.

Other officers, unlike Steuben, believed the problem did not rest completely on the lack of discipline. The major problem, they argued, were the militia laws which made it difficult, and frequently impossible, to utilize the militia to their best advantage.[127]

Hoping that the states would correct their deficient militia laws, Washington, beginning in 1779, appealed to Congress to request the states to put their militias on a more respectable footing, and under such regulation as would enable them to assemble rapidly when called into service.[128] The states did not quickly nor adequately respond to the calls made by Washington and others to improve their militia laws and the militia. Some civilian leaders did not attribute the deficiencies of the militia to the militia themselves nor the laws governing them, but to the general officers, including Continental generals, who led them.[129]

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[127]William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS 9 (January-June 1897): 411; Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 39; John R. Anderson, "The Militia Law in Revolutionary New Jersey," PNJHS 76, no. 4 (October 1958): 282; ibid., 77, no. 1 (January 1959): 9, 12; Richard Dallam to Thomas Sim Lee, January 16, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 47:20-21.

[128]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 25, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 15:143-144.

[129]John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 15, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:354.

Others, also unwilling to directly face the problems of the militia, debated the civil rights question regarding the raising of the militia and their service.[130] Such debate caused General Moultrie to tell the President of the South Carolina Senate that "by contending too much for the liberties of the people you will enslave them at last; remember, my friend, it has always been the maxim of all communities, to abridge the people of some of those liberties for a time, the better to secure the whole to them in the future." Similarly, Governor Harrison told his legislature that "Our fears of despotism seem to be carried too far for a time of War and may in the end deprive [us] of that Liberty we are contending for & bring on us the most abject slavery."[131]

Random militia successes, particularly early in the war, convinced many Whigs that the militia, as constructed and used, was indeed the bulwark of the country's defense and, therefore, the state legislatures were lax in changing their militia laws and state executives were frequently lax

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[130]Charles C. Pinckney to General William Moultrie, February 3, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:299-300.

[131]William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, February 11, 1779, ibid., 311-312; Benjamin Harrison to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, May 6, 1782, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:217.

enforcing them. This was especially true after the militia success at Bennington in 1777.[132] The defeat of the militia at Camden, however, awoke many to the dangers of relying on the militia. The greatest defenders of the militia realized that unless the militia system was improved, not only would military defeats continue, but the proponents of a large, long enlisted standing army, might be able to do away with the militia system completely.[133] This was something the ardent Whigs did not desire. Forty years after the war, John Adams expressed the Whig view held by most of the revolutionary generation, that being that "Whenever the militia comes to an end, or is despised or neglected, I shall consider this union dissolved, and the liberties of North America lost forever."[134]

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[132]James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 79; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, March 18, 1781, Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina, rev. ed., p. 226.

[133]William Gordon to Horatio Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters of Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1920-June 1930): 440; James Madison and Theodorick Bland to Thomas Jefferson, [January 23?, 1781], Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:436; James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 79; James Warren to John Adams, August 10, 1777, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 72 (1917): 349.

[134]John Adams to W. H. Sumner, May 19, 1823, [William H. Sumner], Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth; In a Letter from William H. Sumner,...to John Adams...with His Answer, p. 70.

Seeing the militia under so much reproach, and desiring to maintain it as the safeguard of the liberties of America, many state leaders by mid war, and many more by 1781, were calling for their state legislatures to enact more effective militia laws, for as Governor Hancock told the people of Massachusetts in his 1780 inauguration address, it was the militia upon which "the safety of the Commonwealth naturally rests."[135] Similarly, in Virginia, a committee of the House of Delegates late in 1782, in calling for a better militia law, stated "that a permanent body of disciplined citizens is the only safe defence of any republic."[136] The state legislatures responded in many instances to the demands for improving the militia laws.[137]

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[135]Cited in The Independent Chronicle. And the Universal Advertiser, November 4, 1780.

[136]Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun and Held in the City of Richmond. In the County of Henrico, on Monday, the Twenty-First Day of October in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-Two (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1823), p. 23; for other appeals, see George Clinton to the New York Convention, March 8, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:655; William Livingston to George Washington, May 8, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:295-296; Thomas Burke's Address to the North Carolina General Assembly, June 9, 1781, Clark, NCSR, 22:1033; Speech of John Rutledge to the South Carolina General Assembly, June 9, 1782, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:311.

[137]John R. Anderson, "Militia Law in Revolutionary Jersey," PNJHS 77, no. 1 (January 1959): 20; Alexander Hamilton to John Laurence, [December 12, 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:212; Edmund Randolph to James Madison, November 22, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of

Despite the satisfaction the Continental officers must have felt with the improved militia system beginning in many states by 1780, there existed the ever present fear that Continental battalions would be neglected and not filled up. With the British occupying New York, Charleston, and several other major cities in 1780 and 1781, it was obvious to many that only successful seiges could be undertaken by troops that could be depended upon to remain at their posts in a disciplined manner for an unlimited period. Only Continental troops fit this description, it was argued.[138] Simultaneously with the call for an improved militia came reminders of the limitations of the militia. Greene believed, as he told Jefferson, the militia could serve some useful purpose "if they are not depended upon as a principal but employed as an Auxillary," reminding him that "if you depend upon them as a principal the very nature of the War must become ruinous to the Country." In a similar vein Washington told the Governor of Rhode Island that the militia were only good for light parties to skirmish, as they lacked firmness which was only acquired

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James Madison, 5:308.

[138]Henry Knox to George Washington, Draft, May 23, 1780, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); George Washington to the Committee of Cooperation of Congress, May 25, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:418; George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, July 4, 1780, ibid., 19:119.

by habits of discipline and service. "I mean not to detract from the merit of the militia," he wrote, "their zeal and spirit upon a variety of occasions, have entitled them to the highest applause; but it is of the greatest importance we should learn to estimate them rightly." Despite the questioning of the nature and value of the militia, Joseph Reed frankly admitted to Greene, "we must give up the contest or cherish the militia."[139] And to a large degree, the militia were cherished, often at the expense of military efficiency. American Whigs feared any military body, even their own militia. But of all military bodies, the militia seemed the safest, as they were civilians temporarily in uniform, unlike the Continentals who, in many instances, were professional soldiers or, after several years of service, became so.

A primary concern of the civilian leaders during the American Revolution was ensuring their revolutionary war was won without resorting to or resulting in a military tyranny. This concern, as discussed in this chapter, translated into actions that impacted on the size, complexion, and leadership of the military. It also impacted, as will

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[139] Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:131; George Washington to William Greene, October 18, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:250; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, June 16, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:355.

be shown in the next chapter, on how the civilians controlled the military, particularly with respect to ideological and personal controls.

C H A P T E R III

CITIZEN SOLDIERS, CIVIL-MILITARY CONNECTIONS AND CIVIL SUPREMACY

The American revolutionary leaders believed that among the best means of ensuring their military would not subvert the revolution would be to make sure the military remained subordinate to the civilian governments and leaders. To accomplish this, the revolutionary leaders placed great emphasis on the quality, character, and conduct of their officer corps. To a large extent, this meant carefully selecting their military leaders and ensuring they adhered to the concept of civil supremacy.

Early in the war, Charles Lee told a delegation of Massachusetts civilian leaders at camp that American liberties depended upon the quality and character of the army, and that depended on their officers. About the same time, Nathanael Greene wrote the chief executive of Rhode Island that "without a good set of Officers the Troops will be little better than a lawless Banditti or an ungovernable Mob."[1] Most American revolutionary leaders did not have to

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[1]Charles Lee to the Commissioners from Massachusetts at Camp, November 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 308; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke,

be told about the importance of their officer corps, for they realized that the officers would have a primary responsibility for preventing anarchy and military tyranny, as well as assuring military victory. It is not surprising, therefore, the civilian leaders demonstrated great interest and expressed concern about the selection and promotion of their officer corps.

The revolutionary leaders desired officers who shared the same beliefs and goals as themselves, who would exert themselves in preventing any form of anarchy or military tyranny, and who would subordinate themselves to civilian control. The best method to select and promote officers who met the above criteria, it was generally assumed, was by giving that responsibility to the legislative bodies. It was believed they were best suited to judge the quality and character of their fellow citizens. Besides, it was argued, that by selecting and promoting the officers, they would have more control over them.

Some soldiers, however, objected to the selection of their officers by the legislative bodies, believing they should themselves select some, if not all, of their own officers.[2] With respect to company grade officers, this

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October 11, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene, 1:313.

[2]The Maryland Gazette, July 18, 1776; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 34; David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, pp. 166-169.

procedure had been adopted in several of the colonies before the war.[3] Realizing that to recruit and maintain a sufficient army some compromises were necessary, several provincial legislative bodies and early state legislatures provided for company grade officers to be elected by their men. Although allowing for such a procedure, the North Carolina Provincial Congress reserved to itself the exercise of a veto of the selections made. Several colonies allowed field grade officers to be elected by the company grade officers, and Pennsylvania allowed for the selection of its two Flying Camp generals by a committee composed of soldiers and officers. At the other extreme, New Hampshire once allowed field grade officers to appoint company grade officers. Most colonies, however, reserved to the legislature the selection of the field grade and general officers, and in many of the colonies the selection of company grade officers was the responsibility of either the legislature or a local civilian authority, such as a committee of safety.[4]

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[3]Ibid., pp. 157, 159, 161; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 33-34, 35.

[4]Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 5 vols. (New York: States History Company, 1927-1930), 3:72, 138; Saunders, NCCR, 10:196-209; Clark, NCSR, 23:981; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, pp. 180, 187-188, 191, 555; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 1:108-109; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, [eds.], The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents

The initial selection of the field grade and company grade officers were thus the responsibility of the colonies to appoint, not that of the Continental Congress. This meant the army Washington commanded during 1775 was composed of officers selected by either the legislative bodies or the soldiers themselves. Unimpressed by the quality of his officer corps, Washington informally suggested to several members of Congress that he be given power of appointment, subject to the veto of Congress. He also formally requested Congress allow him to appoint inferior officers of the staff departments.[5] Although Congress granted his request, his

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on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, pp. 46-48; William P. Clark, Official History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania From the Earliest Period of Record to the Present Time, 1:90; Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," PMHB 69, no. 1 (January 1945): 21; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783 (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1941), p. 6; William Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware (Wilmington: James and Webb, 1875), p. 10; Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), p. 82; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 263; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:263; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:337; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth, pp. 142-145; Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, December 24, 1775, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:141; George Mason to Martin Cockburn, July 24, 1775, Rutland, Papers of George Mason 1725-1792, 1:241.

[5]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 20, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:351; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, August 29, 1775, ibid., 451; George Washington to Caesar Rodney and Thomas McKean, August 30, 1775, ibid., 457.

suggestion was not taken up by Congress until October 1775, when the question of appointment of the officers of the two New Jersey regiments precipitated a debate. James Duane suggested Congress have the responsibility, after consulting the military, for appointing and promoting all officers. Others agreed, believing the union of the colonies depended upon breaking down provincial distinctions. These arguments were countered by those that maintained it was safer to leave the responsibility with the individual colonies for, after all, soldiers would not enlist unless they had some part in the selection, or at least knew the officers who would be appointed over them. Congress avoided making a decision, by simply selecting the officers specifically nominated by the New Jersey Provincial Congress. Nevertheless, discussion continued on the subject of officer selection throughout the first winter of the war.[6]

It was not, however, until September 1776, that Congress made provisions for selecting and promoting the officers that would command the large and relatively long enlisted army they had just authorized. At that time, Congress decided that generals would be selected, promoted,

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[6]John Adams Diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:202-204; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, February 28, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:367; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of New Jersey, pp. 212-213; Ford, JCC, 3:285-289.

and commissioned by Congress and that all other Continental officers would be selected by the states and commissioned by Congress.[7] The military would be given no say in the selection process, as it was considered "dangerous to the publick liberty." At least that is how John Adams explained it to several Continental generals.[8]

Washington and other officers questioned the wisdom of Congress and the state governments with respect to promotions.[9] Initially, officers were promoted within the regiments in their respective state lines. This lead to many unqualified men being raised to positions of regimental command through the attrition process within their regiment. Realizing this was a problem, Congress late in 1778 recommended to the states they promote regimentally to the rank of captain, and then in the line of the state to the rank of colonel. The following June, Congress told the states they should make promotions within their respective lines. The Board of War, after hearing numerous complaints from the military about this latter system, suggested unsuccessfully

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[7] Ibid., 5:762-763.

[8] John Adams to General Nathanael Greene, June 22, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:404; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, June 22, 1776, ibid., 405.

[9] John Sullivan to Henry Laurens, January 20, 1778, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:16; Ford, JCC, 6:1043-1044; John Adams to John Winthrop, October 2, 1776, MHSC, 5th ser., 4:295.

during the summer of 1780 that Congress rescind their previous suggestion to the states as it had resulted in much confusion in the military. The Board of War, supported by Washington, desired a uniform system, preferably one that provided for promotions within the line. Finally, on May 25, 1781, a plan acceptable to the military was adopted. It called for promotions to Major General by seniority; to brigadier general by brigade; to all other grades by line; and to officers of units not attached to any state, by regiment.[10]

Selection and promotion of general officers were problems that faced Congress, the states, and the military frequently during the first three years of the war. The revolutionary leaders believed that well-qualified generals would be the best instrument for controlling the officer corps, who in turn could control the army. Therefore, great care was exercised in their first selections, and all subsequent promotions to and promotions of general officers. At Baltimore, during mid February 1777, Congress debated at great length the best method by which generals would be selected and promoted. It was suggested that major generals

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[10] Ibid., 11:1157-1158; 14:779; 17:607, 670; 20:539-540; George Washington to John Sullivan, December 17, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:488; Same to same, May 11, 1781, ibid., 22:70; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1780, ibid., 20:502.

be appointed by Washington and the other generals. Richard Henry Lee liked the idea, believing the military were in the best position to judge the military merits of each other. Most members of Congress, however, were adamant in their opposition to letting the military have any say in the selection. John Witherspoon argued that he had once made the mistake of letting the seniors at Princeton elect their commencement honormen. This had resulted in much confusion and ill-feeling. In stronger terms, Benjamin Rush, in a sardonic manner, stated that if the military were allowed to make the choice of the generals he would "move immediately afterwards that all the civil power of the continent may be transferred from our hands into the hands of the army, & that they may be proclaimed the highest power of the people." Agreeing, John Adams stated he was distressed that some members of Congress were so disposed to idolize an image which their own hands had molten; that they paid superstitious veneration to Washington. [Note: this was just six weeks after his victories at Princeton and Trenton.] "Altho' I honour him for his good qualities," Adams remarked, "yet in this house I feel myself his superior. In private life I shall always acknowledge that he is mine. It becomes us to attend early to the restraining our army."[11]

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[11] S. Weit Mitchell, "Historical Notes of Dr. Benjamin Rush, 1777," PMHB 27, no. 2 (1903): 139, 140.

During the debates it became obvious that Congress did not, for the most part, desire the military participating in the selection and promotion of their generals, and that they desired the interests of the states be adhered to whenever possible. Therefore, a compromise method of promoting generals was adopted on February 19, 1777. It was later referred to as the "Baltimore Resolution." It provided for the selection and promotion of general officers to be done by Congress, with them giving due regard for line of succession, merit, and quota of troops raised and to be raised by each state.[12]

The "Baltimore Resolution" did not end discussion on the procedures of selecting and promoting the general officers, for many civilian leaders desired more latitude in the rewarding and punishing of officers for demonstrating their merit and for exercising control over their soldiers. The best way many believed was by annual elections. Annual elections had been suggested frequently earlier in the war.[13]

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[12]Francis Lewis to the President of the New York Convention [Abraham Ten Broeck, February 18, 1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:261; Thomas Burke's Abstract of Debates, February 12-19, 1777, ibid., 261; James Wilson to Arthur St. Clair, February 20, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:383; Elbridge Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:243; Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, May 27, 1778, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:170; Ford, JCC, 7:131-133.

[13]Petition of the Privates of the First Battalion of Militia, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, [March 1776], Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. 8:7438-7439.

During April 1775, in Fairfax County, Virginia, George Mason reminded his fellow citizens, in his remarks at the selection of officers for an independent company, that in Rome the troops had lost their loyalty and attachment to the Republic and gave it to certain generals. The way to avoid this in America was annual elections. This would, according to Mason, prevent undue influences of cabals.[14] During the debates in Baltimore, John Adams and several of the delegates suggested that annual elections be adopted as a means of controlling the military. "For my Part," John Adams wrote his wife, "I will vote upon the genuine Principles of a Republic for a new Election of general Officers annually, and every man shall have my Consent to be left out, who does not give sufficient Proof of his Qualifications."[15] Their suggestion of annual elections was raised again during the fall of 1777 after several military defeats. "There is but one way," Benjamin Rush wrote John Adams, "of producing such a change in your army as will rectify all the disorders which prevail in it. It is by electing your general officers annually. In no other

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[14] "Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax Independent Company," circa April 17-26, 1775, Rutland, Papers of George Mason 1725-1792, 1:230-231.

[15] John Adams to Abigail Adams, February 21, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:166; see also John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:371; John Adams to Nathanael Greene, [March 1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:300.

way will you ever purge the army."[16] As such a suggestion was deemed by many as a way of removing Washington, it was not pursued with great vigor by its proponents after the winter of 1777-1778.[17]

Despite the frequent calls during the first three years of the war for better officers, the revolutionary leadership, for the most part, was satisfied with their officer corps. In many respects the officers selected during the first several years of the war were men who met the criteria established by the revolutionary leadership, as was discussed earlier in this chapter. They were men who reflected and shared their beliefs about society and government, who desired neither anarchy or military tyranny in any form.

America did not have a wealth of military leadership talent available in 1775. Therefore, factors other than military experience were considered in the selection of the officers. Among the primary qualifications considered was

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[16] Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 31, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:163; see also Same to same, October 1, 1777, ibid., 157.

[17] James Lovell to Samuel Adams, December 20, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:593-594.

the personal character of an individual.[18] The military leaders certainly considered this an important consideration. Washington believed that when past military service was not a factor in the selection of an officer, the criteria used should include the consideration of whether the individual "has a just pretension to the Character of a Gentleman, a proper sense of Honor and some reputation to lose." General McDougall agreed, believing the officers selected must be those "who have a Sense of Honor and whose class in Life is respectable." General Jethro Sumner desired officers "whose birth, family connections and property bind them to the interests of their country." "It is a matter of the utmost Importance," George Clinton wrote the chief executive of New Jersey, "to have our army officiered by young Gentlemen of Property, Sense & Spirit."[19] A corollary to character was wealth, for it was believed

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[18] John Adams to William Tudor, July 23, 1775, William Tudor Papers, MHS; John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 3, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:6; Edmund Randolph, History of Virginia, ed. with an intro. by Arthur H. Shaffer (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Virginia Historical Society, 1970), p. 227.

[19] George Washington to Patrick Henry, October 5, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:167; Alexander McDougall to Robert Yates, October 21, 1776, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 2:11; Sumner quoted in Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the Revolutionary War (Charlotte: Phillips Russell, 1965), p. 31; George Clinton to William Livingston, January 13, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:545.

that men of property would give dignity to the officer corps and they would be more likely to lay down their arms when they were no longer needed by Congress and the states.[20]

Numerous men of property and standing did indeed join the patriotic ranks. In Philadelphia, for instance, John Adams reported in 1775 that the city's regiments were "under Officers consisting of Gentlemen of the very first Fortune and best Character in the Place." The best known of these regiments was even nicknamed the "Silk Stocking Company" because of the gentility of its membership. Many of its officers were later commissioned as Continental officers.[21] Similar reports were made about the sons of the southern gentry becoming officers. In Alexandria, Virginia, when the local revolutionary committee met in January 1776 to choose the officers for a new company, twenty-one names were put forth, all from the first families of Fairfax County.[22] Frequently young men of wealth and

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[20]The New York Provincial Congress to the New York delegates in the Continental Congress, June 7, 1775, Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolution (Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1887), pp. 7-8.

[21]John Adams to Isaac Smith, Sr., June 7, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:212, Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 24.

[22]Nicholas Cresswell, Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777, p. 137.

position who were not selected or did not choose to serve early in the war, joined later as the war moved southward, often serving at their own expense.[23]

It was not just the wealthy young southern and Philadelphia men of wealth and social standing that served as officers, for many older northern men of wealth and standing also served.[24] One example was Elias Boudinot. During the spring of 1777, Washington asked him to become the Commissary General of Prisoners. When Boudinot said no, Washington told him that "if Men of Character & Influence would not come forward & join him in his Exertions all would be lost-[.]" Being thus influenced, Boudinot reported, and realizing such a position would allow him to keep an eye "on the Military Power & prevent its Incroachment, on the Civil Authority, I consented to accept the Commission."[25] Many of the wealthy New York land-owning families, including the Van Rensselaers and Livingstons, also supplied numerous officers.

Besides including men of wealth and social standing, the revolutionary officer corps also included many of the

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[23]Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 76-78; Henry P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis 1781 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1881), p. 36n.2.

[24]J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888, 1:239.

[25]Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections, p. 9.

educated and professional class. The officer corps counted among its number hundreds of college students, graduates, and faculty.[26] Professionals, such as doctors, also served as line officers, not just in their professional capacity. Among the doctors who held military command were John Brooks, David Cobb, John Thomas, Arthur St. Clair, Edward Hand, Hugh Mercer, Henry Dearborn, William Irvine, James McHenry, James Wilkinson, John Beatty, John Hazlett, and Theodorick Bland.[27]

And just as the revolutionary leaders attempted to procure the wealthy, educated, and socially acceptable as officers, they also attempted to dissuade and prevent those they considered socially inferior from receiving commissions. In North Carolina, for example, the Provincial Congress, although allowing the soldiers to select their company grade

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[26] Henry P. Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, pp. 3, 16, 36, 38-39, 84, 341-342; Anson Phelps Stokes, Memorials of Eminent Yale Men: A Biographical Study of Student Life and University Influences During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914), 2:290; William H.S. Demarest, A History of Rutgers College 1766-1924 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers College, 1924), pp. 101-138; Samuel Davies Alexander, Princeton College During the Eighteenth Century (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Company, 1872), pp. 149-193; Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, 4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916-1919), 1:155n.3.

[27] J. M. Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolution, p. 107n.1.; Louise C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775-1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Medical Field Service School, 1931), p. 36.

officers, retained to themselves the right of veto. During 1778, the Rhode Island General Assembly denied General Sullivan's request that four non-commissioned officers be commissioned, because of the opposition of the Rhode Island officers who believed the four men were their social inferiors. The influential Van Cortlandt family, during the fall of 1775, was able to dissuade one man from accepting his election to a captaincy; and another New Yorker, in a deferential manner, declined election to a captaincy because he believed he had neither the education or experience to hold such a position.[28]

At his Roxbury, Massachusetts, camp early in August 1775, Connecticut militia colonel John Chester asked a friend whether he should make the most advantage of his current militia commission, being a judge, or having served as a member of the assembly, with respect to obtaining a commission in the regular Continental establishment.[29] A specific answer to his question could not be located; however, as a general rule, considerable regard was given prior legislative experience or current political standing.

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[28]William Greene to John Sullivan, October 30, 1778, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:473; Otto Hufeland, Westchester County during the American Revolution 1775-1783, p. 67; [John P. Becker], The Sexagenary, or Reminiscences of the American Revolution (Albany: W. C. Little and O. Steele, 1833), p. 22.

[29]John Chester to Samuel B. Webb, August 11, 1775, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 29.

Many members of the colonial governments were selected early in the war to serve as military leaders. Washington, for example, had served for a long period in the Virginia House of Burgess. Lord Stirling served on the New Jersey Governor's Council prior to the war and Samuel H. Parsons had served in the Connecticut General Assembly for thirteen years before the war.[30] Political leaders, such as Patrick Henry, Lachlan McIntosh, Samuel Elbert, and Alexander McDougall, were often made senior military officers over more qualified men, simply because of their political standing. It is interesting to note that when Lord Stirling was appointed a general in 1776 before him, McDougall complained loudly until Philip Schuyler and John Jay informed him that the promotion had been made for political reasons and was not meant to be an improper reflection upon his honor or his military ability.[31] Local political leaders were also appointed to military positions, for it seemed that such natural leaders would be more than

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[30]Ditmas, Stirling, p. 6; Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 18.

[31]Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 35, 91, 107, 111, 238n.; Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:312-313; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, p. 72.

able in giving direction and exercising control over their neighbors under arms.[32]

Political considerations were observed throughout the war. Washington frequently obtained promotions for officers because of political necessity.[33] Political considerations were important factors for Congress, as well as for the provincial congresses and early state legislatures in the selection of the military officers. One person complained during July 1776 that most of the inferior officers in his colony selected during the first months of the war were "the creatures and absolute dependents of the governing party."[34] Similarly, Washington complained late in 1776 that the states were appointing officers "not fit to be Shoe Blacks from the local attachments of this or that Member of Assembly."[35] And when they did not select previous political leaders, they selected themselves.

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[32]Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:64; Adrian C. Leiby, The Revolutionary War in the Hackensack Valley: The Jersey Dutch and the Neutral Ground, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1962) p. 69.

[33]George Washington to William Heath, March 21, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:344.

[34]John Jones to James Duane, July 13, 1775, "The Duane Letters," Southern History Association Publications 7, no. 4 (July 1903): 249; see also Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsone, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina, rev. ed., p. 216.

[35]George Washington to John Augustine Washington, November 6, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:246.

It was only natural that many of the revolutionary leaders, who served in their provincial revolutionary bodies during 1775 and 1776 would become officers, often completely leaving behind their positions in the civilian governments.

The New Hampshire Provincial Congress provided from its membership numerous military commanders including John Stark.[36] Similarly, many members of the revolutionary organizations of Massachusetts during 1774 and 1775 went on to distinguished military careers. These included Generals William Heath, Artemas Ward, John Paterson, and Benjamin Lincoln.[37] In Vermont, sixteen of the twenty-eight men who served on the Council of Safety would serve in the military.[38]

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[36]Moore, John Stark, p. 127; John Scales, Life of Gen. Joseph Cilley (Manchester, New Hampshire: Standard Book Company, 1921), pp. 21, 24, 26, 28; Walker, New Hampshire's Five Provincial Congresses, Appendix, pp. 55-56; Offutt, Patriotic Maryland, p. 182.

[37]Nathaniel N. Shipton, "General Joseph Palmer: Scapegoat for the Rhode Island Fiasco of October 1777," NEQ 33, no. 4 (December 1966): 499; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, pp. 221-228; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 209; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:195; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts (Boston: Printed for the Society, 1873), p. 327; Frederick Lewis Weis, "Asa Whitcomb, A Sterling Patriot," PMHS 67 (October 1941-May 1944): 120-123; William Henry Lee, "An Address on the Life and Character of Major-General John Paterson, of the Revolutionary Army, and the Paterson Family to which he belonged, delievered before the New York Genealogical and Biographical Society, April 11, 1890," NYGBR 21, no. 3 (July 1890): 106.

[38]Walton, Records of Vermont, 1:114-129, 190n.1, 237-241, 276-277; 2:1-2, 114, 241; 3:1-2.

Many members of New York's provincial congresses served as military leaders. Among them were Alexander McDougall, Robert G. Livingston, Abraham Ten Broeck, Walter Livingston, Richard Montgomery, and Nathaniel Woodhull.[39] In one listing of members of the provincial congress, forty-two of the two hundred twenty-six had a military title next to their name.[40] Of the twenty-eight men of Rockland County who served in the provincial congress and/or the state legislature, nine served as militia officers and three as Continental officers.[41]

Many members of the New Jersey Provincial Congress played major roles in leading the colony's military forces in the field as military commanders. These included William Maxwell, William Winds, William DeHart, Nathaniel Heard, Charles Stewart, Ephraim Martin, Philemon Dickinson, and

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[39]Frank Bertangue Green, The History of Rockland County (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1886), pp. 74-75; Henry B. Dawson, Westchester-County New York, During the American Revolution, pp. 100-101, 102-109; Edwin Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons of Livingston Manor (New York: Published for the author by Knickerbocker Press, 1910), pp. 519-520, 531, 227, 535, 545-546; William H. S. Demarest, History of Rutgers 1766-1924, p. 131; Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 409; Kirkland, Letters on the Revolution, 2:23n.3; Jones, History of New York, 2:331-332; Thomas P. Robinson, "Some Notes on Major General Richard Montgomery," NYH 37, no. 4 (October 1956): 389, 391; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 104-105.

[40]Hough, The New-York Civil List, pp. 49-54.

[41]Frank Bertangue Green, The History of Rockland County, pp. 74-75.

Elijah Clark.[42] Pennsylvania had many officers who served for varying periods of time during the war in the Association, the Flying Camp, and in the Continental army, who served during the first two years of the war in the legislative and constitutional bodies of the colony. Among them were John Nixon, Thomas Hartley, Henry Haller, John Bayard, Anthony Wayne, William Irvine, Samuel Miles, and Daniel Brodhead.[43] Of the twenty-five members of the first Committee of Safety nine later served as military officers, including Anthony Wayne, William Thompson, and John Cadwalader. Of the thirty-four men who served in the second

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[42]Andrew M. Sherman, Historic Morristown, New Jersey: The Story of its First Century (Morristown: Howard Publishing Company, 1905), pp. 152-173; Kirkland, Letters on the Revolution, 1:75n.7, 55n.8; New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 1:5n.1, 9-10n.1, 170n.2; 2:128n.1, 131n.1; 3:2n.1; Edmund J. James, "Some Additional Information Concerning Ephraim Martin Esquire Colonel of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment of the Continental Line," PMHB 36, no. 2 (1912): 146-149.

[43]Charles Henry Hart, "Colonel John Nixon," PMHB 1, no. 2 (1877): 194; John W. Jordan, "Biographical Sketch of Colonel Thomas Hartley, of the Pennsylvania Line," ibid., 25, no. 3 (1901): 303-304; ibid., 46, no. 1 (1922): 72n.150; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774-1783 (Reading, Pennsylvania: Chas. F. Haage, 1894), p. 231; Offutt, Patriotic Maryland, pp. 194, 209; David R. B. Nevin, Continental Sketches of Distinguished Pennsylvanians (Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, 1875), pp. 119-120; Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 62-63n.2; Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:262n.12; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:330n.1; Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 14-15; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:284-285; Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 1:757.

Committee of Safety fourteen served as military officers.[44] Further south, Delaware and Virginia Provincial Congress members John Haslet, William Woodford, and William Christian also served as military officers.[45]

The deep South's experience was similar, as civilian leaders in the provincial bodies became military officers. Many of the early military leaders in North Carolina, both Continental and militia, served initially in the provincial congress and/or one of the several committees of safety. Among them were Benjamin Williams, Griffith Rutherford, Jethro Sumner, Isaac Gregory, Robert Howe, and Gideon Lamb.[46] Like their northern neighbor, many South Carolina military leaders served in the early provincial and early state

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[44]Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives. 2d ser. 3:681-682, 684; Similar statistics for the first two councils of safety are found in ibid., 3:685-686, 686-687.

[45]Ernest J. Moyne, "Who was Colonel John Haslet of Dealware?" DH 13, no. 4 (October 1969): 291; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:352, 380; J. G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, ed., "Revolutionary Diary of William Lenoir," JSH 6, no. 2 (May 1940): 250n.6.

[46]Ibid., 250n.5; Draper, King's Mountain, p. 478; Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:162, 165, 71; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:65-66, 178-179, 307-311; 3:168-170, 258-259; 5:31-32, 368-369, 398; 6:114-116; Leora McEachern and Isabel M. Williams, eds., Wilmington-New Hanover Safety Committee Minutes 1774-1776, appendix 1, 139-140; 4:121, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 392-395; 5:75-76, 396-401, 467-468; 7:115-116, 275-277.

legislative bodies before becoming officers.[47] Many of Georgia's leaders in its provincial congress and committee and councils of safety became military leaders. These included Samuel Elbert, Joseph Habersham, John Martin and Lachlan McIntosh.[48]

Early in the war, General Greene expressed his hope "No popular prejudices nor family connexion will influence" the elections of the officers.[49] He was to be disappointed. Often when a political leader did not himself serve in the military he was able to obtain a commission for a family member or a protege. John Hancock, for example, got his former clerk, William Palfrey, appointed paymaster of the Eastern Department and his brother, Ebenezer Hancock, appointed deputy. New Jersey Lieutenant Ebenezer Elmer reported in his journal early in the war that he obtained

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[47] Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, pp. 231, 242, 230, 262, 305, 319, 330; BDC, p. 1005.

[48] "Official Letters of Governor John Martin, 1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 281-282; White, Historical Collections of Georgia, pp. 214, 215; Peel, Historical Collections, 1:186-187; Charles C. Jones, Jr., "The Life and Service of the Honorable Major Gen. Samuel Elbert of Georgia," MH, extra no. 13 (1887): 9, 28; Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," ibid., extra no. 2 (1886): 236-237, 239; Charles C. Jones, Biographical Sketches of the Delegates from Georgia to the Continental Congress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1891), p. 114.

[49] Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 11, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:313.

his commission from the New Jersey Provincial Congress on the recommendation of one of its members, his uncle, Theophilus Elmer.[50] Although Greene and some others objected to such practices, most revolutionary leaders believed that various forms of nepotism were a deterrent to military tyranny.

In every state, by blood or by marriage, civilian leaders had relatives and in-laws serving in the military. In Georgia, Governor John Houston had a brother who served as a Continental surgeon; another who served in the state legislature; a son-in-law, Lachlan McIntosh, who served as a Continental general; and his father-in-law, Jonathan Bryan, served in the Council and as vice-president. Bryan had two sons who served in the state legislature and another who served as a Continental officer.[51]

George Walton, who served as chief executive of Georgia, as a member of Congress, and as a Continental and

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[50]Herbert S. Allan, John Hancock: Patriot in Purple (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 227; "Journal Kept During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no. 3 (1847): 98.

[51]Edith Duncan Johnston, The Houstons of Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1950), pp. 209, 234, 298-299, 319; [Isabella Remshart Redding], Life and Times of Jonathan Bryan, 1708-1788 (Savannah: The Morning News Print, 1901), pp. 79-80.

militia officer, had a brother who served in both Congress and in the state government. Another active Georgia family was the Habershams. Joseph served as a member of the executive council and speaker of the assembly, as well as a Continental officer. His brother, James, also served as speaker of the assembly. Their brother, John, and brother-in-law, Samuel Elbert, served as Continental officers.[52]

South Carolina had several prominent families supplying both civilian and military leaders. Charles Pinckney, who served in various civilian positions including stints in the privy council and senate, had a first cousin, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who served in the state legislature and as a Continental officer. The latter's father-in-law was Henry Middleton and his brother-in-law was Arthur Middleton, both civilian leaders. Another brother-in-law was Continental and militia officer Daniel Horry. Horry, who also served in the senate, had two brothers who served as Continental officers and in the state legislature. The Middletons, who both served in Congress and in the state government, by marriage were realted to Edward Rutledge, who also served in Congress and in the state legislature. His

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[52] BDC, 1877; Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," MH extra no. 2, no. 7, part 2 (1886): 236-237, 239; Peel, Historical Collections, 1:186-187.

two brothers, John and Hugh, both served in the state government, the former as chief executive and the latter as Speaker of the House. Another active family were the five Huger brothers. Isaac was a Continental general and a member of the state legislature; Daniel was a member of the House and council; John was a militia officer, a member of the Council of Safety, and Secretary of State; Francis was Deputy Quartermaster General of the Southern Department; and Benjamin was a Continental officer. The Gadsdens were also active, with Christopher serving as a Continental general, member of Congress, and as Lieutenant Governor. His son, Thomas, was a Continental officer and his son-in-law, Thomas Ferguson, was a member of the House and the privy council.[53]

North Carolina had several families who were active in both civilian and military affairs, particularly the Ashes. John served as a member of the Committee of Safety, Provincial Congress, State Treasurer, and militia general. His sons, John, Jr., and Samuel, were Continental officers. His brother, Samuel, who served in the military and as chief judge, had three sons who served as Continental officers.

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[53]Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Founding Father, pp. 43-44; Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of South Carolina, pp. 239, 241-242, 290, 303; BDC, p. 1156; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:283; Walsh, Christopher Gadsden, pp. 12ln3, 153n3.

John Ashe's brother-in-law, James Moore, served in the Provincial Congress and as a Continental general. Moore's brother, Maurice, who served in the Provincial Congress, had two sons, and a brother-in-law who served as Continental officers. Maurice Moore's son-in-law was Continental general Francis Nash, whose brother was Abner Nash, who served as governor, in the Provincial Congress, Council of Safety, senate, assembly, and as a member of Congress. Their father was a member of the Committee of Safety. Other active North Carolina families were the Hawkins, Joneses, Sumners, Blounts, and Brevards. John Brevard, who was active in state government, had six sons who served in the military, and by marriage they were related to Generals William Lee Davidson and Thomas Polk. William Blount, who served in the Continental Army before serving in the state legislature and Congress, had two brothers who served as Continental officers. Continental General Jethro Sumner had two brothers who served in the senate and two others who were active in the military. Their brother-in-law, Elisha Battle, also served in the senate. Willie and Allen Jones both served in Congress. The latter's sons-in-law were Colonel William Richardson Davie and militia General Thomas Easton. Benjamin Hawkins, who served in the House, aide-de-camp to Governor Nash, and in Congress, had a brother, Philemon, who was a militia colonel, who served

in the Provincial Congress, the assembly, and on the governor's council.[54]

Many Virginia families also had family members serving in military and civilian positions. This was especially true of the Lees and Randolphs. Richard Henry Lee had four brothers, Francis Lightfoot, Thomas Ludwell, William Arthur, and a brother-in-law, William Shippen, Jr., who were active in civilian affairs. His second cousin and nephew-in-law, Light Horse Harry Lee, was the cousin of civil-military leader, Theodorick Bland. Bland and Thomas Jefferson were fourth generation Randolphs. Also related to the Randolphs were Light Horse Harry Lee, John Marshall, State Treasurer Robert Carter Nicholas, and Speaker of the Senate, Archibald Cary. The latter's sons-in-law included militia Colonel Thomas Mann Randolph and Continental Captain

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[54]Leora McEachern and Isabel M. Williams, eds., Wilmington-New Hanover Safety Committee Minutes 1774-1776, appendix 4, pp. 121, 130; Junius Davis, Alfred Moore and James Irdell: Revolutionary Patriots, and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. An Address Delievered in Presenting their Portraits to the Supreme Court of North Carolina on Behalf of the North Carolina Society of the Sons of the Revolution (Raleigh: Published by the Society, 1899), pp. 9-12; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 1:45-47, 50, 194-195, 404; 2:300-306; 3:299; 4:46, 51-52, 252, 254-255; 5:19-20, 140-141, 143-146; 8:18-19, 23, 25-27; Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:237-241; William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), pp. 29-45; Kemp P. Battle, "Career of Brigadier-General Jethro Sumner. One of North Carolina's Revolutionary Officers," MAH 26, no. 6 (December 1891): 423; Merritt B. Pound, Benjamin Hawkins-Indian Agent (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1951), p. 3.

Carter Page, son of state leader, John Page. The latter's brother, Mann Page, who served in Congress and the state legislature, had as a son-in-law Continental Colonel George Baylor. Joseph Jones, a state leader and member of Congress, had as nephews James Monroe, John Marshall, and Thomas Marshall, the latter a captain in the Virginia state regiment, and by marriage was related to General William Woodford. Governor Patrick Henry's brothers-in-law included General William Campbell and Colonel William Christian, and his son-in-law was Colonel Samuel Meredith. Governor Thomas Nelson, who also served in the military, had three cousins serving as Continental officers and a brother who served in the state legislature. Member of Congress and state leader, Edmund Pendleton had a nephew and an adopted son serving as Continental officers. On the Virginia-North Carolina frontier Evan Shelby, general of the Virginia militia and a member of both North Carolina and Virginia legislatures, had a son, Isaac, who served in both state's militia and state legislatures.[55]

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[55]Brock, Archibald Cary, pp. 6, 47, 121, 122; Thomas Boyd, Light-Horse Harry Lee (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 10; Jonathan Daniels, The Randolphs of Virginia (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1972), Genealogy chart, pp. 95, 99; Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, p. 36; Oliver Perry Chitwood, Richard Henry Lee: Statesman of the Revolution (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 1967), p. 211; Curtis P. Nettles, George Washington and the American Independence (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. 124; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:350, 402, 633; 2:969; Herbert A. Johnson et al., eds. The

Maryland Governor Thomas Johnson, who served in Congress and as a general of the militia, had four brothers serving in the militia. John Hanson, who served in Congress, was related to Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison, Washington's military secretary, and to members of Congress Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer and Thomas Stone. Hanson's three sons served in the Continental Army, one of whom, Alexander Contee Hanson, served as private secretary to Washington.[56]

Delaware and New Jersey had numerous families with their members serving in military and civilian positions. George Read, who served as chief executive of Delaware and as a member of Congress, had two brothers who served in the military and two brothers-in-law who were active: Gunning Bedford as a Continental lieutenant colonel, and George Ross, a member of Congress. Ephraim Martin, who served in the Provincial Congress and a member of the council, had a son

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Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p. 312n.4; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), p. 20; Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 61, 127; Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 86, 150, 239; Draper, King's Mountain, pp. 383, 412, 414; Scharf, History of Maryland, 1:450-451.

[56]Ibid., 452-454; Jacob A. Nelson, John Hanson and the Inseparable Union: An Authentic Biography of a Revolutionary Leader, Patriot and Statesman (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1939), pp. 113-114; J. Bruce Kremer, John Hanson of Mulberry Grove (New York: Albert and Charles Buni, 1938), pp. 40-41.

who served as a Continental officer. Many of New Jersey's delegates to Congress had relatives who served in the military. For example, John Witherspoon had three sons who served as military officers; and William Livingston, who also served as the chief executive, was related by birth and marriage to the New York Livingstons, who provided many military officers. His son, Brockholst, was a Continental officer, whose brothers-in-law were John Jay and Lieutenant Colonel William Smith Livingston. William Livingston's nephew was Continental officer Matthew Clarkson and his brother-in-law was General Stirling, whose brother-in-law was state leader John Stevens. Stirling's son-in-law was William Duer, who served in Congress and in the New York legislature.[57]

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[57]J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888, 1:186-190; Edmund J. James, "Some Additional Information Concerning Ephraim Martin, Esquire, Colonel of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment of the Continental Line," PMHB 36, no. 2 (1912): 146-149, 152; Ann Clark Hart, Abraham Clark: Signer of the Declaration of Independence (San Francisco: Pioneer Press, 1923), pp. 38-40, 62; Donald W. Whisenhunt, [ed.], Delegate from New Jersey: The Journal of John Fell (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 164; Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., John Morgan: Continental Doctor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), p. 195; The Letters of Moore Furman: Deputy Quartermaster General of New Jersey in the Revolution (New York: Frederick H. Hitchcock for the New Jersey Society of the Colonial Dames of America, 1912), p. 42n.47; Wallace, William Bradford, p. 285; David Freeman Hawke, Paine (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 212; Varnum Lansing Collins, President Witherspoon: A Biography, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925), 1:193n27; 2:31, 31n.23, 49n.35; Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 41, 44, 241; Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 392; Flexner,

Pennsylvania's delegates to Congress also had relatives serving in the military. Frederick Muhlenberg's brother was General John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, and John Armstrong, Sr.'s son served as a Continental Officer. James Wilson and George Ross had as their brother-in-law Mark Bird, who was a militia lieutenant colonel and Deputy Quartermaster General. John Dickinson's brother, Philemon, was a militia general, as well as a member of Congress. The Dickinsons were cousins to Colonel Lambert Cadwalader and General John Cadwalader. The Dickinsons and Cadwaladers, by marriage, were related to militia General Samuel Meredith, as were members of Congress George Clymer and militia Colonel Henry Hill. Another member of Congress, Edward Biddle, had as brothers, Owen Biddle, who served as Deputy Commissary General of Forage and as a member of the Board of War; and Charles Biddle, Vice President of the state; and Clement Biddle, who served as Commissary General of Forage and Quartermaster General of Pennsylvania. Their brother-in-law was Peter Scull, who served as a Continental officer and later, Secretary to the Board of War.[58]

The Traitor and the Spy, p. 161; Edward Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons of Livingston Manor, pp. 525-526.

[58]James Haltigan, The Irish in the American Revolution and their Early Influence in the Colonies (Washington, D.C.: Patrick J. Haltigan, 1908), pp. 202, 236-237; Edward W. Hocker, The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg;

One cannot discuss the civil-military family relationship in New York without mentioning the Livingstons. Philip Livingston, Second Lord of the Manor, had five children: Robert, Peter, Philip, William, and Sarah, who themselves, their spouses or their children were active during the war. Robert's son, Peter, was a militia colonel and member of the assembly; another son, John, was an aide-de-camp to Governor Clinton; another son, Henry, who was a militia lieutenant colonel; and his daughter married James Duane, whose son-in-law was Major William North. Peter was President of the Provincial Congress. Philip was a member of the Provincial Congress, the senate, and the Continental Congress. His son, Henry P. Livingston, was an officer in Washington's Life Guards. William Livingston was a member of Congress and Governor of New Jersey. His children were mentioned earlier. Sarah Livingston was the wife of Lord

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Lutheran Clergyman, Military Chieftain and Political Leader (Philadelphia: Edward W. Hocker, 1936), p. 133; Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:261-262n.9; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:91n.8; Wharton Dickinson, "Philemon Dickinson: Major-General, New Jersey Militia-Revolutionary Service," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 420; Charles Biddle, Autobiography of Charles Biddle, Vice-President of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania 1745-1821 (Philadelphia: E. Claxton and Company, 1883), p. 74; David R. B. Nevin, Continental Sketches of Distinguished Pennsylvanians, pp. 169-170; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, pp. 212, 268-269; James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 59.

Stirling and their son-in-law was William Duer. Then there were the related cousins, Judge Robert R. Livingston of Clermont, Robert G. Livingston, and Henry Livingston of Dutchess County. Judge Livingston had three sons and three sons-in-law active in civil and military positions during the war, including Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston; member of Congress Robert R. Livingston; militia Major John R. Livingston; Major General Richard Montgomery; Dr. Thomas Tillotson, Physician Surgeon of the Northern Department; and Morgan Lewis, aide to Gates, and Quartermaster General of the Northern Army. The latter's father, Francis Lewis, was a member of Congress. Robert G. Livingston had three sons in the military: Robert G. Livingston, Jr., who was a Continental colonel and member of the Provincial Congress; Gilbert R. Livingston, a Continental officer; and Henry G. Livingston, a brigade-major and aide-de-camp to Lord Stirling. Henry Livingston of Dutchess County had two sons, Henry, Jr., and Robert H., who were Continental officers.[59]

Another New York family actively involved in civilian and military affairs, who by marriage were related to Philip Livingston ("The Signer"), were the Van Rensselaers.

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[59]Edwin Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons of Livingston Manor, pp. 515-535, 545-556, 227-229; Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 98.

Their military involvement is evidenced by the fact that twelve of them served in the northern campaign of 1777. Pierre Van Cortlandt, who by marriage was related to the Livingstons, served as chairman of the committee and council of safeties, member of the Provincial Congress, President Pro Tem of the senate, and Lieutenant Governor. His son, Pierre, and son-in-law, Abraham Van Wyck, were Continental officers. Other active New York families were the Morrises, McDougalls, Clintons, Schuylers, and Gansevoorts. Peter Gansevoort, a Continental colonel and militia general, had a brother, Leonard, who was a member of the Provincial Congress; his brother-in-law, Jacob Cuyler, was also a member of the Provincial Congress and Deputy Commissary General of Purchases; his uncle, Volkert P. Duow, was Vice-President of the Provincial Congress. Philip Schuyler, a member of Congress and a major general, had as a son-in-law Alexander Hamilton, and his brother-in-law was John Cochran, Director of the Military Hospitals. Schuyler's mother was a Van Cortlandt, his wife a Van Rensselaer, and he was related to the Livingstons.[60]

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[60]Ibid., pp. 68, 409, 451; Van Rensselaer, Annals of the Van Rensselaers, pp. 217-219, 548; Henry B. Dawson, Westchester-County, New York During the American Revolution, p. 105n.7; Koebling, The Journal of the Reverend Silas Constant, p. 430; Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany: Dutch Patricians in the Upper Hudson Valley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. 89, 92, 93, 119; Tuckerman, Philip Schuyler, p. 104; Spaulding, George Clinton, pp. 89, 98.

Governor and General George Clinton's brother was General James Clinton, whose son, Alexander, was a Continental officer. George Clinton's brothers-in-law included a militia lieutenant colonel and Christopher Tappan, a state leader and militia major. Tappan's son, Peter, was a Continental officer. Clinton was also related to militia colonel Charles DeWitt, who also served in the Provincial Congress, Council of Safety, and the Assembly. Major General Alexander McDougall, who also served in Congress, had two sons who were Continental officers. His brother-in-law was Daniel Roberdeau of Pennsylvania, and his son-in-law was the Judge Advocate of the army, John Lawrence. General Lewis Morris, who also served in Congress, had two sons who were Continental officers. His half brother was Gouverneur Morris.[61]

New England also had a large number of families who were involved in civil and military affairs, especially in Connecticut. Silas Deane had as a father-in-law militia General Gordon Saltonstall; his oldest step-son was Colonel Samuel B. Webb, whose father-in-law was John Jay; and his youngest step-son was John Webb, who served as an aide-de-camp to Generals Greene and Howe, and whose father-in-law

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[61] Ibid., pp. 53, 161; Bliven, Under the Guns, p. 119; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 178; Morris, John Jay, 1:325n.5, 7; Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 127; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:24n.3, 5.

was Colonel John Chester of the Connecticut State Regiment. Roger Sherman had three sons who were Continental officers and George Wyllys, Secretary of State, had two sons serving as Continental officers and another as a militia officer. Militia Major General Jabez Huntington, who served in the assembly, had four sons in military service, including Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Huntington and General Jedediah Huntington, whose father-in-law was Governor Jonathan Trumbull. Jabez Huntington's brother-in-law was Colonel Experience Storrs, who served both in the militia and the Continental army. Governor Trumbull's three sons, Joseph, Jonathan, and John, were Continental officers, the latter two serving on Washington's staff. His son-in-law, William Williams, was a member of Congress.[62] In Massachusetts, James Warren, Sr., President of the Provincial Congress and later Speaker of the House, had a son who was a naval officer. His father-in-law was James Otis, whose son-in-law was Benjamin Lincoln, and whose sons, James Otis, Jr., was a naval officer and Samuel Alleyne Otis was a member of the state Board of War and Deputy Clothier General. The

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[62]Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:xxvii-xxx, 178n., 212-213n.; 3:268; Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 62; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, pp. 8, 24, 265; Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:135; Seymour, A Digressive History, pp. 50, 53, 177; "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 1, 2n., 166n.; Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 170-176.

President of the Massachusetts Board of War, Samuel Phillips Savage, had two sons serving as Continental officers and another who was a major of the South Carolina militia. Massachusetts Board of War member Jonathan Glover, who was also a member of the legislature and colonel of the militia, had as a brother General John Glover. Member of Congress Robert Treat Paine's brother-in-law was Lieutenant Colonel David Cobb, who served as an aide-de-camp to Washington.[63] Governor Samuel Ward of Rhode Island, who also served in Congress, had a brother, Henry, who was Secretary of State; a son, Samuel, who was a Continental officer who served as an aide-de-camp to Washington, and whose father-in-law was Governor William Greene; and a son-in-law, Colonel William Greene, whose cousin was Nathanael Greene. Governor William Greene's cousins included Nathanael Greene and Griffin Greene, Paymaster of the First Rhode Island Regiment. General Greene's brother, Jacob, was a member of a county Committee of Safety; his brother-in-law, William Littlefield, was a Continental officer; and his cousin was Colonel

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[63] Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:247n.; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, pp. 385, 497; Samuel Savage Shaw, [ed.], "Adams-Savage Correspondence, 1776-1785," PMHS 43 (October 1909-June 1910): 328-329, 328n.2; George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960), p. 60; Ralph Davol, Two Men of Taunton in the Course of Human Events 1731-1829 (Taunton, Massachusetts: Davol Publishing Company, 1912), pp. 176-177.

Christopher Greene, whose son-in-law was Continental Captain Thomas Hughes. Governor Nicholas Cooke's sons-in-law were Lieutenant Colonel Jeremiah Olney and New York militia Lieutenant Colonel Asa Waterman. Deputy Governor Bradford's son, Major William Bradford, was an aide-de-camp to General Lee. State leader and militia Major General Joshua Babcock had two sons who served as Continental officers.[64] New Hampshire Chief Executive Meshech Weare had a son serving as a Continental officer and Vermont's Chief Executive Thomas Chittenden had a son-in-law, Matthew Lyon, who served in the Continental Army as Paymaster of the Vermont troops, Secretary to the Governor and Council, and Assistant State Treasurer.[65]

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[64]Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 410; RIHSC 6 (1867): 83-84, 87; John Ward, "Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Ward, of the Revolutionary War," NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 1203; Edward Field, ed., Diary of Colonel Israel Angell: Commanding the Second Rhode Island Continental Regiment During the American Revolution 1778-1781 (Providence, Rhode Island: Preston and Rounds Company, 1899), pp. 7n.1, 17n.2; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:15n.1, 55n.5; Stone, Our French Allies, pp. 64, 449; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, p. 16; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, pp. 178, 204-205.

[65]C. E. Potter, The Military History of the State of New-Hampshire, From Its Settlement, in 1623, to the Rebellion, in 1861: Comprising an account of the Stirring Events Connected therewith: Biographical Notices of many of the Officers Distinguished Therein: and Notes Explanatory of the Text (Concord: McFarland and Jenks, 1866), p. 303n.; James Haltigan, The Irish in the American Revolution and their Influence in the Colonies, pp. 73, 76-77.

Although many of the officers were from the educated and wealthy class of colonial society, for the most part, the officers were men who were selected because of their popularity with their neighbors who, in many cases, elected them. This often meant men of simple and respectable means. A Frenchman observed that "by far the greatest part of the American officers are farmers and farmers' sons of independent or easy fortunes."[66] Another Frenchman observed the American officers corps "is composed of deserving and prosperous artisans, well-known and respected merchants, and farmers, beloved and revered by their neighbors."[67] These observations were particularly true of the middle and New England states, which produced most of the Continental officers.[68] Innkeepers and tavern owners, who were generally

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[66]De Lisle to Count ?, November 28, 1777, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 35, no. 3 (1911): 367.

[67]Edward D. Seeber, trans., On the Threshold of Liberty: Journal of a Frenchman's Tour of the American Colonies in 1777, Indiana University Publications, Humanities Series, no. 43 (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 105.

[68]Benjamin Trumbull to George Washington, August 13, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 1:936; for examples of the artisan nature of the officer corps, see Edwin M. Stone, The Life and Recollections of John Howard, Late President of the Rhode Island Historical Society (Providence: George H. Whitney, 1857), pp. 37-38, 38, 43; Mrs. [Catherine] Williams, Biography of Revolutionary Heroes: Containing the Life of Brigadier-Gen. William Barton, and also Captain Stephen Olney (Providence: Mrs. Williams, 1839), p. 70; Oliver Ayer Roberts, History of the Military Company of Massachusetts now Called the Ancient and Honorable

popular in their communities, often became officers, particularly as colonels and generals. Among them were George Weedon; Jethro Sumner; John Greaton; Henry Haller; and Israel Putnam who, in addition to being a farmer, also kept a tavern.[69]

Because the American revolutionary military officers were, for the most part, a reflection of civilian society, it is understandable that they shared the same goals with respect to their struggle with Great Britain. There were some exceptions, of course. Some openly avowed Loyalists joined the American military forces during 1775 and 1776 simply to prevent anarchy until the dispute with the mother

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Artillery Company of Massachusetts 1638-1888, 4 vols. (Boston: Alfred Mudge and Son, 1895-1901), 2:68-69, 80, 208, 216-217; Helen Tilden Wild, Medford in the Revolution: Military History of Medford, Massachusetts. 1765-1783. Also list of Soldiers and Civil Officers, with Genealogical and Biographical Notes (Medford: J. C. Miller, Jr., Printer, 1903), pp. 30, 40, 46, 52; David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of Colonel Humphreys (New York: Hodge, Allen and Campbell, 1790), p. 23.

[69] Dawson, Diary of David How, p. 14n.; [Segur], Memoirs and Recollections, 1:335; Chastellux, Travels in North-America, pp. 57, 57-58n.; [Mary Theresa Lieter], Biographical Sketches of the Generals of the Continental Army of the Revolution (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1889), p. 146; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, pp. 230-231; John Ferdinand Dalziel Smyth, A Tour in the United States of America: Containing an Account of the Present Situation of the Country; the Population, Agriculture, Commerce, Customs, and Manners of the Inhabitants; Anecdotes of Several Members of Congress and General Officers in the American Army, 2 vols. (London: G. Robinson, J. Robson and J. Sewell, 1784), 1:196-197; 2:113-114.

country could be resolved within the framework of the Empire. However, when the colonies declared themselves independent, these officers left military service.[70] Some so-called "Sons of Liberty" also became officers. Early in 1777, a former Boston Sons of Liberty leader, Paul Revere, wrote another colleague that he found but few of their former friends in the army. Those that did join were generally of the moderate disposition.[71]

What were the goals they shared? Why was the American soldier fighting? Before setting out from Philadelphia in July 1775 to the scene of battle in New England, James McHenry made out his will, explaining he was off to war "to defend the liberties of Americans and mankind, against the enemies of both." McHenry was not the only soldier to put his participation in the revolutionary war in such moral terms, on such a high plane. During the summer of 1777, General Parsons stated he was fighting to maintain the right of humanity and to vindicate the liberties of freemen. Timothy Pickering, later that year at Valley Forge, told his wife that "the cause of America I consider as the cause of humanity." Even Washington expressed his

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[70] "Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia, Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 186.

[71] Paul Revere to Colonel [John Lamb], April 5, 1777, Elbridge Henry Goss, The Life of Colonel Paul Revere, 2 vols. (Boston: Joseph George Cupples, 1891), 1:280-281.

belief that the American forces were fighting for the essential rights and liberties of the present generation, and for millions yet unborn. "Our cause," he told James Warren, "is noble, it is the cause of Mankind."[72]

The soldiers were more likely to see the war in terms of the Whig rhetoric of the day. Officers frequently reminded themselves and their soldiers they were fighting to protect American rights, liberties, properties and lives.[73]

The officers also believed that whatever sacrifices they made in terms of life and property was necessary to ensure that the lives, properties and liberties of their neighbors were safe against British tyranny. Early in the

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[72]James McHenry's will dated July 29, 1775, in The James McHenry Papers, 2 auction catalogs (New York: Parke Bernet Galleries, Inc., 1944), 2:56; Samuel H. Parsons to Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 263; Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Timothy Pickering, December 13, 1777, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:196; George Washington to James Warren, March 31, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:313, 312-313; see also George Washington to the Ministers, Elders, Deacons and Members of the Reformed German Congregation of New York City, Nov. 27, 1783, ibid., 27:249.

[73]General Orders, ibid., 5:424; Orders by Robert Howe in Francis Marion's Orderly Book, June 28, 1777, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 2:61; Campbell, Orderly Book, p. 2; "The Orderly Book of Colonel William Henshaw, October 1, 1775, through October 3, 1776," PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947): 120; Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775, Gerlach, Philip Schuyler, p. 284; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, September 28, 1779, [copy], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5).

war, Tench Tilghman wrote he wanted to return home, but realized "if we succeed I am in no fear of making ample amends for my lost time. If we fail, anything in this Country is not worth a thought." Similarly General Wayne wrote his wife that "the Blessings of liberty cannot be purchased at too high a price-the Blood and treasure of the Choicest and best Spirits of this land is but a trifling Consideration for the Rich Inheritance-[.]"[74]

Despite these expressions of why they fought, there were those Whigs who often questioned the motives of the military. Two months into the war Greene wrote that the American soldiers desired only to devote themselves "to arms not for the invasion of other Countries but for the defence of our own; not for the gratification of our own private Interest, but for the Publick security." A year and a half later, Greene wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, "Some amongst you, I am told are uncharitable enough to charge the army with a design of protracting the war for their own private advantage." He said nothing could be further from the truth. Nevertheless, in early 1781, Thomas Sumter informed Greene that personal glory and private gain were

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[74]Tench Tilghman to James Tilghman, February 22, 1777, Tilghman, Tench Tilghman, p. 153; Anthony Wayne to Mrs. Wayne, June 7, 1777, Stillé, Anthony Wayne. pp. 66-67.

the goals of many of his fellow soldiers.[75] Most soldiers, however, simply wanted to end the war as soon as possible, under honorable conditions, so that they could return to their peaceful means of profit. Few indeed envisioned becoming professional soldiers. Most simply saw themselves as temporary soldiers, citizens with a military duty to perform.

William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, wrote that in free states "a man puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp, but it is because he is a citizen and would wish to continue so that he makes himself for a while a soldier."[76] This was certainly true of the American soldiers during their revolutionary war. Washington certainly always considered himself a citizen first. "When we assumed the Soldier," Washington told the New York legislature in June 1775, "we did not lay aside the Citizen." Three years later, he told a friend that the Continental soldiers were "Citizens having all the ties, and interests of Citizens," and that they should be

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[75] Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., July 14, 1775, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, p. 99; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:117; Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1781, "Letters to General Greene and Others," SCHGM 16, no. 3 (July 1915): 98.

[76] William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1765-1769), 1:13.

considered, with Congress, as having "embarked in one Cause...and [with] the same End."[77] The French minister reported to Vergennes early in 1779 that Washington was constantly setting forth the principle that one must be a citizen first and an officer and soldier afterwards.[78] But Washington was not the only one making such statements.

At a meeting held in a park in New York on August 10, 1814, Marinus Willett told a gathering that the favorite toast of the revolution was "May every Citizen be a Soldier, and every Soldier a Citizen."[79] This was indeed a popular toast.[80] This sentiment the military not only shared amongst themselves but also reassured the civilian leaders they were citizens first, and foremost. Knox early in 1778 during the so-called "Conway Cabal" wrote Elbridge Gerry it was true that some persons who were and had been in the army wished to have their power perpetuated at the expense

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[77]George Washington to the New York Legislature, June 26, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:305; George Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, ibid., 11:291.

[78]Conrad Alexandre Gerard to Comte de Vergennes, March 7, 1779, Meng, Despatches and Instructions of Gerard, p. 567.

[79]Cited in Willett, Marinus Willett, appendix 10, p. 152.

[80]E.g., Second Lieutenant [Thomas?] Blake's Journal October 17, 1778, in Frederic Kidder, History of the First New Hampshire Regiment in the War of the Revolution (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1868), p. 45.

of the liberties of their fellow citizens, "but it is by no means the sentiment or wish of the army in general, who consider themselves only as citizens in arms, and who would rejoice to return to private life were the independence of America established." Almost five years later, General St. Clair told the army's committee then at Philadelphia they should "remind Congress that when they took up arms it was not with a view to make a profession." He stated that if most of the officers and soldiers had known the war would have lasted so long they would have not engaged in the armed forces.[81] There was little exaggeration in this statement, for most believed the war would be of only short duration.

The military, except for a few would-be professionals and glory seekers, desired nothing more than to return to their civilian status with no other reward than the approbation of their fellow citizens for having done their duty.[82] "We are Soldiers ambitious only to restoring the violated Rights of Citizens-and these secured," General Schuyler wrote the first summer of the war, "We are to return instantly to

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[81]Henry Knox to Elbridge Gerry, January 4, 1778, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:239; Major General Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Colonels Matthias Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:574.

[82]Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., May [ ], 1778, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 455.

the Business & Employments of Civil Life."[83]

Washington certainly desired, from the first week of his command, to return to the peaceful banks of the Potomac. On his way to Cambridge he addressed the New York legislature on June 26, 1775. He told them he desired the war to end as soon as possible, stating "we shall most sincerely rejoice with you in that happy hour when the establishment of American Liberty, upon the most firm and solid foundations, shall enable us to return to our Private stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful and happy Country." By the end of that summer, in hot and humid New England, Washington told Congress "there is not a Man in America, who more earnestly Wishes such a Termination of the Campaign, as to make the Army no longer necessary." As the war lengthened into years, and Washington remained hundreds of miles from his beloved Mount Vernon, his desire to return home increased. By the summer of 1779, he confessed to Joseph Reed "the first wish of my Soul is to return to that peaceful retirement, and domestick ease and happiness from whence I came." Two years later, he told John Armstrong that he panted for retirement, "for those domestic and rural enjoyments which in my estimation far surpasses the highest pageantry of this world." By the

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[83]Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775, Gerlach, Philip Schuyler, pp. 284-285.

fall of 1782, Washington had only been home one time in seven years, and that for only a day. He longed for home. "There is not a Man in America," he told a New England minister late in 1782, "that more Fervently wishes for Peace, and a return to private life than I do."[84] Other officers shared these sentiments.

During the second month of the war, Greene told his wife that he would rather be home than be a soldier. Greene's desire to return to his family and friends in Rhode Island increased the longer he remained away. He told a cousin during the summer of 1780 that "No pleasure is equal to domestic happiness" and his desire for the war to end so he "might return to my dear fireside." "I should be extremely happy," he told his wife the following spring, "if the war had an honourable close, and I on a farm with my little family about me." During the mid summer of 1781, he told her his desire for the war's end and his retirement to their home, "where love and softer pleasure are to be found." When Gouverneur Morris suggested to Greene that he really

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[84] George Washington to the New York Legislature, June 26, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:305; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, ibid., 3:511; George Washington to Joseph Reed, July 29, 1779, ibid., 16:9; George Washington to John Armstrong, March 26, 1781, ibid., 21:378; George Washington to William Gordon, October 23, 1782, ibid., 25:288; see also Washington's Circular of May 4, 1782, ibid., 24:234-238.

enjoyed the military life, Greene responded by telling him that he was "truely domestic." "The more I am in an army and the more I am acquainted with human nature," he wrote Morris, "the less fond I am of political life."[85]

"I wish for nothing more," General Wayne wrote late in 1778, "than an opportunity of returning to my 'Sabine field,' with safety to my country and honor to myself." Late on a cold December 1777 night Jedediah Huntington wrote home that he hoped "God in his Great Mercy" would restore peace to the land so "that I may return To the Duties and Joys of Domestick Life." The following summer he wrote "I most ardently hope for a speedy End to the War and I think it seems to be the Wish of almost everyone." It certainly was the feeling of Timothy Pickering. During the summer of 1777 he told his young bride that he hoped the war would be brought to a speedy finish so he could "return to the arms of my beloved." Later that summer, he told her that

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[85]Nathanael Greene to Catherine Greene, June 2, 1775, Showman, The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:82-82; Nathanael Greene to Griffin Greene, June 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:297; Nathanael Greene to Catherine Greene, March 18, 1781, ibid., 3:209; Same to same, July 18, 1781, ibid., 351; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, November 21, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 3:229.

when he joined the Army he thought the war would last one campaign.[86]

Evidence of the desire to be citizens first was the fact that so few officers and soldiers served the whole war. Yet many believed they had an obligation to serve in a civilian capacity if they did not serve in a military one. Thus, numerous revolutionary leaders served in civilian positions once having left military service. And frequently officers served in a civilian capacity while serving in the military.

Many revolutionaries moved frequently between civilian and military positions. Examples in the northern states are numerous, including such leaders as Benjamin Lincoln, John Sullivan, Thomas Mifflin, Joseph Reed, Philip Schuyler, George Clinton, Alexander McDougall, Caesar Rodney, John Dickinson, Philemon Dickinson, and Thomas McKean.[87]

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[86]Anthony Wayne to Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778, Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 75; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 10, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 386; Same to same, June 10, 1781, ibid., 20:409; Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Rebecca Pickering, June 3, 1777, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); and Same to same, June 23, 1777, ibid.

[87]Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, pp. 209, 269-270; Henry W. Bellows, Historical Sketch of Col. Benjamin Bellows, passim; Edwin M. Stone, The Life and Recollections of John Howland, Late President of the Rhode Island Historical Society, p. 54n.; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, pp. 221-228; Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John Langdon of New Hampshire (Concord: Rumford Press, 1937), pp. 114, 151-153, 172; BDC, pp. 754, 859, 970, 1371, 1380, 1406, 1625, 1625-1626, 1665, 1774; Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:236n.;

The southern states probably had more individuals moving back and forth between civilian and military positions, primarily because of the lack of numerous leaders.[88] Such movement not only strengthened the ties between the civilian and the military, but reinforced civilian virtues and goals.

Besides desiring the officer corps be as much as possible a reflection of the civilian revolutionary leadership, it was the universal desire of the revolutionary leaders that the military would subordinate themselves to the civilian leadership, to the principle and practice of

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John W. Jordon, "Biographical Sketch of Colonel Thomas Hartley, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 25, no. 3 (1901): 303-306; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, p. 231; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:330n.1; Roche, Joseph Reed, pp. 66-67, 82, 120, 122-123, 125, 129, 147, 149, 178-179; Frank Bertangue Green, The History of Rockland County, pp. 74-75; Henry B. Dawson, Westchester-County, New York, During the American Revolution, p. 109n.1; Coleman, Thomas McKean, pp. 132, 145-146, 217; New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 2:128n1; Offutt, Patriotic Maryland, p. 210; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, p. 111; John A. Munroe, Federalist Delaware 1775-1815 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. 91, 91n.324.

[88] J. G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, ed., "Revolutionary Diary of William Lenoir," JSH 6, no. 2 (May 1940): 250n.5; Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:56-57, 99, 101, 162, 165; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 4:392-395; 5:75-76, 467-468; 7:2-4; Lyman C. Draper, King's Mountain, p. 478; Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, pp. 176, 230, 231, 262, 305, 317, 319, 330; BDC, pp. 548, 938, 979, 1449, 1465, 1510, 1645-1646, 1877, 1952; Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," MH, extra no. 2, no. 7, pt. 2 (1886): 236-237, 239; Peel, Historical Collections, 1:186-187.

civil supremacy. The question of civilian control was raised frequently in the years preceding the war and would be constantly during the war itself.

When asked to remove the troops from the Boston metropolis during 1769, Governor Bernard responded that he had no authority over the King's troops. This brought a response by the Massachusetts House of Representatives that the civil power must have control over the military.[89] This response was to be expected, as if in a knee jerk reaction, because the American colonists firmly believed in Cicero's dictum "Cedant arma togae," i.e., let arms yield to law. The colonists knew their classical history, as well as the history of the preceding two centuries. They knew that whenever the military was not checked by civilian authority, military tyranny was instituted. A meeting of delegates of New London and Windham Counties in Connecticut rhetorically asked, "What subdued the Roman & Grecian Republicks, An Army not under the Control of the civil Magaistrate!"[90] Most Americans had, to varying degrees

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[89]Francis Bernard to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, May 31, 1769, Bradford, Speeches of the Governor of Massachusetts 1765-1775, p. 168; The Massachusetts House of Representatives to Francis Bernard, June 13, 1769, ibid., pp. 169-170.

[90]Memorial to the Connecticut General Assembly from the delegates of New London and Windham Counties, September 8, 1774, CHSC, 20:215.

after 1770, knowledge of the debates in England concerning parliamentary control of the military. Even more Americans knew the story of how Cromwell and the Major Generals ruled England in a tyrannical fashion.[91] By the institution of the Coercive Acts, most Americans were, as discussed earlier, aware that the military of the King could very easily duplicate what had happened in England a century before. They, at least many Whigs, believed that the Ministry was using the military in the colonies as the sword of their conspiracy to usurp them of their freedom and liberty. Governor Bernard's lack of control over the military was just another proof. It is not surprising then, that during 1774-1775 the Whigs included among their charges against the Ministry its attempt to render the colonial governments subordinate to the military.

Jefferson, in his A Summary View of the Rights of British-America during the summer of 1774, stated the British imposed a standing army upon them of soldiers "not made up of the people here, nor raised by the authority of our laws" and that the King had "expressly made the civil subordinate to the military." He wrote that "Every state must judge for itself the number of armed men which they may safely trust among them, of whom they are to consist, and under

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[91] Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!", pp. 2, 3, 34, 71.

what restrictions they are to be laid." Similar views were expressed by Virginia in declaring itself independent and again in the Declaration of Independence.[92]

Once the war began, the revolutionary leaders continued to express a concern about controlling the military. In their declarations, constitutions and bills of rights, they stated the necessity for keeping the military under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civilian governments.[93]

It cannot be emphasized enough that the revolutionary leaders truly believed that for their revolutionary war to be successful, the military would have to be carefully controlled by the civilian governments; that civil supremacy would have to be genuinely accepted by the military. As will be demonstrated later, the revolutionary leaders, being realistic and by no means totally dogmatic about civil supremacy, would, at times, compromise their beliefs regarding civilian control. Civil supremacy would be a dynamic concept. Nevertheless, they were adamant about such

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[92]Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:133, 134, 378, 431.

[93]E.g., Proceedings of the Convention of the Delaware State, p. 20; Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 3d ser., 10:770; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 9:856; Saunders, NCCR, 10:1004; Walton, Records of Vermont, 1:95; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, eds. The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, p. 446.

compromises being temporary in nature and punishing unauthorized violations to the principle and accepted practices of civil supremacy.

To a large extent the American concept of civil supremacy was an extension of their jealousy of power. As was discussed earlier, the revolutionary leaders were a very jealous people, very conscious of their rights and liberties, and very knowledgeable of how precarious their freedom was when the military either assumed or was given too much power. The military existed to win the war, but it was for the civilian governments to assure the revolution itself was successful.

Just how jealous were the civilian leaders during the war? The answer is: very jealous.[94] On the one hand they did not desire the military to be raised too high in the eyes of their fellow citizens as the true saviors of the country and on the other hand they did not desire the military to usurp any unauthorized power nor violate the established tenets of civil supremacy.

With respect to the military being raised too high, Abigail Adams informed her husband early in the war that "every man who wears a cockade appears of double the

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[94]Chevalier De La Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes, January 28, 1781, Durand, New Materials for the History of the American Revolution, pp. 234, 235.

importance he used to, and I feel a respect for the lowest Subaltern in the Army."[95] Samuel Adams was fearful if the war was long lasting, such attitudes would prevail and the military would eventually be "apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens." Therefore, he warned James Warren, the military "should be watch[e]d with a jealous Eye." In the same vein, he observed:

> I have a good Opinion of the principal officers of our Army, I esteem them as Patriots as well as Soldiers; But if this War continues, as it may for years yet to come, we know not who may succeed them. Men who have been long governed by military Laws, and inured to military Customs and Habits may lose the Spirit and Feeling of Citizens. And even Citizens having been used to admire the Heroism which the Commanders of their own Armies have displayed and to look up to them as their Saviours, may be prevailed upon to surrender to them those Rights for the Protection of which against an Invader, they had employ[e]d and paid them.[96]

The military were indeed watched with a jealous eye, often to an extreme degree.

One example of the extreme to which some civilian leaders went in their jealousy of the military being shown too much preference was in the matter of a toast. Throughout

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[95]Abigail Adams to John Adams, June [16?], 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:218-219.

[96]Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 197-198.

the war, whenever toasts were offered in Whig gatherings, precedence was always given to the United States and the Continental Congress before General Washington and the Continental Army.[97] But even in complying with this standard priority, a difficulty arose in the course of one such series of toasts. At a dinner party at Faneuil Hall during the summer of 1778, toasts were offered by the military and civilian leaders in attendance. The first, given to the United States, and the second, given to the monarch and kingdon of France, were both followed by thirteen-gun salutes. The third toast was offered for Congress. The officer in charge of the cannon looked to John Hancock for approval before giving the salute. Hancock shook his head

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[97] The Maryland Gazette, July 11, 1782; The Providence Gazette; and Country Journal, April 10, 1779; The Virginia Gazette [Purdie], May 17, 1776; The New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury, August 28, 1775; The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser, July 8, 1779; The New England Chronicle, July 25, 1776, The New-Jersey Gazette, July 8, 1778, February 17, 1779, July 12, 1780, July 11, October 31, November 7, 1781; May 29, 1782; James Warren to Samuel Adams, September 30, 1778, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 48-49; Benjamin Tallmadge to Barnabas Deane, July 6, 1778, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:115-116; Frederick Cook, [ed.], Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan Against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779 (Auburn, New York: Knapp, Peck and Thomson, Printers, 1887), p. 182; I. W. Stuart, Life of Jonathan Trumbull, Sen., Governor of Connecticut, pp. 389-390; Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 848; Scharf, History of Western Maryland, 1:145; Henry Onderdonk, Jr., Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and Kings Counties; With an Account of the Battle of Long Island, and the British Prisons and Prison-Ships at New York (New York: Leavitt and Company, 1849), p. 204; Bray, Diary of a Common Soldier, pp. 212, 249.

negatively. Thus, no salute was given. The same thing happened after the fourth toast was offered to the army and navy of France. But immediately after the fifth toast, to Washington and the American Army, Hancock waved his hand eagerly in signal for the salute to be given. It was. Afterwards, James Warren asked Hancock why Congress was not treated to the highest marks of respect and distinction that a salute indicated. Hancock replied that Congress had been included in the salute given the United States. Warren then asked why were not Washington and the American Army included in the same salute to the United States. He told Hancock he held Washington and his army in the greatest respect, but if they were held up against Congress, they should be disbanded. Warren informed Samuel Adams of the incident, leaving it to him to "say whether this was oweing to no principle, or to a wish to distinguish the Military above the Civil, or to Contrast himself with Men he had represented as Inimical to the General and Army."[98] Upon receiving Warren's letter, Adams wrote him the incident was probably not worthy of notice. However, "Things which detach[e]d and by themselves are justly consider[e]d as Trifles[,] light as Air, when they are connected with and made Parts of a great Machine, become important and do good or Hurt."

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[98]James Warren to Samuel Adams, September 30, 1778, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 73 (1925): 48-49.

Adams believed it very wrong to show any partiality to the military. Such preference, he believed, put Congress in an awkward situation. He told Warren:

> While they are exerting their utmost Influence, on all proper Occasions, to support the civil Authority of the several States over the Military, there are some Men, even in that State . . . who would less Respect shown to them than to the Creatures which they have made. Tyrants have been the scourges and Plagues of Mankind; and Armies their Instruments. . . . The Time may come when the Sins of America may be punish[e]d by a standing Army; and that time will surely come when the Body of the People, shall be so lost to the Exercise of common Understanding and Caution, as to suffer the Civil to stop the Military Power.[99]

This was just one example of the extreme to which some civilian leaders expressed their concern about perceived violations even to the spirit of civil supremacy.

Scholars now studying the American Revolution have often remarked about the extreme degree to which concern about civil supremacy was exhibited by the civilian leaders and how this hampered the war-making efforts by the military. Almost one hundred fifty years ago, Jared Sparks stated "The army suffered throughout the war from this trembling timidity of the civil fathers, this fearful distrust of the strength of purpose and self-control of the leading agent

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[99] Samuel Adams to James Warren, October 20, 1778, ibid., 57, 58.

of their will."[100] During the war itself, many in the military expressed concern about the often extreme degree to which the civilians were jealous of the military and fearful of its power. John Laurens, for one, wrote his father, at the time a member of Congress, that he wished to see "all odious distinctions of jealousy laid aside, for we are all citizens, and have no separate interests."[101] Most Americans, however, believed that despite the difficulties it created, jealousy was necessary in a republic, for a power unchecked was tyranny. "The jealousy between the army and the body politic," according to John Adams, "is not to be dreaded; it only shows that the spirit of liberty is still alive and active in the people."[102]

At times, jealousy of the military was carried to extremes. As a result, the military were often stifled in their efforts by adherence to the accepted tenets of civil supremacy. Nevertheless, the civilian leaders demanded compliance with it, from the beginning of the war until the end. Early in the war, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph

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[100] Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:232-233; see also Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 175.

[101] John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 11, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 157.

[102] John Adams to Baron Van Der Capellen, January 21, 1781, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:357.

Trumbull "it is the fixed Determination of Congress to preserve the civil above the military, and the authority of that will not be surrendered, should it be necessary to disband the army in preserving the same."[103] Later, another member of Congress wrote his state's assembly that Congress was "careful to admit no Idea of Power in the Military Order Repugnant to, or interefering with the Civil authority, nor insolence to the Civil Magistrate of any State to pass with impunity."[104]

Congress constantly reminded the military of their desire for them always to subordinate themselves to the civilian leaders. During the summer of 1777, Congress resolved that it "will, on all occasions, discountenance and punish any indecent behaviour of any officer or officers in the Continental service, towards the civil authority of the several states." The following year Congress informed the chief executives that if any officer acted badly towards them or the state governments to report them to Washington or the commanding officer of the department. During the spring of 1779, Congress resolved "that

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[103]Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL: see also Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 13, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:34.

[104]Thomas Burke to the North Carolina Assembly, [August 1779], ibid., 4:368.

any disrespectful and indecent behaviour of any officers . . . , under the appointment of Congress, to the civil authority of any State in the Union, will be discountenanced and discouraged."[105] These were not idle threats.

Despite some critical commentary by the military with respect to civil supremacy, as a general rule, most American soldiers accepted civilian control of the military as necessary for a successful revolution. Washington certainly accepted the necessity of civil supremacy. In replying to an address by the city magistrates of Philadelphia late in 1781, he stated, "As I have ever considered a due support of Civil Authority essential to the preservation of that liberty for which we are contending, I have from duty as well as from inclination endeavoured as far as possible, to avoid the least violation of it."[106] According to John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, "By training, by association and by custom was an earnest and honest believer in the right and justice of constituted authority." A more recent historian, Richard B. Morris, observed that "If anyone doubted his devotion to republican institutions and his

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[105]Ford, JCC, 8:656; 10:139-140; 13:413.

[106]George Washington to the Magistrates of the City of Philadelphia, December 17, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:394.

frequent comments on that score and his decisive actions."[107]

Morris stated that "In his handling of Congress and his deference to their judgment, he [referring to Washington] showed himself a master politician." A Washington biographer of fifty years ago observed that Washington "held Congress always and most scrupulously in reverence" and "Nothing in Washington's life is more heroic than the deference with which he treated this congress."[108] So was Washington really a master politician, really heroic, in his dealings with Congress? Not so much as he was a realist, understanding the necessity of civil supremacy and a strong central government if the American Revolution and war for independence were to be successful. Therefore, in both word and deed, Washington was ever deferential and subordinate to Congress, from the day Congress commissioned him till the day he resigned his commission.

It was expected by Congress, when they gave him his instructions on June 25, 1775, that he would keep Congress abreast of his activities and rely on them for all decisions of a political nature. Congress, realizing however they

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[107]Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself, p. 208; see also p. 284; Richard B. Morris, Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny: The Founding Fathers as Revolutionaries (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), p. 70.

[108]Ibid., p. 68; John Corbin, The Unknown Washington: Biographic Origins of the Republic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 206, 205.

could not foresee all possibilities, informed Washington they were leaving many things to his prudent judgment, which they hoped would reflect the opinion of councils of war.[109] These instructions were generally agreeable to Washington. He saw the necessity of keeping Congress informed. All one has to do is look at Washington's correspondence to see how often he formally wrote Congress and informally wrote its members. The same source also demonstrates how frequently he corresponded with the chief executives of the various civilian entities, informing them, encouraging them, and asking their support. Even in picking his aides throughout the war, Washington frequently selected men who either by birth or politics were able to share his views informally with the civilian leaders. With respect to councils of war, Washington accepted the Congressional instructions almost too literally. During the first year of the war, Washington made few tactical or strategic decisions without consulting his general officers and whatever civilian leaders who could be compelled upon to offer advice. So much did he depend on them, Congress finally told him he did not have to rely on such consultations if he could more properly make a decision himself.[110] Washington,

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[109] Ford, JCC, 2:100-101.

[110] Ibid., 5:602; 7:196-197, 201; 8:663.

however, preferred the advice of others. Throughout his military, and subsequent political career, he disliked making decisions without consultation, or without knowing the exact limits of his authority. He told Joseph Reed early in the war he was not fond of stretching his powers, stating if Congress would say "'This far and no farther you shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst I continue in their service." With respect to not making political decisions Washington completely agreed with Congress's instructions. As Washington told Philip Schuyler late in the war, he had always made it a point "not to interfere in the civil Concerns of the Continent or the Legislatures, except where they are intimately connected with Military Matters."[111] Washington was basically true to his word.

Washington constantly referred questions of a political nature to the civilian authorities rather than acting upon them in a unilateral manner. This was especially true of his dealings with Tories and British emissaries.[112] With respect to his contacts with British officials, Washington was always careful to ascertain that the enemy

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[111]George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 3, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:367; George Washington to Philip Schuyler, February 6, 1782, ibid., 23:488.

[112]Bradley Chapin, The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National Origins (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 55-56.

understood that he was subordinate to Congress, for they were the legitimate authority of the continent. Thus, whenever the British contacted him to negotiate, he referred them to Congress, notifying Congress of their approaches.[113] Additionally, when Jacob Duche attempted to have Washington negotiate a settlement with the British, Washington did not bother to respond. Instead, he simply forwarded Duche's letter to Congress for their consideration.[114] Washington also referred questions of retaliation to Congress, believing such questions were as much, if not more, political than military.[115] This was especially true of the Asgill affair.

Late in March 1782, New Jersey militia Captain Joshua Huddy was captured and hanged by a "refugee partisan force." Washington and his council of officers recommended retaliation if the British did not turn over the guilty

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[113]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick Writings of Washington, 6:427-428; Same to same, August 5, 1782, ibid., 24:466; Same to same, August 28, 1782, ibid., 25:71, 71-72; George Washington to Sir Henry Clinton, May 31, 1778, ibid., 11:496-497.

[114]Jacob Duche to George Washington, October 8, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:448-458; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, October 16, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:382-383; [J. M. Butler], Washington at Valley Forge: Together with the Duche Correspondence (Philadelphia: J. M. Butler, 1858), pp. 45-77; Ford, JCC, 5:530; 6:886-887; Graydon, Memoirs, pp. 428-433.

[115]George Washington to Nathanael Greene, December 15, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:391.

party. Congress agreed. On May 3, 1782, Washington ordered Hazen to select by lot a captured British captain, who was an unconditional prisoner. None being found, Washington had Hazen pick any British captain prisoner. The choice fell on twenty year old Charles Asgill, who had surrendered with Cornwallis, thus covered by a prescribed treatment of officers so captured. This bothered Washington, but he decided to go ahead with the execution unless Congress could be persuaded to stop it. Understanding Washington's dilemma and being persuaded by the French Minister to intercede on Asgill's behalf, Congress ordered Washington to release Asgill. Washington was relieved by Congress's decision, especially since he firmly believed, as he told Congress, Asgill's release was of such a political and international nature that it was out of his purview.[116]

Congress desired Washington to give strategic and tactical direction to the Continental armies, always keeping in mind the reasons why they had been raised. They did not

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[116]George Washington to the General and Field Officers of the Army, April 19, 1782, ibid., 24:136-137; George Washington to Moses Hazen, May 3, 1782, ibid., 218; Same to same, May 18, 1782, ibid., 263-264; Same to same, June 4, 1782, ibid., 305-306; George Washington to the Secretary at War, June 5, 1782, ibid., 319-320; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 20, 1782, ibid., 144-145; Same to same, August 19, 1782, ibid., 25:40-41; George Washington to James Duane, September 30, 1782, ibid., 222-223; Ford, JCC, 22:217-218; 23:715, 718-719, 829n., 845-847, 965n.

expect him to turn to themselves or the state governments for military advice, and when they gave him extraordinary grants of power they expected him to use it fully. On both accounts they misjudged Washington, who was, as already indicated, quite reluctant to act without advice or to overstep the bounds of what he considered his proper relationship to private property, private citizens, and civilian governments. Washington continually called on Congress for strategical advice. During the late summer of 1776, for instance, Washington queried Congress whether or not he should burn New York City upon evacuation. Late in the war he was still seeking advice, asking Congress where the main western fortification should be located and whether or not they wanted troops stationed in the Wyoming Valley.[117] "Don't forget to urge Congress to resume the power of appointing all military Officers" Benjamin Rush reminded Richard Henry Lee early in 1777, less than a month after Washington had been given dictatorial powers by Congress.[118] Rush need not have worried, for Washington disliked grants of

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[117]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:6; George Washington to William Irvine, December 18, 1781, ibid., 23:396; George Washington to James Potter, October 26, 1782, ibid., 26:301-302.

[118]Benjamin Rush to Richard Henry Lee, January 6, 1776 [1777], L. H. Butterfield, ed., "Further Letters of Benjamin Rush," PMHB 78, no. 1 (January 1954): 17.

extraordinary power, and generally was quite eager to return the powers granted him, believing the civilian bodies more capable of mandating the desired means and ends. Even some non-extraordinary powers Washington believed should be more properly exercised by civilian bodies rather than himself. Thus, we find early in the war, Washington hounding both the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and the Continental Congress to assume the responsibility for the prizes taken by his "navy." The Continental Congress did so in August 1776, assuming at that time control of all naval affairs.[119]

Washington not only assured Congress and the state governments of his willingness to subordinate himself to them, but he was also quite adamant about insuring that his army clearly understood the principles and practices of civil supremacy, and acted upon them. Early in the war, when precendents were being established regarding the military's relationship to the civilian governments, Washington was very diligent in assuring that his subordinates understood the military was subject to the will of the civilian

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[119]William Bell Clark, George Washington's Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England Waters (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1961), pp. 15-16, 17, 19-20, 135, 174, 185-186; Donald W. Beattie and J. Richard Collins, Washington's New England Fleet: Beverly's Role in its Origins, 1775-1777 (Salem, Massachusetts: Newcomb and Gauss Company, 1969), pp. 34-41; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, November 8, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:73; Same to same, April 25, 1776, ibid., 517-518.

governments, particularly the Continental Congress. During the summer of 1776, Washington told a congressional board of war that he would "obey to the utmost of my power and to the best of my Abilities, all orders of Congress with a scrupulous exactness."[120] Washington expected no less from his subordinates.[121] He also expected them to keep the best relations possible with the civilians, for he considered harmony between the army and the civilians essential to winning the war.[122] He told Major Henry Lee "There is nothing I wish for more than harmony and a good understanding to prevail between the Country and the Army." Two years earlier, when Washington had received complaints against Lee's corps for illegal foraging, he told him "This complaint I confess gives me extreme pain, as there is nothing I wish so much as a perfect good understanding and Harmony between the Inhabitants and every part of the Army."[123] When Washington learned that Colonel Moylan had

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[120]George Washington to the Board of War and Ordnance, July 29, 1776, ibid., 5:347-348.

[121]George Washington to Philip Schuyler, June 25, 1775, ibid., 3:302-304; George Washington to Artemas Ward, April 4, 1776, ibid., 4:467.

[122]George Washington to George Clinton, October 19, 1782, ibid., 25:277; George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, March 23, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 351.

[123]George Washington to Henry Lee, September 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:493; Same to same, November 29, 1778, ibid., 13:357.

had a misunderstanding with Governor Trumbull, he wrote Moylan that "You will upon the whole, find that many advantages by cultivating a good understanding with Civil Authority."[124]

When Elias Boudinot went to Washington with an informant's information about a traitor, Washington told Boudinot not to take up the citizen and confine him without letting him know his crime or his accuser. Boudinot, somewhat taken back by Washington's attention to civilian rights, wrote, "My mortification was very great, to think, that I who had entered the Army to watch the Military & preserve the civil rights of my fellow citizens should be so reproved by a Military man, who was so interested in having acted otherwise[.] I recd[Sic] it as a severe lecture on my own imprudence."[125]

Washington's officers shared his beliefs about civil supremacy. They acknowledged that the state governments and Congress were superior to themselves.[126] Like

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[124]George Washington to Stephen Moylan, February 3, 1780, "Selections from the Correspondence of Col. Stephen Moylan, of the Continental Cavalry," PMHB 38, no. 3 (1913): 353.

[125]Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections, pp. 66-67.

[126]John Haslet to ?, December 24, 1775, Delaware Archives, 3:1384; Statement signed by Georgia Continental officers, February 10, 1776, White, Historical Collections of Georgia, p. 94; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.

Washington, they realized the importance to the war effort of their relationship to the civilian authorities, and the necessity for harmony between the civilian governments and the military.[127] They also realized the civilians were quite jealous of their power. As General Putnam told another officer, "The civil power is exceeding jealous lest the Military should make encroachments on its Jurisdiction."[128] Therefore, the military were generally careful not to offend the civilian authorities.

The military leaders throughout the war, continually demonstrated to the civilian leaders their subordinate position. This involved giving basic courtesies, following orders, asking and receiving advice, avoiding political involvements, and generally abiding by the basic tenets of civil supremacy.

It was in their dealings with the British on questions of a basic political nature where the American

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[127]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:410-411; Nathanael Greene to Henry Lee, August 19, 1781, Lee, The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas, appendix c, xvi; Marquis de Lafayette to the Chairman of the Albany Committee, March 21, [1778], Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:373; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 377.

[128]Israel Putnam to Ebenezer Gray, December 2, 1778, Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, p. 133; see also Benedict Arnold to Lord George Germain, October 7, 1780, Rudolf Cronau, The Army of the American Revolution and its Organizer (New York: Rudolf Cronau, 1923), p. 64.

officers clearly demonstrated, as Washington did, that Congress and the state governments set public policy, not themselves. Even Charles Lee, who violated the spirit, if not the letter, of almost every aspect of civil supremacy, was quite proper in his relations with the British, at least at the beginning of the war. When Burgoyne contacted him during July 1775 about an interview, Lee asked the Massachusetts Provincial Congress whether it was proper for him to meet with the British general, and if they did, would they appoint one of their members to accompany him. They informed Lee that was a bad idea, but if he decided to meet with Burgoyne to have Elbridge Gerry represent the govern-. ment. Lee, deciding a meeting would cause jealousies and suspicions, opted not to meet Burgoyne. Other generals were even more adamant in their refusal to deal with the British. Sullivan, for instance, during the spring of 1778, refused one British general's attempt to have him circulate Lord North's conciliatory bills to the people of Rhode Island. In doing so, he informed General Pigot the people of Rhode Island recognized no authority but the civil magistrates, and therefore he would turn over all the copies to the Rhode Island Assembly. Similarly, another British general contacted Greene during 1782 in hopes of having him stop South Carolina abuses of Tory property. Greene refused, informing him that questions of Tory property were in the

purview of the civilian authorities and therefore he should deal with them. He later gave the same advice to him when the latter desired a temporary cessation of hostilities so that he might purchase supplies.[129]

The military also demonstrated their subordinate position by obeying instructions, even when the instructions were militarily unsound. The classic example is Lincoln defending Charleston when it was really not defensible. He probably should have evacuated his troops from the city early in its seige. Instead, at the instructions of Congress, he defended it and was forced to surrender the largest American force captured until that at Corregidor in 1942. Other military decisions were also based upon political considerations, such as Washington's decision in 1776 to protect New York City and his 1777 decision to winter at

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[129]Charles Lee to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, July 10, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 193; Charles Lee to John Burgoyne, July 11, 1775, ibid., 194-195; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 483; Robert Pigot to John Sullivan, April 24, 1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:114n.; John Sullivan to Robert Pigot, April 27, 1778, ibid., 114n.; John Sullivan to George Washington, May 1, 1778, ibid., 114; Alexander Leslie to Nathanael Greene, April 4, 1782, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, pp. 632-633; Nathanael Greene to Alexander Leslie, April [ ], 1782, ibid., p. 633; Alexander Leslie to John Mathews, April [ ], 1782, ibid., p. 633; John Mathews to Alexander Leslie, April 12, 1782, ibid., pp. 633-635; Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, April 8, 1782, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 2:155.

Valley Forge. And when given power by the state governments or Congress to act in a forceful manner, the military, realizing the necessity of not offending the civilian leaders often did not exercise their power to its fullest. We have already discussed how Washington frequently did not use powers given him. Similarly, Israel Putnam made every effort to avoid a display of power or to appear placing the military above the law, when he became military commander of the city of Philadelphia on December 12, 1776, and placed it under martial law.[130]

Additionally, the military demonstrated their subordinate status by turning over to civilian authorities those soldiers and civilians they believed should be tried by civilian law rather than military law.[131] When four

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[130]Benjamin Lincoln's Report to George Washington, July 17, 1780 [Copy], Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); James Thomas Flexner, George Washington in the American Revolution (1775-1783) (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 90; A. E. Zucker, General DeKalb, Lafayette's Mentor, University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literature, no. 53 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 162; Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, pp. 220, 221, 250-251, 255; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:334; William Cutter, The Life of Israel Putnam, Major-General in the Army of the American Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Cooledge, 1850), p. 273.

[131]George Washington to George Clinton, October 8, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:50; Alexander McDougall to Aaron Burr, January 15, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1836-1837), 1:145; Asa Bird Gardner, "Martial Law During the American Revolution," MAH 1, no. 12 (December 1877): 714.

officers complained to General Wayne they were going to be turned over to civilian authorities to stand trial for an offense committed against civilians, he reminded them they "Certainly can't be Ignorant of the superior power of the 'Civil Law' over the Military."[132] In some instances military officers even threatened their soldiers with civilian justice believing it would be more severe.[133]

The military realized they needed the advice and support of the civilian leaders to be successful. Therefore, they frequently called upon state leaders for advice and to issue instructions that could just as well be issued by themselves, but would be more acceptable coming from civilian authorities rather than from the military.[134] Because of vagueness in instructions and because of political ramifications, military leaders often consulted with civilian leaders before taking action. This was especially true early in the war when precedents were being established and

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[132]Anthony Wayne to Jno. Henderson and John Marshall and Wm. Bell and Peter Smith, October 10, 1778, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 172.

[133]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, November 5, 1778, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 200.

[134]Philemon Dickinson to William Livingston, June 26, 1777, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, p. 74.

divisions of authority were blurred.[135] A major problem throughout the war for the military leaders was what to do with civilians and British subjects either caught in illegal acts or suspected of some nefarious plans. The military did not desire to inflict punishments unilaterally, thus throughout the war we find them consulting with civilian leaders as to what course of action they should take.[136]

Besides asking advice, the military leaders also demonstrated their subordinate position by keeping the civilian leaders informed of their activities and intentions, often when it was requested but just as often when it was not. They did so, believing the civilian leaders would be better able to assist in the strategic decision-making process. In New York during 1776 and 1777, George Clinton was very diligent in keeping the New York Committee of Safety and Convention informed of his activities. Also

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[135]David Wooster to Peter V. B. Livingston, July 7, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1604; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:424; Jo[seph] Seawell Jones, A Defence of the Revolutionary History of the State of North Carolina from the Aspersions of Mr. Jefferson (Boston: Charles Bowen, 1834), pp. 242-243; George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, August 18, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:36.

[136]Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, July 11, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:64-65; Same to same, March 4, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 343; Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, May 17, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:452; William Irvine to President William Moore, March 17, 1782, Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, 1:235-236.

keeping the New York authorities informed were Tench Tilghman and Alexander Hamilton. Between March and September 1777, Hamilton wrote the Convention's Committee of Correspondence over twenty letters. Earlier, during the fall of 1776, Tilghman sent almost daily military situation reports to a committee of the convention. New Hampshire's John Stark, after the death of General Enoch Poor, assumed the responsibility for keeping the government of his state cognizant of the movement of their state's troops. Similarly, Generals Putnam, Parsons and Huntington kept Governor Trumbull apprised of how Connecticut's troops were performing.[137] In the middle states, early in the war, Lord Stirling kept the New Jersey Assembly and Council of Safety informed, as did Joseph Reed, President Wharton of Pennsylvania.[138] Further south, early in the war, Robert Howe regularly reported his activities to the Virginia Convention. Later in the war, George Rogers Clark kept the chief executive and the Board of War of Virginia apprised of the

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[137]Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:passim; Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:216-321 passim; Emily Stone Whiteley, Washington and His Aides-De-Camp (New York: Macmillan Company, 1936), pp. 30-31; John Stark to Meshech Weare, December 14, 1779, Stark, John Stark, p. 197; see Connecticut correspondence in MHSC, 7th ser., 2:passim.

[138]Lord Stirling to [Samuel Tucker], October 2, 1775, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:20-21; Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:passim.

movements of his command in the west. Often both Lee and Lafayette, despite their constant difficulties with state executives, kept them acquainted with their plans and actions. Assisting Lafayette keep in touch with Maryland's governor during the 1781 campaign was James McHenry, who as a volunteer aide-de-camp, wrote Governor Lee nearly fifty letters, generally about the state of the army.[139]

Probably the most important way the military evidenced their subordinate position to the civilian authorities was by their constant support of the civilian governments. The military saw the necessity of stable governments, for they would help in preventing anarchy and military tyranny. Additionally they provided the best means of supplying the army and harnessing the resources of the state, i.e., monies and recruits.

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[139] Stewart, William Woodford, 1:523-560, passim; James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781," passim; James, "George Rogers Clark's Papers 1781-1784," passim; Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, November 14, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:55; Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 25, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 37; Marquis De Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, February 21, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia, p. 3; For numerous letters from Lafayette to Governor Thomas Sim Lee of Maryland, see J. Alexis Shriver, Lafayette in Harford County 1781: An Account of the Events Attending the Passage of the Marquis de La Fayette and His Troops Through Harford County in 1781 and of Subsequent Events, to the Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown (Bel Air, Maryland: Privately Printed, 1931), pp. 24-112, passim; Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 3 (September 1954): 227.

Where the governments were weak or virtually non-existent, the military played an important role in supporting and re-establishing the governments. This was especially true in the South during the latter part of the war. Both Greene and Lincoln when they commanded the southern army stressed the necessity of the state governments existing and being free of military interference. In May 1781, Greene told the chief executive of South Carolina that the state government should be re-established immediately, "as it is of importance to have the minds of the people formed to the habits of civil rather than military authority."[140] That summer he advised the Georgia state leaders to elect a legislature, called on Colonel Clarke to have the people elect a council, and directed Nathan Brownson, who he recognized as governor, to repair to Augusta to organize the government. During the summer and fall of 1779, Lincoln encouraged both McIntosh and Colonel Walton to assist the Georgia civilian leaders with the re-establishment of the state government and to encourage them to send delegates to Congress.[141]

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[140]Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, May 14, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:281.

[141]Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 367; Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:145-146; Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan McIntosh, December 18, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 1:122-123, BPL; Same to same, July 15, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to

The military also protected the state governments in the South. During the summer of 1780 the South Carolina legislature shared the courthouse at Hillsboro, North Carolina, with Gates, relying on him to have the southern army protect their existence. Throughout the spring and summer of 1781 Sumter, Marion, and Pickens helped keep the civilian authority in existence in South Carolina. During the fall of 1781, at the request of South Carolina's chief executive, the brigadier generals of the South Carolina troops conducted the assembly elections in their respective militia districts. Once the legislature assembled at Jacksonborough during January 1782, a Pennsylvania Regiment was assigned to camp near the legislature in order to afford it protection.[142]

In addition to upholding the governments, the military also assisted them in preventing anarchical conditions and fighting the domestic enemies. During 1779, 1780, and 1781, Washington, at the request of Governors Trumbull and Clinton, used the military to stop people from carrying on

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George Walton, October 17, [17]79, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 1:71, BPL.

[142]Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:145; [Feltman], Journal of William Feltman, p. 37; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 213; Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941), p. 31.

trade with or making war on those living on Long Island, as it was feared that such activity would cause retaliation.[143] Washington and other Continental officers used the army to assist the states in quelling the internal enemies.

Early in the war several states, to varying degrees, authorized the Continental officers to use their soldiers, as well as the militia, to quell the disaffected.[144] For example, New York had the Continental soldiers assist their state forces in putting down the disaffected in Dutchess County during 1777. Also that year General Smallwood and Colonel Mordecai Gist, accompanied by Maryland political commissioners, lead a small force of Continental troops and militia against the disaffected in Maryland. The following year, Rhode Island authorized General Sullivan to call out and control their militia against the disaffected.[145]

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[143] George Washington to Benjamin Tallmadge, November 2, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 17:62-63; George Washington to Stephen Moylan, January 14, 1780, ibid., 392-393; Instructions to William Heath, August 19, 1781, ibid., 23:23; George Clinton to Jonathan Trumbull, August 20, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 7:234-236; Thaddeus Burr to Jonathan Trumbull, November 5, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:453-454.

[144] Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 268-270; McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Virginia, 1:468-469.

[145] Bliven, Under the Guns, p. 326; Ford, JCC, 7:82-83; 8:667-668; William Smallwood to [ ] Jenifer, March 3, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:157-159; Maryland Council of

The main force used against the disaffected were the militia who were often authorized by the state governments to be led by Continental officers. The militia, for the most part, were commanded by their own officers, often under the immediate direction and control of the civil authorities. This was especially true in New York, where the militia and special ranger companies assisted state and local committees in keeping the Tory element under control.[146] During 1777 in Dutchess County, where a large Tory element expected the British to come to their aid, both the militia and the Continental Army were used by New York's Commissioners for Detecting Conspiracies to quell them into submission.[147]

Safety to Henry Hooper, February 13, 1777, ibid., 134; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, p. 176.

[146] Hanson, The Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County, passim; Willis T. Hanson, Jr., A History of Schenectady During the Revolution to which is Appended a Contribution to the Individual Records of the Inhabitants of Schenectady District During that Period (privately printed, 1916), pp. 61-62; New York Provincial Committee Report, 1776, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 1:488-489; Victor Hugo Paltsits, Minutes of the Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York. Albany County Sessions 1778-1781, 3 vols. (Albany: State of New York, 1909-1910), 1:10, 11, 47-50; Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety, and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 1:149, 184, 633-639, 648, 693, 676, 774, 784, 794, 803, 1061.

[147] Harold M. Hyman, To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), p. 89; General Orders Issued by the Committee of Safety, January 6, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:533-535; Staughton Lynd, "The Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May 1777," NYHSQ 48, no. 2 (April 1964): 173.

The militia were also active in New England. For example, during the summer of 1779, the Governor and Council of Safety of Connecticut authorized Brigadier General John Tyler to use the militia to jail anybody in the New London-Great Neck area who he suspected of being unfriendly to the state.[148] The middle states also relied upon the militia to assist their committees in keeping control of the disaffected. New Jersey even used special units for that purpose, in addition to regular militia units.[149] During the summer of 1780 the Delaware militia was used to quell Tories in the lower county who failed to pay taxes and bid defiance by arms.[150] James Allen, on January 25, 1777, wrote in his diary that thus far during the winter Pennsylvania had been governed by a council of safety who had "put the execution of their decrees & the whole dispensation of Justice into the hands of the field-officers of the several battalions." Pennsylvania indeed relied heavily on their

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[148] Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 2:370.

[149] Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, p. 79; Gerlach, Prologue to Independence, p. 275; William Livingston to William Winds, July 3, 1777, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 80-81; Minutes of the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, p. 109.

[150] Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, August 22, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 308.

militia for maintaining order.[151] At various times both Virginia and Maryland gave their militia officers great latitude in using the militia against the disaffected in their respective states.[152] North Carolina and South Carolina were also active in using their militia, as well as ranger and light horse units, to assist their committees in controlling the disaffected.[153]

The militia, as well as the Continentals, with a few exceptions, used the authority given them without abusing it. They did so in part because of their faith in the civilian authorities and in civil supremacy, and because the civilian and military leaders, as will be shown in the next three chapters, kept a tight rein on them.

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[151] "Diary of James Allen, of Philadelphia, Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 189; Edward Ford, David Rittenhouse: Astronomer-Patriot 1732-1796 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), p. 86.

[152] Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752-1839 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971), pp. 36-37; Harold J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, p. 147; Bradley Chapin, The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National Origins, pp. 60-61.

[153] Guilford County Committee of Safety to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 23, 1776, Saunders, NCCR, 10:761; Provincial Congress Meeting, November 26, 1776, ibid., 940, 941; A. S. Salley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County South Carolina from its First Settlement to The Close of the Revolutionary War (Orangeburg, South Carolina: R. L. Berry, Printer, 1898), pp. 396-397.

C H A P T E R IV

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY

When Congress met in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775, the war with Great Britain was a month old, the colonies were calling upon Congress not only to give a unity to addressing their common grievances, but also to take direction and control of the military. Both before and during the war the Whigs expressed great concern about keeping the military under tight restraint, for to do otherwise would be to allow the possibility of military tyranny and anarchy. Peace was the first preference, a successful military war the second, but more important was controlling and directing the military.

The delegates to the second Continental Congress, realizing the importance of their tasks, immediately set about putting not only their political house in order, but also their military establishment. Besides providing for an army and selecting its military commanders, Congress suggested military policies and began the process of establishing the machinery for controlling and directing

the military.[1]

The question that was frequently raised during the early summer of 1775, with respect to controlling and directing the military, was where Congress should physically locate themselves. Some members preferred removing to Cambridge or Hartford, so as to be near the scene of battle. Debate continued about a location into the fall, but by the following spring when the war had spread to other parts of the continent, it was decided to stay in the centrally located Philadelphia. Debate regarding being nearer the army was renewed during the summer of 1779, when several delegates unsuccessfully attempted to have Congress join the army and act "en Militaire."[2] Although Congress as a whole never sat near the army, they did actively involve themselves in the control and direction of the army.

Until 1781, when executive departments were created, Congress attempted to keep the direction and control of the army in their own hands, though sharing some authority and

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[1]John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 24, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:255-256; Ford, JCC, 2:passim.

[2]Titus Hosmer to Silas Deane, May 28, 1775, Burnett, LMCC, 1:94n.2; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston, June 5, 1775, ibid., 113; Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, June 20, 1775, ibid., 138; Toger Sherman to Hoseph Trumbull, July 6, 1775, ibid., 154; Silas Deane to Mrs. Deane, September 22, 1775, ibid., 204; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, July 17, 1779, ibid., 4:328; Ford, JCC, 14:835-836.

responsibility with the states and for limited periods, with the military themselves. During the first two years of the war Congress frequently involved itself in even the minutest details of army policy and procedures. Relying on standing committees, special committees, and grand committees, Congress attempted to keep tight rein over all aspects of the military. Special committees generally were appointed to answer specific queries made by the military. Standing committees were established to handle such matters as procuring cannon, fire arms, saltpetre, clothing, beef and salt. Standing committees were also established to provide for prisoners of war, spies, cavalry, recruiting, improving the militia, and the health and discipline of the army. Hospital and medical standing committees were also established the first year of the war.[3] Generally the committees numbered between three and five delegates, but often numbered thirteen members, one from each colony. The latter were called grand committees.

Spending so much time on the minute military matters, Congress frequently accomplished little else, even when

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[3]Ibid., 2:86, 106, 191, 203, 250; 3:419, 436, 459; 4:40, 45-46, 49, 55, 58, 63-64, 108, 154, 162, 164, 169, 184; 5:350, 442, 616, 810; 6:992; 7:193, 280-281; 8:413.

relying on the committees for guidance and recommendations. Part of the problem was absenteeism.[4] Also, the members, when present, were forced to spend a large amount of their time among many committees. Thomas McKean was chairman of five committees and a member of thirty-three others at one time during the first year of the war and Richard Henry Lee, during his first five years in Congress, served on forty-five military and naval committees. John Witherspoon served on 120 committees during his six years in Congress; Roger Sherman on 110 during his six years; and William Ellery on seventy during his five years. John Adams, during his short stay in Congress, chaired twenty-five committees and served on sixty-five others.[5]

The committee system was as tedious, cumbersome, and complex as it was slow and ineffective, as committees often worked at cross-purposes.[6] Responding to Washington

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[4]James Lovell to Banjamin Franklin, October 28, 1780, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 4:107.

[5]G. S. Rowe, "Thomas McKean and the Coming of the Revolution," PMHB 96, no. 1 (January 1972): 33; Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 1:215; Varnum Lansing Collins, President Witherspoon: A Biography, 2:4; William M. Fowler, Jr., William Ellery: A Rhode Island Politico and Lord of Admiralty (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1973), p. 187; Butterfield, AFC, 2:332n.1.

[6]Samuel Ward to Henry Ward, November 2, 1775, Knollenberg, Correspondence of Governor Samuel Ward, pp. 115-116; William Fleming to Thomas Jefferson, July 13, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:315.

regarding a letter he had written Congress, President Laurens reminded him that it was the rule of Congress to commit letters to the consideration of committees and boards that were dispersed in different parts of Philadelphia and governed by rules of their own making for meeting and responding to Congress, and therefore, "it is not always or I should say, 'tis seldom in the power of the President to answer with that dispatch which may seem necessary."[7] Even when the committees met, they were not, for the most part, given any more authority than to inquire and make suggestions.

Even as early as January 1776 it was obvious to most members of Congress they could not continue regulating all military matters by temporary committees and by the committee of the whole, for although these seemed the safest way, it also appeared that some form of a permanent military oversight should be established. Therefore, on January 24, 1776, a committee was appointed to consider the propriety of establishing a congressional war office. Their report, calling for a Board of War and Ordnance, was made in April and adopted on the twelfth of June. Its first members, John Adams, Roger Sherman, Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson and Edward Rutledge, with Richard Peters as secretary, were

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[7]Henry Laurens to George Washington, November 13, 1777, ibid., 2:549.

elected the next day. Charles Carroll of Carrollton, because of the experience he had gained by visiting the army in Canada and his knowledge of French, was added a month later.[8]

Initially, the Board of War and Ordnance was authorized to keep military records and accounts of arms and supplies; forward congressional dispatches and money to the army; provide for the prisoners of war; and superintend the raising, fitting out and dispatching the army. The Board met most mornings and every evening, at least when its members were not sitting on other committees or attending sessions of Congress. In Congress, much of their time was spent explaining and justifying their proposals and actions, for Congress remained a council of war, still passing final judgment on any matter of the least substance.[9]

The demanding schedule of the members of the Board, coupled with personnel changes in congressional membership, resulted in frequent changes in membership on the Board. During the first five months of its existence the Board had nine different members.[10]

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[8]Ford, JCC, 4:85, 215, 293, 293n.1; 5:434-435, 438, 575.

[9]Ibid., 434-435; John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 26, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:24; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:342.

[10]Ibid., 342; Ford, JCC, 5:732, 751; 6:923.

President Hancock, elated when the Board was established, wrote Washington that it was a great event in the history of America and would be attended with essential advantages when properly conducted and inspected.[11] This did not happen for obvious reasons. Instead of being given broad powers, the Board of War and Ordnance was initially granted only authority to consider and deliberate military policies and procedures, and had no real decision-making powers. Occasionally, Congress would delegate just enough authority to the Board to care for specific problems when they arose, but in almost all instances the Board had to report to Congress as a whole for a decision to be made. Additionally, Congress continued to rely on the various special, standing, and grand committees for military recommendations. Despite the handicaps under which the Board operated, they were able nonetheless to make several useful recommendations.[12] If this method of conducting military policy conformed to Whig beliefs regarding the placement of authority in numerous hands, it certainly was a dilatory and ineffective system. This was not very

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[11] John Hancock to George Washington, June 14, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:488.

[12] Ford, JCC, 5:632, 729, 751, 753, 754, 757, 762, 768, 780, 781, 835, 838; 6:1041, 1043, 1047, 1053; 7:13, 108-109, 115-118, 154-155, 188-189, 340; 7:422, 491-492, 494-495.

important the first year of the war, as most Whigs expected, or at least hoped, for a peaceful accommodation with Great Britain.

By the end of 1776, it appeared to most Whigs that the Board of War and Ordnance was not significantly assisting Congress in handling military affairs, and in fact, due to personnel changes and absenteeism, as well as lack of military experience, might even be detracting from their efforts. "If we expect to succeed in the present war," Samuel Chase wrote one general, "we must change our mode of conduct. Distinct and precise departments ought to be established. A gentleman of the military must be of the Board of War."[13]

Other members, agreeing with Chase, persuaded Congress on December 26, 1776, to appoint a committee to formulate a plan for better regulating the executive business by non-members.[14] The committee's report of April 8, 1777, was tabled until mid July, at which time Congress resolved to appoint a new Board of War. This new body was to consist of three members not of Congress who

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[13]Samuel Chase to John Sullivan, December 24, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:186.

[14]Benjamin Harrison to Robert Morris, December 29, 1776, ibid., 196; William Hooper to Robert Morris, December 28, 1776, ibid., 196; Richard Smith Diary, March 19, 1776, ibid., 1:398-399; Ford, JCC, 6:1041-1042.

would, on a full time basis, conduct the business of the older board, under the direction and supervision of the existing Board of War and Ordnance. However, on July 22, 1777, the date set for the election of the three non-members, Congress, having second thoughts, postponed making a selection and allowed the plan to lapse.[15]

While Congress spent the first half of 1777 in deliberating the possibility of creating a new board, the old one continued to function, with its members coming and going with alacrity.[16]

Washington's defeats at Brandywine and Germantown, coupled with his expressed desire for a knowledgeable board of war to superintend all the war business, thereby relieving both him and Congress from the details of administration that weighed them down, Congress during the fall of 1777, began once again seriously to consider appointing a new board with membership consisting of non-members. Most members, by late fall, with the army in retreat, and finding directing military affairs too complex for the limited amount of time they had to devote to them, and believing that some executive authority could safely be entrusted to non-members, decided the time had come to appoint an effective board of

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[15] Ibid., 7:241-242, 259; 8:424, 563.

[16] Ibid., 9:1080.

war. So, on October 17, 1777, Congress provided for a new Board of War, to consist of three members not of Congress. Its duties were to keep a register of officers, and accounts of ordnance and supplies; superintend the building of arsenals and foundries; forward dispatches of Congress to the States and armies; superintend the raising, recruiting, and dispatching of the land forces of the Continent; lay before Congress estimates of the military stores needed; and make entries of all business transacted. All of their proceedings were to be inspected by Congress once a month, or oftener, as Congress thought proper and convenient. The board was required to sit where Congress did and no member of it could absent himself without permission of Congress.[17]

"Nothing is more essential than the proper Establishment of this Board" James Duane informed General Schuyler, referring to the new Board of War.[18] Most Whigs completely agreed. Despite fears of giving military men too much authority in either a civilian or military capacity, it was generally believed that experienced military men should

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[17]Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, October 20, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:338; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, October 13, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:366-367; Ford, JCC, 9:818, 818-820.

[18]James Duane to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:559.

be the non-congressional members of the new board. Under the watchful oversight by Congress, it was believed that the military men could be trusted, for they had, to that point in the war, demonstrated obedience to Congress and the concept of civil supremacy. But which military men? Certainly those with demonstrated administrative abilities, and most members did not want men who were sycophants to Washington who, by late 1777, was coming into greater disfavor with a certain segment of Congress and the country.

Thomas Mifflin, Timothy Pickering, and Robert H. Harrison were the military men selected to the board on November 7, 1777. Mifflin, until that morning had been the Quartermaster General, was allowed to retain his major generalship although resigning his position. Pickering, the Adjutant General of the Army, remained in that position until mid January 1778, before assuming his place on the board. Harrison, Washington's military secretary, refused the position, primarily because he believed that Mifflin and Pickering were not loyal to Washington, and were going to use their position to undermine him.[19]

With Pickering at camp, and Harrison refusing to serve, Congress decided that the old Board of War and

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[19]Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Mifflin, November 2, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:347; Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:183-184, 203, Ford, JCC, 9:874.

Ordnance would continue to function until the new one began its operations. And to breathe some new life into the old board, seven members of Congress were appointed board members during the fall and winter.[20] Also in an attempt to give more direction and control to the board, particularly with respect to better organizing and disciplining the army, in December it was authorized to appoint an Inspector General in every department, who, in Eliphalet Dyer's words, would be the executors and assistant agents of the board.[21]

By the end of November, when it appeared that only Mifflin was readily available and willing to serve on the board, Congress decided that additional members be selected. Schuyler and Gates were favored by many members, in part because both were qualified, and because by selecting them various factions in Congress would be satisfied. Despite the support for Schuyler, he was not selected. Gates was, on November 27, 1777. He was to serve as President of the Board, retaining his military rank and leave to take the field whenever he desired. Richard Peters and Joseph Trumbull were also selected, the former as secretary. Peters assumed the new job, and retained his position as secretary to the Board of War and Ordnance. Because of ill

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[20] Ibid., 871-872, 874, 953, 1080; 12:1277.

[21] Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, December 15, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:589.

health, Trumbull never took his place on the new board, resigning formally in April.[22]

Two reasons have been proferred as to why the Board of War was established, both in the context of the Conway Cabal, of which more will be said in a later chapter. The first is that Washington, unable to discipline his army and unable to win major battles, needed guidance from those who understood the military realities of the war, supposedly Gates, Pickering, Mifflin, and Conway. Thus, their appointments. Another reason is that Congress, needing the time for other duties, had the board established as a helpmate to both itself and Washington, and was not established to undermine or thwart Washington.[23]

During 1778 the new board suffered a succession of failures, beginning with their first project, an invasion of Canada. In its wake came the resignations of Conway as Inspector General and James Wilkinson, who had served as secretary of the board for less than two months. Trumbull

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[22]Same to same, November 28, 1777, ibid., 575; James Duane to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1777, ibid., 559; Ford, JCC, 9:960, 971, 971-972.

[23]Marquis de Lafayette to Henry Laurens [ca. January 5, 1778], Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:216; Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, November 20, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:349; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, November 27, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:571; William Williams to Joseph Trumbull, November 28, 1777, ibid., 573; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, November 28, 1777, ibid., 575.

had resigned in April, never having taken his seat; and that month Gates left to take command of the Northern Department. Thus, by the summer of 1778 the board was criticized for being just as ineffective as the old board and even more caught up in small details.[24]

To improve the board's efficiency, Congress, on October 29, 1778, changed its membership so that it would consist of three non-congressional members and two members of Congress, with any three constituting a quorum. Colonel Harrison, Pickering, and Richard Peters were the three non-congressional members chosen; Francis Lightfoot Lee and Jesse Root, the members of Congress appointed. Harrison again declined and was replaced by Colonel William Grayson, who had served during 1776 on Washington's staff. Major Peter Scull was elected secretary. The congressional membership frequently changed during 1779 and 1780, with nine different members serving.[25]

For long periods during 1779 and 1780 it appears that Peters and Pickering managed the Board of War by themselves, and when Pickering left in the summer of 1780 to

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[24]Henry Laurens to Robert Morris, April 6, 1778, ibid., 3:156; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, May 16, 1778, ibid., 245; Henry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 5.

[25]Ford, JCC, 11:546, 641; 12, 1076, 1077, 1086, 1101, 1134, 1241, 1277; 15:1447; 18:1230.

become Quartermaster General, Peters managed affairs until that fall by himself. After November, he was ably assisted by Ezekiel Cornell, who was appointed a congressional member.[26]

To make the Board of War more than just a super adjutant general's office, Congress on November 25, 1779, placed the board in charge of the Departments of Quartermaster General and Commissary General of Purchases and Issues, hoping it could untangle the difficulties in which those departments found themselves.[27] This responsibility only bogged the board down in more detail, thereby preventing them from concentrating on often more pressing needs of military administration. It should be noted, it was not the Board of War alone which suffered from inefficiency, overwork, and lack of real authority. Most of the other major committees of Congress lacked any force or strength, and as 1780 ended, with the army suffering and threatening to either disband or turn on their civilian leaders, Congress decided to create separate executive departments

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[26]Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Department of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 15; Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795, p. 5; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, vol. 10 of the Harvard Historical Studies (New York: Longman's Green, and Company, 1904), pp. 19-20.

[27]Jesse Root to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 26, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:527; Ford, JCC, 17:511-512.

to handle their executive business. By doing this, it was hoped that the army would understand that Congress had not forgotten their responsibilities and obligations to them.

On January 10, 1781, the first executive department was created, the Department of Foreign Affairs. A month later, the Departments of Finance, Marine, and War were also created. It was decided to appoint a Secretary at War who, besides being a super Adjutant General, would provide a more efficient liaison between the civil and military leaders. Until one was selected, however, Congress decided the Board of War would remain in operation.[28]

Washington, pleased with Congress's decision to create a Department of War, desired a member of his staff, Hamilton, be appointed secretary. He also believed Hamilton's father-in-law, Philip Schuyler, would make a good choice. Schuyler, however, would not accept the post without prior guarantees that he be reinstated as a Major General, something that many in the army and Congress objected to. John Sullivan, who like Schuyler had had experience both in army and Congress, was also put forth by some as a likely candidate, despite his lack of interest in the post. Pickering believed the delegates might pick

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[28]Ibid., 19:19, 126-127, 133, 206; 21:1030.

him, all the other candidates being undesirable for one reason or another.[29]

Indeed, there were reasons that some of the candidates were undesirable, and as there was no clear choice, Congress, late in February 1781, postponed the selection until the following October. The New England delegates favored this because they feared Sullivan would be chosen, something they did not desire for, as a member of Congress, Sullivan frequently voted with the southern delegates, and as a person with close ties to the army, it was feared he might side too often with Washington against Congress. Another group of delegates desiring the selection of Gates, supported the postponement, hoping that by October Gates would be cleared by a court of inquiry for the defeat at Camden, and therefore be eligible if selected. The official reason given for the delay was that it was imprudent to hazard a change in congressional military administration when the campaign was just beginning.[30]

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[29]George Washington to John Sullivan, February 4, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:181; Philip Schuyler to George Washington, April 3, 1781, Jared Sparks, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 12 vols. (Boston: J. B. Russell, 1834-1837), 7:460n.; Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:283; John Sullivan to General George Washington, March 6, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:11-12; Same to same, March 17, 1781, ibid., 90.

[30]Same to same, March 6, 1781, ibid., 11-12; Philip Schuyler to George Washington, April 3, 1781, ibid., 12n.4; James Duane, William Floyd, Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 11, 1781, ibid., 24, James Mitchell Varnum to

During the first week of October 1781 Greene, Knox, and Lincoln were nominated for the post of Secretary at War. Debate respecting the three generals's merit lasted several weeks. It was generally believed that Greene should remain with the southern army and Knox with the artillery at the seige at Yorktown, and then most probably at New York at a later date. This left Lincoln, who had once obeyed Congress's orders, even when it meant losing Charlestown and the tarnishing of his own reputation. Thus he was elected and, by the end of November 1781, he had accepted and been confirmed by Congress.[31]

The army was pleased with Lincoln's selection, as he was well liked by them and Washington. This was evidenced in part by Washington having allowed him to receive the British surrender at Yorktown. Most civilians were pleased as well. The Rhode Island delegates informed their governor that "when we add his knowledge and experience as an officer, his integrity and attention to business, we cannot but flatter ourselves that the public will receive

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George Washington, August 20, 1781, ibid., 191; Ford, JCC, 19:205.

[31]James Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, October 2, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:231; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, November 1, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:375; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, November 1, 1781, Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 2:141; Ford, JCC, 21:1087, 1141.

essential benefits from his appointment."[32] The benefits were not that essential, but certainly Lincoln was the best choice at the time and did able and steady service as the Secretary at War. Washington worked well with Lincoln, sending his communications to Congress through him and respecting him as a symbol of civil and congressional authority. Similarly, Lincoln respected Washington and, though his civilian superior, treated him with deference. Thus, they worked well together, with Lincoln constantly demonstrating great wisdom, tact, thrift, all with an amiable manner.[33]

Observing Lincoln at work, a young French nobleman wrote that the "work is not immense and all important points are decided by Congress."[34] For the most part, this is an accurate observation. Lincoln's responsibilities were mainly those held heretofore by the Board of War and by an additional grant in April 1782 he was given many of the time-consuming administrative duties hitherto the responsibility of Washington. Lincoln, although given some decision-making authority, rarely exercised it, believing that Washington

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[32]William Ellery and Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, December 6, 1781, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 360.

[33]Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795, p. 37.

[34]E. W. Balch, trans., "Narrative of the Prince de Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 4 (April 1877): 233.

and Congress should be consulted on all matters of substance, and to a degree Congress expected Lincoln to rely upon them for guidance.[35] Lincoln, assisted by a secretary and two clerks, was content simply to do what was expected of him, no more, no less. During 1782 he found time to write geographical descriptions in letters to family and friends and to make philosophical notes for his own amusement.[36] However, during 1783, as the war came to a close, his duties increased with the disbanding of the army. With most of the army disbanded, Lincoln retired during the late fall of 1783.[37]

By giving some military control and direction to the Board of War and Ordnance, the Board of War, and the office of the Secretary at War, Congress and the military commanders were relieved of many administrative details, but neither were truly relieved of the policy-making aspects of military control. Congress, because of their republican fears of consolidation of authority and responsibility in a few

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[35]Ford, JCC, 20:36-37, 177-179; William Ellery and Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, April 16, 1782, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 366; Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, p. 102; Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795, pp. 13, 15, 17.

[36]Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6), passim.

[37]Ford, JCC, 25:753.

individuals, and fear of giving the military too much authority, kept most military policy-making in their own hands. Despite the limitations on the three above-mentioned offices, they did serve as a useful link between Congress and the military, and were just another reminder to the military of their subordinate position to the civilian authorities, even when the membership on them became progressively more militarily oriented.

Another form of controlling and directing the military came in the form of the personal contact between members of Congress and the military, as members of committees and individually. As has been stressed in the previous chapter, personal connections were very important to understanding the mechanics of how civil control operated and was maintained throughout the war.

The first members of Congress to visit the army were Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Lynch, Sr., who, at Washington's request, came as a committee to confer with the commander-in-chief at Cambridge on the organization and operation of the army. Arriving in Massachusetts late in October 1775, they met not only with Washington and his officers, but also with the New England civilian leaders then in camp. Their meetings, which lasted a week, resulted in the committee successfully recommending to Congress that

they adopt Washington's suggestions for improving the operation of the army.[38]

Another congressional committee, consisting of Robert R. Livingston, Robert Treat Paine, and John Langdon, also took to the field that fall. In November they went to Canada with instructions to visit Schuyler and the northern army, which by the time they had arrived in New York, had retreated out of Canada. The result of their visit was an accurate report of the reasons for the failure of the Canadian expedition. Rather than being resentful of the committee overseeing his activities and reporting on past failures, Schuyler welcomed congressional oversight. In fact, early in 1776 he requested Congress send another committee, hoping it would help him supervise his unruly army, composed to a large degree of New Englanders with whom Schuyler did not work well. Before the arrival of spring 1776, Congress selected Franklin, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, and Samuel Chase as a committee to the northern army, empowering them to sit and vote on military

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[38] Ibid., 2:265-267; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:505-506; Richard Smith Diary, September 29, 30, 1775, Burnett, LMCC, 1:210; Thomas Lynch, Sr., to George Washington, November 13, 1775, ibid., 253; [Jeremy Belknap], "Journal of My Tour to the Camp, and the Observations I made There," PMHS 4 (1858-1860): 82; Frederick Tuckerman, ed., "Diary of Samuel Cooper, 1775-1776," AHR 6, no. 2 (January 1901): 322.

councils, with any two having complete control over the military; suspend officers and fill up vacancies; and to authorize the raising of up to six independent companies.[39]

Also early in 1776 Congress sent a committee, consisting of Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Lynch, Sr., and Andrew Allen, to New York City to calm the impetuous Charles Lee, who had managed to embroil himself in a debate with the New York authorities regarding their respective responsibilities and authority.[40]

Sending committees to camp, Congress very quickly learned, was a useful means of informing themselves of the situation of the army, coordinating activities with military and civilian leaders on a direct basis, and exerting congressional supremacy on a personal basis. Therefore, despite the introduction of a Board of War and Ordnance in 1776, Congress continued to send committees to camp frequently during the next two years.

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[39]Report of the Committee appointed to confer with General Philip Schuyler, December 23, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:442-446; Ford, JCC, 3:339-341; 4:151-152, 215-220, 233; Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Samuel Chase to John Thomas, May 15, 1776, John Thomas Papers, MHS (Microfilm); Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, February 15, 1776, Morris, John Jay, p. 228.

[40]President John Hancock to George Washington, January 29, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:332; Richard Smith Diary, January 26, 1776, ibid., 329; James Duane, William Floyd, and Henry Wisner to the New York Committee of Safety, January 27, 1776, ibid., 330; Ford, JCC, 4:92-94.

Late in the summer of 1776, they sent Elbridge Gerry, Rober Sherman, and Francis Lewis to New York to inspect the state of the army, and George Clymer and Richard Stockton to the northern army for the same purpose. That fall they sent William Paca, John Witherspoon, and George Ross to Washington's camp to discuss promotions and the appointments of officers. The next summer they sent Elbridge Gerry, Philip Livingston, and George Clymer to the main army to ascertain its condition. To determine the condition of the army at Fort Pitt, Congress appointed Joseph Reed, Gabriel Jones, and Samuel Washington late in November 1777 as a committee to travel to that western post, authorizing them to suspend and appoint officers and to draw up offensive operational plans in concert with General Hand. Because of other duties, this committee was replaced by George Clymer, Sampson Mathews, and Samuel McDowell, who did not reach Fort Pitt until March 1778.[41]

Undoubtedly the most important committee appointed the first half of the war was the one sent to Washington's camp during the winter of 1777-1778. This was a time when

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[41] Ibid., 5:808; 6:973, 973n.1, 975; 7:546, 577; 9:942-945, 1018; 10:9, 38, 314; William Williams to Joseph Trumbull, September 26, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:104; Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, September 27, 1776, ibid., 105; Samuel Chase to the Maryland Council of Safety, November 26, 1776, ibid., 166; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, July 15, 1777, ibid., 414; Henry Laurens to George Clymer, March 27, 1778, ibid., 3:144, 144n.2.

Washington's popularity in Congress was at its lowest, and the war effort desperate. Hoping to help Washington, and at the same time to assert closer control over the military, Congress during the fall of 1777 established the Board of War and the Inspector General's department, and began sending committees to Washington's camp.

On November 28, 1777, Congress appointed Elbridge Gerry, Robert Morris, and Joseph Jones to repair to the main army to discuss with Washington the possibility of a winter campaign. They reached camp on the third of December and, after several days of meetings with Washington and his generals, realized the army was in no condition to mount a winter offensive. Therefore, upon returning to Congress, they had that body resolve that the army not take to the offense until spring. They also suggested to Congress, as did Washington, that since the army was in such bad shape, the quartermaster general's department in shambles, they send another committee to camp to help assist Washington in correcting abuses and to make new arrangements for the preservation of the officer corps and the army itself.[42]

Congress responded on January 10, 1778, by appointing three members of Congress and a like number from the

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[42]Ford, JCC, 10:972, 1029-1031; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 13, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:194.

Board of War as a committee to meet with Washington at camp, where they would reduce the regiments; make recommendation, removals, appointments; and adopt such other measures "as they shall judge necessary for introducing economy and promoting discipline and good morals in the army."[43] Elected on the tenth were Joseph Reed, Francis Dana, and Nathaniel Folsom, and Board of War members Gates, Mifflin, and Pickering. John Harvie was added as a congressional member on the twelfth.[44]

Because of the embarrassing situation created for Washington's critics in and out of Congress when the "Conway Cabal" fell apart, it was decided in Congress that it would be impolitic to have Washington directly controlled at camp by Gates and the other Board of War members. Thus Gates, Mifflin, and Pickering were excused from going to camp, being replaced by Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Gouverneur Morris. Most of the members of the committee to camp eventually made it to Valley Forge, and they, in conjunction with Washington, were able to impress upon Congress the necessity for the proper providing of the officers and soldiers. During the first week of May 1778, several members of Congress came to camp to help celebrate the French

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[43] Ford, JCC, 10:40.

[44] Ibid., 40, 41.

alliance and, while there, discussed military policy. Another committee was sent to camp that summer to help arrange the organization of the army.[45]

Although Washington was allowed more control over the affairs of the army after the summer of 1778, Congress nevertheless continued to send committees to camp to discuss military policy. In December 1779, for example, Philip Schuyler and Henry Marchant were selected to see Washington about the arrangement of the Southern Department. On January 10, 1780, when it appeared to many members that the military needed help, Elbridge Gerry moved that Congress send a committee to camp who would, with the commander-in-chief, "be authorized to take such measures as they may judge necessary, for obtaining immediate supplies for the army." Although this motion was soundly defeated, Gerry, Robert R. Livingston, and John Mathews were selected as a committee to investigate the possibility of reducing the size of the army and increasing its efficiency.[46]

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[45]Ibid., 67; 11:676, 769; Gouverneur Morris to John Jay, February 1, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:66; The Committee of Conference to Thomas Johnson, Jr., February 16, 1778, ibid., 86-87; The Committee of Conference to George Clinton, March 16, 1778, ibid., 131; Francis Lewis to Pierre Van Cortlandt, March [April], 10, 1778, ibid., 163-164; Joseph Reed to Esther Reed, August 16, 1778, ibid., 375; The Committee of Arrangement to Theodorick Bland, September 11, 1778, ibid., 407; The Committee of Arrangement to George Washington, September 30, 1778, ibid., 431-432; Horatio Gates to Thomas Conway, May 17, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p.143.

[46]Ford, JCC, 15:1331, 1332; 16:37-38.

About a week and a half later, to supplement the activities of the above-mentioned committee, Congress decided to send two men, one of whom was to be a member of Congress, as a committee to camp. Philip Schuyler and Board of War member Pickering were selected, and later Thomas Mifflin was added.[47] Schuyler, however, feeling Pickering and Mifflin were enemies of Washington and that Mifflin had failed as Quartermaster General and, therefore, was not capable of making a contribution to the better provisioning of the army, refused to serve. Thus, the committee collapsed and never went to camp.

Washington, although appreciating Schuyler's loyalty, nevertheless wanted a committee to be sent to camp to assist him in provisioning his army and keeping them under control, as well as helping him to get the states to supply his army. Congress responded to Washington's April appeal by appointing a three-man committee which would go to camp to confer with Washington about the reduction of the army and the arrangement of the staff departments. This was in hopes that a smaller army, efficiently supplied, would not only remain in the field, but would not turn on their masters. Schuyler, John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody were elected as the

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[47] Ibid., 75-77, 79.

committee on April 13, 1780, and proceeded to camp shortly thereafter.[48]

This committee, which was given additional responsibilities and authority in May, was not that successful, even when Congress in June called on the states to cooperate with it. The military leaders, who had hoped the committee would be able to assist them in better supplying and controlling the military, became disillusioned. So did Congress, which finally recalled them by an overwhelming vote on the eleventh of August, believing the committee wanted too much authority for themselves and the military commanders.[49]

So, upset and disappointed with this committee, Congress did not send any members to camp the remainder of the war. Individuals from, and representing Congress did, however,go to camp. Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris and Board of War member Richard Peters visited Washington's camp at Dobb's Ferry during August 1780 to ascertain the arrangement of the army for the ensuing campaign and to

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[48]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:207-211; Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton, April 8, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:110; Ford, JCC, 16:332-333, 354-356, 362.

[49]Ibid., 17:438-439, 720; 18:538, James Duane to Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:170-171; Nathanael Greene to Samuel B. Webb, July 4, 1780, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:269.

determine their financial needs. The Secretary at War, Benjamin Lincoln, visited the camp also, during 1782 and 1783 for the same reasons.[50]

Individual members of Congress also visited camp throughout the war, for various reasons, but always with the affect of reminding the military their actions were not only being directed by Congress, but also monitored. Most often, congressional visits came about as members traveled to and from the meetings of Congress.[51] Such congressional visits began with John Adams visiting camp at Cambridge in January 1776, where he consulted with the commander-in-chief about sending General Lee to New York, and ended with James Duane's visit to Washington's headquarters at Newburgh during February 1783.[52] Some members of Congress went to camp to

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[50]Ford, JCC, 21:791, 817; George Washington to Israel Putnam, June 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:462; Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795, p. 24; Robert Morris Diary, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:418, 418n.1; 2:74-80; Joseph Reed to George Washington, August 3, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:164-165; James Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, August 20, 1781, ibid., 191.

[51]James Duane to Alexander Hamilton, February 17, 1783, ibid., 7:45; Minutes of Councils of War, January 16, 17, 1776, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:774, 774-775; John Adams to George Washington, January 6, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:370-371.

[52]James Duane to George Clinton, March 13, 1778, "Original Documents," MAH 13, no. 2 (February 1885): 177; Horatio Gates to John Stark, January 24, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p. 142; Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:404; Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:365; Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, p. 39; Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York:

serve as military volunteers, such as Benjamin Rush during the winter of 1776-1777, Thomas Burke during the Brandywine campaign, and Elbridge Gerry and three others during the 1780 New Jersey campaign.[53]

Another means by which members of Congress maintained their personal contact with, and indirect control of the military officers was by having their sons and other relatives serve as aides-de-camp to the major military leaders. For example, Silas Deane's stepsons, Samuel B. Webb and John Webb, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Washington, Putnam, Howe, and Greene. Lewis Morris's sons, Lewis, Jr., and Jacob, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Greene, Lee, and Sullivan. Francis Lewis's son, Morgan, served as an aide-de-camp to Gates. John Witherspoon's son, James, served as an aide-de-camp to General Nash. James Duane's son-in-law,

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Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 449; Burnett, LMCC, 5:134n.2, 206-207n.3; James Mitchell Varnum to William Greene, April 21, 1781, ibid., 6:65; James Duane to Horatio Gates, December 16, 1777, ibid., 2:590; James Duane to Philip Schuyler, December 16, 1777, ibid., 590.

[53]Corner, Autobiography of Benjamin Rush, pp. 124-127; Griffith J. McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Irdell, One of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1:547; John Steele to Will[iam] Steele, June 14, 1780, "Original Revolutionary Letter," HM 4, no. 5 (May 1860): 138; L. Carroll Judson, The Sages and Heroes of the American Revolution. In Two Parts Including the Signers of the Declaration of Independence. Two Hundred and Forty Three of the Sages and Heroes, are presented in due form and many others are named incidentally (Philadelphia: L. Carroll Judson, 1851), p. 119.

William North, served as an aide-de-camp to General Steuben. Philip Livingston's son, Henry P., was captain of Washington's guards. Henry Laurens's son, John, served as an aide to Washington; and John Hanson's son, Alexander Contee, served as private secretary to Washington. John Armstrong, Sr.'s son, John, Jr., served as an aide-de-camp to Generals Mercer and Gates. William Burnett's son, Ichabod, served as an aide-de-camp to General Greene. Edward Biddle's son-in-law, Peter Scull, served as an aide to Washington. And James Mercer's half-brother, John Francis Mercer, served as an aide-de-camp to General Lee.[54]

Another indirect way the members of Congress were able to strengthen their control over the military was by having military leaders communicate with them. This not only reminded the military that Congress was the supreme decision-making body of the continent, but it also allowed Congress to know better what was happening in the army. Additionally, it strengthened the ties between the civilian and military leaders.

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[54]Julia Delafield, Biographies of Francis Lewis and Morgan Lewis, 2 vols. (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Company, 1877), 1:46; Varnum Lansing Collins, President Witherspoon: A Biography, 2:31, 31n.23; James Haltigan, The Irish in the American Revolution and their Early Influence in the Colonies, pp. 236-237; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, From 1774 to 1783, pp. 212, 268-269; Joseph P. Bradley, "William Burnett, M.D.," PMHB 3, no. 3 (1879): 310.

Throughout the war, members of Congress asked military leaders to write them on a personal basis about conditions at camp and about the qualifications and abilities of their fellow officers.[55]

Most officers welcomed the opportunity to express themselves to members of Congress, and frequently did so.[56]

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[55]Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, September 24, 1776, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:115; John Jay to Lewis Morris, Sr., December 20, 1775, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 434; Thomas Nelson to Horatio Gates, December 31, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 3:1506; Robert Morris to Nathanael Greene, September 10, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 2:229; Gouverneur Morris to Robert Morris, [September 10, 1781], ibid., 229; Roger Sherman to Joseph Trumbull, July 6, 1775, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 3, CSL; John Adams to Abigail Adams, December 3, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:331; John Adams to John Thomas, November 13, 1775, John Thomas Papers, MHS (Microfilm); Same to same, March 7, 1776, ibid.; John Adams to William Heath, February 18, 1776, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, October 5, 1775, ibid., Same to same, April 15, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:9; Same to same, August 3, 1776, ibid., 14; John Adams to Horatio Gates, March 23, 1776, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Correspondence of John Adams and Horatio Gates," PMHS 17 (October 1941-May 1944): 138-139; Same to same, April 27, 1776, ibid., 143; John Adams to John Sullivan, June 23, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:408; John Adams to William Tudor, July 23, 1775, William Tudor Papers, MHS; Same to same, July 26, 1775, ibid.

[56]For Lafayette, see Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:passim; for Hamilton, see Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1, 2, 3:passim; Generals McDougall and Schuyler frequently wrote Jay, see Morris, John Jay, passim; Robert Morris frequently written by Tench Tilghman, Generals Wayne and Gates, see Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1, 2, 3, 4:passim; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 46.

Some even initiated the correspondence, not waiting for a member of Congress to ask them to write.[57]

Military men also visited Congress, thereby reinforcing the supremacy of the civilians. These visits were often prescribed by Congress, but just as frequently military leaders took it upon themselves to come to Congress to lay before that body a particular complaint or request, generally relating to their own professional advancement, which of course, they equated with the patriotic cause.

Washington, who preferred to stay at camp and deal with Congress by letters and emissaries, as well as through visits of committees, nevertheless was occasionally required to come to Philadelphia to discuss strategy and the arrangement and subsistence of the army. He, Gates, and Mifflin were ordered to Philadelphia during the summer of 1776, where they met with several committees to discuss plans for a Canadian campaign, as well as plans for Washington's next campaign.[58] This two week stay was almost more than Washington could bear, for he believed his time could be

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[57]"Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the Continental Congress, May, 1778, to August, 1780," HCEI 55, no. 3 (July 1919): 162.

[58]John Hancock to George Washington, May 16, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:449; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 19, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:58; Same to same, May 20, 1776, ibid., 62; George Washington to Israel Putnam, May 26, 1776, ibid., 67; Ford, JCC, 4:383-384, 391, 399-400, 410-412.

better spent in the field than in the cabinet. He avoided coming to Congress for over a year, but return he did during August 1777, when he spent several days with a committee discussing the Northern Department.[59] Another whole year would elapse before Washington again would be summoned to Congress. This was late in December 1778. Despite being wined and dined for a month and a half, and meeting with various committees and members, Washington continually expressed his desire to return to his army, and was allowed to do so in February.[60] Appreciating Washington's objections to being called away from his army during a winter encampment or a summer campaign, Congress refrained from calling him to confer with them for over two years. Washington's next visit occurred during Spetember 1781, as his army was marching towards Virginia through Philadelphia. Washington used the opportunity to meet with Morris and members of Congress, primarily to discuss finances.[61] After his successful

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[59]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 7 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1957), 4:447-449.

[60]Ford, JCC, 12:1250; 13:7; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, January 29, 1779, Henry Knox Papers, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #4); Eliphalet Dyer, Jesse Root, and Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, January 4, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:7-8; John Jay to George Washington, January 31, 1779, ibid., 49; John Fell Diary, January 1, 5, 1779, ibid., 1, 10; James Duane to Philip Schuyler, January 3, 1779, ibid., 4.

[61]The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser, September 2, 1781; Robert Morris Diary, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 2:172-175.

Yorktown campaign, Washington returned to Philadelphia late in November 1781 and remained there until March 1782, meeting with committees of Congress, as well as with individual members, to discuss the arrangement and future of the army.[62] The only other visit Washington made to Congress before the peace treaty arrived the following spring, was in July 1782, when he and Rochambeau met with several members of Congress to discuss possible operations against New York City.[63]

Although Washington did not enjoy visiting Congress--not because he held any disrespect for that body, but because he hated to be away from his army, particularly as they were constantly on the verge of mutinying and/or disbanding--he did not mind sending or having sent his representatives. Congress, therefore, did not hesitate calling upon Washington's subordinates to come to confer with them.

Because of the importance of logistics, members of the army subsistence staffs were frequently called to Congress. This was particularly true of Quartermaster Generals Greene and Pickering, who spent much time discussing

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[62]Robert Morris Diary, ibid., 3:316, 356, 399, 435; Daniel Carroll to George Washington, November 28, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:270; Same to same, December 5, 1781, ibid., 273-274; Ezekiel Cornell to George Washington, [February 12, 1782], ibid., 302.

[63]Ezekiel Cornell and David Howell to William Greene, July 19, 1782, ibid., 387.

the support of the army with committees of Congress and the Board of War.[64] Other officers also visited Congress to discuss the supply of army, including Thomas Mifflin in 1776; Colonel Daniel Brodhead in 1781; and General Greene's aides, Lewis Morris, Jr., and Robert Burnet, during the latter years.[65]

Strategy and related activities also prompted Congress to call upon military commanders to personally discuss policy with them, particularly with newly appointed theater commanders before taking command. Thus, most all of the Southern Department commanders, beginning with Lee in 1776 and ending with Greene in 1780, came to Philadelphia before assuming command.[66] Similarly, Northern Department commander Gates and Schuyler also held discussions with

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[64]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, January 29, 1779, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #4); Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, 1781-1782, passim, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull, April 23, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:44-45; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, pp. 261, 264, 271-272; Robert Morris Diary, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 3:316.

[65]Robert Morris Diary, ibid., 109, 200, 232, ibid., 2:267n.2; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, November 23, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:303; Thomas Mifflin to George Washington, November 26, 1776, Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:266; Samuel Huntington to George Washington, June 2, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:108.

[66]John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), p. 110; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, p. 270; Kapp, Kalb, pp. 194-195.

Congress before taking command of their department. Commanding officers often came to Congress on their own to discuss strategy, particularly relating to plans that would enhance their reputation or gain territory for their state.[67]

Other officers also visited Congress uninvited to plead their special interest, normally involving promotions and command assignemnts. Although at times this was a nuisance, it did serve to reinforce the belief that if the military wanted something they had to obtain it through legitimate means, by appealing to the civilian authorities.[68]

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[67]Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:139-140; James Benjamin Wilbur, Ira Allen: Founder of Vermont 1751-1814, 1:65-66; C. W. Butterfield, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782 (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Company, 1873), pp. 27-29, 41-42, 111; Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 67; Elizabeth S. Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Lebèque Duportail: Commandant of Engineers in the Continental Army 1777-1783, Institute Francais De Washington (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), p. 137.

[68]Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, December 4, 1780, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1779 (New York: Helen Fahnestock Hubbard, 1944), p. 132; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Joins the American Army (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), pp. 118, 121; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 197, 337; Ford, JCC, 21:1134-1136; Kapp, Steuben, pp. 241, 272; Baron von Steuben to George Washington, August [ ], 1778, ibid., p. 178; Same to same, December 6, 1778, ibid., pp. 190-191; Same to same, January 26, 1780, ibid., p. 242; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, January 18, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 17:407; Same to same, October 13, 1780, ibid., 20:175; John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?, p. 190.

Despite the nuisance of some of the uninvited visits, Congress, as has been stated earlier, appreciated the fact that the military looked to them for guidance and direction. Congress, we must remember, was the supreme civilian authority, and therefore responsible for keeping the continent's military forces from becoming tyrannous. Fear of a military tyranny, a Cromwell, and the desire to uphold civilian direction of the war effort and the military was ever present in the thinking and actions of the members of Congress. Although this authority would be shared with the state governments and with the military itself, Congress from the first days of their meeting in May 1775 attempted to get and retain a firm grip on the control and direction of the military forces of the continent.

As discussed earlier, the primary control exercised by Congress was its authority to commission and promote officers, especially the general officers. But there were many other ways that Congress controlled and directed their military forces; all of which tended to reinforce the concept of civil supremacy.

Congress spent a considerable amount of time, particularly early in the war, making personnel assignments for even the lowest ranking officers, especially for the foreign officers which they commissioned with abandon.[69]

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[69]Ford, JCC, 4:223; 5:565.

These personnel assignments were not just limited to the lower ranking officers, for Congress even made personnel assignments for general officers, such as sending De Woedtke to Canada in 1776, keeping Mifflin in the Philadelphia area late in 1776, and sending Steuben to Rhode Island in 1778.[70] These personnel assignments did not generally upset the military as a whole or Washington, but congressional involvement in troop movements, command decisions, investigations, and strategy did, especially if they were made without consultation with the military. Nevertheless, most of the military accepted the authority of Congress to make those decisions, and grudgingly accepted them, even when they believed Congress did not have the expertise or the best interest of the army in mind when making military decisions.

Early in the war especially, but throughout it, Congress made troop assignments, even at the company level.[71] Often these assignments came to Washington in the form of a request, generally asking him to spare a regiment or two

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[70] Ibid., 4:209-210; 6:979, 995; 11:849.

[71] "Diary of Governor Samuel Ward: Delegate from Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, 1774-1776," MAH 1, no. 9 (September 1877): passim, 549-561; "Diary of Richard Smith in the Continental Congress, 1775-1776," AHR 1, no. 2 (January 1896): 288-310; ibid., 1, no. 3 (April 1896): 493-516.

for a specific duty.[72] More frequently, however, Washington was simply ordered to make such assignments. Thus, he was ordered to reassign the Connecticut soldiers under General Wooster during the summer of 1775; the German Battalion the following summer; and the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Lines during the fall of 1776.[73] It is important to remember that each colony was more concerned about its own protection than that of their neighbors, thus they desired special consideration from Congress and Washington with respect to sending troops to their defense. Early in the war, Congress generally granted such requests for help. But as the war progressed, and realizing Washington in the field had a better idea of how to utilize his forces, especially after demonstrating his abilities at Trenton and Princeton, Congress did not often burden him with requests for helping out one state at the expense of another.[74] This did not mean Congress relinquished control over tactical movements of their army as they frequently ordered Washington to send portions of the army to specific locations, particularly with respect to the Southern Department between 1779 and 1781.[75]

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[72] Ford, JCC, 4:70-71, 236,302, 365; 16:240.

[73] Ibid., 2:123, 186; 5:810; 6:977.

[74] Ibid., 7:649, 659.

[75] Ibid., 12:969; 13:132; 14:560; 15:1256, 1347, 1351, 1365; 18:997, 19:177.

Besides making individual personnel and unit assignments, Congress also mandated which units constituted a particular command. Often this meant nothing more than providing for a merging of units, such as the joining together of Pulaski's Legion and Armand's Corps in 1780. Congress frequently declared which units constituted a particular field army, such as with the southern army. They also mandated during 1775 that five thousand troops be kept in the New York theater of operations, and in 1777 they informed Washington that he could not detail more than twenty-five hundred men from the northern army without first consulting with General Gates and Governor Clinton. When making these organizational decisions, Washington was generally consulted, particularly after Trenton and Princeton, but there were exceptions, as the president of Congress explained to him after ordering the Pennsylvania Line south in 1781 without prior consultation, stating quick action necessitated their decision.[76]

Probably no other subject caused more debate within the army and Congress than the appointment of commanding generals of the various armies and expeditions. Although

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[76] Ibid., 2:207, 225; 16:187; 19:177; Thomas G. Frothingham, Washington: Commander in Chief (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930), p. 230; Samuel Huntington to George Washington, February 20, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 5:574.

Washington was frequently asked his opinion or given authority to make such appointments, more often than not Congress reserved to itself the right to make these decisions, particularly with respect to the northern and southern armies. At the beginning of the war, Washington believed he commanded the main army subject to the will of Congress, but the northern army was subject directly to Congress. The result of Washington's acquiescence with respect to the northern army resulted in many complications, as evidenced by the Schuyler-Gates feud for command in the Northern Department, and by the debate over the choice to lead the expedition against Canada in 1778.[77] Congress also kept a firm grip on control of the southern army, beginning with the appointment of Charles Lee during the spring of 1776 until the appointment of Gates during the early summer of 1780. Congress appointed successively Lee, Howe, Lincoln, and Gates without consulting Washington; with Washington's one appointment, DeKalb, being only temporary in nature.[78] It was not until Gates faltered at Camden did Congress ask Washington to name the southern commander. Ever deferential,

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[77] Ford, JCC, 5:448-451; 8:668; 10:87, 107.

[78] Ibid., 17:508; James Duane to Lord Stirling, March 1, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:369; Henry Laurens to Robert Howe, October 20, 1777, ibid., 2:525-526; Cornelius Harnett to Richard Caswell, September 26, 1778, ibid., 3:426.

Washington responded by recommending Greene, who Congress readily accepted.[79]

Congress made other command appointments as well. They included the creation of a position titled Commandant of the Forts in the New York Highlands and filled it in the spring of 1777 with George Clinton; the appointment of Gates to command the army in the area around Fishkill, New York, during the spring of 1778; and several of the commanders at Fort Pitt and the Western Department, including Edward Hand and William Irvine.[80]

Just as Congress appointed commanding officers, they also removed them, as well as investigated their actions, beginning with the removal of General Wooster in June 1776, and Washington being directed the following month to make an inquiry into the conduct of the officers who had directed the unsuccessful Canadian expedition. The following year, Washington was able to ward off a congressional called-for investigation of Sullivan's conduct at Staten Island and Brandywine. Not so lucky were St. Clark and Schuyler, who were recalled after the loss of Forts Ticonderoga and Independence, and required to repair to Washington's

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[79] Ford, JCC, 18:906, 994-995.

[80] Ibid., 6:203; 9:944; 10:275, 354; 21:996-997; Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 15, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:325.

headquarters to face an investigation. Also called to account for their actions were the commanders of Forts Clinton, Montgomery, and Mifflin, which also fell in 1777. McIntosh and Howe were removed from their respective commands in the south for their inability to get along with the local civilian authorities. As Washington became more trusted by Congress, he was allowed greater latitude in calling for investigations and removing officers. Congress even ignored the fact that Washington avoided having an investigation of Gates's conduct at Camden, despite having previously requested it; and eventually repealed their request.[81]

By making personnel and troop assignments, investigations, and command appointments, Congress kept a relatively tight rein on the military. True, Washington, as he demonstrated his ability and willingness to subordinate himself to the will of Congress, was given more decision-making responsibility. Nevertheless, when major strategical decisions were to be made Congress, believing they were in

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[81] John Hancock to George Washington, June 7, 1776, ibid., 1:476; Cornelius Harnett to Richard Caswell, September 26, 1778, ibid., 3:426; George Walton to George Washington, August 5, 1777, ibid., 2:439; John Adams to Abigail Adams, August 20, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:321; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 15, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:227-229; Ford, JCC, 4:472; 8:588, 590, 596, 616, 700, 742, 749; 9:975-976; 12:951; 18:906; 23:465-466.

a better position than the military leaders, including Washington, to see the needs of the continent as a whole, throughout the war mandated and recommended major campaigns, expeditions, and other strategical movements.

Much of American strategy during the war was simply a response to British movements. Nevertheless, Congress was quite active giving military directions to their military commanders, beginning soon after their meeting in May 1775. At that time, Congress specifically advised New York not to oppose British troop landings and to leave them in peace unless they committed hostile acts or erected fortifications. They also ordered the New York forces to abandon Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and withdraw all the troops, cannon, and stores to the southern end of Lake George. Later that month, and during June, Congress ordered that New York and the Hudson River be protected; prohibited, and then reversed themselves, regarding a Canadian expedition. In September 1776, when it appeared that New York City would be captured, many of Washington's generals suggested burning the town to the ground before evacuating. Initially, Congress ordered Washington to hold the town and do no damage to it; but after Washington's queries to them, Congress informed him he was under no obligation to hold the town, but under no circumstances was he to burn it. Earlier that year and again in 1778, before later suspending

their orders, Congress directed expeditions be taken against Detroit.[82]

Early in the war, particularly, Congress took an interest in the Northern Department. During the winter of 1777-1778, for example, they twice ordered the securing of the Hudson River, and authorized, then cancelled, a Canadian expedition. During 1777 and 1778 they also took an active interest in the western theater of operations, ordering Gates in the latter year to mount an offensive in the Seneca Country and during 1779 they ordered an expedition against the western Indians. Additionally, during the fall of 1777, they commissioned James Willing, a brother of member of Congress, Thomas Willing, to lead an expedition down the Mississippi, attacking the enemy wherever he found them. With respect to the Southern Department, they ordered an expedition against West Florida in 1777, and against East Florida in 1778.[83]

After 1779, Congress relied more on Washington to make strategical decisions, in part because he had become more trusted, and because he would have to coordinate his

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[82] Ibid., 2:49-53, 55-56, 59, 75, 109-110; 4:301; 5:730, 733, 749; 11:588-589, 720; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 3, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:6.

[83] John Caughey, "Willing's Expedition Down the Mississippi, 1778," LHQ 15, no. 1 (January 1932): 6; Ford, JCC, 8:566-567; 9:865; 10:84, 87, 217, 253-254, 354; 11:588, 589-590; 12:1091; 13:252.

activities with the French. Nevertheless, Congress did not relinquish their right to mandate strategy, for in August 1780 they ordered Washington to make plans with the French to rid the south of the British forces.[84] They also continued, as they had throughout the war, making recommendations. Often Congress believed they knew what the best strategy or military policy was, but realizing that military in the field might have better judgment with respect to practicability of carrying out their plans, they formed their strategical requests as recommendations. Late in November 1777, for example, Congress recommended that Washington undertake a winter campaign. Although they were unsuccessful in this instance, as the army went into winter encampment at Valley Forge, they were successful in their recommendation during the late summer of 1782 to have the military undertake a western campaign against the Indians.[85]

Congress, although possessing the authority over the continent's military establishment, frequently shared this authority with military leaders, particularly Washington. This sharing of authority was progressive in nature, in that it was increasingly shared as military commanders became more trusted and as the war situation worsened.

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[84] Ibid., 17:699.

[85] Ibid., 9:972; Edgar W. Hassler, Old Westmoreland: A History of Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1900), pp. 186, 186-187.

Actually, the sharing of authority began with Washington's appointment as commander-in-chief on June 25, 1775. Realizing they could not foresee all eventualities, Congress told Washington they were leaving many things to his prudent judgment, which they hoped would reflect the opinion of councils of war. These councils, they desired, would suggest the most advantageous means for the ends to which the army had been raised.[86] Gates had hoped Congress had been more explicit in granting Washington specific powers, but Washington was satisfied that Congress had been proper in their instructions to him.[87] For the next year and a half, Washington generally followed what he believed to be Congress's desire; that is, calling councils of war before making any important decisions. Additionally, Washington, in his desire to remain completely under the will of Congress, frequently did not take action until he received the express authority from Congress.

By consulting Congress so frequently, Washington had, by the summer of 1776, become a nuisance. Bluntly, Congress told Washington they "have such an entire confidence

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[86] Ford, JCC, 2:100-101.

[87] Horatio Gates to George Washington, June 22, 1775, Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, Letters to Washington and Accompanying Papers, 5 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company for the Society of the Colonial Dames of America, 1898-1902), 5:175.

in his judgment, that they will give no particular directions about the dispositions of the troops, but desire that he will dispose those at New York, the Flying Camp and Ticonderoga, as to him shall seem the most conducive to the public good."[88] With respect to him calling councils of war, Congress that winter and again the following year indicated that he did not have to rely completely upon councils of war, preferring he acted as circumstances dictated.[89]

Despite the discretionary authority granted Washington early in the war, he was, for the most part, still subject to the will of Congress, which constantly involved themselves in overseeing and directing the military. For example, early in the war they ordered Washington to offer a pardon to all deserters; strongly recommended he give Lafayette command of a division; and directed him in the spring of 1778 to call a council of war to formulate plans for the next campaign.[90] Such orders and recommendations continued throughout the war, as Congress acted on the belief they must keep a firm grip on the military,

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[88]Ford, JCC, 5:602.

[89]Ibid., 7:196-197, 221; 8:663; Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, April 10, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 1:272.

[90]Ford, JCC, 9:816, 982-983; 10:364.

otherwise the military might put a firm grip on them and the country. Yet, as the military became more trusted, they were given greater latitude in decision making, especially Washington.

Early in the war, during the height of the Schuyler-Gates conflict, when Gates was reappointed by Congress to command the Northern Department, Congress informed Washington that they "never intended by any commission hitherto granted by them, or by the establishment of any department whatever, to supersede or circumscribe the power of General Washington as the commander in chief of all the Continental land forces within the United States."[91] Yet, as we have seen, the powers granted the commander in chief were indeed circumscribed by Congress. It was a fine line that Washington walked, as many decisions he faced often required asking whether or not he was even entitled to make such decisions. That, to a large degree, is why Washington frequently consulted Congress and its members, as definition of his powers changed with events. Hoping to clarify matters for Washington and itself, Congress, early in 1779, directed Washington to "superintend and direct the military operations in all the departments in these States," subject to the

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[91] Ibid., 8:668.

general orders of Congress.[92] This meant the Northern, Western, and Middle Departments, for Congress at that time reserved to themselves control over the Southern Department. Thus, Washington never had control, or at least complete control, of all the forces of the continent, nor the grand strategy.

Washington was allowed after 1778 greater say in what constituted that strategy. To a large degree this was because of the arrival of the French forces. Thus, despite ordering many of the forces under Washington's direct control to the southern theater of operations during 1779 and 1780, Congress in the summer of 1779 authorized Washington to act with the French without applying to Congress for directions.[93] Besides giving Washington more say-so over strategy, Congress gave him more control over command and personnel assignments.

Washington was frequently authorized to make major appointments, beginning with commanding general and other generals of the "Flying Camp" during the summer of 1776. During 1778 and 1779, he was authorized to appoint the

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[92] Ibid., 13:109, 110, John Jay to George Clinton, February 19, 1779, Morris, John Jay, p. 562; Conrad Alexandre, Chevalier Gerard to Comte de Vergennes, May 16, 1779, Durand, New Materials for the History of the American Revolution, p. 240.

[93] Henry Laurens to John Laurens, September 27, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:441-442.

commanding officers of the Canadian expedition, a general to replace Spencer in Rhode Island, the commanders at Fort Pitt, and the commander-in-chief of the cavalry. After Congress's appointments of commanders of the Southern Department faltered one after another, Washington was directed in October 1780 to appoint a successor to Gates. Not desiring to force his choice upon Congress, Washington simply nominated Greene. Congress then appointed him officially with instructions that he would be responsible to Washington and not to themselves.[94]

After the reorganization of the army late in 1776, and finding that the states were dilatory in appointing new officers, and thus the inability to recruit the new army, Congress directed Washington, in consultation with his officers, to appoint the new officers.[95] As discussed earlier, this was an especially important grant of authority, for appointment of officers was something Congress and the states generally kept in their own hands. This statement does not apply to staff officers for Congress frequently authorized Washington to make such appointments.

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[94]Ford, JCC, 5:418; 10:84, 87, 188; 11:417; 12:1158; 18:906, 995; George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, March 5, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:194; George Washington to Nathanael Greene, October 14, 1780, ibid., 20:182; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, October 15, 1780, ibid., 189.

[95]Ford, JCC, 6:920-921; John Hancock to George Washington, November 5, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:139-140.

Beginning during the summer of 1775, Congress authorized Washington to make staff appointments. At that time they authorized him to appoint the Commissary of Muster, the Quartermaster General, and the Wagon Master. The following year he was authorized to appoint a Commissary of Clothing for the army under his immediate command and a Clothier-General of Supply for the army. At Valley Forge early in 1778, Washington was authorized, in conjunction with a congressional committee at camp, to appoint minor positions in both the Quartermaster and Commissary departments, and the following year he was authorized to arrange the western Commissary and Quartermaster departments, "any resolutions of Congress notwithstanding."[96]

Washington was also given discretionary authority with respect to other military personnel matters. Realizing he was in a better position than themselves to judge his recruiting needs, Congress often allowed Washington, if he judged necessary, authority to give bounties to augment Continental bounties. Similarly, he was authorized to offer rewards to British deserters, if he thought proper, and in 1778, he and the commanders of the various departments

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[96]Ford, JCC, 2:190-191, 211-212; 6:881, 1043; 10:185, 186; 13:130-131.

were authorized to determine the basic ration according to circumstances.[97]

Additionally, Washington was given authority to call on certain states, for a fixed period of time and for a fixed number of militia, to serve generally for a set amount of time in a specific area for a specific purpose.[98] In granting this authority Congress reminded Washington that he, like themselves, could only make such requests of the states, not compel.

Probably the most surprising grants of authority to Washington and the other generals during the war were those of a dictatorial nature.

Disappointed with the state the American forces found themselves during the fall of 1776, Charles Lee wrote his friend, Benjamin Rush, that if Congress would give him sufficient power for just a week, he could improve the condition of the army and thus their ability to defeat the British the next time the forces met. But he doubted Congress would ever give any military man the necessary power. "Did none of Congress," he queried Rush, "ever read the Roman History?"[99] Most had, and knew that the military

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[97]Ibid., 6:1043; 8:417; 11:838; 12:890, 13:108, 298-299; 14:758.

[98]Ibid., 3:324; 10:309-310; 11:684; 15:1108, 1331.

[99]Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 20, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 289.

in Rome had frequently been safely entrusted with dictatorial grants of power. They knew also, however, that it was the military that had undone the civilian leadership of the Roman Empire. They also knew of the military tyranny and despotism of the preceding century, and their own with the British forces in America the decade before the war actually began.

Nevertheless, by mid December 1776, there was talk of giving the military dictatorial power, for it appeared the war would be lost unless something drastic was done. The army had been reduced to less than five thousand men, and the British army was sweeping through New Jersey on its way to Philadelphia. Drastic action was indeed needed, and it was called for by many both in and out of the army.[100] Washington's neighbor, George Mason, successfully had the Virginia legislature on the twenty-sixth of December adopt a resolution calling for Congress to "invest the Commander in Chief . . . with more and ample extensive Powers for conducting the Operation of the War."[101] Even Benjamin Rush, certainly not someone to trust the military with extensive

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[100]Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 21, 1776, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL.

[101]Resolution in Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 1:327.

powers, called for Washington to be invested with dictatorial power for several months.[102]

"Safety from external danger," Hamilton wrote in the Eighth Federalist, "is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent lover of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates."[103] This was true during December 1776. Threatened with extinction if they remained in Philadelphia, Congress, on the twelfth of December, departed for the safety of Baltimore. Before leaving, however, they conferred complete control of the army in Washington's hands and placed Philadelphia under the military command of General Putnam.[104]

Washington was pleased to have complete responsibility and control of the Continental military forces, but he needed the appropriate power to make his control meaningful and effective. He therefore wrote Congress asking for the power to procure men and supplies, explaining that he was not lusting for power, but that desperate diseases required desperate remedies.[105] Congress, not wanting to set a

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[102]Benjamin Rush to Richard Henry Lee, December 30, 1776, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:123.

[103]Jacob Cooke, ed., The Federalist, p. 45.

[104]Ford, JCC, 6:1017, 1027; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, pp. 106, 111.

[105]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:402.

precedent for military dictatorship, but realizing that extraordinary measures were required, decided that Washington would have to be trusted with some form of dictatorial power. Thus, on the twenty-sixth of December they appointed a committee, headed by Richard Henry Lee, to consider entrusting Washington with extraordinary powers. Their report, the next day, called for giving Washington the authority to raise sixteen regiments, three thousand light cavalrymen, three regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers; to appoint, promote and discharge their officers; to call on the states for militia; to impress supplies; to arrest and confine persons who refused to accept Continental currency, or were disaffected to the American cause; and to give bounties, or otherwise prevail on the troops, whose terms of enlistment were to expire on January 1, 1777, to stay for a longer period. Their report was accepted and Washington was given these powers for a period of six months unless sooner revoked by Congress.[106]

Explaining this decision to Robert Morris, William Hooper stated Congress had given Washington "large and ample powers, fully equal to the object if America means to contend and support him." "Thus the Business of War will

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[106] Ford, JCC, 6:1043-1046; Francis Lewis to the New York Committee of Safety, December 27, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:193; Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 1:186-187.

for six months to come," he added, "move in the proper channels and the Congress be no longer exercised about matters of which it is supremely ignorant." Benjamin Harrison told Morris that if these powers granted Washington did not save Philadelphia, nothing else would, particularly anything Congress could do.[107]

Despite the belief they were doing the right thing in granting Washington dictatorial power, many members of Congress, realizing that many Americans would not understand the dictatorial grant, called for an official explanation. Therefore, on the twenty-eighth of December, a committee was appointed to prepare a circular letter to the states explaining the reasons which induced Congress to enlarge Washington's powers and asking them to cooperate with him. This circular was sent to the states two days later.[108] Additionally, several members of Congress wrote letters to the leaders of their respective states explaining, as did William Whipple, that "This measure was thought absolutely necessary for the Salvation of America."[109]

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[107]William Hooper to Robert Morris, December 28, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:196; Benjamin Harrison to Robert Morris, December 29, 1776, ibid., 196.

[108]Ford, JCC, 6:1053; Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 1:186-187.

[109]William Whipple to Josiah Bartlett, December 31, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:198; see also William Ellery to Nicholas Cooke, December 31, 1776, ibid., 199.

Notwithstanding these assurances many people believed that Washington had been appointed "Dictator;" at least many people used that term to describe Washington's status as 1777 began.[110] In explaining Washington's grant of dictatorial power, John Adams was very careful to tell his wife that "Congress never thought of making him Dictator, or giving him a Sovereignty."[111] Congress was also careful to make this clear to Washington. The resolve giving him absolute powers was sent to him with an accompanying letter from the committee of Congress then in Philadelphia, expressing their trust in him. "Happy it is for this Country," they wrote, "that the General of their Forces can safely be entrusted with the most unlimited Power and neither personal security, liberty or property be in the least degree endangered thereby."[112] At least that was their hope and desire; and they would not be disappointed.

Washington showed great restraint in exercising the powers granted him, particularly as they did not have to be fully used because of the victories at Princeton and Trenton

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[110] Dr. William Shippen, Sr., to [ ] Shippen, January 4, 1777, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 21, no. 4 (1897): 498; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, p. 111.

[111] John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 6, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:200.

[112] Robert Morris, George Clymer, and George Walton to George Washington, December 31, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:198.

which eased the military crisis that had prompted the grant of powers to meet the crisis. John Glover wrote: "I have always been a Lover of Civil Law, & ever wish'd to see America govern'd by it. But I am fully of the Opinion that it would be the Salvation of this Country was Martial Law to take place, at least for 12 Months-& that Genl. Washington was invested with power to call forth (any or) all the Male inhabitants (if wanted) at 24 hours Notice."[113] To a degree Congress agreed, but it was not until mid September, with the British army approximately twenty miles from Philadelphia, that they acted.

On September 17, 1777, two days before vacating Philadelphia, Congress provided that for a period of sixty days, anywhere within a seventy mile radius of Washington's camp, the commander-in-chief be authorized to suspend officers for misbehavior; fill up company grade and field grade vacancies; seize provisions and other articles; and remove goods from owners in areas subject to control by the British army. These powers were augmented and extended by Congress in October and November. Washington, however, ever respecting the sanctity of private property, was somewhat hesitant to seize property. This forbearance on Washington's part caused Congress on December 10, 1777, to pass a

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[113] John Glover to Jonathan Glover or Azor Orne, June 17, 1777, "General John Glover's Letter Book." HCEI 112, no. 1 (January 1976): 14.

resolution stating that they understood his delicacy in exerting military authority on the citizens of the states, but reminding him that though it was highly laudable in general, it may, "on critical exigencies, prove destructive to the army and prejudicial to the general liberties of America." They told him they expected him to draw his supplies from exposed areas, and explicitly ordered him to seize and pay for supplies anywhere within seventy miles of his camp and, in general, to carry off or destroy everything that might be useful to the British army, and not absolutely necessary to the owners. Washington's powers were extended to April 10, 1778, on December 30, 1777; and to August 10, 1778, on April 23, 1778.[114]

In April 1780, with his army in a terrible condition, Washington asked Congress to help him provide for his army. Congress responded by sending a committee, consisting of Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody, which was dicussed earlier in this chapter. Schuyler hoped this committee would be invested with the power necessary to adequately help Washington. In fact, he hoped they and Washington would be invested co-jointly with a dictatorial power.[115] At first Congress, though trusting Washington, restricted the powers

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[114]Ford, JCC, 8:752; 9:784, 905, 1013-1014, 1068; 10:384.

[115]Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton, April 8, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:110.

granted the committee. Learning this, Washington wrote a private letter to a member of Congress, that it was necessary for the committee to be vested with a power sufficient for cooperation with the French army, to draw out men and supplies, and able to "give their sanction to any operation which the Commander in chief may not think himself at liberty to undertake without it as well beyond, as within the limit of these States."[116] Mathews returned to Philadelphia almost immediately after arriving at camp, to lobby Congress for increased authority for the committee.[117] Somewhat responding to Mathews, as well as the news that Lincoln and the southern army had been captured at Charleston, and that there had been a mutiny by the Connecticut Line, Congress twice, during May and June, called on the states to cooperate with the committee at camp and Washington in drawing out supplies and men.[118] Washington and the committee had hoped for more than this recommendation to the states. They wanted the necessary authority to draw out the supplies

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[116]George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 14, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:356-357; see also George Washington to James Duane, May 14, 1780, ibid., 358.

[117]Robert R. Livingston to Philip Schuyler, May 21, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:158-159; James Duane to Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780, ibid., 170-171; Ford, JCC, 17:438-439.

[118]President Samuel Huntington to the Several States, May 19, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:155-156; Same to same, June 21, 1780, ibid., 232.

and men on their own. But, as Duane told Schuyler, "it is the fate of deliberate bodies to move with caution."[119]

Many found the actions and explanations of Congress unsatisfactory. Ezekiel Cornell, after visiting the army at Morristown in May, wrote the governor of Rhode Island that he despaired of "any vigorous exertions until there is a power vested in some man or number of men, obligatory and binding on all the states in the Union, as it will be impossible to convince the several legislatures of the necessity, until the happy moment is past."[120] Returning to Philadelphia later that summer, Cornell reported others shared his desire for more authority to be lodged in fewer hands. In fact, some even spoke of making Washington a dictator, under the belief that was "the only means, under God, by which we can be saved from destruction."[121]

Talk of a dictatorship frightened many members of Congress, particularly as the committee at camp, Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody, appeared to fully support Washington at the expense of civilian supremacy. Thus, the committee was recalled by an overwhelming majority. Upon returning

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[119]James Duane to Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780, ibid., 170.

[120]Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, May 20, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 293.

[121]Same to same, August 1, 1780, ibid., p. 303.

to Congress, Mathews wrote Washington that "I suppose any future propositions of mine will be immediately exploded, as too strongly tinctured with those 'Army principles,' which I had imbibed, whilst with them."[122]

The recalling of the committee was a signal to those concerned about Washington not having ample powers to save the states that Congress was unwilling to give any dictatorial powers to Washington, Washington and the committee jointly, or even to themselves. The reason Congress was unwilling to do so had to do, to a large degree, with their growing uncertainty of their own authority and their greater reliance on the states to provide for the army. Thus, the states would have to act to ward off the impending crisis of the war effort completely collapsing.

A convention of New England civilian leaders meeting at Boston early in August, 1780, after a lengthy debate on the state of the army, recommended the New England states and New York send commissioners to Hartford that November to discuss how the army could be better provided for, expecially with winter coming. The New York legislature responded to the call by unanimously agreeing in October to send delegates, with instructions to have the meeting urge Congress be given the power to march the army into

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[122]Ford, JCC, 17:720; John Mathews to George Washington, September 15, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:374.

delinquent states to force compliance with resolutions for men and supplies. This the Hartford meeting did, as well as urging Congress be given power of taxation in order to pay the interest on the national debt.[123]

Several civilian leaders believed if the Hartford Resolutions were adopted and implemented by Congress, and the French gave their full cooperation, that a renewed army could possibly win the war in 1781.[124] Not everybody shared their enthusiasm. There was great opposition to the resolutions.[125] James Warren, for one, believed they had been adopted "without recollecting political Maxims, without attending to Historical Admonitions and warning or the Principles on which our Opposition to Britain Rests." He

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[123]John Witherspoon to William Livingston, December 16, 1780, ibid., 487-488; Franklin B. Hough, ed., Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates from Several of the New England States, Held at Boston, August 3-10, 1780 (Albany: J. Munsell, 1867), pp. 35-52; Resolutions of the Hartford Convention in "Original Documents," MAH 8, no. 10, (October 1882): 688-698; James Warren to Samuel Adams, December 4, 1780, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 151-152; Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton, September 10, 1780, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:425; Same to same, September 16, 1780, ibid., 433.

[124]Jesse Root to Jonathan Trumbull, December 27, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:504; James Duane to George Clinton, November 14, 1780, ibid., 445; Josiah Quincy to George Washington, November 27, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:158.

[125]William Livingston to John Witherspoon, December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Abigail Adams to John Adams, November 13, 1780, Butterfield, The Book of Abigail and John, p. 279.

believed Washington to be a "Good and a Great Man" but "only a Man and therefore should not be vested with such powers and besides," he added, "we do not know that his successor will be either Great or Good." Additionally, he worried about "what Influence this precedent," if adopted, "may have half a Century Hence."[126] He need not have worried, for Congress was not about to give Washington or anybody else dictatorial powers of the nature that was suggested in the Hartford Resolutions.[127] With the French army present in large numbers, it was believed it would be dangerous to experiment with any form of unlimited power placed in the hands of the military. Besides, French help might end the war, thus making grants of power to make the states comply with requisitions unnecessary. Nevertheless, Congress did make a concession to those that wanted a stabler and stronger central government, by reducing the value of the currency, establishing executive departments, and adopting resolutions for an impost to pay the interest on the national debt.

With the French assistance in defeating the British at Yorktown and satisfied with the actions taken by Congress

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[126] James Warren to Samuel Adams, December 4, 1780, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 151-152.

[127] John Witherspoon to William Livingston, December 16, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:487.

mentioned above, Washington no longer felt the need to ask for any special powers the remainder of the war; nor was he granted any. Although Washington was no longer given extraordinary powers, he was, as he was frequently throughout the war, given information formally by Congress that would not normally be given by a civilian body to a military commander. He was also frequently given such information informally by congressional members, including the president.[128]

Before discussing, in the next chapter, how the states controlled and directed the military, and what powers they shared with them, it should be noted that Congress also gave General Gates "dictatorial" powers. In fact, he received his first grant before Washington. On June 16, 1776, Congress ordered Washington to send Gates to command the Northern Department with authority to appoint officers, fill vacancies, and suspend officers, as well as to settle financial accounts, until October 1, 1776.[129] John Adams

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[128]Elias Boudinot to George Washington, March 17, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:81; James Lovell to George Washington, February 23, 1780, ibid., 5:48; John Sullivan to George Washington, November 26, 1780, ibid., 460; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, May 7, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 170; Henry Laurens to George Washington, May 5, 1778, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 2:570; Thomas McKean to George Washington, August 12, 1781, ibid., 4:629-630.

[129]Ford, JCC, 5:448-449; George Washington to Horatio Gates, June 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:173.

told Gates that Congress was sending him north as "Dictator in Canada for Six Months, or at least untill the first of October."[130] By later grants of power to Washington the grant to Gates during the summer of 1776 can hardly be considered extensive, or dictatorial. But in mid 1776, this grant was considered as such.

Gates, who became the darling of many members of Congress during 1777 and 1778, was given great latitude by Congress with respect to calling on the states to supply him with militia. He was also given authority, at times, to make personnel decisions generally made by Congress. During the summer of 1777 he was empowered for a four month period to suspend any officer and appoint replacements in the Northern Department. During the summer of 1780, he was authorized to appoint all staff officers for the southern army. This latter grant of authority was also given to Greene when he replaced Gates as commander of the southern army. Greene, and Lincoln before him, were also authorized, as commanders of the southern army, to call on the states for militia assistance. These grants of authority were limited in nature for, as John Adams told Gates, "We don't

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[130] John Adams to Horatio Gates, June 18, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:497.

choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too long [a] Time."[131]

Although Congress did not grant the military commanders too much power, for too long a time, as with Washington, they did provide them with information that normally a civilian body would not provide the military. This was usually done in an informal manner, usually in the form of correspondence between friends.[132]

Congress, in summation, was generally able to control and direct the military, primarily because the military were willing to be controlled and directed by the civilians. There were problems and difficulties, but for the most part the military believed the best chance for their revolution and war to succeed was to subordiante themselves to the civilian government, for to do otherwise was to increase the opportunity for and the possibility of military tyranny, something both the civilian and military leaders feared and wanted to avoid.

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[131] Ford, JCC, 8:614, 642, 644; 9:865; 10:354, 368; 15:240; 17:510; 18:995; John Hancock to Horatio Gates, August 14, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:452; John Adams to Horatio Gates, June 18, 1776, ibid., 1:497.

[132] John Collins to Nathanael Greene, March 21, 1780, ibid., 5:90; see also same to same, ibid., passim; Samuel Adams to William Heath, October 26, 1775, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Elbridge Gerry to William Heath, May 17, 1776, ibid., William Williams to Joseph Trumbull, 1775-1777, Joseph Trumbull Papers, passim, vol. 5, CSL.

C H A P T E R V

STATE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY

Although Congress provided central control of America's military efforts, the state governments also played an important role in controlling and directing the military forces, particularly their militia. The means by which the states controlled and directed the military varied from state to state, and from time to time. What did not vary, was their desire to keep the American military forces from becoming the enemy.

The states, fearing too strong an executive power, placed most of the control and direction of the military in their legislative bodies. Initially, however, quasi legislative-executive bodies controlled and directed the military forces in every colony. These bodies were committees and councils of safeties, which were first established during the fall of 1774 and the subsequent winter, as has been discussed earlier.

The early realization of the importance of controlling and directing the military in every colony prompted Congress during July 1775 to recommend to those colonies

without committees of safety to appoint them, suggesting they be empowered to direct all military matters in the recess of the respective colonial assemblies or provincial congresses. At that time five colonies did not have committees of safety, but by year's end they did.[1]

Generally, the early committees of safety functioned only when the provincial congresses were in recess and were often restricted to specified duties. But more often than not, their authority, as well as tenure, was just as vague and ill-defined as the authority upon which the provincial congresses acted. Few of the committees existed after 1777, with those of Vermont, New York, and New Jersey lasting until 1778; Rhode Island until 1781; and New Hampshire and Connecticut to the end of the war. Nevertheless, they served a useful and important function in the civilian control of the American military forces, particularly in those colonies, later states, where the executive was weakened by constitutional or self-imposed restrictions, and where the provincial congress and later, state legislature, infrequently assembled or did not adequately exercise their constitutional responsibilities.

Early in the war the New England committees and councils of safety were frequently given extensive authority

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[1]Ford, JCC, 2:189; Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, p. 171.

with respect to appointing and commissioning officers, raising and discharging troops, and directing their movements. Later, when their states were threatened with or actually invaded, such authority was again given. The reason they were given such authority, and were successful exercising it, was the fact that they were composed, for the most part, of prominent leaders, including chief executives and members of Congress.[2]

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[2] Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 43, 52; Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, pp. 43, 45; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 7:477, 478, 485; 8:111, 195, 770, 845; Jere R. Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism: New Hampshire Politics and the American Revolution, 1741-1794, p. 128; "Records of the Committee of Safety," CNHHS, 7:vi-vii, 127-131, 213, 339-340; Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 6:5, 39, 315; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 1:253; 2:18-19; 5:120; Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 157; I. W. Stuart, Life of Jonathan Trumbull, Sen., Governor of Connecticut (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1859), pp. 204, 626, 626n.; Jonathan Trumbull, ed., The Leabanon War Office (Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Brainard Company for the Connecticut Society of Sons of the American Revolution, 1891), p. 8; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 7, 32, 33, 48, 89, 238, 240-242, 498-499; Harry A. Cushing, History of the Transition from Provincial to Commonwealth Government in Massachusetts, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 7, no. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1896), pp. 175-176; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:322, 365, 442, 501, 503, 574; 8:56-57, 229, 316, 382, 404, 419, 447, 449, 545, 615; 9:68, 73, 74, 422, 486; William Greene to Henry Marchant, October 22, 1778, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 205; Stone, Our French Allies, p. 10; Irwin H. Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union 1774-1795, Northwestern University Studies in History, no. 5 (Evanston, Indiana: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 25, 25n.11; James Benjamin Wilbur, Ira Allen: Founder of Vermont 1751-1814, 1:86.

affairs, particularly during times of threatened or actual invasions.[4]

The committees of safety, though for the most part short lived, generally served as useful forces in giving direction to their respective colony's military policy and providing for the control of the military itself. Although their authority was often questioned and occasionally challenged, they nevertheless provided the legitimacy and stability necessary until the governments under the state governments were established. To a large degree their success was due to the fact that their membership consisted

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[4] Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland, held at the City of Annapolis in 1774, 1775, & 1776 (Annapolis, J. Greene; Baltimore: J. Lucas and E. K. Deaver, 1836), p. 24; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:101, 126; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution, p. 84, 112; John V. L. McMahon, An Historical View of the Government of Maryland, from its Colonization to the Present Day (Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr., Cushing and Sons, and William and Joseph Neal, 1831), pp. 418-419; Saunders, NCCR, 9:1047; 10:200, 208-213, 579-581, 913; Jo[seph] Seawell Jones, A Defence of the Revolutionary History of the State of North Carolina from the Aspersions of Mr. Jefferson, pp. 206, 232, 258; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, pp. xxi, 50; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:83-85; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina under the Royal Government 1719-1776 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1899), p. 793; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:125; Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, pp. 124-127; Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton, pp. 132-133, 142-143, 158, 165; Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 8:75-239; Agnes Hunt, The Provinical Committees of the American Revolution, pp. 99-101, 122-126, 130-131, 141, 145-146, 150.

of prominent leaders who, realizing the necessity of preventing anything that would lead to anarchy or military tyranny, generally exercised their powers so that the mob and the military would not undermine the political and social fabric. Once the constitutions were written and the governments under them were formed, the responsibility for the direction and control of the military within the states passed to the state legislatures, who also realized the importance of keeping tight control of the military.

By 1777, when the legislatures began fully exercising their powers, most legislators, because of their lack of military experience and because the military situation often necessitated broad-based policies, often deferred, in military matters, to the Continental Congress and the Continental generals. Yet this was only to the degree that their own state's interests and safety were provided for. The state legislatures nevertheless rarely relinquished their responsibility for appointing and commissioning officers, supplying the military, and giving some direction to the military activities in their respective states.

Despite most of the responsibility for overseeing the activities of the military rested with the committees of safety early in the war, the provincial congresses and conventions also directed and controlled military affairs. The state legislatures did as well; particularly in

Massachusetts, which, until 1780, had no chief executive. Although occasionally delegating military authority to their Council, their Board of War, and even to military officers, the Massachusetts legislature was active in giving military directions and setting military policy. During the early years of the war the New York Provincial Congress also gave great attention to military affairs, especially with respect to preparing the colony's defenses.[5]

Most legislatures, however, did not have the time and experience, nor were they suited for giving their undivided attention to military affairs. That is why, early in the war, military responsibilities were frequently delegated to the committees of safety. Because of the fear of placing too much power in the executive and because they were not always in session, some of the state legislatures provided for other bodies to oversee various military activities. These bodies included boards of war, extraordinary councils, war offices, and county lieutenant systems.

Realizing it was too large to control efficiently the military affairs of the state, the Massachusetts legislature on October 26, 1776, created a board of war, endowing it with authority to direct the operations of the

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[5]Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 3:121; Saunders, NCCR, 10:passim.

land and sea forces of the state. The following spring, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania created a board of war and navy board to assist them in military matters. The Board of War, composed of such prominent men as Owen Biddle, David Rittenhouse, Richard Bache, and John Bayard, was initially responsible for supplies and finance. Later they were given responsibility for military appointments and given more authority over military policy. Their tenure was rather short, as their existence ended on August 7, 1777. Vermont established a board of war on February 25, 1779, primarily to oversee the defenses of the New Hampshire Grants. It remained in existence until 1783.[6]

The states that experimented most with boards of war, extraordinary boards, and war offices were North Carolina and Virginia, particularly when they became the subject of British offensives during the middle years of the war. Governor Jefferson, at times indecisive about exercising executive leadership, took an active stance in May 1779, by calling upon the Virginia legislature to create a board of war, which was done later that month. It served as an advisory body to the governor on military matters

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[6]Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 1:5, 12-74; Walton, Records of Vermont, 1:294; Samuel Adams to James Warren, November 6, 1776, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 72 (1917): 275; Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War, 1:xxiii.

until its abolishment a year later. The Board of War was replaced during the summer of 1780 by a war office, headed by a commissioner, appointed by the Governor with advice of the Council. The commissioner served as a military clerk to the Governor and Council, thereby relieving them of the secretarial chores.[7] Because North Carolina's Governor Nash had trouble maintaining sufficient attendance of his councillors to assist him and because he lacked sufficient authority to control and direct his state's military forces, the Assembly in September 1780 unconstitutionally put the state's war power in the Governor and a five man board of war. The board of war, actually composed of three men, had two major stumbling blocks to exercising their power. They were considered too inexperienced by the military, and Governor Nash, being upset that he had to share the authority over the military with them, treated them as an advisory body. In his message of January 28, 1781, to the state legislature, Nash threatened to resign unless the Board of

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[7] Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, June 21, 1779, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:291; Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun and Held at the Capital, in the City of Williamsburg on Monday, the third day of May, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Nine (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827), pp. 6, 8, 17; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:17-18; 291-292; Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 3:399n.; Thomas Jefferson to William Davies, March 22, 1781, ibid., 5:204.

War was abolished. It was, but upon the suggestion of ex-Governor Richard Caswell, then a member of the Senate, a "council extraordinary" was established on February 15. This council, consisting of Caswell, Alexander Martin, and Allen Jones, was responsible for advising the governor on all matters, and any two of them, with the governor, were invested with full power to take measures for the defense of the state. Nash, not liking this arrangement, refused to seek re-election. Because his successor, Thomas Burke, also refused to work with the council, it was abolished.[8]

The extraordinary councils, boards of war, and war offices were generally adopted when matters were desperate, and therefore they were usually not very effective. Often of extra-constitutional origin, they were disliked by the executive, whose authority they generally shared. They were also unpopular with the military, who saw them, for the most part, as just another layer of civilian control. Rather

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[8]Clark, NCSR, 18:707; 24:355-357, 378-380; 25:vii-viii, 225-229; William D. Cooke, compiler, Revolutionary History of North Carolina, in Three Lectures, by Rev. Francis L. Hawks, Hon. David L. Swain, and Hon. Wm. A. Graham (Raleigh: William D. Cooke; New York: George P. Putnam and Company, 1853), p. 172; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 246, 254; Blackwell P. Robinson, William R. Davie (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 82-83; Davidson, William Lee Davidson, p. 69; George Doherty to [Jethro] Sumner, September 16, 1780, Jethro Sumner Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Abner Nash to Thomas Burke, July 5, 1781, John Watterson III, "The Orders of Governor Burke," NCHR 43, no. 2 (April 1971): 96.

than sharing the power of the state with the military during emergencies these bodies were created often to control the military, as well as be a liaison between the civilian and military leaders.

Another important layer of civilian control were the county lieutenants. Virginia and Pennsylvania appointed civilian military commanders, Colonels of the militia, in each county, and gave them command of the militia in their county and some control of the military policy in the county. This was particularly effective in the western counties which were frequently the scene of military action.[9]

Although most of the military control and direction on the state level was exercised by multi-person bodies, the executive branch of the revolutionary governments also, to various degrees, exercised authority over the military throughout the war. The prevalent distrust of executive power, as well as that of concentrated power, and the haste with which the new governments were instituted in each state, affected almost every constitutional aspect of the executive branch of the new state governments. Fear of concentrated

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[9]Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 81; Edgar W. Hassler, Old Westmoreland: A History of Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution, p. 40n.4; Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania During the Revolution, p. 48; Thomas Jefferson to Lieutenants of Fayette, Lincoln, and Jefferson Counties, December 24, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:237.

power caused power to be divided everywhere, particularly with respect to that to be exercised by the new chief executives. An accompanying diffusion of power did not always apply to the legislative branch, as they retained most of the real authority over the military. Thus, the revolutionary governments were not truly balanced. Where the legislatures, like the English parliament, exercised their authority with few restraints, the chief executives were restricted by the state constitutions, statutes, councils, and the legislatures, as well as restraints they placed upon themselves.[10] For the most part, the chief executives, with their councils, did not initiate legislation or make policy, but simply carried out the desires of the legislatures, who in most states, were the ones who elected the chief executives. Under peacetime conditions the weakened chief executives would have not been so noticeable because of their lack of authority; however, as one governor told General Greene, "I am left to the Constitution which may do in Peace but is by no means adopted to war."[11]

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[10]Margaret Burnham Macmillan, The War Governor in the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 57-73; James DeWitt Andrews, ed., The Works of James Wilson: Being His Public Discourses upon Jurisprudence and the Political Science Including Lectures as Professor of Law, 1790-2, 2 vols. (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1896), 1:357.

[11]Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Greene, March 4, 1782, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:170.

Most of the states severely limited the authority and power of their chief executives. They also limited their tenure. In all but three states the chief executive was limited to a one year term of office. Most of the states imposed restrictions on successive terms of service, with only Connecticut and New York allowing unlimited tenure. None of the chief executives were given unlimited veto power, and the few that did allow the veto, provided for it to be overridden by the legislature. In addition, as a further limitation on the chief executive, most states appended a council to their executive branch, providing the council's concurrence in many instances. In Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Delaware the Council was the executive body, its president generally just a first among equals.[12]

The chief executives were restrained in their ability to make military policy or give direction to the military forces of their states.[13] In most states the chief executive could not call out the militia on his own authority,

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[12]Albert Berry Saye, A Constitutional History of Georgia 1732-1968, rev. ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970), p. 115; Meshech Weare to Josiah Bartlett, August 8, 1778, "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection," HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.

[13]John Jay to William Livingston, March 22, 1777, Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 1:123; Roche, Joseph Reed, pp. 150-151.

although some states did allow them this authority in special circumstances, such as during invasions.[14]

It was not just constitutional, statutory, and legislative restraints which hampered the chief executives from giving direction to their state's military forces. Often they limited themselves. Some chief executives were simply indecisive leaders, such as Lowndes of South Carolina and Jefferson of Virginia. The latter, because of his strict constitutionalism, refrained from taking actions, frequently believing major decisions needed the imprint and sanction of the legislature.[15] Many chief executives, rather than taking active roles in military affairs, expended their energies in political matters. This was particularly true in Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and to a degree, New York, where the states were often embroiled in debates between radical and moderate Whig factions.

Other problems confronted the chief executives. Thomas Burke of North Carolina spent considerable time, after

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[14]Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton, pp. 210-211; David A Bernstein, "William Livingston: The Role of the Executive in New Jersey's Revolutionary War," William C. Wright, ed., New Jersey in the American Revolution, 2:21-22.

[15]Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 243-244; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, pp. 210, 220.

escaping from the British, trying to re-establish his legitimacy as many argued that he had broken his parole by escaping. Burke was not the only chief executive captured or forced to flee before the British army. Governor McKinly of Delaware was captured, and Livingston, Rutledge, Reed and Jefferson all spent considerable time avoiding capture. The chief executives were also exhausted by time-consuming duties of their office, as few had administrative staffs to handle the day-to-day business.[16] Despite these handicapping factors and influences, many chief executives took, were given, and/or properly exercised their responsibility over military affairs. Usually, however, this did not take place until the state faced invasion or actually had been invaded.

Several chief executives, either by acquiescence by the legislature or by the vigor of their personalities, did become true heads of state during the war. These included Jonathan Trumbull, Caesar Rodney, Thomas Johnson, Thomas Sim Lee, Meshech Weare, William Livingston, George Clinton, Richard Caswell, Joseph Reed, William Greene, John Rutledge, and for a few months, Thomas Nelson. For the most

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[16]Benjamin Harrison to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, December 20, 1782, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:409; Meshech Weare to Josiah Bartlett, August 8, 1778, "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection," HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.

part, the chief executives possessed varying degrees of personal prestige and some were able to use their political and personal standing to exercise an influence on their respective councils and legislatures. This was particularly true with respect to Trumbull, Livingston, Reed and Clinton. The chief executives were by no means novices to the political structure of their states. All the first state chief executives had been prominent local leaders before the revolution and eleven had been members of the provincial assemblies. Weare, Trumbull, Caswell and Bulloch had served as speakers; Wharton and McKinly had been presidents of their councils of safety; and Caswell and Bulloch had presided over their respective provincial assemblies. Clinton, Livingston, Johnson, Henry, Caswell, Rutledge and Bulloch, were or would be members of the Second Continental Congress. These were not radical men. They were among legal, social, and political leaders of their respective states. Nor were the later governors. Of the fifty-five wartime governors (ten from Georgia), nearly half were very prominent and would have been, were they not already, leaders even without the revolution.[17]

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[17] Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783, pp. 190-191; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governors in the American Revolution, pp. 51-53.

Given or taken power over military affairs, several chief executives demonstrated they could use the limited resources to best advantage. We must remember that besides not being political novices, many of the wartime governors were not military novices either. Of the first thirteen chief executives, four had served as militia generals: Clinton, Livingston, McKinly, and Johnson; and three as militia colonels: Weare, Henry, and Caswell.[18] Clinton, Reed, Trumbull, Nash, Nelson, Burke and Jefferson all demonstrated at times an interest in and exercised vigorously their authority over military affairs. Clinton was active throughout his tenure in office suggesting military policy. So was Jefferson. Both were quite interested in western expeditions, especially since such expeditions would undoubtedly result in the addition of territory for their respective states.[19] Other chief executives, such as Reed, Rutledge, and Gwinnett, also involved themselves in military

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[18] Ibid., p. 53.

[19] George Clinton to George Washington, October 15, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:163-164; Same to same, October 17, 1778, ibid., 167-169; George Clinton to the New York Delegates to the Continental Congress, November 18, 1778, ibid., 294-295; Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, January 29, 1780, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781," pp. 144-149; Anthony Marc Lewis, "Jefferson and Virginia's Pioneers, 1774-1781," MVHR 34, no. 4 (March 1948): 551-588.

planning.[20] Most chief executives, to varying degrees, involved themselves in directing and controlling the military by their participation in providing supplies, countering Tory activities, and assisting in the selection and promotion of officers.

The most direct control of the military by the chief executive resulted when he was in the field with the military, or meeting with military leaders who came on their own or by direction to visit him. Normally the chief executives became quite active in giving direction to military affairs and exercising control over the military when the British had entered their state. Clinton and Rutledge are perhaps the best examples of chief executives as commanders-in-chief. Clinton, even after being elected Governor of New York, early in 1777, remained in the field as a Continental Brigadier General, and even once inaugurated, he returned to the field, rather than assuming his civilian duties. During his first six months in office he spent much time in the field, giving orders for the state's

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[20] Joseph Reed to Archibald Lochry, March 27, 1779, "Original Documents," MH 5, no. 3 (March 1907): 175; Joseph Reed to Robert Morris et al. [September 21, 1781], Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 2:328-329; Robert Morris Diary, September 21, 1781, ibid., 316; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:479; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia, 1:51, 53-58; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution (Jacksonville, Florida: Guild Press, 1932), pp. 23-25.

defense. Since the Hudson Highlands were of such strategic importance during most of the war, Clinton found himself frequently in the field in that area, giving directions, offering suggestions, and receiving information as to the needs and concerns of the military stationed in that area. During 1779 he was persuaded by Washington from going on an expedition against the western Indians, as his presence was needed in the Highlands area in event of a British offensive. The next year, however, Clinton often led the militia into the western portions of his state against the Indians.[21]

Rutledge, the President of South Carolina, similarly took to the field, but unlike Clinton, he did so as a civilian rather than as a military commander. He usually took to the field to assist the military to procure supplies and to inspire them, as well as the citizens of his strife-torn state, particularly after the fall of Charleston early

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[21]George Clinton to George Washington, July 31, 1777, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 2:262; George Clinton to the New York Delegates to the Continental Congress, June 14, 1780, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:821-822; George Washington to Goose Van Schaick, July 31, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:287; George Washington to James Clinton, June 25, 1781, ibid., 22:262; George Washington to Moses Hazen, November 18, 1782, ibid., 25:349; John Palsgrave Wyllys to George Wyllys, October 11, 1777, "Wyllys Papers 1590-1796," CHSC 21 (1924): 458; Proceedings of a Council of War, October 31, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:180-181; Spaulding, George Clinton, pp. 128-129, 133; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 139, 141.

in the summer of 1780. Rutledge's ventures to the field actually began the year before as he joined with Lincoln to help direct the movements of the South Carolina militia. During 1780 he left besieged Charleston to attach himself to Sumter's command, later joining Gates in North Carolina. The next year he ventured north to visit Congress and Washington to discuss policy before returning to South Carolina to re-establish civil government in his state. Upon returning, he joined Greene's camp at the High Hills of the Santee on August 1, 1781, re-established the civil government, before continuing on to Camden to re-organize the state's militia.[22]

Clinton and Rutledge were somewhat unique in the amount of time spent in the field, but they were not the only chief executives who ventured into the field, either to command the militia or to assist military commanders. Governors Houston and Gwinnett of Georgia took part in

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[22]George Washington Diary, June 5, 1781, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799, 4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company for the Mount Vernon Ladies Association of the Union, 1925), 2:224; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 351, 764-765; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina 1780-1783, pp. 510, 511; Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter (Columbia, South Carolina: R. L. Bryan Company, 1931), p. 182; Rev. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1895), p. 76; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, pp. 281, 283; Journals of Benjamin Lincoln, September 3-4, 1779, Benjamin Kennedy, ed. and trans., Muskets, Cannon Balls & Bombs: Nine Narratives of the Siege of Savannah in 1779 (Savannah: Beehive Press, 1974), p. 121.

expeditions against Florida.[23] North Carolina's chief executives, Caswell, Burke and Nash, also ventured into the field.[24] So popular was Caswell as a military commander that while governor, the South Carolina delegates to Congress early in 1779 invited him to accept a major generalship over the North Carolina militia in their state, and to rank only second to Lincoln. He declined, sending General Ashe to command the militia.[25] Alexander Martin, Speaker of the North Carolina Senate and Acting Governor during Burke's captivity, during the fall of 1781 joined General Rutherford's camp to assist him in controlling the state's militia.[26] Chief executives of the upper south also took to the field

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[23]Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia, 1:59-61, 113-114; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution, pp. 23-25, 31-34; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 144-145.

[24]Abner Nash to George Washington, March 19, 1781, Elizabeth G. McPherson, ed., "Unpublished Letters from North Carolinians to Washington," NCHR 12, no. 2 (April 1935): 157; Same to same, April 4, 1781, ibid., 157; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 200, 260; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:29-30.

[25]William D. Cooke, compiler, Revolutionary History of North Carolina, in Three Lectures, by Rev. Francis L. Hawks, Hon. David L. Swain, and Hon. Wm. A. Graham, p. 201; R. D. W. Connor, Revolutionary Leaders of North Carolina, North Carolina State Normal and Industrial College Historical Publications, no. 2 (n.p.: State of North Carolina, 1916), p. 95.

[26]William A. Graham, General Joseph Graham and his Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History with Appendix: An Epitome of North Carolina's Military Services in the Revolutionary War and of the Laws Enacted for Raising Troops (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, 1904), pp. 363-364.

to control military activities. Maryland's Governor Johnson, a military veteran, commanded the militia in 1777, as did Virginia Governor Nelson at the siege of Yorktown.[27] Few northern chief executives took to the field, when compared to their southern counterparts. Nevertheless, besides Clinton, other chief executives in the northern states did play active roles in the field with the military, as evidenced by the activities of Pennsylvania's Joseph Reed and Massachusetts's John Hancock. The former, during 1779 and 1780, frequently took to the field to give assistance and encouragement wherever he could, and during the latter year he commanded the militia in person. Hancock, who frequently took to the field, primarily in Rhode Island, before becoming governor in 1780, continued to do so once assuming his state's top position, even leading the Massachusetts militia to Rhode Island during 1781.[28]

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[27]Delaplaine, Thomas Johnson, pp. 250, 256; Acomb, Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 180; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, August 21, 1781, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:389-392; Thomas Nelson to David Jameson, September 21, 1781, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:65; Same to same, September 27, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2:501; Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 106, 112.

[28]Joseph Reed to Baron Von Steuben et al., February 29, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:199; Joseph Reed to Archibald Lochry, March 27, 1779, "Original Documents," MH 5, no. 3 (March 1907): 175; Joseph Reed to George Washington, August 17, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:238; Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 102; Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nicholson, 1757-1800 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University

Although some chief executives took an active interest in directing military activities and controlling the military, most were not granted sufficient authority and power to do either adequately. From the beginning of the war, many Whigs believed a strong executive was needed to prevent anarchy and military tyranny, as well as to direct the energies of the state.[29] This became more apparent as the war progressed and state after state was invaded and occupied. Some chief executives were actually urged to seize authority, especially during a crisis period. Governor Lee of Maryland, for example, was told by James McHenry during the summer crisis of 1781 to "Let the people clamour, but save the State."[30] Lee and most chief executives refused to act in an extra-legal or unconstitutional manner, preferring to work within the established political framework. Exceptions were few, but they did occur. Governor Nelson of Virginia, although being granted extraordinary authority during the summer of 1781, exceeded it by providing for military impressment without the consent of his council.

Press, 1975), pp. 6-7; John Hancock to ?, March 6, 1781, Collections of the Maine Historical Society, 2d ser., 19: 177-178.

[29]Edward Rutledge to John Jay, November 24, 1776, Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 1:94.

[30]James McHenry to Thomas Sim Lee, July 10, 1781, Kite, A Side Light on History, pp. 23-24.

For this action he was later greatly condemned.[31] And Governor Burke, when asked by a militia colonel for approval of acting without formal confirmation by the Assembly, told him, "Go on and prosper in God's name[,], do all the good you can under any form or title you please."[32]

Most Whig leaders were realistic and practical men who understood the mechanisms for directing and controlling the military during periods of crisis were inadequate. Therefore, the state legislatures often gave their chief executives extensive powers while the legislature was in recess and/or the state under invasion. For the most part, granting of extensive powers to the chief executive to harness the energies of the state took place in the southern states, which were occupied by large British forces beginning in 1778.

South Carolina, which perhaps suffered more than any other state, placed great trust in their chief executive, Rutledge, giving him more power than any other civilian leader during the war. Early in 1779, the Assembly, foreseeing a rather long legislative recess, voted him and his council authority during the interim "to do everything that

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[31] Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 104, 114-115.

[32] Thomas Burke to Robert Lutrell, September 4, 1781, John S. Watterson, III, "The Ordeal of Governor Burke," NCHR 43, no. 2 (April 1971): 103.

appeared to him and to them necessary for the public good." On February 3, 1780, the South Carolina legislature again conferred additional powers on Rutledge and the council, stating that since it had always been the policy of republics to concentrate powers of government in the hands of the supreme magistracy during time of danger and invasion, they were to do so, for a limited period. Until ten days after their next session meeting the legislature authorized Rutledge with such of council he could conveniently consult, "to do all . . . things which may be judged expedient and necessary to secure the liberty, safety and happiness of this State except taking away the life of a citizen without legal trial," and prohibited the subjecting the militia to Continental articles of war.[33] From this point early in 1780 until the Assembly met at Jacksonborough in January 1782, "it is not an exaggeration," according to one historian, "to say that the government of South Carolina centered in the person of John Rutledge, rather than in any group of persons as the Privy Council, or in any place."[34] These powers

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[33]Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 319, 432; David Ramsay, The History of the Revolution in South Carolina, 2 vols. (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1785), 2:47048; David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina, 2:197-198; Robert W. Barnwell, Jr., "Rutledge, 'The Dictator,'" JSH 7, no. 2 (May 1941): 216.

[34]Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation, p. 10; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in the American Revolution, p. 84.

granted Rutledge, for a short period in 1782, were extended to his successor, John Mathews.[35]

Other southern state legislatures authorized extensive executive powers, for limited periods to their chief executives, although not for the length of time nor to the extent of that given Rutledge. With the Constitutional Convention adjourned, most of the members of the Council of Safety departed from the capitol, and facing a threat of a British-launched invasion from Florida, six members of the Council of Georgia signed a statement on February 22, 1777, giving President Archibald Bulloch extraordinary executive powers for a month's time, with the only restriction that he be required to call on the assistance of at least five persons of his own choosing to consult and advise him on every occasion when a sufficient number of councillors could not be convened. Within a few days of adopting this measure, Bulloch died and, apparently, this power was not extended or assumed by his successor, Button Gwinnett.[36] A year later, however, the Executive Council of Georgia authorized the chief executive, John Houston, to take full military control of the state without consulting

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[35]George Smith McCowen, Jr., The British Occupation of Charleston, 1780-82, Tricentennial Studies, no. 5 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission, 1972), p. 140.

[36]Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 121-123.

them, stating circumstances made it necessary and as well as the fact the constitution was not clear on the matter. Houston was hesitant at first to assume the power granted him. But realizing that the Assembly would meet in the near future and thus relieve him of his responsibility, and that the full force of government was needed to support the planned invasion of St. Augustine, he began to exercise the authority given him. Another reason for taking a stronger stance as chief executive was because the military leaders were, for the most part, members of the opposition political faction who would have had an excuse for assuming greater control of the state's affairs had he not acted.[37] Extraordinary powers were given to North Carolina's governor during 1780 and 1781 and to Maryland's governor during 1778.[38] Virginia was more hesitant than its neighbors in granting extensive powers to its chief executives, even when invaded.

The question of giving the executive extensive powers in Virginia first rose during the beginning of the second winter of the war. At that time, several members

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[37]Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:34-35, 75-76; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:304-305.

[38]Abner Nash to Thomas Jefferson, February 2, 1781, Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:504; James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, June 26, 1780, ibid., 3:466; 2:344.

of the House of Delegates proposed that a dictatorship be created, invested with every civil and military power. Great opposition, especially by Archibald Cary, Speaker of the Senate, greeted this proposal. So opposed to giving dictatorial powers to Governor Patrick Henry, Cary supposedly told Colonel Syme, Henry's step-brother, that he would personally kill Henry should be become dictator. Nevertheless, Cary and other opponents of any form of dictatorship, did agree to giving Henry and the executive council additional powers for a limited period.[39] Even in 1781, when Virginia was invaded and the regular government disrupted, necessary extraordinary power was not given the chief executive until June when Thomas Nelson became governor.

Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville precluded the scheduled June 4, 1781, election for governor and forced the Virginia Assembly to move to Staunton, where, on the seventh of June, a debate began on whether or not to establish some form of dictatorship as a means of marshalling the state's resources. George Nicholas moved that Virginia appoint a dictator and that Washington be chosen for that post. When Nicholas' motion was defeated, Richard

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[39]Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia: With an Appendix, 8th Amer. ed. (Boston: David Carlisle, 1801), p. 185; Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:505-509, 522-523; Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton, p. 211; Brock, Archibald Cary, pp. 101-104.

Henry Lee called on James Lovell to have Congress assume control of the state's affairs until a stable government could be re-established or, at least, urge Washington into accepting some form of dictatorial power to be used in their state. Lee made a similar proposal to Virginia's Congressional delegates, stating "Both ancient and modern times furnish precedents to justify this procedure, but if they did not, the present necessity not only justifies but absolutely demands the measure." Lee also wrote Washington of his desire that he come to his native state's defense, as a dictator. Washington, already planning to come south as the commander-in-chief of the combined armies, declined Lee's offer without explaining his plans, which were still secret.

But Virginia did need a strong executive to guide the state through its period of crisis. On June 12, 1781, Thomas Nelson was elected governor and during the following three months was given enough power to make a dictatorship unnecessary. When he was elected governor, Nelson was authorized by the Assembly, among other things, to call out the state's military forces, impress for military purposes, seize and confine loyalists, place the state quartermaster department in the hands of Continental officers, and to declare martial law in a twenty-mile radius of British and American camps. Nelson also extended the power granted him

beyond the breaking point. He was not, however, severely chastised as it appeared the end justified the means, a view that the practical Whigs were willing to accept at times.[40]

Granting of executive authority to chief executives was more limited in the northern states. Nevertheless, when circumstances warranted it, extraordinary powers, for limited periods, were authorized. In Pennsylvania during the summer of 1780, the Assembly authorized the President or Vice President in Council during the recess of the legislature to declare martial law. President Reed, at Washington's insistence, used this power to impress needed supplies.[41]

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[40]Richard Henry Lee to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress, June 12, 1781, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 3:158; Richard Henry Lee to James Lovell, June 12, 1781, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:237; Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, June 12, 1781, ibid., 234-235; George Washington to Joseph Jones, June 7, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 22:179; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1781, ibid., 382-384; Henry Young to William Davies, June 9, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 6:84-85; Archibald Stuart to Thomas Jefferson, September 8, 1818, ibid., 85n.; Henning, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:411, 413-416, 419-421, 423, 437; Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia: With an Appendix, p. 185; Evans, Thomas Nelson, pp. 102, 181n.2.

[41]Statement of President Joseph Reed to the Continental Congress, July 30, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:467; Samuel Shaw to [ ], June 20, 1780, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 75.

The legislatures also granted military leaders, both Continental and militia, extraordinary and almost dictatorial authority, particularly with respect to using their descretion in distant theaters of operations, waging war against internal enemies, and calling forth the militia and other resources of the state.[42] In several instances, the states also authorized Continental officers to command or direct their militia.[43] The chief executives also delegated authority to the military in their state.[44] Although most

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[42]Asa Bird Gardner, "Martial Law During the Revolution," MAH 1, no. 12 (December 1877): 711-713; Bradley Chapin, The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National Origins, p. 65; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 3:76; George Washington to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, December 19, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:399; Same to same, December 22, 1776, ibid., 423-424.

[43]James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, July 7, 1776, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 42; Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, p. 385; Patrick Henry to John Todd, December 12, 1778, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1:312-313; Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, April 21, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:525; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, p. 179; John Morris Scott, John Hobart, and William Duer to William Heath, January [3?], 1776, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); John Penn to Officers Commanding North Carolina Militia, General Butler or General Sumner, October 2, 1780, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution (Philadelphia: Printed for the Seventy-Six Society, 1857), p. 58; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:280; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:312; Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, December 19, 1775, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:98.

[44]Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in the American Revolution, p. 181; John Rutledge to Thomas Sumter, March 8, 1781, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina

of these grants of authority to the military took place in the south beginning in 1779, such grants were made in both the north and south before that time. Generally, grants to Continental officers frequently involved a legislature's trust, or a governor's trust, in a person who, more often than not, was a native of the state involved. It was believed that a military man who had previously demonstrated loyalty to the civilian government could be trusted, and thus, could safely be given extraordinary authority.

Late in 1778, George Rogers Clark was given discretionary authority by Governor Henry. During 1780 and 1781, Jefferson also gave Clark great discretion in the western theater of operations, generally as long as he furthered Virginia's interests in that area and communicated to the chief executive his plans and actions.[45] Clinton of New York frequently authorized military commanders discretionary

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in the Revolution 1780-1783, pp. 139-140; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, p. 256; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:238.

[45]Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15, 1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 62; Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, April 19, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 3:354-355; Same to same, [April (19)], 1780, ibid., 356-357; Same to same, December 25, 1780, ibid., 4:237; Thomas Jefferson to James Innes, December 28, 1780, ibid., 247.

powers, including the allowing of Generals McDougall and Parsons to obtain supplies.[46]

Probably the most often granted authority given the Continental officers by the states was the permission to call out the militia, as well as to command them. Early in the war, the New York legislature, acutely aware of the seriousness of the threat upon the existence of the revolutionary government in their state, requested Washington appoint a Continental general to command the militia along the Hudson. Washington appointed George Clinton, but suggested that the New York legislature give him commands since the troops were not Continental. During December 1776, the New York Provincial Convention authorized Clinton, as well as Scott, Duer, Morris, and a Mr. Landon to direct all military affairs, including calling out the militia of Dutchess and West Chester counties. Two months later, in February 1777, the convention gave Schuyler special authority to call out the militia whenever he wished and early that April, before he became governor, Clinton was given permission to call out the militia of four counties until the first of August. As governor, Clinton turned over some responsibility to controlling the militia to Continental

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[46]George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, April 5, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:130-131; Same to same, March 18, 1779, ibid., 4:646; George Clinton to Samuel H. Parsons, March 17, 1778, ibid., 50-51.

Generals Parsons and McDougall, and even offered to place himself under McDougall as a Continental brigadier general.[47]

Another northern state which frequently faced invasion and occupation was Rhode Island. They too authorized Continental and militia officers authority to call out the militia; generally, however, with the advice and consent of the governor.[48]

Early in the war, New Hampshire's legislature authorized, in the absence of the council and Assembly, or if the Committee of Safety was not sitting, the general officer of the colony to call out the militia. Later in the war, New Jersey militia Major General Philemon Dickinson was given authority to call out his state's militia while the Assembly was in recess.[49] Such granting of authority to

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[47] George Washington to the New York Legislature, August 8, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:399; Resolve of the New York Convention, December 19, 1776, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:486; ibid., 682-683n.; George Clinton to Samuel H. Parsons, February 27, 1778, ibid., 2:818; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, June 1, 1779, ibid., 5:6; Bush, Philip Schuyler, p. 79; Ford, JCC, 10:180.

[48] Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:361; 8:417, 429; 9:38; The Providence Gazette and Country Journal, April 18, 1778.

[49] Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:82; George Washington to William Livingston, March 1, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:325-326.

call out the militia was primarily a southern phenomenon, especially during the latter half of the war.

Throughout the war, Virginia, realizing that the military officers frequently, in emergency situations, needed this authority, first granted the right to assemble the militia to Colonel William Woodford during the fall of 1775. In 1777 and 1778, Continental Generals Hand and McIntosh, both operating in the western theater, were given power to call out the militia. When Steuben assumed command of the army in Virginia early in 1781, he received the authority to command the Virginia militia once they were called out. Other southern states also granted the military various degrees of control over their militia. Maryland, during the spring of 1776, authorized the military, because of an impending invasion, to call out the militia and during 1779, South Carolina's chief executive transferred responsibility for controlling the militia from his hands to those of General Moultrie. So concerned was the North Carolina legislature about its inability to protect the state after the defeat at Camden, that it gave Gates's second-in-command, General William Smallwood of Maryland, authority over the North Carolina militia.[50]

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[50]Virginia Committee of Safety to William Woodford, [October 24?, 1775], Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:122; Patrick Henry to Edward Hand, July 3, 1777, Thwaites, Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777-1778, pp. 16-17; Same to same, July 27, 1777, ibid., p. 31; McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Virginia, 2:174; Thomas

On the frontier, the need for quick response to an enemy attack was quickly realized and therefore the military leaders in the west were often authorized to call out the militia upon any alarm. Such authorizations were granted the military leaders in the Articles and Agreements or Compact of Government of the Settlers of Cumberland River on May 13, 1780, at Nashborough.[51]

The military, although given extensive authority and power during periods of crisis, were generally under the firm control and direction of the civilian authorities, both at the Continental and state levels. Control and direction at the state level was exercised by several methods, including the control over the selection and promotion of officers; directly overseeing military affairs, by visits to and from the military; and by making military policy.

In most states, the legislature, at various times, selected and promoted the Continental and militia officers. Although the company grade officers were usually selected by the soldiers themselves, the field grade officers and

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Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, January 4, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:308; Browne, Maryland Archives, 11:262-263; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, pp. 54-55; William D. Cooke, compiler, Revolutionary History of North Carolina in Three Lectures, by Rev. Francis L. Hawks, Hon. David L. Swain, and Hon. Wm. A. Graham, p. 171.

[51]Thomas Edwin Mathews, General James Robertson: Father of Tennessee (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1934) p. 188.

some general officers were selected by the legislatures, thereby placing a dependence upon them, and thus a form of control.[52] So dependent were the officers in one colony, according to one observer, that they were "the creatures and absolute dependents of the governing party."[53]

One method by which the state civilian leadership maintained control of the military and assisted in the direction of the military effort was by sending individuals, such as the chief executives, previously discussed in this chapter, and committees to the military camps. Such civilian visits to Washington's camp began very early in the war, beginning with the visit by Elbridge Gerry and two others representing the Massachusetts Provincial Congress upon his arrival at Cambridge.[54] During the siege of Boston, many

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[52]David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, p. 161; Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789, p. 82; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth, pp. 142-145; George Mason to Martin Cockburn, July 24, 1775, Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 1:241; Isaac S. Mulford, History of New Jersey. Civil and Political (Camden: P. Keen and E. Chandler, 1848), p. 422; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, p. 6; William Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware, p. 10; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 263; Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 3:72, 138; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 35.

[53]Cited in Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the Revolutionary War, p. 31.

[54]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 486.

civilian leaders visited Washington to discuss policy and to oversee the activities of the soldiers and officers from their colony, including the arrangement of the officer corps.[55] During the winter of 1775-1776, Washington was visited by Governor Cooke of Rhode Island; Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Griswold; Oliver Ellsworth of the Connecticut Council of Safety; Matthew Thornton, President of the New Hampshire Provincial Congress and Chairman of its Committee of Safety; and numerous members of the revolutionary government of Massachusetts.[56] While in New York during 1776, Washington was visited by various state leaders, including Connecticut's Eliphalet Dyer and William Williams, New York's John Jay, Robert R. Livingston, and Robert Yates, and three members of the Rhode Island Assembly.[57] Visits to

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[55]Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 1:26; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:50, 354, 386-387; J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888, 1:24; Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, September 6, 1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:283-284.

[56]Samuel Cooper Diary, October 19, 1775, Frederick Tuckerman, ed., "Diary of Samuel Cooper, 1776-1776," AHR 6, no. 2 (January 1901): 322; Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of My Tour to the Camp, and the Observations I made There," PMHS 4 (1858-1860): 82; William Garrott Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (New York: Macmillan Company, 1905), p. 49; Charles Thornton Adams, Matthew Thornton of New Hampshire: A Patriot of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: Dando Printing and Publishing Company, 1903), pp. 30, 34-34.

[57]Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 15:253, 495; David Richard Palmer, The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress West Point 1775-1783 (New York: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969), p. 59; Nicholas

Washington's camp continued throughout the war. For example, New York sent John Jay and Gouverneur Morris to see Washington during the summer of 1777 to discuss the state of the northern army and, early in 1781, Virginia sent Benjamin Harrison to Philadelphia to make application to Congress and Washington for assistance. Although Harrison met with members of Congress, he was unable to meet Washington, since the latter had returned to camp.[58] Generally, Washington's dealings with state authorities were with the chief executives, either in person or in writing, as he did not have the time, nor did he desire to visit or correspond with individuals and committees representing the various governments. Early in 1777, Washington learned that Virginia had sent John Walker to his camp to be the state's official liaison. He then notified Governor Henry that this was unacceptable, as it would set a precedent for the other states, and besides, he argued, some things needed to be

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Cooke to George Washington, September 6, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:619; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, September 17, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene, 1:301.

[58]John McKesson to George Clinton, July 29, [1777], Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:145; Benjamin Harrison to George Washington, February 16, 1781, "Benjamin Harrison's Mission to Philadelphia," TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July 1921): 24-26.

kept secret.[59] Walker remained in camp; Washington making him an extra aide-de-camp.

Although the states did limit the sending of committees and individuals to Washington's camp, they continued sending them to other major encampments and fortifications to investigate the needs and activities of the military, as well as to discuss strategy and political matters. These visits to military encampments began almost as soon as the encampments were constructed, as the civilian leaders believed their presence was needed to oversee the activities of the military. This was particularly true in New York, where the Provincial Congress in May 1775 sent George Clinton and Christopher Tappen as a committee to the Highlands to inspect the defenses and later that year other committees were appointed for the same purpose. During the summer of 1776, the Provincial Congress sent a committee to Gates's camp to investigate the officer corps and the discipline of the soldiers. During the fall of 1776, the New York Committee of Safety sent Robert R. Livingston, James Duane, Robert Yates, and nine others as a committee to cooperate with Schuyler at Albany in planning the defenses of the state, and that December, Livingston, James M. Scott, and William Duer were appointed as a

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[59] George Washington to Patrick Henry, February 24, 1777, Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:484.

committee to cooperate with George Clinton. A month later, the New York Committee of Safety sent a committee to Dutchess County to supervise the militia and late in April, the New York Convention sent a committee to investigate the difficulties of mustering and controlling the militia. The New York Committee of Safety sent a committee in February 1777 to cooperate with Wooster and Heath and, at Schuyler's insistence during the early summer of 1777, the Council sent Gouverneur Morris and Abraham Yates to inspect the state's northern defenses. Late in December 1777, Putnam also requested a committee be sent to cooperate and coordinate the state's defenses with him. The legislature complied by sending a committee to confer with him.[60]

The other northern states similarly sent committees to camp. Massachusetts in 1775, and Pennsylvania in 1776,

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[60]Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:129, 130-132, 526-527, 731; Philip Schuyler to Pierre Van Cortlandt, June 30, 1777, ibid., 2:63n.; John McKesson to George Clinton, July 29, [1777], ibid., 145; Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 1:504-534, 548-550, 622-628; Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany: Dutch Patricians in the Upper Hudson Valley, p. 92; Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolution, pp. 135-136; William Duer to George Washington, January 28, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:330; Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:130; Israel Putnam to George Washington, February 13, 1778, Livingston, Israel Putnam, p. 371; Richard Palmer, The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress West Point, 1775-1783, p. 139; John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America. With Memoir of the Author and Military Reminiscences from General Logan's Private Journal (Chicago: R. S. Peale and Company, 1887), pp. 109-111.

sent committees to Fort Ticonderoga to oversee and inspect military activities. In the latter year, Pennsylvania also appointed a committee to accompany Thomas Mifflin in his attempt to influence the Association members to turn out and stimulate them to action, and another committee to oversee their navy. During 1777, New Hampshire's Committee of Safety sent Josiah Bartlett and Nathaniel Peabody to Bennington to cooperate with Stark and, during the same year, the Pennsylvania State Navy Board was sent to the Red Bank area to personally direct the movements of the state's military forces. The following year, New Hampshire sent a committee to Sullivan's camp to ascertain the condition of the army and, during the summer of 1779, Massachusetts sent Samuel Adams to Providence to petition Gates to spare Jackson's regiment for the Penobscot expedition and, that same summer, Connecticut sent a committee to New London and Groton to inspect the fortifications and confer with the commanding officers.[61]

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[61]Alden Bradford, History of Massachusetts 1764-1820, 3 vols. (Boston: Richardson and Lord; Wells and Lilly; Alden Bradford, 1822-1829), 2:153; James Potter, William Clark, and John Morris, Jr., to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, November 11, 1776, "Original Documents," MH 4 (1906): 292-294; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 23; Ford, JCC, 6:979, 995; Instructions to Walter Spooner, Jedediah Foster, and James Sullivan from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, June 14, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1407-1408; Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 10:559; "Records of the Committee of Safety," CNHHS, 7:113; Pennsylvania State Navy Board to President Thomas Wharton, October 30, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser.,

The southern states also utilized committees to inspect and oversee military activities, beginning in South Carolina during the summer of 1775. At that time the South Carolina Council of Safety sent William Henry Drayton and the Reverend William Tennent to the back country with orders to direct the militia in protecting those that signed the Association.[62] Because of the distances involved on the southern and western frontiers, as well as the nature of the war there, military commanders were often given great latitude. Nevertheless, civilian leaders were sent to the frontier to oversee and cooperate with them. Virginia, for example, sent a committee to Fort Pitt early in the war and, during the winter of 1781-1782, sent a committee to advise George Rogers Clark, as well as to settle the accounts of his soldiers. Similarly, during 1782, Georgia sent a committee to the St. Mary's River area to investigate and

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5:723; Matthew Thornton to John Sullivan, September 28, 1778, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:92-95; Samuel Adams to ?, August 14, 1779, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:161-162; James Wentworth et al., to Jonathan Trumbull and the Council of Safety, August 7, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:420.

[62] Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:326-329, 396-398; William M. Dabney and Marion Dargan, William Henry Drayton and the American Revolution (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1962), pp. 101-104; A. S. Salley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County South Carolina from its First Settlement to the Close of the Revolutionary War, pp. 282-304.

supervise military activities.[63] Because the southern states were frequently involved in armed conflict throughout most of the war, their state governments made use of committees and individuals as liaisons with the military with respect to strategy decisions. In June 1776 a member of the Georgia Council of Safety went to Charleston to plead with General Lee for Continental assistance in defending Georgia by attacking Florida. Lee informed him he would discuss the matter with only an official delegation from Georgia. Such a delegation, consisting of Jonathan Bryan, John Houston, and Lachlan McIntosh, paid Lee a visit in July. The result was the sending of a military force under Howe and Moultrie to Georgia.[64]

Besides the states sending committees to camp to oversee military activities, they also sent individuals to act as liaisons with the military leaders. During the summer of 1776, William Sharpe, a member of the North Carolina Council of Safety, accompanied General Rutherford on his western expedition, acting as an aide. Similarly, the New Hampshire Committee of Safety sent Samuel Folsom to

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[63] Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 9:374; George Rogers Clark to the Commissioners of Western Accounts, December 15, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:396-397; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:337.

[64] Ibid., 144, 146-148; Isabella Remshart Redding, Life and Times of Jonathan Bryan, 1708-1788, p. 72.

join Stark's camp during the summer of 1777 to act as a liaison. During the summer of 1780, Jefferson of Virginia sent one of his law students, the former Continental captain, James Monroe, to the southern army armed with the title of "Military Commissioner from Virginia to the Southern Army." He was charged with collecting and communicating information about the state of the southern army to not only Jefferson, but also Rutledge of South Carolina and Nash of North Carolina. Early in 1781, Jefferson attempted to send another individual to the southern army, to be attached to Greene's headquarters as a liaison. However, the plan was dropped when Greene assured Jefferson that it was unnecessary to send anybody to camp, for he would make sure Jefferson was adequately informed of events.[65]

It was not just civilians visiting camp that provided a means for civilian oversight over military affairs. The military were often required to visit the civilian leaders.[66] Often the military simply came on their own. Just as the

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[65]Willie Jones to Patrick Henry, October 25, 1776, Saunders, NCCR, 10:860-861; Moore, John Stark, p. 271; Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, June 10, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 3:431; Same to same, June 16, 1780, ibid., 451-452; Thomas Jefferson to Abner Nash, June 16, 1780, ibid., 452; M. F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene 1780-1781 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 211, 212n.17.

[66]Tench Tilghman to William Smallwood, September 20, 1776, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 65.

military leaders often paid visits to Congress to discuss supplies and strategies, as well as to ask for preference of one kind or another, so did they, even more frequently, visit the state governments for the same things. This was especially true after 1779 when the states became more responsible for the needs of the Continental army.[67]

Another way the state civilian leaders kept a personal contact, as well as an indirect control over the military leaders was by having their sons and other relatives serve as military aides to the major military leaders. For example, Governor Trumbull's son, John, served as an aide-de-camp to Spencer and Washington, adjutant to Gates, and as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Sullivan. Governor William Livingston's sons, William S. and Henry Brockholst, served as aides-de-camp to Greene, Schuyler, Arnold and St. Clair. His nephew, Matthew Clarkson, served as an aide-de-camp to Arnold and Lincoln.[68]

State leaders also were able to watch the activities of the military by serving with them as

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[67]Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in the American Revolution, p. 134.

[68]Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 173-175; Graydon, Memoirs, pp. 145, 145n.; Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy, pp. 161, 463.

volunteers.[69] For example, John Houston, after leaving the governorship of Georgia in 1779, and before serving in Congress, served as a volunteer aide to McIntosh; John Archer, a member of the Maryland Assembly, served as a volunteer aide to Wayne; and James Sullivan, judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, served as a volunteer aide to his brother, John Sullivan.[70]

Another indirect control of the military was by state leaders having the military write them. This not only allowed the civilians to know what the military were doing, but reminded the military that the civilians were the supreme power. It also strengthened the ties between the civilian and military leaders. Such requests for correspondence were often formal, as chief executives and executive and legislative bodies often asked military commanders, including Washington, to inform them of their

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[69] Wallace, William Bradford, pp. 107-108, 121, 128, 135, 157; Hanson, Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County, p. 109n.8; Samuel Rezneck, Unrecognized Patriots: The Jews in the American Revolution (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 23-24; David Ramsay, Ramsay's History of South Carolina from its First Settlement in 1670 to the year 1808, 2:257-258; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799 (New York: Hobson Book Press, 1946), p. 148.

[70] Edith Duncan Johnston, The Houstons of Georgia, pp. 223-224; BDC, p. 522; Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 3:123.

plans and activities.[71] Most requests for correspondence were informal in nature, as it was believed it allowed the military a greater degree of freedom in their expressions.[72]

The military leaders welcomed the opportunity to communicate with the civilian leaders, and frequently did so, both informally and formally.[73] Often they initiated the correspondence with the state leaders, asking them to

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[71]Maryland Council to Marquis De la Fayette, July 3, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 45:494; Virginia Committee of Safety to William Woodford, [October 24?, 1775], Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1:123; Committee of the Executive Council of Georgia to Benjamin Lincoln, August 18, 1779, Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:159; Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, September 6, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:620; George Clinton to George Washington, March 3, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:255-256.

[72]John Penn to William Woodford, August 11, 1778, Stewart, William Woodford, 2:958; John Dagworthy to Caesar Rodney, September 15, 1777, Leon de Valinger, Jr., "Rodney Letters," DH 3, no. 2 (September 1948): 108; Elias Boudinot to Alexander McDougall, January 20, 1779, "Selections from Portfolios in Various Libraries," HM, 2d ser. 3, no. 2 (February 1868): 80-81; John McKinly to Caesar Rodney, April 29, 1777, Delaware Archives, 3:1402; George Clinton to Alexander Hamilton, March 5, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:865.

[73]Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 3 (September 1954): 227; William Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware, pp. 13-14; Adolph Benson, Sweden and the American Revolution (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor Company, 1926), pp. 84-85; "Original Documents," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 531-445; Nathanael Greene to [ ] Brownson, January 7, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Nathanael Greene to Anthony Wayne, January 9, 1782, ibid.

reciprocate with information that would be useful to the military.[74]

One of the most important contacts between the military leaders and the state civilian leaders came about in the form of meetings regarding the safety of a state. Frequently commanding officers of departments and other military commanders visited state leaders to discuss strategy and other military matters. This was especially true in the southern states.[75] Charles Lee, in 1776, while commanding the southern army, discussed military policy with a wide variety of southern civilian leaders, primarily those of Virginia and Georgia. Howe also consulted southern civilian leaders, mainly as a result of the contemplated expeditions against Florida in 1777 and 1778. Lincoln frequently met with the chief executives of North Carolina and South Carolina to discuss strategy and policy. Gates, after taking command of the southern army, visited Jefferson in Virginia, as did Lafayette the following year. Lafayette also visited Maryland's Council upon arriving in the Southern

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[74]William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 10, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:258; Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, June 5, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:54.

[75]Rawlins Lowndes to William Moultrie, November 29, 1778, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:246; William Moultrie to Charles Pinckney, April 16, 1778, ibid., 370-371; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 529.

Department. Similarly, Greene, after being appointed to command the southern army, spent over a week in Philadelphia discussing strategies with Congress before proceeding south on November 2, 1780. Arriving in Maryland, he discussed strategy and supplies with state leaders, leaving behind General Gist to continue lobbying for support. From Annapolis, he proceeded to Richmond to see Jefferson and the legislature of Virginia about his plans. There, he left behind Steuben to act as a liaison with the state, joining Gist in forwarding recruits and supplies.[76]

Because of the distances involved in the Southern Department, the commanding generals, desiring personal contact with state leaders, often sent emissaries, military necessity preventing them from leaving camp. Lincoln used Moultrie and Colonel Pinckney as a link to Rutledge, as did

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[76]Virginia Committee of Safety to Charles Lee, April 10, 1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:486-488; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 67; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:179, 190-191; Charles Lee to Archibald Bulloch, August 23, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 238; Same to same, August 24, 1776, ibid., 240-241; Button Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28, 1777, Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 218-221; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia, 1:113; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, pp. 270, 271; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 384; Patterson, Horatio Gates, pp. 302-303; Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1976), p. 220; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, p. 201; McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Virginia, 2:343; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:344; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, pp. 286-288.

Lafayette use James McHenry as a link to the government of Maryland and George Augustine Washington to the government of Virginia.[77]

Visits of commanding officers and their emissaries to state leaders were not limited to the south. Schuyler, for example, visited the New York Convention in 1777 to discuss that state's defense and a year earlier Lord Stirling visited the New Jersey Committee of Safety to discuss that state's defense. Lafayette, on his way north to command the ill-fated Canadian expedition early in 1778, visited Clinton; and on his way south late in 1780, he visited Thomas Mifflin in Philadelphia to discuss Pennsylvania's recruiting policies. During 1779, Putnam, who commanded the Continental troops on the east side of the Hudson, visited the Connecticut General Assembly to discuss policy, particularly as it related to raising additional troops. Not that successful a field commander, Putnam was adept at dealing with civilian officials, and was quite successful in coordinating the defenses of New England and the Hudson Highlands with the civilian leaders. During 1778 and 1779, General Maxwell,

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[77]Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, February 12, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Nelson, August 7, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia, p. 44; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, August 21, 1781, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 219; Same to same, August 24, 1781, ibid., p. 221.

and officers he permitted, frequently visited the New Jersey legislature, primarily to draw attention to the distresses of the New Jersey Line.[78]

It was not just the top field commanders who visited the state civilian leaders. More often than not, it was a company or regimental commanding officer who directly appealed to his state to provide supplies, recruits, and pay. Connecticut's government was frequently prevailed upon by Parsons, Putnam, Tallmadge, and Humphreys; Vermont by Stark; and New York by McDougall.[79] Southern field commanders were less likely, as the war progressed, to visit

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[78]Bush, Philip Schuyler, p. 78; Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling, p. 174; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Joins the American Army, p. 134; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, December 5, 1780, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 135; Livingston, Israel Putnam, pp. 195, 395; William Maxwell to the New Jersey Legislature, April 25, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 146-147.

[79]Livingston, Israel Putnam, p. 377; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., August 16, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:118; Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, May 11, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 94; George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17, 1777, ibid., p. 96; Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 24, 1780, ibid., p. 292; Same to same, July 4, 1780, ibid., p. 294; Samuel H. Parsons to the Committee of Congress, June 24, 1780, ibid., pp. 292-293; Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge, p. 41; Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:205-207; Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to George Washington, January 22, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:200; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, April 15, 1781, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:547-548; Same to same, June 16, 1781, ibid., 549-550; John Stark to George Washington, April 9, 1782, Moore, John Stark, p. 459; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 166.

their state governments as they were either being pursued or were pursuing the British. Generally, however, most commanders in the field during the southern campaigns sent subordinate officers to visit the state civilian leaders.[80] Fortunately for the southern officers, state executives did spend a lot of time at camp to coordinate their state's defense. Therefore, it was possible for General Andrew Pickens, early in 1781, to pay a special visit to Rutledge at Greene's camp.[81]

Although Washington rarely visited Congress to discuss the concerns of the army, he frequently paid visits to the leaders of the state governments, particularly those of New York when the army was quartered at New Windsor and Newburgh during 1781 and 1782.[82] Because of the demands on his time, Washington preferred dealing with state leaders by mail. Whenever possible, he often had his letters hand

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[80] Stewart, William Woodford, 2:1153-1154; Hugh P. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 344, 381; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sim Lee, November 10, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 40:177; Baron de Kalb to Thomas Sim Lee, July 9, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 1 (March 1954): 16.

[81] A. L. Pickens, Skyagunsta, The Border Wizard Owl: Major-General Andrew Pickens (1739-1807) (Greenville, South Carolina: Observer Printing Company, 1934), p. 89.

[82] Spaulding, George Clinton, p. 136; George Washington to Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:341.

carried by members of his staff or other officers who could expound on his written communications. He also sent aides-de-camp and generals to the state leaders to discuss policies, particularly as they related to supplies and pay. Washington began sending top assistants to the states for help during the fall of 1776, when he sent Mifflin to Pennsylvania, Reed to New Jersey, General Nixon to Massachusetts, and General Varnum to Rhode Island.[83] Until 1782, Washington frequently dispatched Knox and Heath to the New England states to lobby for support.[84] During 1778, Washington sent Deputy Quartermaster General Lutterloh to see the chief executive of Pennsylvania about supplies and Philip Van Cortlandt to see the chief executive of New York about troop dispositions. During 1781, Washington told Stark that as long as he was in New Hampshire he should impress upon the legislature the needs of the army. The following year, Parsons, then in Connecticut, received a

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[83]George Washington to William Livingston, November 23, 1776, ibid., 6:304-305; Thomas Mifflin to George Washington, November 26, 1776, Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:266; Samuel B. Webb to Jonathan Trumbull, November 24, 1776, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:173; Wilkins Updike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston: Thomas H. Webb and Company, 1842), pp. 149-150.

[84]George Washington to William Heath, June 2, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:468; Same to same, May 9, 1781, ibid., 22:63-66; Circular to the New England States, May 10, 1781, ibid., 68-69; George Washington to Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, ibid., 25:341; Abbatt, Memoirs of Major-General William Heath, p. 249; Callaghan, Henry Knox, pp. 99, 136-137.

similar letter from Washington.[85] Even as the war came to a close, Washington was still sending lobbying parties to the states. Early in 1782, he sent numerous officers to the New England states to plead with the legislatures about filling up their battalions.[86]

Besides appointing and selecting the officers, and visiting them, and receiving visits from them, the civilian leaders asserted themselves by directing, whenever possible, the strategy the military followed. Often this simply meant endorsing the plans the military brought to them, such as George Rogers Clark's plans for the western frontier approved by Virginia and Ethan Allen's plans for invading Canada approved by the New York Provincial Congress.[87] But more than often it meant adopting a strategy that would benefit the state the most, often disregarding other states. Such was the case with Massachusetts, who, without consulting Congress, fitted out a military-naval force of nearly four

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[85]George Washington to Thomas Wharton, March 7, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:45-48; George Washington to John Stark, May 6, 1781, ibid., 22:41; George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, January 3, 1782, ibid., 23:433; George Washington to Philip Van Cortlandt, October 17, 1778, Judd, Correspondence of the Van Cortlandt Family, p.269.

[86]George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, January 25, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:463-465.

[87]Edgar W. Hassler, Old Westmoreland: A History of Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution, p. 131; Journal of the New York Provincial Congress, 1:65.

thousand men during the summer of 1779 for the expedition against Penobscot.[88] Besides directing the military in grand strategy, the state governments also directed the military in lesser matters, ever reminding them of their subordinate role.[89]

The state governments, like Congress, kept a relatively tight grip on the military. Nevertheless, when it appeared consistent with the safety of the body politic, they allowed the military extraordinary power and authority. For the most part, the military responded by not abusing the trust reposed in them. Yet there is evidence that the military often violated the trust placed in them. As will be seen, the state governments, just like Congress, viewed all such violations of civil supremacy with great concern and acted accordingly.

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[88]Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 3:36-38; Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "Penobscot Assault-1779," MA 17, no. 2 (Summer 1953): 83-94.

[89]Proceedings of the Convention of the Delaware State, p. 20.

C H A P T E R VI

THE ARMY CONTROLS ITSELF

Nicholas Cresswell, during July 1777, wrote in his journal that the American army was composed of a "ragged Banditti of undisciplined people, the scum and refuse of all nations on earth." A Swedish Colonel in French service described the American army in Savannah during 1779 as being composed "almost wholly of deserters and vagabonds of all nations."[1] These were somewhat exaggerated descriptions, yet at times they seemed very true and therefore concerned the revolutionary leaders. Their ideal was a disciplined army composed of Whigs who had a stake in society. They desired an army composed of men who shared the same cultural, political, and social background and beliefs. But because of the difficulty in recruiting such an army, and military necessity, many who did not share a stake in American society as they envisioned it, enlisted in the patriot forces. These included Blacks, Indians, foreigners, British

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[1] [Nicholas Cresswell], Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777, pp. 251-252; Baron Curt von Stedingk to King Gustavus III, January 18, 1780, Adolph B. Benson, Sweden and the American Revolution, p. 165.

and German deserters and prisoners of war, as well as Tories.

The first group that was taken into the American military forces, against the wishes of most Americans, were the Blacks, a people many had always feared to arm.[2] Despite Blacks demonstrating their skill and courage at Lexington and Bunker Hill, Washington issued orders that they were not to be recruited, although those already enlisted could remain. Congress in September rejected a motion to discharge all Blacks, but a council of officers at Cambridge on October 8, 1775, unanimously agreed to discharge all slaves. By a large majority, they agreed that free Blacks in service not be re-enlisted when their enlistments ended. Washington concurred.[3]

Late in 1775, however, because of difficulty in recruiting, Washington allowed Blacks to re-enlist. Learning this, Congress informed Washington that he could continue to re-enlist Blacks who had faithfully served at the siege of Boston, but no others. This restriction was lifted during the following years as enlistments slackened,

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[2]Banjamin Quarles, "The Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower," MVHR 45, no. 4 (March 1959): 648, 652.

[3]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:319; 4:57, 86; Details regarding the October 8th meeting in Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1040; Recruiting Instructions, ibid., 3:1385; Diary of Richard Smith, Burnett, LMCC, 1:207.

and Blacks were encouraged to join both the Continental army and the state military forces. By the summer of 1778, there were over 750 Blacks serving in the Continental army and by 1780 both Rhode Island and Connecticut had all Black companies, except for the officers.[4]

This increasing use of Blacks did not take place without protest. Six members of the Rhode Island Assembly opposed the decision of their body to raise Black companies, fearing the world would believe that the Americans were attempting to win their rights and liberties with a band of slaves. Heath was asked by Schuyler whether it was "consistent with the Sons of Freedom to trust their all to be defended by Slaves?" Heath agreed it was not.[5]

Opposition to the use of Blacks, as one would surmise, was greater in the southern states, for as one

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[4]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:194; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 31, 1775, ibid., 195; Ford, JCC, 4:60; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961), pp. viii, 16-18, 52, 55-56, 71-72, 80-82; Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 10-11; David O. White, Connecticut's Black Soldiers 1775-1783, Connecticut Bicentennial, ser. 4 (Chester: Pequot Press, 1973), passim; James M. Varnum to George Washington, January 2, 1778, "Revolutionary Correspondence," RIHSC 6 (1867): 209-210; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:358-360, 640-641.

[5]Ibid., 361, Philip Schuyler to William Heath, July 28, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:135-136; William Heath to Samuel Adams, August 27, 1777, ibid., 148.

southerner wrote, arming them was "the child of a distempered Imagination." Nevertheless, from the beginning of the war, Virginia allowed Blacks to join the militia and South Carolina allowed them to be used as laborers. Additionally, Maryland allowed (the only southern state to do so) Blacks to be enlisted and even resorted to drafting them in 1781.[6]

Congress, during the British invasion of South Carolina and Georgia in 1779, suggested the use of Blacks under white commissioned and non-commissioned officers, compensating slave owners for any loss they may suffer. Alexander Hamilton, for one, thought the plan a good one, believing the slaves would make good soldiers, having lived a life of subordination. But he doubted the southerners would readily accept such a plan, believing "Prejudice and private interest will be antagonists too powerful for public spirit and public good."[7]

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[6]E[dward] Giles to Otho H[olland] Williams, June 1, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 46; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution, pp. 56-58; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 141.

[7]Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, [September 11, 1779], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:166; Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, March 14, 1779, ibid., 17-19; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, February 2, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 117; William Ellery and John Collins to William Greene, April 13, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:156; John Collins to William Greene, March 30, 1779, ibid., 124; Ford, JCC, 13:387-388.

Hamilton was correct in believing the plan would not be adopted, for as one southerner wrote after learning of it, "We are much disgusted here at the Congress recommending us to arm our Slaves, it was received with great resentment, as a very dangerous and impolitic Step." Despite the rejection of the plan, some Continental officers and civilian leaders continued to lobby for the use of Blacks, believing that the threat posed by a British army outweighed the danger of using slaves.[8]

John Laurens, once elected to the South Carolina legislature in 1782, raised the possibility of the state enlisting a Black regiment under his command. This recommendation was not adopted, as "The prejudices against the measure," according to Lewis Morris, Jr., "are so prevailing that no consideration could induce them to adopt it." The legislature did, however, agree to the limited use of Blacks for fatigue duty.[9]

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[8]Christopher Gadsden to Samuel Adams, July 6, 1779, Walsh, Christopher Gadsden, p. 166; Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, July 24, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Joseph Jones to James Madison, December 8, 1780, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 2:233; James Madison to Joseph Jones, November 28, 1780, ibid., 209.

[9]Lewis Morris, Jr. to Jacob Morris, February 7, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 499; Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, January 21, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, January 25, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 26, no. 4 (October 1925): 194; Edward Rutledge to

Although the use of Blacks in combat was sporadic during the war, it has been estimated that some five thousand did serve in various guises, primarily as sailors aboard privateers.[10] Another domestic source of manpower that was avoided as much as possible was the Indian, who, like the Black, was considered to possess the seeds of discord and anarchy.

The first two years of the war, Congress and the colonies, for the most part, attempted to keep the Indians neutral, believing the cost of maintaining them as allies outweighed any advantages which may be gained by their use. Indians did, however, serve in American arms in the first year of the war at the siege of Boston, in Canada, and on the South Carolina frontier.[11]

Arthur Middleton, February 8, 1782, ibid., 27, no. 1 (January 1926): 4; A. S. Salley, Jr., ed., Journals of the House of Representatives of South Carolina (Columbia: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1916), pp. 56-58; John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, [July 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:121.

[10]Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution, pp. ix, 83; Luther Porter Jackson, Virginia Negro Soldiers and Seamen in the Revolutionary War (Norfolk: Guide Quality Press, 1944), p. vi.

[11]Ford, JCC, 2:123, 4:191; Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:106-113; 395-396; Philip Schuyler to George Washington, August 6, 1776, Walter H. Mohr, Federal Indian Relations 1774-1788 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), p. 39; Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the Eastern Indians, May 14, 1-75, Frederic Kidder, Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia During the Revolution, Chiefly compiled from the Journals and Letters of Colonel John Allan, with Notes and a Memoir of Col. John

Because of manpower shortages, the urging of Gates, and after consulting Washington, Congress in May 1776 authorized Indian use during the northern campaign, allowing bounties for Indians who would take prisoners at garrisons, hoping this would prevent massacres. In June, Washington was authorized to recruit up to two thousand Indians, and later that summer was authorized to recruit additional Indians from the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes.[12]

Despite the seemingly large numbers authorized during 1776 and 1777, Indians were rarely used in large bodies, hardly ever incorporated with Continental units, and almost always used on the frontier. This remained true during 1778 and 1779 as Congress, pressed for military manpower, authorized Indian use, even giving blank commissions to the Northern Department's Indian Commissioners to pass along to warriors of the Oneida and Tuscarora tribes, hoping this would bring

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Allan (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867), pp. 51-52; Edward Miles Riley, ed., The Journal of John Harrower: An Indentured Servant in the Colony of Virginia, 1773-1776 (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1963), pp. 127-128; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congress of South Carolina 1775-1776, pp. 56, 159-160; Isaac J. Greenwood, "The Stockbridge Indians During the American Revolution," NEHGR 54 (April 1900): 162-164; Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:144.

[12]Horatio Gates to John Adams, April 23, 1776, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Correspondence of John Adams and Horatio Gates," PMHS 67 (October 1941-May 1944): 140; Ford, JCC, 4:394-395; 5:412, 452, 527.

them into closer cooperation. During the spring of 1780, Colonel Brodhead was given six blank commissions to bestow upon Delaware Indians, and early in 1781 he was authorized to use as many Delawares as volunteers as he desired. On the southern frontier during 1780, Major William R. Davie supplemented his command with thirty-five Catawba, whose tribe also supplied warriors in 1781.[13]

In all, probably two or three thousand Indians served in or with the American military forces during the war. Rarely were a hundred used at the same time and place, and always their conduct was carefully monitored. The states generally restricted their use in populated areas and frequently prohibited their serving in the militia.[14]

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[13]Ibid., 9:943, 1002; 10:220-221; 12:411; 14:693; 16:373; 19:33; Allen D. Chandler, ed., "Minutes of the Executive Council, May 7 through October 14, 1777," GHQ 34, no. 1 (March 1950): 31; J. E. A. Smith, The History of Pittsfield, (Berkshire County,) Massachusetts, from the year 1734 to the year 1800 (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1869), p. 296; Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), pp. 132-133, 197; Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:446n.39; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, p. 249; George Washington to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, March 13, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:76-77; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, new ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974), p. 71; Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania During the Revolution, pp. 86-87; Edgar W. Hassler, Old Westmoreland: A History of Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution, pp. 74-79, 81; Peele, Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians, p. 61; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 291.

[14]Arthur J. Alexander, "Exemption from Militia Service in New York State During the Revolutionary War," NYH 27, no. 2 (April 1946): 206; Clark, NCSR, 24:336; 25:335.

Washington was generally against using them, believing their services never compensated the expense.[15] He felt the same way about another category of manpower both Congress and the states were forced to call upon--British and German deserters and prisoners of war.

Initially, orders were issued both by the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and by the army forbidding the enlistment of British deserters. Throughout the war similar orders would be issued, as well as prohibitions against enlisting British prisoners of war.[16] These prohibitions did not, however, preclude Congress from frequently providing incentives for British and German soldiers to renounce their allegiances, with no obligation to serve in the American military forces.[17] It is estimated about thirty-thousand

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[15]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 3, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:343-344; George Washington to William Heath, September 3, 1781, ibid., 23:75.

[16]George Washington's Recruiting Instructions, ibid., 6:198; 7:7; 11:186; George Washington to Thomas Johnson, April 8, 1779, ibid., 14:349; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 592; Samuel H. Parsons's Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 160-161; Caesar Rodney to ?, February 3, 1780, Delaware Archives, 3:1459; William Heath's General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Regiment of Artillery Raised for the Defence of the Town of Boston in 1776," HCEI 14, no. 2 (April 1877): 127-128; Ford, JCC, 4:105.

[17]Ibid., 369; 5:640, 653-655, 707-708; 7:430; 8:417; 10:406-407; Proclamation by Thomas Jefferson, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:505-506; Arthur J. Alexander, "Exemption from Militia Service in New York State During the Revolutionary War," NYH 27, no. 2 (April 1946): 211.

German mercenaries served in America between 1776 and 1783, about twenty thousand of them Hessians, who, for the most part, neither demonstrated great love for the British nor great hatred for the Americans. It is understandable, therefore, why nearly half were captured, and some five thousand deserted.[18]

With increasing manpower needs during the second and third years of the war, many civil and military leaders believed German mercenaries who had deserted or were taken prisoner should be recruited, and some actually were. Congress and Washington generally opposed their use, despite the argument that German mercenaries were disciplined, and therefore posed no threat to persons or property.[19]

Washington believed their limited use by the end of 1777 had demonstrated that the Germans deserted the American forces

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[18]Edward J. Lowell, The Hessians and the Other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1884), pp. 282, 300; Matthew H. Volm, The Hessian Prisoners in the American War of Independence and their Life in Captivity, Virginia Pamphlets, vol. 13 (n.p., 1937), pp. 4, 7, 10.

[19]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, November 27, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:310; George Washington to the Board of War, November 30, 1776, ibid., 317; George Washington to John Sullivan, May 29, 1777, ibid., 8:136; The Board of War to Horatio Gates, November 2, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:539-540; Ford, JCC, 10:203; 11:522-523; for discussion of employing mercenary forces, see Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Benjamin Franklin, August 12, 1777, Rowland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, 1:209.

just as easily as they had the British, taking with them their bounty as well as their equipment.[20]

Early in 1778, Congress agreed to the limited use of Germans, primarily fighting as a separate corps on the frontier, or as part of Pulaski's Partisan Corps of Armand's Legion. Later that year, at Washington's suggestion, Congress gave Pulaski and Armand great latitude with respect to the foreign deserters and prisoners of war they could recruit for their respective corps.[21] But just as quickly as they and other commanders enlisted German and British deserters and prisoners of war, they deserted.[22] This was also true of many foreigners who were recruited to serve in the state forces, often against the wishes of the

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[20]George Washington to George Baylor, June 19, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8:264; see also John Taylor to Edmund Pendleton, April 13, 1778, "Original Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., 2 (October 1895): 104, 105; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, March 15, 1778, "Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 405, 405-406.

[21]Ford, JCC, 10:291, 312, 405-410; 11:642-644; 12:1159; Casimer Pulaski to George Washington, March 19, 1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:87-88; George Washington to the Committee from the Continental Congress, April 9, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:230; George Washington to Casimer Pulaski, May 1, 1778, ibid., 337.

[22]Adrian C. Leiby, The Revolutionary War in the Hackensack Valley: The Jersey Dutch and the Neutral Ground, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962), p. 265; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, February 28, 1781, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:247; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1781, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 28, no. 2 (1904): 241.

legislatures and military commanders.[23]

By 1780, Washington and other military commanders were willing to admit the experiment of using foreigners was not worth the expense and trouble.[24] Yet deserters and prisoners of war were continually recruited because of military necessity.[25]

Not much trust and faith was placed in the Tories who frequently, when captured, quickly joined the patriot forces rather than face summary punishment. They were never systematically recruited during the war, as it became evident very early in the war that Tories, forced into American arms, deserted at the first opportunity, taking their bounty with them. Yet many served, and proved to be as unruly as their

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[23]Abraham Ten Broeck to George Clinton, February 26, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:13; George Clinton to Abraham Ten Broeck, March 9, 1778, ibid., 14; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 20, 1777, "Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 387; The Maryland Council to the Recruitings Officers of Anne Arundel County, January 3, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 43:48; Clark, NCSR, 25:335.

[24]George Washington to Lord Stirling, March 22, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:139; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1781, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 28, no. 2 (1904): 241.

[25]Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 261-262; Benians, A Journal by Thos. Hughes, p. 95; William Irvine to William Moore, March 17, 1782, Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 235-236; Chevalier de la Luzerne to the President of the Continental Congress, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 4:11; The Maryland Council to Charles Armand-Tuffin, October 31, 1782, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:295; see also ibid., 45:227; Ford, JCC, 22:275.

Whig brothers.[26] Also not systematically recruited were criminals and vagabonds. But they were used, often given the choice of serving or being jailed. Maryland, by mid war, was giving pardons to criminals who agreed to serve three years in the army, and South Carolina forced many convicted of being idle, lewd, or disorderly persons into the military.[27]

So concerned about recruiting those they believed had no real stake in American society, the revolutionary leaders, at times, prohibited, or at least limited, the use of foreign born residents of America.[28] Early in the war, Massachusetts set the pattern by forbidding the enlistment

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[26]Allen Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 16; Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, November 7, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:99; Charles Davis, A Brief History of the North Carolina Troops on the Continental Establishment in the War of the Revolution, with a Register of Officers Of the Same. Also a Sketch of the North Carolina Society of the Cincinnati from its Organization in 1783 to its So-Called Dissolution after 1790. By Henry Hobart Bellas (Philadelphia: n.p., 1896), p. 30.

[27]Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, December 9, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 5:382; Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy; Its Development Since 1775, 2d ed. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Company, 1961), p. 26; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 300, 309; Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quota," MHM 42, no. 3 (September 1947): 193; Browne, Maryland Archives, 43:35, 94; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, p. 253; Arthur J. Alexander, "Desertion and Its Punishment in Revolutionary Virginia," WMQ, 3d ser., 3, no. 3 (July 1946): 397.

[28]W[illiam] Smallwood's Instructions to the Colonels, February 19, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 61.

of foreigners, unless they were truly a settled resident with a wife and family. Delaware, New York and Virginia, in 1776, ordered their recruiting officers to only take men, who by birth, or family connection, or property, were tied to the country.[29] Washington wanted only natives for his guard, and only natives, or foreigners of approved fidelity for the light dragoons. Similarly, Greene imposed the same standards for his dragoons.[30] Despite these prohibitions, many foreign born residents of America served in the revolutionary military forces.[31]

Thus, despite all the attempts at limiting the "outside" influence in the army, the American military forces were indeed a mixture of races and cultures. What was desired-mature domestic yeomen--did make up the bulk of the army surrounding Boston during the summer of 1775, but by the end of the year many of those had left the service when their enlistments terminated. Even those Americans

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[29]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, p. 593; Delaware Archives, 1:33; Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, p. 11, Campbell, Orderly Book, p.33.

[30]George Washington to Alexander Spotswood, April 30, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:495; Instructions to Officers of Light Dragoons, December 30, 1777, ibid., 10:230; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:288-289.

[31]Graydon, Memoirs, p. 181; "Notes and Queries," PMHB 25, no. 4 (1901): 578-579; John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), p. 506.

that were recruited beginning in 1776 began to include the young, the old, and the lame.[32] Late in the war, Heath complained to Washington that among the eighty most recent recruits arriving in the Highlands from Massachusetts were many old men, boys, Negroes, as well as two French from a French frigate.[33] Captain Webb's company of the Fourth Connecticut Regiment, in 1777, listed thirty-six of its fifty-seven men, with ages given, as being twenty or younger.[34] The militia, which was supposed to be the backbone of American society, also suffered from a lack of stable, responsible, and respected membership, especially in the southern states.

General Lee described the militia as being composed of the most idle, vicious and dissolute members of society.

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[32]Ibid., p. 499; "Diary of Ezekiel Price, 1775-1776," PMHS 7 (1863-1864): 188; John Taylor to William Livingston, September 25, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776-1786, p. 180; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, July 26, 1781, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, pp. 94-95; Acomb, Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 102; Journal of Jean-Francois-Louis, Comte de Clermont-Crevecoeur, Rice, The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:33; Washington's Circulars to the States, December 19, 1781, and January 31, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:399, 480.

[33]William Heath to George Washington, May 7, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., V:373; for earlier complaint, see William Heath to Caleb Davis, March 16, 1781, ibid., 181.

[34]"Roll of Capt. Nathaniel Webb's Co., In the Fourth Connecticut Regiment-Revolutionary War-Col. John Durkee, Commanding," NEHGR 22, no. 2 (July 1868): 281-282.

Another officer called them a "dangerous part of society."[35] Even Stark, who successfully led the militia, reported they were "such a set of poltroons" as found no place else on earth.[36] The militia indeed suffered the same recruiting problems as the army, often filling out their ranks with small boys and old men.[37]

Because both the army and the militia were composed of so many people who were either "outsiders" to American society or were barely a part of it, the Whigs believed that the officers would have to keep a close watch on the military, to keep them from becoming a threat to life, liberty and property. "Without a good set of officers," Greene wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, "the troops will be little better than a lawless Banditti or an ungovernable Mob." The success of their cause, Governor Cooke was told by Greene, "depends upon establishing a good Core or Corps of Officers,"[38] Cooke and the other civilian leaders

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[35]Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 323-324; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, November 18, 1776, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 27.

[36]John Stark to the President of the New Hampshire Congress, June 28, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p. 172.

[37]John Crayford, The Penobscot Expedition: being an Account of the Largest American Naval Engagement of the Revolutionary War (Orrington, Maine: C. and H. Publishing Company, 1976), p. 11.

[38]Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 11, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:313.

realized this, but the officer corps, like the men they commanded, left much to be desired, especially at the company grade level.

The company grade officers were, for the most part, little different from the men they led. After all, in most instances, these officers had been elected by the men they commanded. From the first day Washington arrived at Cambridge, he realized that most officers were not born leaders. In fact, he reported, they were "generally speaking . . . the most indifferent kind of People I ever saw."[39] It was not only of the New England officers he complained, believing all the states were appointing officers "not fit to be Shoe Blacks," even his own Virginia.[40] Knox agreed, believing the bulk of the officers "a parcel of ignorant, stupid, men, who might make tolerable soldiers, but bad officers."[41] Similar complaints were voiced both within and without the army during the first three years of the war.[42] If the quality and character of the

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[39]George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:433.

[40]George Washington to John Augustine Washington, November 6, 1776, ibid., 6:246; George Washington to Jackie Custis, January 22, 1777, ibid., 7:52.

[41]Hnery Knox to William Knox, September 23, 1776, Drake, Henry Knox, pp. 31-32.

[42]John Adams to Joseph Hawley, August 25, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:434; "Journal of a Campaign in America by Du Rousseau de Fayolle," in Idzerda, Lafayette

Continental officer was complained of, then that of the militia officer was condemned. Washington described the militia officers, with few exceptions, "not worth the bread they eat."[43]

Like their men, the officers frequently came and went, as personal needs and desires dictated. It was the rare officer who always remained in camp to oversee the activities of his men. Many officers, besides furloughing themselves or resigning when things got rough, simply deserted. In one study of seven New York regiments it was found that during the war at least 15 percent of the officers deserted.[44] Officers were also constantly in trouble, just like their men. A study of some fifteen hundred offenses committed which were penalized by court martials reveals that 30 percent were committed by officers and non-commissioned officers.[45] They frequently demonstrated

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in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:71, 72; Samuel Patterson to George Read, September 19, 1776, William Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware, p. 18.

[43]George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:138-139; see also Alexander McDougall to John Jay, October 20, 1775, Morris, John Jay, p. 174; David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, pp. 162-165.

[44]Allen Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 72.

[45]Ibid., 116n.21.

insubordination, and were often unruly.[46]

Often such conduct was the result of drink, which was not limited to just the company grade officers.[47] Lord Stirling, William Maxwell, Henry Babcock and Adam Stephen had drinking problems, the latter being dismissed from service as a result.[48] Officers were also frequently involved, because of drink, or greed, or low pay, in plundering, taking financial advantage of their men, or involving themselves in questionable and fraudulent schemes.[49]

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[46]Edward D. Seeber, trans., On the Threshold of Liberty: Journal of a Frenchman's Tour of the American Colonies in 1777, p. 97; Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, July 11, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1646; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 13, [1775], "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 216; "Journal Kept During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no. 4 (1847): 176.

[47]Ibid., 3, no. 2 (1848): 92; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to George Washington, September 27, 1777, Rowland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton Papers, 1:218; Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle, pp. 146-147.

[48]Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling, pp. 275-277; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, pp. 104-105, 106, 117-118, 135-136; Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 2:9; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 204.

[49]John Taylor to Edmund Pendleton, April 13, 1777, Stewart, William Woodford, 2:756; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, December 22, 1777, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:368; George Clinton to Alexander Hamilton, December 28, 1777, ibid., 371; Regimental Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 677-678.

The soldiers they commanded certainly were more unruly and undisciplined, especially early in the war. A surgeon aboard a British warship anchored in Boston harbor wrote late in May 1775 that the American army was a "Rabble, without order, subjection, discipline, or cleanliness," and predicted in three months' time they would dissolve as a unified fighting force.[50] Similarly, Benjamin Thompson observed in Boston on November 4, 1775, about the lack of discipline in the American army, observing "the doctrines of independence and levellism have been so effectually sown throughout the country, and so universally imbibed by all ranks of men, that I apprehend it will be with the greatest difficulty that the inferior officers and soldiers will be ever brought to any tolerable degree of subjection to the commands of their superiors."[51] American officers agreed with these observations. General Montgomery believed "The New-England troops are the worst stuff imaginable, for soldiers." "There is such an equality among them," he lamented, "that the officers have no authority."[52] Schuyler, during July 1775, informed Washington that with respect to

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[50]Letter dated May 26, 1775, in Farley's Bristol Journal of July 8, 1775, cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard, Letters on the American Revolution 1774-1776, p. 120.

[51]Cited in Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p. 155.

[52]Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, October 31, 1775, Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 1:427.

the New England troops, "it is extremely difficult to introduce a proper subordination amongest a people where so little distinction is kept up." So frustrated did Schuyler become that by November he wanted to retire from service, believing he would never be able to discipline the soldiers under his command.[53] These problems were not only encountered by the New York generals already cited. Many officers expressed contempt for the New Englanders, generally believing them too radical and independent in their thoughts, beliefs, and actions, and certainly too excessive in their equality.[54] As Joseph Reed told his wife, it was impossible to introduce discipline where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, "where so great an

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[53]Philip Schuyler to George Washington, July 15, 1775, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:4; Same to same, November 22, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ed., 3:1635; Same to same, January 5, 1776, ibid., 4:580-581; Graydon, Memoirs, p. 143.

[54]Persifor Frazer to Mary Frazer, August 6, 1775, "Some Extracts from the Papers of General Persifor Frazer," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907): 135; Same to same, September 21, 1776, ibid.; William Thompson to ?, January 25, 1775 [1776], "Letters of Two Distinguished Pennsylvania Officers of the Revolution," ibid., 35, no. 3 (1911): 305; Stephen Moylan to Joseph Reed, October 24, 1775, Griffin, Stephen Moylan, p. 16; John Haslet to Caesar Rodney [October 10, 1776], Ryden, Letters to and From Caesar Rodney, p. 138; "Journal of Col. Rudolphus Ritzema. Of the First New York Regiment August 8, 1775 to March 30, 1776," MAH 1, no. 2 (February 1877): 98.

equality and so thorough a levelling spirit predominates."[55]

In many respects the New England soldiers at the beginning of the war were indeed an ungovernable mob, doing pretty much as they pleased, causing displeasure to the officers that commanded them, particularly those of the middle colonies, but also to the soldiers of the other colonies that served with them. At the beginning of the war Benjamin Thompson predicted the American forces would never be united due to the fact that there existed great jealousies between the troops of the different colonies and would only get worse the more they came in contact with one another.[56] These sectional differences did exist, and frequently manifested themselves in fighting between the troops of the different sections.[57] Fights also took place

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[55]Joseph Reed to Esther Reed, October 11, 1776, Reed, Joseph Reed, 1:243; see also John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:358; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, December 6, 1775, Morris, John Jay, p. 190.

[56]Cited in Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p. 155.

[57]John Trumbull to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1776, ibid., p. 221; North Callahan, Daniel Morgan: Ranger of the Revolution (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 57; George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960), pp. 68, 212n.30; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 68-69; Henry P. Johnston, The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn. Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society 3 (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society, 1878), pp. 240-243; Francis Barber to [ ] Dayton, February 28, 1781, Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, p. 444; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, April 14, 1781, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 182; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of

between Continental soldiers and the militia.[58]

The southern troops were oftentimes as guilty, if not more so as the war progressed, of being unruly and undisciplined. One company of Virginia backwoodsmen under the command of Captain George Gibson were so rowdy they were satirically called "Gibson's Lambs."[59] Several months after taking command of the southern army, Greene reported that his army was "so addicted to plundering that they were a terror to the Country."[60] Indeed they were, as will be discussed later in this chapter. But if the Continental soldiers were unruly, undisciplined, and at times a terror to the country, as well as to each other, then the militia were even more so.

Late in the war, a young Pennsylvania officer serving in North Carolina complained that the militia in

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Christopher Marshall, p. 213.

[58]Ibid., pp. 275-276; William Atlee to Joseph Reed, May 25, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 9:170.

[59]Resolutions adopted by Officers at Williamsburg, Virginia, July 18, 1775, "Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778, of George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle County, Va.," VHSC, new ser., 6:92; John T. Goolrick, The Life of General Hugh Mercer (New York: Neale Publishing Company, 1906), pp. 44-45.

[60]Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:531.

that state were under no control.[61] This complaint was not unique to the south.[62] Referring to the militia at Whitemarsh late in 1777, one observer noted "There is no more regulation among what I have seen of them, than a flock of Bullocks." From the falls of the Ohio, another reported the militia was under no subordination, where "every man

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[61]Enos Reeves to ?, March 13, 1782, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 3 (1897): 386.

[62]Abraham Ten Broeck to George Clinton, July 20, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:563-564; Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 9, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:292; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 7, 1780, ibid., 546; Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, May 16, 1781, ibid., 296; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 4, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:352; Same to same, March 18, 1781, ibid., 350; George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:138; George Washington to Robert Morris, March 2, 1777, ibid., 7:222; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 27, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 219; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, November 18, 1776, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 27; Benjamin Lincoln to Elbridge Gerry, March 14, 1777, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:260; William R. Davie to Richard Caswell, August 29, 1780, Blackwell P. Robinson, William R. Davie, p. 64; Thomas Conway to the President of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council, August 17, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., V:530-531; Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 468-489; "Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia, Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 3 (1885): 280, 296; Jesias Hawkins to Matthew Tilghman, October 7, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 12:325; Matthias Williamson to William Livingston, September 15, 1776, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776-1786, pp. 9-10; Petition to Horatio Gates from Benjamin Cleveland, Isaace Shelby, John Sevier, Andrew Hampton, William Campbell, and Joseph Winston, October 4, 1780, Clark, NCSR, 14:663-664; Marquis de Lafayette to [George Clinton], March 16, 1778, Idzerda, Lafayette in the American Revolution, 1:356.

seems to do that which he thinks best." The militia indeed did what they thought best, often against the desires of their officers. "With the militia," Greene wrote, "everybody is a general." When called on to explain his accounts, Richard Peters who commanded a company of Philadelphia Associators, was asked how many men he commanded, stated "Not one." The paymaster immediately queried him as to his large expense account if he commanded no men. Peters explained that he indeed commanded not one, "but I am commanded by ninety."[63]

The militia constantly demonstrated that they would only be commanded by those that they selected, and would only obey such orders as they thought proper to their best interests.[64] Both the Pennsylvania and Maryland militia made it perfectly clear they did not desire to be commanded by anybody they had not chosen and would not follow any that

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[63]Samuel Hay to William Irvine, November 14, 1777, "Replies," HM 3, no. 9 (September 1859); 284; George Slaughter to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:410; Nathanael Greene to Henry Knox, December 7, 1781 [1780], Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:545; "A Collection of Puns and Witticisms of Judge Richard Peters," PMHB 25, no. 3 (1901): 367-368.

[64]Richard Dallam to Thomas S. Lee, January 16, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 47:20-21; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 27, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 219.

their legislative bodies selected for them.[65] So frustrating was it for one Maryland militia officer to command a company, that he resigned, preferring to stand in the ranks as a common soldier.[66] The thing about the militia that most upset military commanders was that they came and went as they pleased, including the officers. Washington complained, "they come, you scarce tell how, they go, you hardly know when."[67] In all, not counting drafts who never joined the army, one scholar has estimated that at least half of the militia enrolled during the war deserted.[68]

With such military forces as these it is easy to understand why America had few successes the first three years of the war. Most of the failures were attributed to the lack of discipline both in the field and in camp. This lack of discipline greatly concerned both the civilian and military leaders for without it, not only would military

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[65]Richard Barnes to Thomas Jefferson, December 20, 1777, Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 205; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 88-89; Charles S. Smith to [Matthew] Tilghman, September 9, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 12:262-263; Thomas Wright to the Maryland Council of Safety, September 20, 1776, ibid., 288-289.

[66]Charles S. Smith to [Matthew] Tilghman, September 9, 1776, ibid., 262-263.

[67]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 26, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:319.

[68]Allen Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 70.

success be impossible, but it was necessary to prevent domestic anarchy and military tyranny. This concern about discipline was a carry-over belief from the pre-war days, when the colonists were urged to moderate their protest by using legitimate, constitutional, and peaceful methods. Thus, during the first months of the war, discipline was called for in the army by individuals, colonial legislative bodies and Congress.[69] So important was discipline considered by Congress that they informed the army they would "consider activity and success, in introducing discipline into the army, among the best recommendations for promotion." That was an idea that Congress thought might improve discipline in 1776. During 1777, Congress continually attempted to come up with other ideas that would promote discipline, some of which will be discussed later in this chapter.[70]

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[69]Abigail Adams to John Adams, June [16?], 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:218; Address by George Gilmer in Albemarle, Virginia, 1775, "Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778, of George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle County, Va.," VHSC, new ser., 6:128; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, p. 353; Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolution, p. 11; "Journal of the Council of Safety for the Province of South Carolina, 1775," SCHSC, 2 (1858): 38; John Hancock to Philip Schuyler, October 11, 1775, Burnett, LMCC, 1:228; Ford, JCC, 2:96.

[70]Ibid., 5:784; 794; 7:193, 259, 274; Edward Rutledge to Robert R. Livingston, August 19, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:55; John Hancock to Philip Schuyler, September 27, 1776, ibid., 107.

Individual members of Congress constantly urged the necessity of discipline. We "will stand or fall," John Adams told Heath, according to how the army "adheres to or deviates from the same discipline," referring to that of the Roman legions and British regulars. So concerned about discipline, he wrote the Judge Advocate of the Army that "Every officer ought to be hanged, who does not discipline his Men every day."[71] Thomas Lynch told Washington during the fall of 1775, shortly after the articles of war had been adopted, that he should enforce them with vigor, with the full support of his friends in Congress.[72]

Washington, from his previous plantation and military experience, was a devout believer in the necessity of discipline. During the Seven Years War, he wrote "Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all." Twenty years later, in approving a court martial sentence at Valley Forge, he stated,"exact discipline and

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[71]John Adams to William Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:14; John Adams to William Tudor, March 11, 1777, William Tudor Papers, MHS; see also John Adams to Henry Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:61; John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 13, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:209; Same to same, July 18, 1777, ibid., 284; Same to same, August 8, 1777, ibid., 304; Same to same, August 24, 1777, ibid., 328.

[72]Thomas Lynch to George Washington, November 13, 1775, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:84; see also Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, June 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:506.

the strictest obedience to orders is the Soul of an Army."[73] Upon taking command of the army in July 1775, he emphasized the need for exact discipline being adhered to, stating without discipline the army would become the scene of disorder and confusion. Again on January 1, 1776, in the first general orders of the new Continental Army he warned "an Army without Order, Regularity, and Discipline, is no better than a Commission'd mob." "It is Subordination and Discipline (the Life and Soul of an Army) which next under providence," he stressed, "is to make us formidable to our enemies, honorable in ourselves, and respected in the world."[74] These themes he constantly reminded the officers and soldiers.[75] His subordinates reminded their men as well.[76]

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[73]General Instructions to Captains of all Companies, July 29, 1757, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 2:114; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p.206.

[74]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:309, 354-355; 4:202, 202-203.

[75]General Orders, ibid., 355, 525-526; 18:214-215; 20:34; Proclamation, ibid., 4:412-413; George Washington to William Woodford, November 10, 1775, ibid., 80; George Washington to Israel Putnam, August 25, 1776, ibid., 5:489; George Washington to John Stark, June 25, 1781, ibid., 22: 264; George Washington to Charles Armand-Tuffin, November 1, 1781, ibid., 23:318; George Washington to Benedict Arnold, June 19, 1778, ibid., 12:94-95; George Washington to Coggeshall Olney or Officer Commanding the Rhode Island Regiment, May 15, 1782, ibid., 24:259; George Washington to Artemas Ward, April 4, 1776, MHSC, 5th ser., 4:7.

[76]Elisha Porter to Capt. Wm. [ ], March 20, 1776, Miscellaneous Manuscripts (1774-April 1776), WLCL; Patrick Henry's Orders of November 19, 1775, in The Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), December 16, 1775; "THOUGHTS on the

Washington knew that simply encouraging discipline would not prevent the army from becoming a terror to the people they were meant to protect. "A people unused to restraint must be led," he wrote Lord Stirling, for "they will not be drove, even those who are ingaged for the War, must be disciplined by degrees."[77] Part of the process of leading them, it was generally agreed, was improving the officer corps and extending the terms of enlistments, which will be discussed later in this chapter, but even more importantly Washington and most other Whig leaders believed that religion and discipline went hand in hand, with one contributing to the other.

Although the fervor of the Great Awakening had played itself out by 1775, still the American Revolution, the mental process, was partly a movement permeated with a

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Present State of the ARMY: addressed to the military," by "A LIEUTENANT COLONEL," The New-Jersey Gazette, December 24, 1777; Henry Knox to [Henry] Jackson, April 27, 1777, Revolutionary War Letter Collection, no. 9, BPL; George Clinton to Major [Abraham?] Cuyler, August 2, 1776, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:289-290; Samuel H. Parsons to Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p.623; Campbell, Orderly Book, p. 2; Charles C. Pinckney's Orders, A. S. Salley, Jr., "An Order Book of the 1st. Regt., S. C. Line, Continental Establishment," SCHGM 7, no. 3 (July 1906): 133-315; Robert Howe to [Robert] Rae, December 1, 1778, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780)," ibid., 13, no. 4 (October 1912):212; Alexander McDougall to Aaron Burr, January 15, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr, 1:145.

[77]George Washington to Lord Stirling, January 19, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:33.

religious conviction that God was actively involved in the welfare of America.[78] As was discussed earlier, Americans believed that God would only protect them so long as they were virtuous and moral. This was constantly stressed by the revolutionary leaders. "The importance of religion and morality and a devout acknowledgement of the government of the heaven, to the support of order and government among men, and the liberty, safety and happiness of society," was, according to Jonas Clark in a 1781 election sermon, "what reason teaches, and what common sense, as well as universal practice of mankind, in all ages and nations, concurs to confirm." "In a word," according to Clark, "religion among a people, in its power, purity and governing influence, is the guardian of liberty, the strength of government, the energy of laws, the band of society, and both glory and defence of the state." Similarly, John Adams wrote that "Statesmen . . . may plan and speculate for liberty, but it is Religion and Morality alone, which can establish the Principles upon which Freedom can securly stand."[79]

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[78]William G. McLoughlin, "'Enthusiasm for Liberty': The Great Awakening as the Key to the Revolution," Preachers & Politicians: Two Essays on the Origins of the American Revolution (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1977), pp. 48, 51.

[79]Jonas Clark, A Sermon Preached Before His Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; Governor; . . . May 30, 1781. Being the First Day of General Election, pp. 34-35; John Adams to

General Washington certainly shared these beliefs. Throughout his public career he regarded organized religion as an important stabilizing force and saw the church as the bulwark of American social and political order. These beliefs, acquired early in his life, were greatly reinforced as he grew older, particularly after his marriage to a devout church woman.[80]

Thus, from the beginning of the war, Washington stressed the need for religion in the army, and the necessity that his army be virtuous and moral. "While we are zealously performing the duties of good Citizens & Soldiers," he told the army at Valley Forge, "we certainly ought not to be inattentive to the higher duties of Religion. To the distinguish'd Character of Patriot, it Should be our highest Glory, to add the more distinguish'd Character of Christians." Earlier he had told the army of his hopes "that every officer and man, will endeavour so to live, and act, as becomes a

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Zabdiel Adams, June 21, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:21.

[80]Paul F. Boller, Jr., George Washington & Religion (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), pp. vii, 3-23, 29, 44-46; W. E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926), p. 142; William J. Johnson, George Washington the Christian (New York: Abingdon Press, 1919), passim; John C. Fitzpatrick, "Washington as a Religious Man," Pamphlet no. 5 in Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Honor to George Washington and Reading About George Washington (Washington, D.C.: United States George Washington Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 46.

Christian Soldier defending the dearest Rights and Liberties of his country."[81]

It is not surprising then to find Washington ordering that Congressional days of fasting, prayer, and humiliation be strictly observed by the army. Nor is it surprising to find him constantly ordering soldiers to attend divine services.[82] He also was concerned about the role of the chaplains of his army, hoping by their conduct and their exhaltations they would guide the soldiers in morality and lead them to discipline.

Chaplains, however, were never plentiful. It has been estimated that less than half the regiments had chaplains during 1775, and by January 1776, there were only nine in Continental service. During 1778, the army employed twenty-two chaplains, and probably that same number were with the army during the latter stages of the war.[83] Despite

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[81]General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p. 303; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:245.

[82]General Orders, ibid., 3:403; 4:369; 9:275; 11:252; Circular to the Brigadier Generals, May 26, 1777, ibid., 8:127; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins, Theron Wilmot Crissey, History of Norfolk Litchfield County, Connecticut 1744-1900 (Everett, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Publishing Company, 1900), pp. 98, 100, 112; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 182, 192, 207-208, 210, 212.

[83]J. T. Headley, The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution, pp. 62-63; Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 2:319.

their small number, these ministers who served as chaplains, as well as officers of the Line, did have some success in encouraging discipline and moral conduct.

Many ministers, such as Enoch Poor, James Hall, John Peter Muhlenberg, and David Avery, served in the army in a military capacity. Others, such as James Caldwell, shouldered weapons as common soldiers, or like Thomas Allen and Caldwell, exhorted men on, or on to, the battlefield.[84]

It was not, however, in their military capacity that Washington and the other Whig leaders hoped the clergy would have great influence. It was in their ability to exert a moral influence over the army that was greatly desired and considered essential, for as Philips Payson of Chelsea, Massachusetts, stated in a May 1778 election sermon, "The fear and reverence of God, and the terrors of eternity, are the most powerful restraints upon the minds of men."[85]

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[84]Ellis Ames, "Death of General Poor in the American Revolution," PMHS 18 (1880-1881): 435-436; J. T. Headley, The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution, pp. 68-69, 72-73, 149-150, 212, 222, 227, 234-236, 246-248, 298-299; Nicholas Murray, "A Memoir of the Rev. James Caldwell, of Elizabethtown," PNJHS 3, no. 2 (1848): 82; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, pp. 222-223, 241; Foote, Sketches of North Carolina, pp. 322-325, 326-327; Edward E. Hocker, The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg Lutheran Clergyman, Military Chieftain and Political Leader, pp. 52, 59-62.

[85]Cited in John Wingate, The Pulpit of the American Revolution or, The Political Sermons of the Period of 1776 with a Historical Introduction, Notes, and Illustrations (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860), p. 339.

Congress, Washington, and others hoped the ministers would help remind the soldiers of the goodness of the revolutionary cause, the necessity for discipline despite hardships, and the desirability for morality at all times.[86] Many ministers complied with these desires, frequently preaching sermons reminding the men of their patriotic and moral duties and obligations. As John Hart told the Virginia soldiers in 1777, that in order to "enjoy our property in security, we must stand firm to the cause of liberty and public virtue."[87]

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[86]Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 2, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 50; John Adams to Nathanael Greene, May 9, 1777, ibid., 54; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:428-429; Ford, JCC, 4:61; 5:522; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:355; 5:211.

[87]Cited in Frank Moore, ed., The Patriot Preachers of the American Revolution with Biographical Sketches (New York: Charles T. Evans, 1862), p. 148; see also Journal of Josiah Atkins in Joseph Anderson, ed., The Town and City of Waterbury, Connecticut, From the Aboriginal Period to the Year Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-Five, 3 vols. (New Haven: Price and Lee Company, 1896), 1:472; Henry Woodman, The History of Valley Forge: With a Biography of the Author and the Author's Father who was a Soldier with Washington at Valley Forge During the Winters of 1777 and 1778 (Oaks, Pennsylvania: John U. Francis, Sr., 1920), pp. 64-65; Journals of Simeon Lyman and Benjamin Trumbull, "Orderly Books and Journals Kept by Connecticut Men While Taking Part in the American Revolution 1775-1778," CHSC, 7 (1899): 121, 124, 207; Appleton Morgan, [ed.], "The Diary of Colonel Elisha Porter of Hadley, Massachusetts Touching His March to the Relief of the Continental Forces Before Quebec," MAH 30, no. 3 (September 1893): 201; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 210.

Washington also involved himself and the other officers in encouraging the soldiers to discourage vice in every shape. "Purity of Morals," Washington told the army in his general orders, was "the only sure foundation of publick happiness in any Country and highly conducive to order, subordination and success in an Army." Orders of a similar nature were constantly issued by Washington and other officers.[88]

Despite these encouragements to maintain a high moral character, the conduct of the army was generally less than desired during the first several years of the war. The soldiers frequently spent their days, including Sundays, gaming, drinking, cursing, and generally being unruly and rowdy. James Warren described the American army occupying Boston during April 1776 as "the most undisciplined, profligate Crew that ever were Collected." Similar descriptions of the army in Canada, in the Southern Department, on the frontier and in New York City and State were made.[89]

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[88]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:118-119; Circular to the Brigadier Generals, May 26, 1777, ibid., 8:127; George Washington to William Woodford, November 10, 1775, ibid., 4:80; Regimental Orders of Nathaniel Wade, "Orderly Book of Capt. Simeon Brown, Colonel Wade's Regiment, Rhode Island Campaign, 1778," HCEI 58, no. 3 (July 1922): 252.

[89]James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, April 15, 1776, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 17; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, May 20, 1777, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 42; Frederick R. Kirkland, [ed.], "Journal of a Physician on the Expedition Against Canada, 1776," PMHB 59, no. 4 (October 1935): 347, 352; Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 28,

The army was greatly undisciplined the first three years of the war, despite David Humphreys' view that enthusiasm for the cause of liberty substituted in the place of strict military discipline, thereby allowing the troops to perform the duties of a disciplined army.[90] The result

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1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 3 (July 1942): 74; "Journal Kept During An Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of Dayton. Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no. 2 (1847): 125; 2, no. 4 (1847): 191; 3, no. 1 (1848): 32; 3, no. 2 (1848): 92; Robert Greenlagh Albion and Leonidas Dodson, eds., Philip Vickers Fifthian: Journal, 1775-1776 Written on the Virginia-Pennsylvania Frontier and in the Army Around New York (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934), pp. 194, 207; Benjamin Trumbull's Journal, "Orderly Books and Journals Kept by Connecticut Men While Taking Part in the American Revolution 1775-1778," CHSC 7 (1899): 167; Journal of Josiah Atkins in Joseph Anderson, ed., The Town and City of Waterbury, Connecticut, From the Aboriginal Period to the Year Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-Five, 1:473, 477, 480; Daniel Barber, The History of My Own Times. Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: S. C. Vstick, 1827): 7; Minton Thrift, Memoir of the Rev. Jesse Lee. With Extracts from His Journals (New York: N. Bangs and T. Mason for the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1823), pp. 29, 33; Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown, January 8, 1776, Black, A Rhode Island Chaplain, p. 7; Same to same, January 29, 1776, ibid., p. 10; Same to same, March 1, 1776, ibid., p. 13.

[90] David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of Colonel Humphreys, p. 265; Edmund Pendleton to Charles Lee, May 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 34; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:417, 433; Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll of Carrollton to the President of the Continental Congress, May 27, 1776, Brantz Mayer, Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, During His Visit to Canada in 1776, as one of the Commissioners from Congress; with a Memoir and Notes (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1845), p. 28; John Trumbull to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1776, Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p. 221; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., August 16, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:118; Benjamin Rush to Patrick Henry, January 12, 1778, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:183; Horatio Gates to Baron von Steuben, March 25, 1778,

of having an undisciplined army was numerous military defeats, and very few victories.[91] An additional and unwelcomed result was the destruction of property and the specter of domestic anarchy. Edmund Burke told Parliament in a speech during 1790 that "An armed, disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society."[92] American Whigs during the mid 1770s shared this opinion. They did not want their revolutionary war to be lost on the battlefield, nor did they want it to become the source for domestic turmoil and tyranny.

By the end of 1777, many Whigs were therefore expressing their concern about the direction the war was taking. The Philadelphia campaign had resulted in the loss of that city; the army was foraging for itself, seemingly under no control; and though victories had been achieved in the north, still no word had come from Europe regarding a

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Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, p. 179; John Hancock to Horatio Gates, February 23, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:273; "Journal of a Campaign in America by Du Rousseau de Fayolle," in Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:72; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:32; George Washington to Charles Armand-Tuffin, September 2, 1777, ibid., 9:167; George Washington to Robert Morris, March 2, 1777, ibid., 7:222.

[91] George Washington to John Sullivan, June 16, 1777, ibid., 6:148-149; Cotton Tufts to John Adams, September 18, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:346.

[92] Cited in Michael Howard, ed., Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), pp. 11-12.

French alliance. Many Whigs, including members of the military establishment and Congress, placed a large share of the blame for the sad state of the army on Washington, believing his Fabian strategy was not working nor that he sufficiently disciplined his army.[93] Many Whigs, however, believed the lack of discipline in the army and the numerous military setbacks were not completely Washington's fault; the blame should rather be placed on the whole officer corps.[94]

The officer corps, for the most part, possessed little real military experience nor the professional background to make them good military disciplinarians. During the summer of 1775, one Connecticut officer complained that many officers, who passed for agreeable, clever men in civilian life, made indifferent figures in the military, having "no Idea of the Discipline and Government which are absolutely necessary among military Men." Another officer

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[93]Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 21, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:159-160.

[94]Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:92-93; Same to [same?], September 28, 1776, ibid., 304; John Trumbull to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1776, John Trumbull, Autobiography, Reminiscences and Letters of John Trumbull, from 1756 to 1841, p. 304; John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 3, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:6; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:431; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 13, [1775], "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 216; William Smallwood to the Maryland Council, October [ ], 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 12:363.

complained to Washington that year the officers, for the most part, "totally ignorant in military affairs."[95] Washington found this to be true during the siege of Boston, learning that his New England officers were not used to handling large bodies of men, being primarily farmers with little or no leadership experience. He learned very quickly that besides being unable to give orders, few of his officers were willing to obey them. A month after arriving at Cambridge, he wrote Lund Washington that the "Men would fight very well (if properly Officered) although they are an exceeding dirty and nasty people."[96] But the army was, as we have seen, not properly officered. During the fall of 1776, William Ellery told the Governor of Rhode Island that "the officers of the army in general are not equal to their appointments, and from hence it is that our soldiery is disorderly and undisciplined."[97] The generals also came under such criticism.[98] So did the militia officers, who

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[95]Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, September 8, 1775, "Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 236; Jacob Morris to George Washington, n.d., cited in North Callahan, Daniel Morgan: Ranger of the Revolution, p. 121.

[96]George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:433.

[97]William Ellery to Nicholas Cooke, October 5, 1776, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 89.

[98]Gouverneur Morris to the President of the New York Council, July 16, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:115-117; Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:157; Same to same, October 31, 1777, ibid., 163, 164.

Washington stated, with few exceptions, were not "worth the bread they eat."[99] The militia officers spent almost no time disciplining their men, and were, as discussed earlier, under little discipline themselves, coming and going as they pleased.[100]

Washington and other commanding officers, realizing that much depended upon the officers disciplining themselves and their men, began very early in the war to suggest and implement methods by which the officers would become more disciplined, and therefore better leaders. From the beginning of the war it was obvious to Washington and others that many company grade officers, in part because they had been selected by the men they commanded, were not strict disciplinarians, often showing great familiarity with their men, as well as giving in to their every indulgence.[101]

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[99] George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:138-139.

[100] William Duer to George Clinton, January 29, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:565; George Slaughter to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:410; Samuel Hay to William Irvine, November 14, 1777, "Replies," HM 3, no. 9 (September 1859): 284; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 27, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 219; Robert Levers to Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:523.

[101] Joseph Glover to the President of the South Carolina Council of Safety, Henry Laurens, September 22, 1775, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed., "Papers of the First Council of Safety of the Revolutionary Party in South Carolina, June-November, 1775," SCHGM 2, no. 1 (January 1901): 4; Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, June 18, 1777, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:150; Elbridge Gerry to James

Washington, most southern officers, and many New York officers, early in the war expressed their disapproval of the levelling influences existing in the army, believing they greatly accounted for the lack of discipline in the army.[102] Although attempts were made to change the officer selection process, they met with little success. Thus, it was realized that if qualified officers could not be immediately had, at least the unqualified ones could be gotten rid of as quickly as their actions warranted.

Within two weeks of his arrival at Cambridge, Washington began arresting and discharging officers for improper conduct. During the next several years numerous officers were cashiered for many offenses, primarily for conduct unbecoming a gentleman and for being absent without leave.[103] While the army was encamped at Valley Forge,

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Warren, October 6, 1777, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 86; John Adams to Joseph Hawley, August 25, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:434-435; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:92-93; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 68-69; Edward Hand to George Washington, August [ ], 1776, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 1:305; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, August 29, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:450-451; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, ibid., 508.

[102]John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:358; Graydon, Memoirs, p. 149.

[103]George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:433, General Orders, ibid., 5:343-344, 141; "Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB

Washington used the lull to cashier many officers, being told by Hamilton that without putting a stop to the numerous abuses by the officers to the military constitution, it would "be impossible to establish any order or discipline among the troops."[104] Cashiering of officers did not cease after the Valley Forge campaign, as many officers were discharged throughout the remainder of the war.[105]

Washington and the other commanding officers realized that discipline in the officer corps would only be achieved with time; time for the officers to learn their trade. To ensure this happened, Washington and his generals set about to stop officers from being constantly furloughed or from furloughing themselves. Early in the war, many good officers spent as much time at home as they did in the field. To put a stop to this, Washington, by mid war, was requiring

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34, no. 3 (1910): 347; Ford, General Orders Issued by Israel Putnam, pp. 49-50, 66-67.

[104]Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [prior to January 29, 1778], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:414; General Orders in Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, pp. 223-224, 235; Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 30, 84, 86; "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army Under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 14, no. 2 (October 1906): 186, 312; 13, no. 4 (April 1906): 348; 14, no. 1 (July 1906): 35-36, 45, 48-49; 17, no. 2 (April 1909): 179.

[105]General Orders, the First Pennsylvania Regiment Orderly Book in Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:359, 382; Regimental Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 269, 301, 630-631; [Feltman], Journal of William Feltman, p. 19; Bray, Diary of a Common Soldier, p. 169.

each regiment to have a certain number of officers present at all times, particularly during each winter encampment.[106]

Just keeping the good officers in the army was not enough. Training and attention to personal character were considered necessary for the American officer corps to be truly effective. With respect to personal character, Washington attempted to instill in the officer corps the necessity of appearing and acting as officers and gentlemen, appreciating their commissions, and realizing their leadership responsibility.

From the beginning of the war, Washington attempted to make the officers more conscious of their character and appearance. With respect to the former, besides encouraging observance of religious duties and discouraging vices, Washington encouraged the creation of and participation in, Masonic lodges, believing they were character building institutions, as well as being stabilizing and socializing forces.

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[106] General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:196-197; George Washington to Israel Putnam, November 27, 1778, ibid., 342; George Washington to William Heath, November 16, 1779, ibid., 17:113; George Washington to the Major Generals and Officers Commanding Brigades, January 22, 1780, ibid., 426; Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr. With Miscellaneous Selections from His Correspondence, 1:112; "Memoir by the Chevalier Dubuysson," cited in Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:81; Baron von Steuben to Nathanael Greene, May 15, 1781, Kapp, Steuben, p. 429; Anthony Wayne to [James] Bowdoin and Council of Massachusetts, March 25, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:388-389.

The first military lodge, St. John's Regimental Lodge, was established during July 1775 by the New York officers. By war's end, ten traveling lodges were established. Washington, who had joined the Masons in 1752, actively participated in their meetings, setting an example many officers followed.[107] As for personal appearance, Washington attempted to make the officers' appearance distinct from their soldiers, first by having them wear different colored ribbons and cockades, and later by distinctive uniforms. And to ensure they had the necessary funds for their personal upkeep, as well as to make their commissions more desirable, Washington got Congress early in the war to raise their wages significantly higher than had originally been authorized.[108]

Training was seen as an absolute necessity to bring about discipline in the officer corps. Many military and

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[107] J. Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in the Thirteen Colonies (New York: Macoy Publishing and Masonic Supply Company, 1929), pp. 202-222; Sidney Hayden, Washington and His Masonic Compeers (New York: Anderson and Company, Masonic Publishers, 1866), pp. 21, 42-45, 52, 73-74; Bernard Fay, Revolution and Freemasonry 1680-1800 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), pp. 245-250; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 181.

[108] Graydon, Memoirs, p. 147; General Orders, Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:379; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 14; Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the Revolution, pp. 117-138; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:508; Ford, JCC, 3:322; 6:853.

civilian leaders during the summer of 1776 began lobbying for a formal military academy, believing it would give the necessary training needed if the war was long lasting. That fall, Congress debated the possibility of establishing an academy, but no formal plans were made, most likely because Washington's victories at Princeton and Trenton convinced many that Great Britain would peacefully end the war, and probably because of the fear of establishing a professional military class.[109]

Although an academy was not established, a training regiment was, which Congress authorized during 1777. This regiment, the Invalid Regiment, was primarily assigned garrison duties. But until it was disbanded during the spring of 1783, it also served as an officer training school.[110] Two other units, though not formally established for that purpose, also provided effective training and produced many disciplined officers. The first was the Delaware Regiment, which was well-trained by Thomas Holland, a former British army captain, who served as its adjutant. The second was the Kentish Guards, formed during the winter

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[109] Ibid., 5:838; 6:860; Henry Knox to William Knox, September 23, 1776, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 32; John Adams to Henry Knox, June 2, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:384; Same to same, September 29, 1776, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:442.

[110] Lewis Nicola to Anthony Wayne, March 19, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:255; Ford, JCC, 5:702-705; 7:288; 8:485, 554, 585, 690.

of 1774-1775 in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, and commanded by James Mitchell Varnum. It was well-schooled in the military arts by William Johnson, a British deserter. This unit provided over thirty Continental officers, including Nathanael Greene.[111]

Although the American forces did not have a wealth of military talent to call upon when the war began, and although many qualified officers, such as Montgomery, Thomas, Mercer, Hitchcock, and Haslet, were killed or died the first years of the war, America did have a sufficient number to provide adequate leadership and discipline. Eleven of the first thirteen Continental generals appointed had prior military experience, and of seventy-three brigadier generals commissioned during the war, sixteen had held European commissions, and all but twenty-one had prior military experience.

It was not just the generals who were experienced in the field of Mars. All but two of the first Virginia regimental commanders had prior military experience, mainly gained during the Seven Years War. Many field grade officers had served in European armies, including Colonels

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[111]Christopher L. Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, pp. 7, 240; Fletcher Pratt, Eleven Generals: Studies in American Command (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949), p. 4; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, pp. 44, 49.

Lutterloh, Febiger, and Beauman.[112] Many foreign officers also joined the army, including Lafayette, DeKalb, DuCoudray, Conway, Steuben, Duportail, DeBorre, DeFermoy, Pulaski, Armand, Fleury, L'Enfant, and Kosciuszko.

It was hoped early in the war that, with time, America's citizen soldiers would become adequate military commanders, able to give the military the discipline necessary to keep it under control.[113] Washington and the other generals constantly urged attention be given to discipline, encouraging officers to spare the time necessary to make themselves better disciplinarians.[114] And many

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[112]Albert Bernhardt Faust, The German Element in the United States with Special Reference to its Political, Moral Social, and Educational Influence, 2 vols. (New York: Steuben Society of America, 1927), 1:298, 332; Henry P. Johnston, "Christian Febiger; Colonel of the Virginia Line of the Continental Army," MAH 6, no. 3 (March 1881): 188-203; Mary C. Doll Fairchild, [ed.], Memoirs of Colonel Sebastian Beauman and His Descendants; With Selections from His Correspondence (Franklin, Ohio: n.p., 1900), p. 3; Henry Augustus Muhlenberg, The Life of Major-General Peter Muhlenberg of the Revolutionary Army (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1849), p. 49; Oliver Lyman Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), pp. 2, 20; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 3.

[113]John Adams to Josiah Quincy, July 29, 1775, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:362; John Adams to Henry Knox, September 26, 1776, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:442.

[114]E.g., General Orders, Orderly Book of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio 1779-1781," p. 434.

Americans did in fact become exacting disciplinarians.[115]

Besides attempting to improve discipline in the army by improving the the quality and adequacy of the officers, Washington and Congress also adopted other measures, including the introduction of inspector-generalships and provost units, and the infliction of punishments.

During the summer of 1777, to placate the aspirations of two French officers, Congress made Colonel Mottin de la Balme Inspector General of Cavalry and Major General du Coudray Inspector General of Ordnance and Military Stores.[116] By doing this, Congress found a method of not only fulfilling commissioning obligations, but set the precedent for establishing an army-wide Inspector General system.

Thomas Conway, who came to America during the winter of 1776-1777 from France with almost thirty years military experience to his credit, gained many admirers, not only for the skill he demonstrated during the Brandywine-Germantown

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[115]Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973), pp. 25-26; George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, pp. 175-176; Stewart, William Woodford, 2:963; Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 22-23, 171; Samuel Youngs to R. V. Morris, January 25, 1814, "Aaron Burr, as a Soldier," HM 2d ser., 9, no. 6 (June 1871): 384-387.

[116]Ford, JCC, 8:539, 630.

operations, but also for the discipline his troops exhibited. Thus, when by late 1777, it appeared that Washington was having problems disciplining the army, Conway was promoted to Major General and made Inspector General of the Army.[117] Before he could actually begin functioning in that capacity, he became involved in what has been called "The Conway Cabal," and lost whatever influence he might have had in the army. Realizing he would be ineffective as Inspector General, Conway did not attempt to exercise his authority and resigned during 1778. His replacement, Steuben, was well-received in camp and by the time Conway resigned, had instilled much discipline in the army at Valley Forge.

Steuben must have made an early impression at Valley Forge when he first appeared early in 1778, wearing foreign decorations and accompanied by an Italian greyhound which he had brought with him from Europe. Washington, learning of his ability as a drill instructor, immediately put him to work as an Inspector General, and Congress accepted his services as a paid volunteer. Steuben would have preferred a line command, but realizing the increasing prejudice against foreign officers assuming leadership positions, decided to prove his worth by becoming a good drill master.[118]

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[117] Ibid., 9:1023-1026.

[118] James L. Whitehead, ed., "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen DuPonceau," PMHB, 63, no. 2 (April 1939): 201-202; Ford, JCC, 10:50; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, February 28, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel

He bagan his task by drafting one hundred twenty men from the various lines, forming them into the guard for the commander-in-chief. "I made this guard," Steuben wrote, "my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual of which I wished to introduce."[119] Assisted primarily by French volunteers, DuPonceau and Ternaut, and by Captain Benjamin Walker, and to a lesser degree by Colonels Francis Barber, John Brooks, William Davies and a field officer from each brigade, Steuben diligently worked at drilling squads of two to twelve men. For emphasis he frequently swore at the men in German and French, and when exhausted of his foreign expletives, he would call to his aides, "'My dear Walker and my dear Duponceau, come and swear for me in English, these fellows won't do what I bid them.'" "A good natured smile then went through the ranks," reported DuPonceau, "and at least the manoeuvre of the movement was properly

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John Laurens, pp. 131-132; Same to same, March 9, 1778, ibid., pp. 137-138.

[119] Cited in Kapp, Steuben, p. 126; General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, p. 35.

performed."[120] His program of drill instruction began on March 24, 1778, and by June there were reports of a noticeable difference in the drill and discipline of the whole army, particularly as after one small group of men learned their lessons they were returned to their respective units to set an example. Part of the reason he was so successful was, according to one witness, because he was "much Respected and Esteem'd" and "beloved by the soldiers who themselves seem to be convinced of the Propriety & Necessity of his Regulations."[121]

Washington, quick to recognize Steuben's value, on March 28, 1778, appointed him Inspector General and

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[120]James L. Whitehead, ed., "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen Duponceau," PMHB 63, no. 2 (April 1939): 219, 210; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, March 25, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, pp. 147-148; Alexander Scammell to John Sullivan, April 8, 1778, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 142-143; Baron von Steuben to the Board of War, May 27, 1778, Kapp, Steuben, p. 144.

[121]Philip Cortlandt to George Clinton, May 9, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:288; see also Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering, June 9, 1778, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #17); Alexander Scammell to Timothy Pickering, April 21, 1778, ibid.; Enos Hitchcock to Captain [ ] Batchelder, May 15, 1778, Edwin M. Stone, History of Beverly, Civil and Ecclesiastical. From Its Settlement in 1630 to 1842 (Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1843), p. 275; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, June 10, 1778, "Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 409; Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, May 26, 1778, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 120; Kapp, Steuben, p. 128.

Lieutenant Colonels Davies, Brooks, Barber, and John Ternant as sub-inspectors, until the pleasure of Congress was known. Additionally, he appointed brigade inspectors and Steuben's sub-inspectors, in April, were made division inspectors, along with Lieutenant Fleury. Congress, learning of the improvements in the army and attributing them to Steuben, on the fifth of May commissioned him a Major General and formally made him the Inspector General. In September, they commissioned John Ternant a Lieutenant Colonel and appointed him Inspector General of the southern army. Congress continued throughout the war to make changes in the Inspector General's department, hoping that it would give greater uniformity and discipline to the army. Once commissioned, Steuben hoped to be given a field command. He did not, however, forsake his interest in drill and discipline for, with the help of Walker, Fleury, DuPonceau, L'Enfant, John Laurens, Hamilton, and Greene, during the winter of 1778-1779 he wrote a manual of discipline for the army, which was adopted by Congress during March 1779 and used until the War of 1812.[122]

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[122]General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 44, 45, 66, 71; Ford, JCC, 11:465; 12:952; 13:196-200, 384; 18:855-861; 22:30-33; James L. Whitehead, ed., "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen Duponceau," PMHB 63, no. 2 (April 1939): 215, 218; Kapp, Steuben, p. 124; Friedrich Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779), 154 pp.

It is difficult to weigh the importance of Steuben to the army. Certainly his contemporaries believed he deserved great credit for the army's successes at Monmouth and Yorktown, but probably more importantly he was most praised for the contribution he made in attempting to give order and regularity to the army, which it lacked before his arrival.[123] But it was not Steuben alone that gave the army the discipline it acquired after the winter encampment at Valley Forge. Other methods and means were employed, such as the creation of a provost corps and the increased severity of punishments inflicted upon the soldiery.

Although men had been assigned to provost duties as early as 1775, it was not until May 1778 that Congress authorized a Provost Corps, consisting of five officers and fifty-eight soldiers, including four executioners. Its primary functions included apprehending deserters, marauders, rioters, stragglers; inspecting departed camps; and during battle, to keep troops from fleeing the scene of action.[124]

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[123]Otho Holland Williams to Baron von Steuben, November 28, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 72; Balch, Journal of Claude Blanchard, p. 175.

[124]Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments and Independent Corps, pp. 132-133; Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:165-167; Ford, JCC, 11:541; General Washington's Instructions to Bartholomew Von Herr, October 11, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:68-70.

Strict punishments were also utilized as a means by which the army was kept under control. Rules of soldierly conduct and punishment were originally adopted by Congress on June 30, 1775, and issued as sixty-nine articles of war. They were modeled on those adopted in April by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. These rules, which Washington believed not comprehensive or severe enough, were amended by Congress in November 1775, during the summer of 1776, and again during April 1777.[125]

Congress ordered the Articles of War be read and published once every two months at the head of every regiment. Washington, by early 1776, was requiring their reading to every company at least once a week. Other commanding officers also had the Articles of War read more often than was required by Congress.[126]

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[125]Ford, JCC, 2:111, 122; 3:331-334; 5:417, 442, 636, 670, 787, 788-807; 7:13, 250, 264-266; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 120-129; see also similar articles of war adopted by the colonial/state governments in Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland, held at the City of Annapolis in 1774, 1775, & 1776, pp. 66, 91-106; Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser., 3:549-555, 584-589; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, pp. 261-262; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 7:537-543.

[126]Ford, JCC, 5:806; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:206, 527; 8:152; General Greene's Orders, Henry P. Johnston, Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn, part 2, p. 142; Edward Craft's General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Regiment of Artillery Raised for the Defence of the Town of Boston in 1776," HCEI 13, no. 4 (October 1876): 240; 16, no. 1 (January 1877): 62; Regimental

Despite all the administrative, personal, ideological and moral efforts to keep the military disciplined and under control, soldiers continually demonstrated insubordination to both civilian and military authority. Therefore, corporal and capital punishments were used as a last resort to correct and punish such behavior.

Early in the war, for disobedience to orders, absences without leave, disrespect to officers, theft, and other minor offenses, punishment generally consisted of riding the wooden horse, being reprimanded, drummed out of the service, paying a minimal fine and/or receiving from ten to thirty-nine lashes.[127] The latter figure, which had been the most common punishment during the English Civil War and the maximum figure allowed by Mosaica Law, was the maximum

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Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 445; Orders of Daniel Brodhead, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 459.

[127]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:490-491, 514-515; 4:89-90, 499; 5:6, 42; Enoch Poor's Regimental Orders and Brigade Orders, Albert A. Folsom, [ed.], Orderly Book Kept by Jeremiah Fogg, Adjutant; Colonel Enoch Poor's Second New Hampshire Regiment, on Winter Hill, during the Siege of Boston, October 28, 1775, to January 12, 1776 (Exeter, New Hampshire: Reprinted from The Exeter News-Letter, 1903), pp. 8-9, 60-61; John Sullivan's Orders, ibid., p. 82; Isaac W. Hammond, ed., Diary and Orderly Book of Jonathan Burton, of Wilton, N. H., While in Service in the Army on Winter Hill: December 10, 1775-January 26, 1776 and of the same Soldier as Lieutenant Jonathan Burton, while in the Canada Expedition at Mount Independence: August 1, 1776-November 29, 1776 (Concord, New Hampshire: Republican Press Association, 1885), pp. 6, 21; Dawson, Diary of David How, p. 12, Diary of David Farnum, pp. 2, 3, MHS.

number authorized by Congress, and was perhaps the most common punishment administered during the first year of the war.[128] Most soldiers considering thirty-nine lashes more sport than punishment, Washington and the Judge Advocate suggested the number be increased to one hundred. This was done in September 1776 when Congress amended the Articles of War.[129]

Despite getting approval for administering one hundred lashes, Washington desired some form of punishment between one hundred lashes and the death penalty. Early in 1781, after the January mutinies, he recommended to Congress that he be authorized to administer such punishments as labor at public works, assignment to sea duty, and five hundred lashes. A committee of Congress recommended five hundred lashes be authorized, but Congress rejected it as too harsh a corporal punishment.[130] Nevertheless, some

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[128] C. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldier During the Civil Wars, The Commonwealth and the Protectorate being the Ford Lectures delievered in the University of Oxford 1900-1, 3rd ed., [1921], with a new intro. by P. H. Hardacre (London: Methuen and Company, 1961), pp. 286, 287; Ford, JCC, 2:122.

[129] Ibid., 5:806; Memorial of the Judge Advocate [William Tudor], [October 1775], Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1164; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:114.

[130] Same to same, February 3, 1781, ibid., 21:178-179; John Sullivan to George Washington, July 2, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:133.

officers did indeed administer more than one hundred-lash punishments, usually administering that number to an individual daily for several days.[131] Some officers did not attempt to disguise their exceeding the maximum number of lashes. Other forms of harsh corporal punishment were used, such as being lashed on the "bare buttocks" and running or walking through a gauntlet where hundreds of soldiers would use switches to inflict punishment.[132] Although harsh corporal punishments were inflicted throughout the war, mild punishments such as thirty-nine lashes, reduction in ranks, and reprimands, continued to be the rule, rather than the exception throughout the war.[133]

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[131] Maurer Maurer, "Military Justice under General Washington," MA 28, no. 1 (Spring 1964): 12.

[132] General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:368-369; "Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 35, no. 2 (1911): 165; "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-.779]," VMHB 14, no. 1 (July 1906): 42, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 273, 706; Boynton, General Orders of Geo. Washington, p. 65: General McIntosh's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 441; Court Martial at Fort McIntosh, ibid., pp. 460, 461-462, 462; Orderly Book of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio 1779-1781," pp. 437, 450; John Smith Hanna, A History of the Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, A Native of Pennsylvania, and Soldier of the Revolutionary and Last Wars. Also, Reminiscences (Baltimore: Robert Neilson, 1844), pp. 202-203, 236-238, 260; Bray, Diary of A Common Soldier, pp. 141, 183.

[133] Ibid., pp. 72-73, 242, 244; Fort Montgomery Garrison Court Martial, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:20; General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Regiment of Artillery Raised for the Defence of the Town of Boston in 1776," HCEI 13, nos. 2, 4 (April 1875, October 1876):

The offenses Congress and the army were most concerned with were desertion and plundering. The former because of the harmful effect it had on the ability of the army to field sufficient numbers to defeat the British and the latter because of the harmful effect it had with respect to the sanctity of private property.

To stop desertion, besides utilizing pickets around the perimeter of the camp and the Provost Corps in the camp, Washington and the other commanding officers had roll calls taken three or four times a day, and infrequently at night.[134] Threats of punishment were also made.[135] Congress also involved themselves in the desertion problem, making provisions for rewards for those that apprehended deserters.[136]

115-135, 237-252, passim; ibid., 14, nos. 1-3 (January, April, July 1877): 60-76, 110-128, 188-211, passim; General McIntosh's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 441.

[134]Daniel Brodhead's Orders, ibid., pp. 430, 434; Greene's Orders, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:337; Charles C. Pinckney's Regimental Orders, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed., "An Order Book of the 1st Regt., S. C. Line, Continental Establishment," SCHGM 7, no. 3 (July 1906): 135; Division Orders, "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 20, no. 3 (July 1912): 254; 21, no. 1 (January 1913): 30, 21, no. 4 (October 1913): 379; General Orders, "Elisha Williams' Diary of 1776," PMHB 48, no. 4 (1924): 338, 341; 49, no. 1 (1925): 55, 60; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:243; 12:221, 22:270; 25:343, 354.

[135]Alexander Scammell's Regimental Orders, "Orderly Book of Captain Daniel Livermore's Company, Continental Army, 1780," CNHHS, 9:236.

[136]Ford, JCC, 3:325; 7:154-155; 8:594; 9:813-814.

Nevertheless, it has been estimated that nearly 20 percent of the army deserted during the war.[137]

Because of the large number of desertions, Congress instructed Washington, as early as the latter half of 1776, to punish desertion.[138] Washington and his subordinates, wishing to set an example, began early in 1777, increasing the severity of punishment for desertion, raising the punishment to one hundred lashes, occasionally administering as many as five hundred to an individual.[139] Death penalties

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[137]Thad W. Tate, Jr., "Desertions From the American Revolutionary Army," (M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1948), pp. 9-11, cited in Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 393; see also Arthur J. Alexander, "A Footnote on Deserters from the Virginia Forces During the American Revolution," VMHB 55, no. 2 (April 1947): 137, 138; John H. Stutesman, Jr., "Colonel Armand and Washington's Cavalry," NYHSQ 45, no. 1 (January 1961): 24; Allen Bowman, The Morale of The American Revolutionary Army, p. 71.

[138]Ford, JCC, 6:933.

[139]George Washington to Joseph Spencer, April 3, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:353; General Orders, ibid., 17:344-347; 22:442-443; 23:320-322; 25:118-119, 212-213, 252-253, 424; "Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 33, no. 3 (1909): 267, 274; 33, no. 4 (1909): 459; 34, no. 1 (1910): 24; 34, no. 2 (1910): 183; General McIntosh's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 441; Court Martial at Fort McIntosh, ibid., p. 462; Court Martial at Fort Pitt, ibid., p. 415; General Orders of the Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 3 (July 1913): 168, 169; 14, no. 4 (October 1913): 220; 15, no. 2 (April 1914): 86; 15, no. 3 (July 1914): 124-125; 16, no. 1 (January 1915); 47-48; 17, no. 1 (January 1916): 29; [John Faucherand Grimke], "Journal of the Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to July 14th, 1778," ibid., 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 206, Bray, Diary of a Common Soldier, p. 181; Thomas Proctor to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 31, 1777, Hazard,

were also increasingly administered, particularly during 1779 and 1780.[140] There were at least 225 soldiers sentenced to death for desertion during the war, but approximately only forty were actually executed, for it often took a man several times to desert before his sentence was actually carried out. One soldier even deserted seven times before

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Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:207.

[140]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 17:343-347; 20:442; 23:320-322; "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 13, no. 4 (April 1906): 340-341; General Orders of the Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 2 (April 1913): 107; 17, no. 1 (January 1916): 29; 17, no. 3 (July 1916): 118; Court Martial at Fort Pitt, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 417; Brown, Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, pp. 162, 199; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 111, 211, 212; Alexander Lawrence, "Journal of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52, no. 3 (September 1968): 344; "Journal of Capt. William Beatty. 1776-1781," MHM 3, no. 2 (June 1908): 108, 112, 115, 119; R. W. G. Vail, ed., "The Western Campaign of 1779. The Diary of Quartermaster Sergeant Moses Sproule of the Third New Jersey Regiment in the Sullivan Expedition of the Revolutionary War, May 17-October 17, 1779," NYHSQ 41, no. 1 (January 1957): 48, 49; [Feltman], Journal of William Feltman, pp. 5, 40; John Bell Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," PMHB 19, no. 2 (1895): 222; Thomas R. Bard, "Journal of Lieutenant Robert Parker, of the Second Continental Artillery, 1779," ibid., 27, no. 4 (1903): 406; "The Journal of Ebenezer Wild (177601781) Who Served as Corporal, Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the American Army of the Revolution," PMHS 26 (1890-1891): 119; Diary of David Farnum, p. 22, MHS.

he was executed.[141] Plunderers and marauders were also harshly punished, as destruction of private property was considered a very serious offense.[142] General Orders were frequently issued by Washington and his subordinates threatening instant punishment for plundering, marauding, or leaving ranks during a march with the intention of doing either.[143] At least one hundred soldiers were sentenced to death for plundering and marauding during the war, of whom as many as thirty were executed.[144]

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[141]Marvin Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), p. 15n.45; William B. Lapham, ed., Elijah Fisher's Journal While in the War for Independence, and Continued Two Years after He Came to Maine 1775-1784 (August, Maine: Badger and Manley, 1880), pp. 9, 15.

[142]Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, January 12, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:344.

[143]Robert Howe's Orders, Otto Hufeland, Westchester County During the American Revolution 1775-1783, p. 154; Israel Putnam's Orders, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:271; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p.72; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:114.

[144]General Orders, Orderly Books in Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 1:632; 2:375; [Feltman], Journal of William Feltman, 1781-1782, p. 41; John Bell Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," PMHB 19, no. 2 (1895): 222; "The Journal of Captain William Beatty, of the Maryland Line, 1776-1780," HM 2d ser., 1, no. 2 (February 1867): 84; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 221.

Early in the war, capital punishment was not generally inflicted upon soldiers as a punishment, in part because of questions of the legality of doing so and because many believed that the soldiers, until properly disciplined, were not responsible for the misbehavior. So, despite many soldiers being sentenced to death during the first three years of the war, only three or four were actually executed. As Washington told Clinton early in 1777, "By making Executions too common, they lose their intended force and rather bear the Appearance of cruelty than Justice."[145] But with the increase of plundering and desertion during 1779 and 1780, when the army was suffering for lack of supplies, approximately fifty soldiers were executed. During the next two years, about twenty-five men were executed. None were during the last year of the war. In all, approximately seventy-five soldiers were executed.[146] Soldiers were frequently forced to watch the executions, in hopes it would be a good object lesson for them. They were often required to march around the dangling body, and in one instance, a deserter of the Maryland Line, after having been executed, had his head brought to the camp of

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[145]George Washington to George Clinton, May 5, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8:18-19; see also George Clinton to the President of the New York Convention, February 25, 1777, Hastings. Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:632.

[146]Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the Revolution, pp. 186-187.

the Virginia Line and placed atop of a gallows as a warning.[147] Also used as a warning were planned executions which were commuted, generally to corporal punishment, at the last possible moment.[148] The tempering of capital punishment was also implemented in the form of proclamations

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[147]General Wayne's Light Infantry Orders, "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 18, no. 4 (October 1910): 428; Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 102-103, 198-199; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, August 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:446n.5; George Washington to Nathanael Greene, August 26, 1780, ibid., 19:446; Alexander Lawrence, "Journal of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52, no. 3 (September 1968): 344; John Smith Hana, A History of the Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, A Native of Pennsylvania, and Soldier of the Revolutionary and Last Wars. Also, Reminiscences, pp. 201, 228-231; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 221, 223; Peter Ten Broeck to Mr. & Mrs. Cornelius Ten Broeck, July 9, 1779, "News from Camp: Letters Received by Cornelius Ten Broeck of Rocky Hill, New Jersey, from his Sons Cornelius and Peter Serving in the Continental Army 1779-1780," MAH 2, no. 3 (March 1878): 169; R. W. G. Vail, ed., "The Western Campaign of 1779: The Diary of Quartermaster Sergeant Moses Sproule of the Third New Jersey Regiment in the Sullivan Expedition of the Revolutionary War, May 17-October 17, 1779," NYHSQ 41, no. 1 (January 1957): 48.

[148]Ibid., 48, 49; John Smith Hanna, A History of the Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, A Native of Pennsylvania, and Soldier of the Revolutionary and Last Wars. Also, Reminiscences, pp. 228-231, 261-263; Bray, Diary of a Common Soldier, p. 172; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins, Theron Wilmer Crissey, compiler, History of Norfolk, Litchfield County Connecticut 1744-1900, p. 97; Brown, Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, pp. 162, 163; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 111, 211, 212, 221; "Journal of Capt. William Beatty, 1776-1781," MHM 3, no. 2 (June 1908): 107; "The Journal of Ebenezer Wild (1776-1781), Who Served as Corporal, Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the American Army of the Revolution," PMHS, 26 (1890-1891): 119, 120-121; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:356.

issued by Congress and Washington pardoning all soldiers awaiting punishment, and by proclamations giving deserters a set amount of time for returning to camp without having to face punishment.[149]

Despite the punishments and pardons; the improvements in discipline made through the efforts of Steuben and the inspectors; the increasing the effectiveness of the officer corps; and obtaining longer enlistments, the army remained barely controllable during 1779 and 1780, attested by numerous mutinies, destruction of property, and violation of personal rights.[150] This was especially true in the south, where Greene reported his army was "so addicted to plundering that they were a terror to the Country."[151] This situation little changed during the remainder of the war.[152] During the summer of 1782, the Governor of South Carolina reported the army was so licentious that they were "extremely

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[149]General Orders and Proclamations, ibid., 4:204; 7:364; 9:426, 496; 11:362; 14:222-223, 429-430; 18:451; 19:471-472; 23:469.

[150]George Washington to Lord Stirling, March 5, 1780, ibid., 18:73; George Washington to James Bowdoin, September 12, 1780, ibid., 20:36.

[151]Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:531.

[152]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, December 6, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:183; Nathanael Greene to Baron von Steuben, December 7, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:541; Colonel [ ] Henderson to John Rutledge, August 14, 1781, ibid., 377.

detrimental to the inhabitants who are unfortunate enough to be within their vortex."[153] Nevertheless, Greene was able to maintain a semblance of discipline by being severe in administering punishment, particularly during 1782 and 1783.[154] Discipline, which had been lax on the frontier in the Fort Pitt area, was improved beginning in the spring of 1782 when General Irvine quelled mutinous troops by numerous court martials. So effective was Irvine that by the next summer the inhabitants of Pittsburgh thanked him for maintaining his troops in such good conduct.[155] Discipline came sooner to the main army under Washington.

Although the main army occasionally mutinied and were unruly during 1779 and 1780, for the most part Washington kept them under tight rein, by increasing the severity of punishments; by keeping the army busy (such as having unnecessary earthworks constructed); and by keeping

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[153]John Mathews to Arthur Middleton, August 25, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 2 (April 1926): 70.

[154]Nathanael Greene to [Otho Holland Williams], June 6, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 66.

[155]C. W. Butterfield, An Account of the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782, pp. 42-43; Address of the Inhabitants of Pittsburg to William Irvine, September 13, 1783, ibid., p. 303.

his army away from populated areas.[156] By the summer of 1781, after the mutinies of that January had been severely quelled, discipline was rigorously enforced, as evidenced by the success by which Washington was able to march his army to and establish the siege at Yorktown.[157] Despite some lapses, discipline continued in a high state throughout 1782.[158]

Discipline in the militia increased during the latter stages of the war, due in large part to the influx

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[156]Benjamin Rush to John Adams, April 28, 1780, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 3:639; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, December 22, 1779, Morris, John Jay, p. 670; General Greene's Orders, September 26, 1780, Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 142; Earl Schenck Miers, Crossroads of Freedom: The American Revolution and the Rise of a New Nation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p.206.

[157]Robert Morris to John Jay, July 5, 1781, Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 2:45; Marquis de Lafayette to Comte de Vergennes, January 30, 1781, Charles H. Sherrill, French Memories of Eighteenth-Century America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), pp. 321-322; Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger, Rice, The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:152; Robin, New Travels Through North-America, p. 36.

[158]George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, November 13, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:336; George Washington to Elias Dayton, May 7, 1782, ibid., 24:230; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, April 28, 1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:377; Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger, Rice, The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:166; Acomb, The Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 242; Balch, Journal of Claude Blanchard, p. 175; Baron von Steuben to George Clinton, April 10, 1782, Spaulding, George Clinton, p. 137; General Orders at West Point and Newburgh, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 215, 216.

of supernumerary Continental officers taking command of militia units. Additionally, Continental officers commanded the militia, often at the insistence of the state governments.[159]

Although the military commanders attempted to and were relatively successful in maintaining discipline within their forces, believing to do otherwise would create opportunities for and the possibilities of attacks on the lives, liberties, and properties of their fellow Americans, the military, nonetheless, as will be seen in later chapters, often were threats to the very things they were charged with protecting. And as will be seen, the civilian leaders rarely tolerated such threats.

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[159] Robert Morris to John Jay, July 4, 1781, Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 2:45; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, April 28, 1782, ibid., 2:210; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 188, 247; George Plater, William Carmichael, John Henry and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Johnson, Jr., June 1, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:244; The Maryland Council to the Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, May 20, 1779, Browne, Maryland Archives, 21:405; George Washington to the Maryland Council, May 25, 1779, ibid., 419-420.

PRESERVING THE REVOLUTION

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE 1775-1783

A Dissertation Presented

By

JAMES GREGORY BRADSHER

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History

C H A P T E R VII

AN ARMY CRITICAL OF CONGRESS, THE STATE GOVERNMENTS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

With the existence of ideological controls and the extablishment of organizational controls as discussed in the first six chapters, one would assume the American military forces would remain subordinate to the civilian governments during the war. For the most part, they did, complying with the desires of the civilian governments and posing little threat to them. Nevertheless, the military were frequently critical of the civilian governments and the civilian control.

This critical attitude, as will be shown, resulted in the military interjecting themselves, both politically and militarily, in civilian affairs. It also resulted in creating a mutinous and rebellious spirit in the military. As a result, conditions were present, particularly during 1780 and 1783, for the two things the Americans feared most: anarchy and military tyranny.

Throughout the war the military, for a variety of reasons, were quite critical of Congress, its policies, procedures, and personnel. Most criticisms of Congress by

the military related to congressional decisions involving military appointments, promotions, rewards, and punishments.

Because Congress seemed inconsistent and indecisive in its command and staff appointments the first five years of the war, the military were often quite vocal in their criticism of Congress. The most notable example of Congress antagonizing the military early in the war with respect to appointments came about as a result of Congress not clearly establishing the authority of General Gates when he was appointed to command the American forces in Canada. By the time Gates arrived in the northern theater of operations, the army he was to command had retreated out of Canada and was generally considered under the jurisdiction of the Northern Department's commanding general, Philip Schuyler. Gates and his supporters assumed he was the commanding general of the Canadian-bound army, wherever it was located, and therefore, acted as such. The result was a year-long debate as to the command authority of the two generals. During that time, Congress removed and reappointed both men, trying to please the supporters of both. Compounding the problem was the fact that John Sullivan, who also served in the Northern Department, believed he had been slighted by Congress when Gates was placed in command of the Canadian-bound army instead of himself. When Congress attempted to have Washington appoint the supreme commander in the Northern Department he referred the problem back to them. He

did this for two reasons. First, he believed it was their responsibility. And second, he did not want the unselected general to be critical of him. Thus, during 1776 and 1777, the Northern Department was in turmoil, and Congress was held responsible.[1]

Congress was also criticized by the military for being inconsistent and somewhat capricious in appointing commanding officers of the staff departments. This was particularly true with respect to the medical department, where professional and personal jealousies among the surgeons caused the offended party to become quite critical of Congress. Whenever Congress made a command appointment, upheld one, or tampered with the organizational structure of the hospital and medical departments, it was inevitable that some surgeon would be offended. This was especially true early in the war, since such strong-willed medical officers as Benjamin Rush, William Shippen, Jr., John Morgan, and Samuel Stringer, were constantly at odds with the decisions

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[1]Ford, JCC, 5:488-451; 6:526; 7:180-181, 202, 216, 179-280, 336, 347; 8:364, 375-376, 391, 540, 596, 600-601, 604; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 3, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:8-9; Philip Schuyler to George Washington, July 1, 1776, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 6:1199-1200; Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1776, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:296; John Sullivan to Philip Schuyler, July 6, 1776, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:280-281; Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), pp. 107-173.

of Congress, as well as with one another.[2]

The Commissary Department also had its critics of congressional decisions respecting their command appointments and organizational changes. The first Commissary General, Joseph Trumbull, had numerous difficulties with Congress regarding his authority, as did Walter Livingston, Deputy Commissary General of Stores and Provisions for the Northern Department. As a result, both left the military very early in the war.[3] Jeremiah Wadsworth, who became the Commissary General in April 1778, was ready to resign by that summer as he had become dissatisfied with congressional policies respecting his department. The following summer he wrote Congress, "I must part with my peace of mind and good Name, or my Office!" Therefore, he requested to resign.

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[2]Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775-1783, pp. 84, 103-104n.2, 117-129, 140, 276-301; J. M. Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolution, p. 32; Harvey E. Brown, The Medical Department of the United States Army from 1775-1783 (Washington, D.C.: Surgeon General's Office, 1873), pp. 16-19, 21-23, 29-31, 34-38, 46-47; James E. Gibson, Dr. Bodo Otto and the Medical Background of the American Revolution (Springfield, Illinois; Baltimore, Maryland: Charles C. Thomas, 1937), pp. 104-114, 185-194, 203-302; Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., John Morgan: Continental Doctor, pp. 178-239.

[3]Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution, pp. 118-134; Don R. Gerlach, "Philip Schuyler and 'The Road to Glory,' A Question of Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4 (October 1965): p. 361.

Congress granted this request, allowing him to resign the first day of 1780.[4]

Nathanael Greene, who became the Quartermaster General during the Valley Forge winter, became completely disillusioned with Congress's handling of his department and, by 1779, was ready to resign.[5] When Congress attempted, early in 1780, to change the Quartermaster system, based on the suggestions of Thomas Mifflin and Timothy Pickering, two men Greene cared nothing for, and realizing this change would make his job more difficult, Greene became very adamant in expressing his disapproval, even taking his views personally to Congress.[6] Getting no satisfaction from Congress, he wrote Wadsworth that Congress "are as great a

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[4]Jeremiah Wadsworth to the President of the Continental Congress, June 5, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 128, CHS; Ford, JCC, 15:1326.

[5]Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 6, 1779, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; John Fell Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 4:292-293; Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull, December 20, 1779, ibid., 542; Robert R. Livingston to Philip Schuyler, December 20, 1779, ibid., 542; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 17, 1779, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:259-263; Same to same, January 13, 1780, ibid., 263-264.

[6]Nathanael Greene to President Joseph Reed, February 9, 1780, ibid., 264-265; Same to same, February 29, 1780, ibid., 271-273; Same to same, April 25, 1780, ibid., 281; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 28, 1780, ibid., 275; Same to same, March 31, 1780, ibid., 257-258; Same to same, April 8, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:108n.4; Nathanael Greene to Jonathan Trumbull, May 7, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:36-37.

set of [rascals] as ever got together."[7] When he received the newly adopted plan on July 26, 1780, and seeing that it provided too small a staff, lower pay, no provision for his two deputies, and obligated him for the acts of his subordinates, Greene immediately wrote Congress, asking to resign and questioning their competency.[8] Greene's letter was not well received. Congress, in fact, was so upset with it that not only did they accept his resignation as Quartermaster General, but even considered removing him from the army altogether. These actions regarding the Quartermaster system and Greene were very upsetting to Washington and others, who were already critical of the congressional system of specific supplies.[9] Greene's and Wadsworth's successors, Timothy Pickering and Ephraim Blaine, also had difficulty with the congressional decisions, and lack of decisions, respecting their departments. Blaine complained

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[7]Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11, 1780, Nathanael Greene Papers [code book provided], CHS.

[8]Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, June 19, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:288-292; Same to same, July 26, 1780, ibid., 314-316; Nathanael Greene to the Committee of Congress at Camp, July 14, 1780, ibid., 304-308; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene, July 29, 1780, ibid., 322; Ford, JCC, 17:615-635, 690-691.

[9]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:152-155; Same to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 19:403-404; George Washington to Joseph Jones, August 13, 1780, ibid., 366-369; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, July 15, 1780, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.

to Congress late in 1780 that he was at a loss as how to run his department, as Congress had set down no government for it.[10] The following spring, Pickering wrote Congress that he did not "mean to be continually hounding the ears of Congress with tales of public poverty and distress," but he needed Congress to act, "If any other man can, without money, carry on the extensive business of this department, I wish most sincerely he would take my place. I confess myself incapable of doing it."[11]

If the command appointments and departmental control caused the military to be critical of Congress, then congressional promotions caused many of them to almost hate Congress, as they believed their honor was involved. One historian of the Revolution wrote in 1822 that "Military reputation is even a more delicate commodity than female chastity. It is often acquired without merit, and as often lost without justice."[12] With respect to the promotion

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[10]Ephraim Blaine to the President of the Continental Congress, October 17, 1780 [copy], Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:301.

[11]Timothy Pickering to the President of the Continental Congress, April 21, 1781, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:289.

[12]Paul Allen, A History of the American Revolution: Comprehending all the Principal Events Both in the Field and in the Cabinet. To Which are added, the most Import Resolutions of the Continental Congress, and many of the Most Important Letters of General Washington, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Franklin Betts, 1822), 2:325.

problem during the American Revolution, he was accurate in his observation. Although most officers were not military professionals, the act of putting on uniforms had the effect of making them highly conscious of their honor and reputation, as well as grieved when someone was promoted ahead or over them. Because of the sensitivities involved in promotions, Washington was eager that Congress be regular in their promotions. Congress was not, however, consistent in their promotion policies, thereby causing Washington to frequently complain to them.[13]

Officers frequently resigned during the war because Congress had not promoted them. William Woodford left the military service in the summer of 1776 when Adam Stephen was made a general before him. The following year, John Stark resigned when Enoch Poor was made a general instead of himself. During 1779, Colonel Thomas Price resigned when Mordecai Gist was promoted before him, and Colonel Harry Livingston resigned when he was not promoted. During 1777, Generals John Armstrong, Jr., and Andrew Lewis left the army when they were not promoted, and Benedict Arnold went home

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[13]George Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army [January 29, 1778], Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:377, 380; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 7, 1778, ibid., 12:163; George Washington to James Duane, December 26, 1780, ibid., 21:15.

to sulk when he was not made a major general.[14] Not only were those that resigned unhappy with the promotions made by Congress, but so were many of their peers who believed Congress had not made the proper selection. Often this involved wide-spread criticism of Congress. Probably the most criticism was generated as a result of Congress promoting James Wilkinson and Thomas Conway late in 1777.

Conway, who had been commissioned a general in May 1777, was promoted to major general and Inspector General of the Army on December 13, 1777. Despite Washington's warning to Congress that the promotion of Conway would be highly disagreeable to the twenty-three men who were his senior, Congress went ahead when Conway threatened to resign if they did not promote him. This news was met at the main army encampment with great disgust. General Huntington reported the promotion was "an Insult to the Understanding and Sensibility of the general Officers of the Army." Early

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[14] E. Hocker, The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg, p. 96; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:721; David R. B. Nevin, Continental Sketches of Distinguished Pennsylvanians, p. 147; Stark, John Stark, pp. 42-43; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:334; Wallace, Traitorous Hero, pp. 134-135; Ethel Armes, ed., Nancy Shippen: Her Journal Book-The International Romance of a Young Lady of Fashion of Colonial Philadelphia with Letters to Her and about Her (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1935), p. 73; Otho [Holland Williams] to Elie Williams, February 24, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 11.

in January 1778, Generals Knox, Huntington, McIntosh, Paterson, Poor, Maxwell, Varnum, Scott, Weedon, and Sullivan sent a memorial to Congress criticizing them for promoting Conway.[15] About the same time as the generals learned of Conway's promotion, and began expressing their ire, the colonels of the army learned that Congress had promoted Wilkinson because he had brought them news of the victory at Saratoga. John Laurens wrote his father that Wilkinson's promotion had given "universal disgust" to the officer corps, and suggested that instead of having promoted him, Congress should have rewarded him with a good horse (as Wilkinson had dallied on his way to Philadelphia). Hoping Congress would rescind the promotion, at least thirty colonels were threatening resignation by year's end.[16] Congress was not

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[15]Nathanael Greene to President of the Continental Congress, January 12, 1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2, WLCL; Jedediah Huntington to Joseph Trumbull, January 21, 1778, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:543-544; Thomas Conway to Charles Carroll of Carrollton, November 14, 1777, Rowland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, 1:225-230; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 29, 1777, "Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 390; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, October 17, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9:387-389; Ford, JCC, 8:349; 9:1023-1026; Callahan, Henry Knox, p. 133; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, January 1, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 100.

[16]John Laurens to Henry Laurens, November 26, 1777, ibid., p. 83; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, January 3, 1778, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:543-544; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, January 12, 1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2, WLCL; John Sullivan to Henry Laurens, January 20, 1778, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:14, 14-15.

pleased with the officers questioning their promotions of Wilkinson and Conway. Nevertheless, Congress, realizing how adamant the officer corps was in opposition to the two officers and their promotions, reassigned Conway to the Northern Department and made Wilkinson Secretary to the Board of War.[17]

The military were also very upset with Congress for commissioning and promoting so many foreign officers. "Congress in the beginning," Hamilton observed, "went upon a very injudicious plan with respect to Frenchmen. To every adventurer that came, without even the shadow of credentials, they gave the rank of field officers." Hamilton believed that it would be wise to acquire the services of several qualified foreigners, even gratifying them "beyond what they can reasonably pretend to." These comments were made in the late spring of 1777. A little less than a year later, after Congress had continued to commission foreigners in large numbers, as well as to promote them ahead of deserving Americans, Hamilton complained that Congress had not been able to "summon resolution enough to withstand the impudent importunity and vain boasting of foreign pretenders," and were thus bullied "by every petty rascal, who comes armed

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[17]Abraham Clark to Lord Stirling, January 15, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:40; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge, January 30, 1778, ibid., 63-64.

with ostentatious pretensions of military merit and experience." "These things," he informed Clinton, "wound my feelings as a republican more than I can express."[18] During the summer of 1778, Washington wrote one member of Congress that he wished Congress had employed no foreigners other than Lafayette, as he considered them little more than adventurers.[19] Most American officers shared these opinions of Hamilton and Washington.[20] Most irritating to the American officers was the commissioning of Philip de Coudray by Congress during the spring of 1777. Du Coudray arrived in America from France with an agreement signed with Silas Deane promising him a Major-Generalship of the artillery

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[18]Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246, 247; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 13, 1778, ibid., 426.

[19]George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, July 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12:226-228; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, May 17, 1777, ibid., 7:75; George Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777, ibid., 9:61, 63; George Washington to Benjamin Franklin, August 17, 1777, ibid., 85-87.

[20]George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24, 1778, ibid., 12:224; William Smallwood to George Washington, December 30, 1778, "Some Revolutionary Letters," MHM 2, no. 2 (December 1907): 340; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, July 16, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 203; Protest of the General Officers of the Army to the Continental Congress, December 31, 1777, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:606-608; John Sullivan to Henry Laurens, January 25, 1779, ibid., 2:501; Arthur St. Clair to James Wilson, February 10, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:382.

and a half-pay pension for life. When news of this reached camp, many officers formally and forcefully voiced their objection to Congress complying with Deane's agreement. As we will see in the next chapter, Congress was displeased with the protest, believing the military should not interject themselves into the civil sphere of commissioning and promoting. Nevertheless, Congress was wise enough to work out a compromise whereby du Coudray was made an inspector general with command of no troops.[21]

Not only did the American officers have problems with Congress commissioning and promoting foreigners, but so did the foreign officers themselves. They often quibbled about the propriety of being subordinate to an officer to whom they would normally be the superior were they in Europe.[22]

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[21]Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246-247; Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 7, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52; Same to same, May 28, 1777, ibid., no. 3 (July 1942): 74; Nathanael Greene to ?, June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:97; James Lovell to Joseph Trumbull, [June], 6, [1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:379; Henry Knox to George Washington, June 5, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:378-380.

[22]Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, June 26, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:389; James Lovell to William Whipple, June 30, 1777, ibid., 394; Same to same, July 7, 1777, ibid., 403; James Lovell to George Washington, July 24, 1777, ibid., 417-419.

Seniority problems also plagued Congress from the beginning of the war almost till the end, as many officers believed Congress often acted improperly in assigning seniority. Seeing the list of the first nine brigadier generals selected, Artemas Ward wrote John Hancock he hoped they would "not have a tendency to create uneasiness among us." They did, however, as four of the selected, Seth Pomeroy, David Wooster, Joseph Spencer, and John Thomas, believed they had been slighted with respect to their seniority. All four threatened to resign unless their seniority was adjusted upward. Eventually Wooster and Pomeroy resigned when Congress did not act. Thomas was placated when he was made the senior brigadier general and Spencer, who went home temporarily, was coaxed back and later promoted.[23] Numerous other generals, including Arnold,

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[23]Artemas Ward to the President of the Continental Congress, June 30, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1140; Cotton Tufts to John Adams, July 3-4, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:237; Charles Lee to John Thomas, July 23, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 197-198; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 10, 1775, Fitpzatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:325-326; George Washington to John Thomas, July 23, 1775, ibid., 358-361; Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, [July], 11, 1775, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:79-81; Ford, JCC, 2:103, 191; North Callahan, Connecticut's Revolutionary War Leaders, A Publication of the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Commission of Connecticut, Connecticut Bicentennial Series 3 (Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press, 1973), pp. 25-26; Christopher Collier, Connecticut in the Continental Congress, Series 2 of the above (Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press, 1973), pp. 26-28.

Weedon, and Muhlenberg, as well as many company and field grade officers, resigned or threatened to resign as a result of Congress not giving them the seniority they expected.[24] Needless to say, such seniority disputes did not endear Congress to the offended officer.

Also not endearing Congress to offended officers involved those instances where officers believed that Congress had not properly rewarded or punished them. Washington, for example, was disturbed with Congress for not giving credit to the role played by Major Lee's partisan unit at Stony Point. Samuel Smith was similarly upset with Congress for giving Pennsylvania's Commodore Hazlewood a sword for his role in the defense of the Delaware River when Smith believed he did not deserve it, and Simeon Thayer was upset he was not given one at all, since he believed his efforts warranted one.[25] More officers were upset by the

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[24]Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, January 17, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Philip Van Cortlandt and Peter Gansevoort to the President of the Continental Congress, April 9, 1779, Judd, Correspondence of the Van Cortlandt Family, pp. 295-298; Philip Van Cortlandt to John Jay, April 14, 1779, Judd, "Memoir" and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 128; Wallace, Traitorous Hero, pp. 134-135; Paul A. W. Wallace, The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950), pp. 170-171; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:72, 722; 2:878-879, 898-916.

[25]Noel B. Gerson, Light-Horse Harry: A Biography of Washington's Great Cavalryman, General Henry Lee (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), pp. 68-69; John Armstrong, Sr., to Thomas Wharton, November 23, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:32; Ford, JCC, 9:862; John W. Jackson, The Pennsylvania Navy 1775-1781: The

way in which Congress punished or censured them. During the summer of 1777, Sullivan and several other officers were upset with Congress for having condemned Sullivan's action at Staten Island without giving him a chance to explain himself. St. Clair and Schuyler were reprimanded by Congress for their role in surrendering Fort Ticonderoga and Putnam, similarly, for abandoning Forts Montgomery and Clinton. All three generals complained so much about not getting a public hearing to explain their actions, that Congress eventually cleared them of responsibility for the military setbacks. Schuyler was also upset with Congress for being so dilatory in investigating and clearing him of charges of misusing public funds. Gates, who was removed from command of the southern army after his defeat at Camden, was upset with Congress for not urging Washington to hold a court of inquiry into his conduct and then for repealing their original resolution calling for such an inquiry, thereby not allowing him to formally clear himself.[26]

Defenses of the Delaware (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974), p. 218.

[26]Adam Stephen to John Sullivan, September 20, 1777, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:455; John Sullivan to John Hancock, September 27, 1777, ibid., 460-470; Arthur St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:446; Gouverneur Morris to Philip Schuyler, August 27, 1777, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:141-142; Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris, September 7, 1777, ibid., 143; Philip Schuyler to the President of the Continental Congress, September 8, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 2:245-247; Same to same, September 14, 1776, ibid., 263; Philip Schuyler to George Washington, September 11,

The military were also critical of Congress for the way they believed it often mistreated Washington. During the spring of 1783, Washington wrote Alexander Hamilton that he "often thought . . . that the public interest might be benefitted, if the Commander in Chief of the Army was more into the political and Pecuniary state of affairs than he is." This was an observation Washington made frequently throughout the war.[27] Not only did Congress not keep Washington adequately informed, often intentionally, but they often sent information to his subordinates without informing him. Learning of an instance of this, John Laurens wrote his father that "The conduct of Congress in giving orders to officers on detached commands, without communicating them to the General, is not only a deficiency of politeness, considered as an omission of a compliment which is due to him, but likewise a breach of military propriety."[28]

1776, ibid., 293-294; Ford, JCC, 5:841; 7:326-327, 349-350; 10:601-602; 11:803-804; 12:1186; 23:465-466; Bush, Philip Schuyler, pp. 134-138; Patterson, Horatio Gates, pp. 319, 324-325, 332.

[27]George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:277; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 21, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 22:404-405; George Washington to Edmund Randolph, August 1, 1779, ibid., 16:28; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, May 11, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:228.

[28]John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 5, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 154.

These transgressions were considered relatively slight when compared to the treatment Washington received during the winter of 1777-1778, the period of the Conway Cabal. It was during this time that many in the military believed Congress was not adequately supporting Washington, and were in fact, adopting policies which undermined his authority.[29]

The military were often critical of Congress for its handling of military policy. Throughout the war, Congress involved themselves in strategical, tactical, and other matters that the military believed came under their purview.[30] "'Inter nos,'" General Lee wrote Benjamin Rush during the fall of 1776, "all the resolves of Congress relating to Military affairs are absurd, ridiculous, and ruinous." Two weeks earlier, he had written Gates that Washington should threaten to resign unless Congress stopped interfering with military policies. About the same time, in

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[29]Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 29, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 390-391; Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, December 14, 1777, Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 215; Elbridge Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:242; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, December 30, 1777, Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:204; Same to same, February 23, 1778, Louis Gootschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 30, Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, March 17, 1778, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:35; Rossman, Thomas Mifflin, p. 132; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 135-136.

[30]Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, March 12, 1778, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:439.

a more charitable mood, Greene wrote "The Congress in the infancy of Politicks could not be brought to believe many serious truths; by attempting speculative principles rather than real life their maxims in War have been founded in folly. However, experience ripens Judgment and . . . I dont doubt the Congress in time will be as able Politicians in military matters as they are in civ[i]l Governm[e]nt."[31]

With the creation of the Board of War late in 1777, many in the military hoped that Congress would become less of a nuisance in military affairs. These hopes were quickly dashed, as it appeared that the Board of War was just as inept as Congress. Their first project, an invasion of Canada early in 1778, was described by Washington as "the child of folly."[32] Not only did the planned Canadian expedition upset Washington and most military leaders, but it caused much bickering among the generals who were to have a prominent part in its implementation. Wisely, Congress cancelled it in March, leaving several generals feeling they had been mistreated by both the Board of War and Congress.

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[31]Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 263; Charles Lee to Horatio Gates, October 14, [1776], ibid., 261-262; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene, 1:375.

[32]George Washington to Thomas Nelson, Jr., February 8, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:432-433.

Lafayette was so upset that he wrote Washington that he had been "shamefully deceived by the board of war."[33]

There were other military related activities that Congress made policy and decisions about that upset the military.[34] They were generally minor in substance, but compounded, they had the result of making Congress appear insensitive to the pride and dignity of the officer corps. One such example related to the status of the staff department officers. Most line officers were upset with Congress for giving the staff department officers, including those in the wagon masters' department, regular commissions. They believed this lowered the value of their own commissions.[35] Another example related to congressional decisions regarding prisoners of war. Sullivan wrote Washington early in 1778 that the conduct of Congress with respect to those prisoners captured earlier in the war would disgrace a

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[33]Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, March 11, 1778, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 27; Marquis de Lafayette to Henry Laurens, January [26], 1778, Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:253-6; Same to same, January 27, 1778, ibid., 258-61; Same to same, January 31, 1778, ibid., 271-272; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge, January 30, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:64.

[34]Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March, 5, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, p. 462.

[35]George Washington to the Committee of Congress at Camp, [January 29, 1778], Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:377; A LIEUTENANT COLONEL writing "THOUGHTS on the Present State of the ARMY: Addressed to the Military," The New-Jersey Gazette, December 24, 1777.

"Senate of Barbarians." Many officers shared this belief, believing Congress was very inconsistent in whom they desired to be exchanged. Congress frequently gave orders as to who would be exchanged and when, often not consulting Washington in the process. This was most upsetting to Washington when Congress involved itself in attempts to get General Lee exchanged. Lee himself, and others, were upset with Congress for attempting to include civilians in their prisoner of war exchange formula, and attempting to have Washington give preference to officers taken at Long Island and New York, rather than to those taken earlier in Canada.[36]

Especially upsetting to the military was what they considered Congress's lack of ability and will to direct a successful war effort. Many officers, particularly early in the war, believed Congress was not energetic in pursuing policies that would allow for a military victory.[37] "Are we

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[36]John Sullivan to George Washington, March 2, 1778, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:28; Ford, JCC, 6:862; Jared Sparks et al., "Report on Exchange of Prisoners during the American Revolution," PMHS 5 (1860-1862): 325-347; John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 171-173, 191-192; Max Mintz, Gouverneur Morris and the American Revolution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 97-99; William Irvine to the Pennsylvania Council, January 7, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:172.

[37]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same to same, January 4, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene, 1:178; Charles Lee to George Washington, July 1, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 103.

at war or are we not?" General Lee rhetorically asked early in 1776.[38] During the last week of June 1776, the Quartermaster General pleaded with one member of Congress, "For Gods Sake Mr[.] Gerry, give a little more velocity to Congress-you do not know the situation of your Country, or your conduct would be more Decisive."[39] A week later, Congress did give a little more velocity by declaring independence, and in September by providing for what they believed was sufficient force and means to achieve a military victory. Nevertheless, many in the military believed Congress was too timid in asserting their powers to assure adequate support of the military. This was particularly true of General Lee, who, early in the war, wrote that it was not just a few members of Congress who were timid, but "the whole Stable."[40] Complaints of congressional inertia increased as the war progressed, so that by the summer of 1780 most military leaders agreed with Joseph Reed that

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[38]Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 23, 1776, ibid., 255.

[39]Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 29, 1776, Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS.

[40]Charles Lee to Horatio Gates, October 14, [1776], "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 261; see Charles Lee to Benjamin Franklin, November 6, 1776, ibid., 266-267; Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts Council, November 22, 1776, ibid., 303; Charles Lee to George Washington, February 26, 1777, ibid., 4 (1872): 335; see also Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, September 5, 1776, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 30.

every measure by Congress for the general good "has been timid, feeble, and languid."[41] This complaint continued the next year, but became less frequently voiced after it appeared that Congress was making itself more efficient in directing the war effort and more effective in supporting the army.[42]

Besides the inertia, also upsetting to the military was the fact that Congress relied on expedients.[43] "We have lived upon expedients," Washington complained during the fall of 1780, "till we can no longer, and it may truly be

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[41]Joseph Reed to George Washington, June 5, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:211; see also Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:273; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 13, 1778, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:425; Arthur St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:446; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, March 9, 1778, Simms, Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 137; Alexander Scammell to John Sullivan, April 8, 1778, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 143; Anthony Wayne to William Irvine, March 10, 1780, "Letters of General Wayne to General Irvine, 1778-1784," ibid., 6, no. 10 (October 1862): 323.

[42]Same to same, March 25, 1781, ibid., no. 11 (November 1862): 339; Horatio Gates to Thomas Johnson, February 26, 1781, Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, p. 254; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 9, 1781, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

[43]Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, March 11, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); George Washington to William Greene, October 18, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:250; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:407.

said that, the history of this War is a history of false hopes, and temporary devices."[44] Similarly, St. Clair complained that Congress was continually "patching rather than adopting some uniform system in regards to the military."[45] Relying on short enlistments and attempting to meet the material needs of the army through a system of specific supplies were just two expedients that upset the military.

The military viewed the problems of congressional inertia and reliance on expedients as a result of the way Congress was organized and functioned. To a large extent the military believed Congress was not capable of being effective because it had almost no executive control of affairs, and what little executive control existed, was in committees and boards, whose membership were constantly fluctuating as was that of Congress itself. "If Congress suppose, that Boards composed of their own body, and always fluctuating, are competent to the great business of War (which requires not only close application, but a constant and uniform train of thinking and acting)," Washington

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[44]George Washington to George Mason, October 22, 1780, ibid., 20:242; see also George Washington to John Cadwalader, October 5, 1780, ibid., 122; George Washington to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 110.

[45]Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, April 8, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:168.

informed James Duane late in 1780, "they will most assuredly deceive themselves."[46] Congress also upset the military by attempting to handle too many matters, including minor decisions, as a committee of the whole, thereby rendering it a less efficient body.[47] "By their grasping to do every thing themselves," complained one general, "very little is done."[48] Adding to the opinion of the military that Congress operated inefficiently and was not competent to the exigencies of the war was the belief that the members of Congress spent too much time in idle debate or were too involved in personal and political disputes.[49] But it was

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[46]George Washington to James Duane, December 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:14.

[47]Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS.

[48]Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:298.

[49]Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, February 5, 1779, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS; Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:298; George Washington to Joseph Reed, November 27, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:348; George Washington to George Mason, March 27, 1779, ibid., 14:301; George Washington to John Armstrong, May 18, 1779, ibid., 15:99; George Weedon to Nathanael Greene, September 29, 1779, Stewart, William Woodford, 2:1087; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, December 30, 1777, Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:204; Marquis de Lafayette to Henry Laurens, [ca. January 5, 1778], ibid., 213-215; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, June 1, 1778, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:182; Nathanael Greene to Alexander McDougall, April 15, 1780, Douglas Southall

with respect to their political foundation that the military were the most seriously critical of Congress.

"The fundamental defect," of America's war effort, Hamilton observed during the summer of 1780, "is a want of power in Congress."[50] Probably the greatest complaint about Congress was that it lacked any real power, that it could really only recommend, and that under the Articles of Confederation one state could counteract the will of the rest of the states.[51] During the first winter of the war, Rhode Island's governor expressed a desire for "a supreme, superintending power, to exert and direct the force of the whole, for the safety and defence of all."[52] Washington certainly shared this opinion, as he believed there should

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Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:150; Nathanael Greene to John Sullivan, December 3, 1779, Hammond, Life and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:171; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:116.

[50]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.

[51]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 100; Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21, 1783, Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 161; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., June 7, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 495; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.

[52]Nicholas Cooke to Charles Lee, January 21, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:448-449; see also Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, January 21, 1776, ibid., 450.

be one supreme director of the country's wartime affairs. He did not want to become that supreme director, but wished that it would be Congress. He informed Congress during the spring of 1780 that he hoped "a plan could be adopted by which every thing relating to the Army could be conducted on a general principle under the direction of Congress." "This alone," he maintained, "can give harmony and consistency to our military establishment, and I am persuaded will be infinitely conducive to Public economy."[53] The fact that a few members of Congress, or one state, could take away from the power of Congress to direct the war effort was most upsetting to the military. "The confederation gives the states individually too much influence in the affairs of the army," Hamilton complained during the summer of 1780. He wished the states had no voice in Continental military matters. "The entire formation and disposal of our military forces," he told James Duane, "ought to belong to Congress."[54] "I cannot well form an Idea of national polity," Greene complained the following year, "where the Constituent parts

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[53]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:210; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, August 8, 1781, ibid., 22:481.

[54]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.

claim absolute and independent sovereignty."[55] Washington told James Duane late in 1780 that it would be madness to continue the war if "individual states conceive themselves at liberty to reject, or alter any act of Congress" and early the next year he told William Fitzhugh that "unless the powers of Congress are made competent to all the purposes of War we are doing no more than wasting our time, and spending our treasury to very little purpose."[56] Washington, like his fellow officers, could not believe Congress operated under a system that allowed the states to comply or not comply with requisitions made by Congress upon them.[57]

Just as maddening to Washington and the military was the fact that Congress frequently relinquished to the states what little power they had, especially with respect

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[55]Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, November 21, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 3:229; see also ibid., 228; see also Charles Lee to George Washington, January 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 259.

[56]George Washington to James Duane, December 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:14; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25, 1781, ibid., 20:375; see also George Washington to John Armstrong, March 26, 1781, ibid., 379; George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780, ibid., 18:453.

[57]Same to same, May 31, 1780, ibid., 18:453; George Washington to Fielding Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid., 19:131-132; George Washington to John Parke Custis, February 28, 1781, ibid., 21:320; George Washington to John Armstrong, March 26, 1781, ibid., 379.

to military affairs.[58] By doing so, Washington and others frequently complained they were forced to look to thirteen states for support, instead of to just one body--Congress; and, instead of having one unified Continental Army, they had thirteen separate armies.[59] And by doing so, one consequence Hamilton observed, was that "some of the lines of the army would obey their states in opposition to Congress notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army[.]"[60] There were other consequences because of Congress giving up their powers, but there were even more problems as a result of the not always clear line of authority between Congress and the respective states.

Although most Continental officers came to view Congress as the supreme civilian authority, this view was not shared by the majority of their countrymen. In fact, most Americans believed their state governments were the supreme civilian authority; after all, they were fighting a

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[58]Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, August 18, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 2:70.

[59]George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:453; George Washington to Fielding Lewis, May [-July 6], 1780, ibid., 19:131; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid., 413; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, August 18, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:372.

[60]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.

war to defend the life, liberty, and property of their fellow citizens, their neighbors, not to establish and/or support a national government, of a unified country. Thus, throughout the war, Continental officers often found themselves caught between the authority of Congress and the state governments. The resulting friction caused the military to become more critical of the ability of Congress to control and direct the war effort, and more upset with the narrow, and often selfish, interests and attitudes of the state governments.[61]

Two problems that arose out of the Continental-state relationship that were particularly upsetting to the military involved their relations with state officials with respect to military policy and command, and to a lesser degree, their vulnerability to state authorities with respect to civil matters. With respect to the latter, Continental officers often found themselves confronting state authorities over judicial matters, generally as a result of civil suits brought against them. These civil suits were generally the result of legal impressing done by the military or attempts to hold the military responsible for the Continental public debt. Quartermaster and commissary officials, such as Greene, Blaine, and Pickering complained constantly

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[61]Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan McIntosh, August 14, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 1:13, 14-15, BPL.

that they and their subordinates were being sued for public debts, being taxed, and in Pickering's instance being arrested.[62] Pickering also was harrassed by state authorities at Yorktown when they would not allow him to receive official mail at their post office unless he paid the postage.[63] The military and state officials also disputed and then debated their respective authority in other matters, such as to when Continental enlistments were completed, who was responsible for transacting prisoner exchanges, letting people travel to New York City, authorizing private warfare,

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[62]Ephraim Blaine to the President of the Continental Congress, July 20, 1782, Ephraim Blaine Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #2); Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 12 [-19], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Donald Whisenhunt, [ed.], Delegate from New Jersey: The Journal of John Fell, pp. 107-108; Timothy Pickering to George Washington, January 18, 1783, Saprks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:544; Timothy Pickering to Udny Hay, July 26, 1781, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:317-319; Timothy Pickering to the President of the Continental Congress, August 12, 1781, ibid., 332; Timothy Pickering to George Clinton, August 26, 1781, ibid., 335-339; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 12, 1779, Charles Caldwell, Memoirs of the Life and Campaigns of the Hon. Nathanael Greene, Major General in the Army of the United States, and Commander of the Southern Department, in the War of the Revolution (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver and Thomas Desilver, 1819), p. 430; Nathanael Greene to John Jay, June 24, 1779, Morris, John Jay, pp. 607-608.

[63]Timothy Pickering to the President of the Continental Congress, October 11, 1781, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:306-307.

and who should pay troops raised by special levies.[64]

The most serious conflict between the Continental officers and the state governments took place when they disagreed about their respective areas of authority. Such disagreements were frequent, especially in the south, where some civilian leaders maintained that once Continental troops entered their state they should be totally subordinate to the control and direction of the state government.[65] The first major disagreement took place in South Carolina during the summer of 1776 as General Lee and the state government issued conflicting orders and disagreed about who was responsible for directing the state's defensive efforts. South Carolina experienced similar problems throughout the war, particularly during the 1779 and 1780 sieges of Charleston,

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[64]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:243-244; George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, January 20, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:120; George Washington to William Livingston, February 19, 1780, ibid., 18:28-31; George Washington to John Cleves Symmes, February 22, 1780, ibid., 43-44; George Washington to the New York Legislature, August 11, 1776, ibid., 5:413-414; Allen D. Chandler, ed., "Minutes of the Executive Council, May 7 through October 14, 1777," GHQ 34, no. 1 (March 1950): 35; George Clinton to the New York Convention, March 23, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:676, 677; Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, May 15, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 242-243.

[65]Thomas Burke to the North Carolina General Assembly, December [ ], 1777, Clark, NCSR, 11:701-703; William Henry Drayton's speech before the South Carolina General Assembly, January 20, 1778, Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, p. 112.

as Lincoln and Moultrie frequently quarreled with the state leaders as how best to defend the city, and whether or not to surrender.[66]

Continental officers also experienced similar difficulties with Georgia's civilian leaders, particularly Governors Gwinnett and Houston. During the spring of 1777, Gwinnett organized an expedition to Florida consisting of two regiments of Continentals under Lachlan McIntosh and a large body of Georgia militia. Once underway, McIntosh refused to subordinate himself to the governor, who had taken to the field to lead the expedition. Learning of this difficulty, the Council of Safety requested Gwinnett and McIntosh return to Savannah to discuss the command problem. Colonel Samuel Elbert, who then assumed command of the expedition, had problems as well, as he received orders from both McIntosh and the civilian authorities.

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[66]Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 123; Same to same, July 22, 1776, ibid., 156; Same to same, July 23, 1776, ibid., 157-160; Same to same, July 24, 1776, ibid., 163; Same to same, July 27, 1776, ibid., 173-174; Same to same, August 3, 1776, ibid., 199; Charles Lee to Patrick Henry, July 29, 1776, ibid., 179; Charles Lee to the Continental Board of War and Ordnance, August 7, 1776, ibid., 203, 204; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:424-426, 428-429, 434; 2:79-80; William Moultrie to John Rutledge, April 6, 1779, ibid., 1:368-369; William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, April 16, 1779, ibid., 370-371; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 360-361, 375, 466, 472-476, 478, 485, 512; Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, pp. 219, 260-261; Marvin R. Zahnizer, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Founding Father, p. 63.

Because of the confusion of authority, the expedition was abandoned, and eventually recriminations resulted in McIntosh killing Gwinnett in a duel.[67]

Similar problems arose during the summer of 1778, as General Howe and Governor Houston debated command authority while leading an expedition against Florida. Because of their dispute and subsequent bickering, the expedition failed. The command problem between Howe and Houston continued during the winter of 1778-1779 when Savannah and Augusta were surrendered.[68]

During the summer of 1780, Congress attempted to rectify the problem of state chief executives in the field demanding control of Continental troops, by adopting a resolution that provided that when a chief executive acted in conjunction with Continentals they would be considered

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[67]Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 144-145; Lyman Hall to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1776, ibid., pp. 228-229; Charles C. Jones, Jr., "The Life and Service of the Honorable Major Gen. Samuel Elbert of Georgia," MH extra no. 13 (1887): 12; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution, pp. 23-25.

[68]Ibid., pp. 31-34; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:230-231; Minutes of a Council of War, ibid., 236; William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, July 26, 1778, ibid., 239; Thomas Pinckney to [Harriott Horry], July 11, 1778, Jack L. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas Pinckney, 1775-1780," SCHM 58, no. 3 (July 1957): 159; John Fauchereau Grimke, "Journal of the Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to July 14th, 1778," SCHGM 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 196, 200-206; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 190-191; Ford, JCC, 11:55.

Continental major generals.[69] What Congress was not able to resolve clearly was the problem of state chief executives and state legislatures not allowing their state troops and militia to be subject to the control and direction of the Continental officers when the need arose.

Samuel Adams, at the beginning of the war, was very adamant about not wanting the militia placed under the direction of Continental generals, at least not until such time as a truly Continental government was established. He wrote Elbridge Gerry that "it is always dangerous to the liberties of the people to have an army stationed among them, over which they have no control." "There is," he added, "at present a necessity for it; the continental army is kept up within our colony, most evidently for our immediate security. But it should be remembered that history affords abundant instances of established armies making themselves the masters of those countries, which they were designed to protect. There may be no danger of this at present, but it should be a caution not to trust the whole military strength of a colony in the hands of commanders independent of its established legislative." Gerry agreed in part with his mentor, believing, however, they must be practical about letting the militia serve under Continental officers. He believed this could be safely done only if the military

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[69] Ibid., 17:777.

establishment was kept entirely subordinate to the civil authorities in every part of the continent.[70]

Although there were many instances of the militia and state troops being ordered by the state governments to cooperate with and subordinate themselves to Continental officers, there were just as many examples of a lack of cooperation, and confusion when they served together. There were even problems regarding the question whether some troops were raised as Continental or as state troops, as was the case in New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.[71] An additional problem was David Wooster (a Continental brigadier general and a Connecticut militia major general), who, during 1775 and 1776 used the confusion resulting from his dual commissions to subordinate himself to civilian and Continental authorities as it suited his own desires.[72] The real problem with respect to Continental control of militia

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[70]Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:120, 119-120; Elbridge Gerry to Samuel Adams, October 9, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:994; Same to same, December 13, 1775, Gerry-Knight Papers 1713-1825, MHS.

[71]Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety and the American Revolution, p. 70; Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety, and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 1:422; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, pp. 126, 130-133; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox, p. 23.

[72]Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution, pp. 49-56; Bush, Philip Schuyler, p. 59.

and state troops related to large extent to the degree to which these troops would be subject to the Continental Articles of War.

During the first two years of the war, Congress attempted to establish the fact that when the militia served in conjunction with Continental soldiers they would be subject to the Continental Articles of War.[73] Some states readily accepted this policy, but most did not.[74] One southern leader, Thomas Burke, totally opposed allowing any state or militia troops to be subject to Continental Articles of War, believing citizen soldiers should be subject to civilian authority, not to military court martials.[75] During the summer of 1776, South Carolina's chief executive would not allow his state's militia serving with General Lee to be subject to Continental Articles of War. This so upset Lee that he wished that Congress would not suffer the militia to exist, unless they were brought under some uniform system that allowed for Continental control.[76] That

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[73]Ford, JCC, 3:352; 5:805.

[74]Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, pp. 261-262.

[75]Thomas Burke's Abstracts of Debates, Burnett, LMCC, 2:277; Thomas Burke's Remarks concerning the Confederation [November 15, 1777], ibid., 557.

[76]Charles Lee to John Rutledge, August 6, 1776, (three letters of that same date), "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 200, 200, 200-202; Same to same, July 22, 1776, ibid., 156; Charles Lee to Richard Peters, August 2, 1776, ibid., 190; Hemphill, Journals of the General Assembly and House of Representatives, 1776-1780, p. 215.

summer, Washington complained to Congress about the militia not following the Articles of War, and expressed his opinion the militia would be the ruin of their cause.[77] The problem resurfaced in South Carolina again in 1779, as Lincoln constantly lobbied to have the militia subject to the Continental Articles of War. He was unsuccessful in his attempt, as the legislature ruled that under no circumstances would they allow their militia to be subject to Continental Articles of war. This policy was even endorsed by numerous South Carolina Continental officers, including General Moultrie.[78] Continental officers had difficulty in other southern states, as well, as it was difficult to convince the state leaders that the militia would be more useful if

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[77]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:111, 112.

[78]Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Andrew Williamson, August 28, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook #33, 1:31, BPL: Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:345; Benjamin Lincoln to Francis Marion, November 25, 1779, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 3:3; William Moultrie to Francis Marion, November 13, 1779, ibid., 2-3; William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 26, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:271-274; Same to same, January 29, 1779, ibid., 286; Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, February 14, 1779, ibid., 314; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 342-343; David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina, 2:186.

they were more disciplined and subject to Continental court martials.[79]

Just as problems resulted from the militia and state troops not being subject to Continental Articles of War, so did problems result as a lack of clear understanding regarding command authority when Continental and state forces served together. During the first year of the war, Congress established a precedence of rank for Continental, state, and militia soldiers when they acted in conjunction with each other. Although precedence was established for officers of equal rank, Congress did not clearly establish the precedence among the officers of different grades of the various categories of soldiers. Some states did, thereby causing confusion and disputes.[80] But beyond the question of precedence of rank, was the more basic question of who would indeed command when Continental and state forces acted in conjunction. This question was raised many times during the war, and generally not resolved to everyone's satisfaction, particularly not to that of the Continental officers.

Almost from the first days of the war, there existed a problem for the Continental officers with respect to their authority to command state troops and militia. During the

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[79]Georeg Weedon to Baron von Steuben, April 1, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:276n.1.

[80]Ford, JCC, 3:326; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, p. 142; Clark, NCSR, 10:199; 16:vi-vii; 24:2.

summer of 1777, when General Schuyler ordered a Vermont regiment of rangers to Saratoga, the Vermont Council of Safety instructed them to remain in Vermont to guard their own frontier. Also that summer, the Schoharie and Schenectady Committees of Safety often countermanded the orders Continental Colonel Goose Van Schaick gave their militia. New Hampshire state troops under General Stark refused to be subject to the command of Continental generals during the summer and fall of 1777, and the New Hampshire lesgilature would not force them.[81]

About the same time, Commodore Hazelwood of Pennsylvania's navy, who commanded a small flotilla on the Delaware River, refused to cooperate with or subordinate his forces to Samuel Smith, who commanded Fort Mifflin, the main fort the British had to take in order to capture Philadelphia. Hazelwood ignored pleas from both Greene and Washington, believing he was a better judge of the best defenses necessary to protect the forts on the Delaware.[82]

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[81]Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, pp. 37-38; Goose Van Schaick to Philip Schuyler, August 4, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:169; Benjamin Lincoln to Philip Schuyler, August 8, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:456-457n.2.

[82]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, November 17, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:73-76; George Washington to Isaiah Washington, October 25, 1777, ibid., 9:427-428; John Hazelwood to George Washington, October 26, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:18-21; The Pennsylvania State Navy Board to Thomas Wharton, October 30,

During the spring of 1779, Colonel Brodhead began what was to be an ongoing debate with the county lieutenant of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, on the question of how best to utilize the county's rangers.[83] Most debates between the Continental officers and the state civil and militia leaders with respect to command authority took place in the south, particularly after 1780.[84]

Problems in the south began during the summer of 1776 in South Carolina, when that state's chief executive and General Lee frequently debated whether Lee would be allowed to command the state's militia which fought with his Continentals.[85] Lincoln expended much energy arguing

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1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:723; James Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, November 19, 1777, John F. Reed, Campaign to Valley Forge July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), p. 325; Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown, November 11, 1777, Black, A Rhode Island Chaplain, p. 64; Same to same, November 23, 1777, ibid., p. 68; John W. Jackson, The Pennsylvania Navy 1775-1781: The Defense of the Delaware, p. 143; Wallace, William Bradford, pp. 428-440.

[83]Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, June 5, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:466-467; Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania During the Revolution, pp. 109-110.

[84]Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox, pp. 105-106.

[85]Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 123; Same to same, July 20, 1776, ibid., 150; Same to same, July 22, 1776, ibid., 156; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:280; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 140-141.

with the South Carolina civilian authorities over the same question during 1779, as did General Howe the previous year with South Carolina's and Georgia's leaders with respect to commanding their militia, who served with his Continentals.[86] During 1781, Greene constantly had problems in the south regarding what control he had over the disorganized state lines, state troops, militia, and partisan units. Greene spent much of 1781 debating with South Carolina's military leaders the necessity of them cooperating with him, rather than carrying on a partisan war. He also spent a considerable amount of time attempting to get the southern state governments to allow him to use their troops as he desired. In the instance of South Carolina he was not that successful, as the government itself was barely functioning.[87]

A major reason the Continental officers were unable to have state forces cooperate with them was because the governments of the states frequently put their own safety ahead of that of their neighbors or the country as a whole.

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[86]Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #3), Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, February 19, 1779, ibid., John Fauchereau Grimke, "Journals of the Campaign to the Southward, May 9th to July 14th, 1778," SCHGM 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 194-195, 202-203.

[87]Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, pp. 120-212; Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter, p. 155; Nathanael Greene to William Henderson, August 14, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:380; M. F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene, 1780-1781, p. 77.

Years after the war, James Robertson was quoted as saying "Whether we were Virginians or Carolinians we asked and cared not; for we were all for the general Congress and for Washington."[88] Robertson's memory must have failed him, for this was not the case, either at the end, and certainly not at the beginning of the war. Fifteen years before the war, an English traveller expressed his doubts of the colonies ever uniting in a common cause, for like "fire and water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies in North America." DeKalb, after visiting the colonies in 1768, reported it would be difficult for the colonies to unite, although he believed it would happen eventually.[89] The reasons for these beliefs was the fact that, despite some commonly held beliefs, values, forms of government, as well as language and religion, the colonies envisioned themselves as separate nations, within the British empire. If any unification was to take place, the states generally looked no further than to their section.[90] Thus, because

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[88]James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke), The Rear Guard of the Revolution (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1889), p. 143.

[89]Andrew Burnaby, Travels Through the Middle Settlement in North-America in the Years 1759 and 1760. With Observations Upon the State of the Colonies, 2d ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 113; John DeKalb to Duc de Choiseul, February 25, 1768, Kapp, Kalb, p. 63.

[90]John Adams to Joseph Hawley, November 25, 1775, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:366-367; Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 56.

each state considered itself a sovereign body, with its own interests and destiny, it was not surprising then, that state governments would look to their own safety than that of the colonies as a whole.

Very early in the war the military came to realize the need for united action by all the colonies, and began urging the colonial governments to put aside their self-interest and sectional concerns.[91] Washington certainly believed that only united action would allow for a military victory. Responding to Rhode Island establishing its own military forces for defensive purposes, Washington told Governor Cooke that "If each state was to prepare for its own defence, independent of the others, they would all be conquered in a short time, one by one."[92] Greene was perhaps the most outspoken about the necessity for doing

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[91]Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, March 11, 1778 [draft], Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #2); Samuel H. Parsons to [?], February 10, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 89; John Sullivan to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, August 5, 1775, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:73.

[92]George Washington to Nicholas Cooke, January 20, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:114; see also George Washington to Joseph Reed, April 15, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:483; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, ibid., 6:405.

away with colonial and sectional distinctions.[93] "For my own part," he wrote from the siege of Boston during the fall of 1775, "I feel the cause and not the place. I would as soon go to Virginia as stay here." Two months later, he wrote, "The Interest of one Colony is no way incompattible with that of another. We have all one common interest and one common wish; to be free from parliamentary Jurisdiction and Taxation."[94]

Late in 1777, Greene expressed the opinion that "it cannot be expected from the local prejudices of mankind that the several legislative bodies will be willing to strip themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their own internal safety unless they are well persuaded the measure is essential to their own happiness and security."[95] At times the states were persuaded of the necessity of cooperating with one another, and there were many instances of cooperation among and between the states as desired and requested by the

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[93]Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, July 22, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:260; Same to same, September 23, 1775, RIHSC, 6 (1867): 126; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, June 27, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:556.

[94]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 16, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid.

[95]Opinion of Nathanael Greene [December 1, 1777], Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, p. 221.

military. But there were just as many instances of a lack of cooperation, and in fact, some states took actions which harmed their neighbors and the military. These actions included prohibitions on recruiting by officers of other states; establishment of embargoes on food stuffs, and refusals to supply weapons to soldiers of another state, except under great pressure, and not at all in one instance.[96]

The states, concerned about self-preservation, sacrificed the good of the whole by undertaking various offensive operations; raising their own infantry, horse, and artillery units for self-defense; and by relying on the militia, at the expense of endorsing Continental enlistments.[97] These actions were upsetting to the Continental officers. With respect to the states relying on their militia and short Continental enlistments, Washington

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[96]Henry J. Yeager, "The French Fleet at Newport, 1780-1781," [memoirs of the Chevalier de Lillebresme], RIH 30, no. 3 (August 1971): 90; McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Virginia, 1:122, 271, 332; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:223, 2:54; Hemphill, Journals of the General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780, pp. 166, 168; Clark, NCSR, 10:795-796, 880; 11:357; Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, January 23, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:15; Same to same, March 16, 1777, ibid., 33-34; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 188-189, 380.

[97]Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, pp. 80-81; Foster, James Jackson, pp. 16-17; Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments and Independent Corps, pp. 116-120.

complained during 1780 that this was "a reflection on the judgment of a nation so enlightened as we are, as well as a strong proof of the empire of prejudice over reason."[98]

State self-interest led the states to be very chary about allowing their troops to be taken from their state to assist another when their own state was threatened. Such instances usually upset the Continental officers, as was the case when Virginia prevented troops from leaving the state in 1781 to assist Greene and when South Carolina prevented troops in 1776 from going to Georgia to assist that state.[99]

Compounding the problems of the military with respect to the state-Continental relationship was the sectional concerns of the states. The consequences of these concerns were that the New England states were loathe to allow their soldiers to serve under General Schuyler; and were even loathe to have their troops commanded by officers

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[98]George Washington to William Greene, October 18, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:250.

[99]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, June 27, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:555-556; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, November 21, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 3:229; Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 22, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 156; Same to same, July 23, 1776, ibid., 157-160; Same to same, July 24, 1776, ibid., 163.

of any colony other than their own.[100] Additionally, many southerners feared early in the war that once the British were driven from New England, the army, composed chiefly of New Englanders, would unleash themselves upon them. It took the election of Washington as commander-in-chief and assurances by the northern civilian and military leaders to dispel such fears.[101]

Besides state and sectional concerns causing the military hardships and hard feelings towards the states and sections, the military also developed a disliking for those states which engaged in disputes over territory, especially when such disputes had the effect of undermining Continental efforts. Duty in and around Fort Pitt brought much grief

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[100]Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris, September 7, 1777, Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p. 569; Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, July 27, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:92; John Jay to Philip Schuyler, September 12, 1777, Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:306; George Washington to Joseph Reed, November 8, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:77; John Adams to John Winthrop, October 2, 1775, MHSC, 5th ser., 4:295.

[101]John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:216; Butterfield, DAJA, 3:321; John Adams to James Warren, July 6, 1775, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 72 (1917): 76; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., October 16, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid.; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, June 17, 1775, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL; Samuel Ward to Henry Ward, November 2, 1775, Knollenberg, Correspondence of Governor Samuel Ward, p. 116; Same to same, December 27, 1775, ibid., p. 150.

to the Continental officers stationed there, for the area was contested for by both Pennsylvania and Virginia. The military were constantly complaining about the problem of the Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute, as not only did they have to expend energies to keep the citizens from both states from making war upon one another, but found that their ability to mount offensive operations were hampered as a result. General Hand, in 1777, blamed his inability to mount an attack on the west on the lack of cooperation between the Pennsylvania and Virginia governments and settlers. Hand's successor, Lachlan McIntosh, also had difficulty mounting an offensive operation in 1778, and he became so discouraged that the following year he asked to be relieved from command. McIntosh's successor, Daniel Brodhead, a Pennsylvanian, was cautioned by Washington to avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute between the two states; nevertheless he found himself constantly at odds with the governments, settlers, and soldiers of both states. He especially had trouble with Virginian, George Rogers Clark, believing his energies were only being expended to grab more land for Virginia. Brodhead's successor, William Irvine, throughout 1781 and 1782 expressed his displeasure about being unable to mount an offense in the west because of the difficulties still existing between Pennsylvania and

Virginia, and because of difficulties surrounding those that wanted to create a new state.[102]

The military were also upset about having to become involved in the difficulties between Connecticut and Pennsylvania relating to control of the Wyoming Valley. Congress placed Continental soldiers there not only to protect the settlers from the enemy, but from each other. Their instructions were not to get involved in the territorial dispute, but they could not help but become involved.[103] Needless to say, the military did not like

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[102]Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania During the Revolution, pp. 74, 125-126, 129; Lachlan McIntosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," pp. 189-190; Daniel Brodhead to George Washington, January 16, 1779, ibid., p. 200; John Dodge to the President of the Continental Congress, January 25, 1779, ibid., pp. 206-210; William Croghan to William Davies, August 18, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2:346; William Irvine to George Washington, December 2, 1781, Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 80; Same to same, April 20, 1782, ibid., p. 108; William Irvine to William Moore, December 3, 1781, ibid., appendix G, p. 232; Same to same, July 5, 1782, ibid., appendix G, pp. 247-248; William Irvine to Benjamin Harrison, April 20, 1782, ibid., appendix H, p. 267; James Marshall to Joseph Reed, June 5, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 9:193; Same to same, June 27, 1781, ibid., 233-234; Same to same, August 8, 1781, ibid., 343-345; Thomas Scott to Joseph Reed, October 19, 1781, ibid., 438; Ephraim Douglass to [?], August 29, 1781, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 4, no. 2 (1880): 247; Herbert Laub, "The Problem of Armed Invasion of the Northwest During the American Revolution," VMHB 42, no. 2 (April 1934): 142.

[103]George Washington to Zebulon Butler, December 29, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:32; Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, January 10, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 326-327.

having to expend their energies on domestic problems, relating to the Continental-state and state-state conflicts. Neither did they like the way the states frequently operated, particularly when it adversely affected their own operations.

Just as the military were critical of Congress for the way it functioned, so did they frequently express a similar displeasure with the state governments. Two years into the war, John Adams wrote that "every new government is as feeble as water, and as brittle as glass," and a year later, John Jay observed "The wheels of Gov[ernment] like those of a new Carriage do not yet go easy."[104] The military certainly believed the state governments were as brittle as glass and slow as the new wheels of a carriage. And they complained about it incessantly.[105] "The vile

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[104]John Adams to James Warren, February 12, 1777, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:453; John Jay to Philip Schuyler, February 6, 1778, Morris, John Jay, p. 465.

[105]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, April 4, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:346; Henry Lee to George Washington, February 21, 1778, ibid., 2:77; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, May 24, 1781, ibid., 3:322; Baron von Steuben to George Washington, February 18, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:652n.; Robert Howe to William Moultrie, December 8, 1778, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:247; William Moultrie to Charles Pinckney, January 16, 1779, ibid., 265; Anthony Wayne to Philip Schuyler, March 23, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:387; Alexander McDougall to [ ], December 22, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 3:1364-1365; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, October 13, 1777, Pickering,

water-gruel governments which have taken place in most of the States are totally disproportioned to the exigencies of the war, and are productive of sentiments unworthy of an energetic republic," Knox complained during the summer of 1781.[106] What was really upsetting to the military was the inability of these weak governments to provide them with pay, supplies, and recruits.[107] Almost as upsetting was the timidity with which the state governments waged war against the foreign

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Timothy Pickering, 1:175; James Craik to William Smallwood, April 14, 1782, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 173; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:116; Alexander Lawrence, [ed.], "Journal of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52, no. 3 (September 1968): 341; Anthony Wayne to William Irvine, March 25, 1781, "Letters of General Wayne to General Irvine, 1778-1784," HM 6, no. 11 (November 1862): 339; David Forman to George Washington, November 7, 1777, Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, pp. 92-93.

[106] Henry Knox to William Knox, July 20, 1781, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 66.

[107] Dan[iel] Morgan to Otho [Holland] Williams, March 10, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 19; William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 10, 1779 [extract], Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:260; Walter Stewart to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1779, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 6 (1874): 304; Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780, ibid., 11 (1878): 455; Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, December 19, 1778, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Richard Caswell, March 3, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 2:12-13, BPL.

and domestic enemy.[108]

Part of the reason the states were not energetic enough, as far as the military was concerned, was because of the lack of power vested in the chief executives. The military frequently expressed their criticism of this defect in the state governments.[109] They also expressed their dissatisfaction with the chief executives, often because of political differences, but also for other reasons, such as Burke violating his parole and Jefferson insisting he was not a military man.[110] Not only were the military upset

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[108]Samuel Patterson to Caesar Rodney, June 22, 1780, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, pp. 247-248; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, December 12, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 226-228; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee, December 12, 1775, ibid., 228; Same to same, April 5, 1776, ibid., 379; Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge, April 3, [1776], ibid., 372; Charles Lee to George Washington, April 5, 1776, ibid., 377; Same to same, February 29, 1776, ibid., 335; John Stark to the Tryon County Committee of Safety, June 16, 1778, Stark, John Stark, p. 163; John Stark to William Heath, September 11, 1781, ibid., pp. 248-249; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.

[109]Baron von Steuben to George Washington, February 18, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:652n; Nathanael Greene to [?], June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:97; Marquis Francis de Malmedy to Charles Lee, December 20, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:163-164.

[110][William Feltman], The Journal of Lieut. William Feltman, of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, 1781-82, p. 37; O[tho] H[olland] [Williams] to [James] Mc[Henry], January 23, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 37; Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, March 2, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 2:12, BPL.

with the lack of executive power and the executives themselves, but they also criticized many state legislators, believing many of them to be men of small minds, large prejudices, and self-seeking natures.[111]

There were numerous other reasons which caused the military to become dissatisfied with the state government, including various personnel matters. The matter of promotions was a source of constant irritation for the military. Just as they were frequently upset with Congress for its appointments and promotions, so too were they upset with the state governments for theirs.[112] And just as they were

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[111]Henry Knox to Henry Jackson, June 7, 1777, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Nathanael Greene to John Adams, April 5, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 49; [Edward] Giles to Otho H[olland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 56; Daniel Morgan to Otho H[olland] Williams, March 10, 1780, ibid., p. 19.

[112]Officers of the Maryland Line to Nathanael Greene, December 13, 1780, "Grievances of the Maryland Line," MHM 4, no. 4 (December 1909): 326-363; Henry Knox to George Washington, March 27, 1781, [draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City of Williamsburg. On Monday, the fifth day of October. In the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Eight (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827), p. 25; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 3:75; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, p. 77; Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter, p. 109; William P. McMichael, [ed.], "Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael, of the Pennsylvania Line, 1776-1778," PMHB 16, no. 2 (1892): 143-144; Josiah Harmer to Anthony Wayne, March 8, 1779, Charles J. Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 176-177; Anthony Wayne to the Committee of Field Officers of the Pennsylvania Line,

critical of Congress for how it utilized them, so also were they critical of the state governments, believing they did not properly utilize their talents. This was especially true of the southern officers, who were often quite sensitive in matters where they believed their honor was at stake.[113]

Commanding generals and other officers who state governments requested not be allowed to serve in their states or command their troops, were, in most instances, happy to be removed from the personal and political quarrels in which they found themselves. Nevertheless, they were almost always upset with the state governments for making it known to Congress, Washington, their commanding general, and the general public they lacked the necessary character or ability to get along with the civilian authorities. Among the generals so upset were Howe, Putnam, Arnold, Gates,

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March 14, 1779, ibid., p. 175; James Craik to Jeremiah Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:67; George Washington to Anthony Wayne and William Irvine, August 11, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:353-358; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, February 21, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:460-461; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:116-117.

[113]Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to William Smallwood, August 24, 1776, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 64; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, pp. 74-76; Stewart, William Woodford, 1:403; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution, p. 255.

Sullivan and McIntosh.[114]

Besides being critical of Congress and the state governments, the military were critical of the American people; the people whose lives, liberties, and properties they were defending. The military were aware, as were most civilian leaders, of the necessity of the American people being virtuous for their cause to be successful. If we fail, one officer wrote his wife, "the Americans can blame only their own negligence, avarice, and want of almost every

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[114]James Lovell to William Whipple, September 17, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:496; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 173; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, p. 330; William S. Livingston to George Clinton, March 28, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:90; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, April 29, 1778, ibid., 232-233; George Clinton to Gouverneur Morris, May 14, 1778, ibid., 310; Robert Howe to Henry Laurens, October 9, 1778, Clark, NCSR, 15:766-767; William Cutter, The Life of Israel Putnam, Major-General in the Army of the American Revolution, pp. 332-333; George Washington to Horatio Gates, September 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12:505; Joseph Reed to George Washington, April 24, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:275-278; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:312n., 321, 329; Button Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28, 1777, Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 218-220; see also, ibid., pp. 138-140; Alexander A. Lawrence, "General Lachlan McIntosh and his Suspension from Continental Command During the Revolution," GHQ 38, no. 2 (June 1954): 101-141; William Glascock to the President of the Continental Congress, May 12, 1780, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1779," ibid., 39, no. 3 (September 1955): 263-264; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:185-189; 3:248; Ford, JCC, 8:591, 597, 616; 14:570, 585-606, 670-671, 673; 16:156, 169-170; 20:752-753; Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan McIntosh, May 22, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 2:37, BPL.

public virtue."[115] General Greene, early in the war, desired that America would open her ports to the world, but realized, as he warned one member of Congress, "it will be necessary to keep a check upon commerce, lest it take the lead of military pursuits." It was not the time, he maintained, to get rich, but to secure what they had.[116] Yet, Greene knew, as did most military leaders, most Americans were exceedingly avaricious, commerce being their genius.[117] Greene's fears were realized as, by the second year of the war, it was apparent to the military that many civilians had lost whatever virtue they may have had, and were expending their energies in making profits at the expense of the needs of the war effort, and therefore, the military.[118]

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[115]Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 6, 1778, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:211.

[116]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid.

[117]Same to same, December 18, 1775, ibid.

[118]Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, August 10, 1777, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., August 6, 1777, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 449-450; Marinus Willett to John Jay, December 17, 1777, Morris, John Jay, p. 456; John Glover to Jonather Glover or Azor Orne, June 17, 1777, Russell W. Knight, ed., "General John Glover's Letter Book," HCEI 112, no. 1 (January 1976): 13.

During 1778 and 1779, the military became more disillusioned with the American people.[119] While the army at Valley Forge suffered, Greene was convinced that the American people were only interested in making money, regardless of what happened to the army and the war itself. He complained that "Money becomes more and more the Americans' object." About the same time, John Laurens observed "it is no less a fact that in every town on the continent, luxury flourishes as it would among a people who had conquered the world."[120] "Where," the Adjutant General asked the last week of 1778, "is that boasted patriotism so

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[119]Tench Tilghman to James McHenry, January 25, 1779, Steiner, James McHenry, p. 25; Nathanael Greene to Samuel B. Webb, December 21, 1779, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 193; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, March 22, 1779, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 54; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson, February 9, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 146; Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:298-299; Rufus Putnam to Deacon Davis, January [ ], 1779, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Correspondence 1779-1780, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, September 16, 1778, Greene, Nathanael Greene, pp. 11, 143; Nathanael Greene to Charles Pettit, November 23, 1778, ibid., p. 445; Otho [Holland Williams] to [Philip] Thomas, September 21, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 15; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.

[120]Nathanael Greene to [?], February 7, 1778, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:163; John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 11, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 157; see also Samuel Smith to James McHenry, February 10, 1778, The James McHenry Papers, (Auction Catalogs) Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 2 vols. (New York: Parke-Bernet Galleries Inc., 1944), 2:100.

much talked of at the Beginning? I absolutely begin to doubt whether the Americans in general deserve the Blessings of Freedom, & Independence. They are such Slaves to sordid Avarice." "The people of America," one officer wrote his parents during the summer of 1779, "seem to have lost sight entirely of the noble principle which animated them at the commencement of it." He complained the "patriotic ardor" had given way to "avarice." Earlier that year, Tench Tilghman complained that America had advanced as far in luxury in the third year of their independency as "the old musty Republics of Greece and Rome did in twice as many hundred."[121] Washington shared these sentiments.

Throughout 1778 and 1779, Washington expressed his concern about and displeasure with the American people's avarice, extravagance, and speculation; their lack of virtue.[122] "Speculation, peculation, and insatiable thirst

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[121]Alexander Scammell to [ ] Scammell, December 30, 1778, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Collection, West Point Library; Samuel Shaw to Mr. and Mrs. Shaw, June 28, 1779, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 58; Tench Tilghman to James McHenry, January 25, 1779, Steiner, James McHenry, p. 25.

[122]George Washington to George Mason, March 27, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:300; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, November 26, 1778, ibid., 13:335; Same to same, May 12, 1779, ibid., 15:60; George Washington to Lund Washington, May 29, 1779, ibid., 180; George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid., 25; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, April 10, 1779, ibid., 14:365; George Washington to Burwell Bassett, April 22, 1779, ibid., 432; George Washington to James Warren, March 31, 1779, ibid., 312; George Washington to Robert Howe, November 29, 1779, ibid., 17:144.

for riches seems to have got the better of every other consideration and almost of every order of Men" he complained to Benjamin Harrison during December 1778. A year later, he told Henry Laurens that virtue and patriotism were almost gone, as "Stock jobbing, speculating, engrossing, . . . seems to be the great business of the day."[123]

During the winter of 1779-1780, the military's poor opinion of the American people increased, as it appeared to many soldiers that their existence was getting worse while that of the citizens was getting better, at the expense of not only the soldier in the field, but also of his family at home. This opinion hardened during the spring and summer of 1780, and created a situation where the Continentals were ready to give up the war effort and/or turn against the civilians.[124] One officer, in camp near Morristown early in

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[123]George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, December 18 [030], 1778, ibid., 13:467; George Washington to Henry Laurens, November 5, 1779, ibid., 17:73.

[124]Philip Van Cortlandt to Pierre Van Cortlandt, March 23, 1780, Judd, Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 152; Baron De Kalb to Baron Holtzendorff, May 28, 1780, Kapp, Kalb, p. 184; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, July 15, 1780, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Same to same, August 17, 1780, ibid., Udny Hay to George Clinton, September 13, 1780, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:226; James Duncan to John Clark, July 28, 1780, "Original Documents," MH 2 (1905): 67.

1780, wrote that when he entered the army he had expected hardships and sufferings, but not because the army would be sacrificed "to Aggrandize a few D-d dirty Rascals." He believed that "by their Conduct," the American people, "deserve to be Slaves to British Masters."[125] "It really gives me pain," General Paterson wrote during March 1780, "to think of our public affairs; where is the public spirit of the year 1775? Where are those flaming 'patriots' who were ready to sacrifise their lives, their fortunes, their all, for the public?" "I once thought America had virtue to encounter the greatest difficulties firm and unshaken," he wrote two months later, "but her conduct shows how weak my Supposition was; indeed, I am fully persuaded the Doctrine of total Depravity (which we have so long denied) is true, and that there is no virtue in man."[126] Later that summer, Ebenezer Huntington expressed the view held by many officers, when he wrote "I despise My Countrymen. I wish I could say I was not born in America. I once gloried in it but am now ashamed of it-[.]"[127]

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[125] Ebenezer Huntington to Andrew Huntington, January 8, 1780, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923):

[126] John Paterson to William Heath, March 31, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:45; Same to same, May 7, 1780, Egleston, John Paterson, p. 115.

[127] Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 7, 1780, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 87.

During 1781, the military continued to express their dissatisfaction with their countrymen.[128] The chief geographer of the army, in May wrote a friend at Rutgers College, "Justice[,] patriotism and charity are fled America[.] sordid Avarice has swallowed us up[.] Instead of gratitude and rewards the Army the benefactors of the Country Meet with neglect-[.]"[129]

Expressions of dissatisfaction with the American people subsided somewhat during the last two years of the war. Nevertheless, many soldiers believed, as will be discussed in chapter nine, as did an artillery officer who wrote late in 1782 that he had "sacrificed my all in the service of an inconsiderate . . . people."[130] Washington certainly believed the American people were controlled by

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[128]William McCraw to William Davies, August 10, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2:311; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Samuel H. Parsons, February 12, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 322; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, April 15, 1781, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:547; Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1781, "Letters to General Greene and Others," SCHGM 16, no. 3 (July 1915): 98.

[129]Simeon De Witt to John Bogart, May 8, 1781, [John Bogart], John Bogart Letters: Forty-Two Letters Written to John Bogart of Queen's College Now Rutgers College and Five Letters Written By Him, 1776-1782, Rutgers College Publications, 2d ser. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers College, 1914), p. 30.

[130]Sebastian Bauman to Henry Knox, November 7, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10).

"every selfish passion" and had replaced public interest with private interest, and in the process ignored the plight of the army.[131]

One result of the military's constant criticism of Congress, the state governments, the Continental-state relationship, and the American people, was the weakening of the civil-military relationship. And out of this weakened relationship grew the conditions by which the military became a threat not only to civilian control, but to the lives, liberties, and properties of the American people. The next chapter will demonstrate the degree to which the American military violated the principles of civil supremacy, and in the process made war on the lives, liberties, and properties of the people they were fighting to defend.

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[131]George Washington to John Laurens, June 10, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:421; see also George Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, ibid., 25:269.

C H A P T E R VIII

THE MILITARY MAKES WAR ON LIFE LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

The military, frequently displeased with the policies and actions of Congress, the state governments, and the American people, often ignored the desires of the civilian governments and the will of the people, giving primacy to their own. In doing so they took actions, with respect to life, liberty, and property, which constituted challenges to the principles of civil supremacy and the concept of civilian control. This chapter will discuss these actions and challenges, as well as the responses of the civilian and military leaders. The next chapter will discuss the serious threats to the established civilian governments; those instances where the plans and actions by the military were not only a threat to life, liberty, and property, but to the revolution itself.

For the most part, the military not only shared with the civilians the belief in civil supremacy, but generally acted upon it. However, lack of confidence in the civilians, and military necessity, at times prompted the military to take actions which challenged civil supremacy and civilian

control. These actions, which took place throughout the war, were often preceded by ultimatums or very strongly worded suggestions, generally in the form of letters to the civilian leaders, stating that if the civil government would not act to satisfy the needs of the military, the latter would act.[1]

Such ultimatums and suggestions were rare during the first two years of the war. But by 1777, when it appeared to the military that the civilian governments were not adequately supporting them, the military did not hesitate threatening the civilian authorities. John Cadwalader informed the Pennsylvania Council of Safety during January 1777 that "We wish to see the Civil authority regulate and direct all our public measures, and should greatly lament the Necessity which may compel the Military power to take the direction into their hands in order to save this Country from absolute ruin," however, he continued, "you may depend that the Military will exert its authority whenever the weakness, languor, or timidity of your Councils shall render it their duty so to do, and all the World will justify them

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[1]Philip Schuyler to James Duane, June 5, 1779, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, 1779-1780, WLCL; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, November 2, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:183.

in it."[2] More specifically, John White, during the fall of 1777, while marching his Georgia regiment through North Carolina, informed the chief executive of that state that if he was not loaned money to feed his troops he would turn them loose on the land and its inhabitants. Early in 1779, John Sullivan twice informed the Rhode Island chief executive that despite being a zealous advocate of civil authority he would either dismiss his troops or turn them loose on the state's inhabitants unless the legislature acted to supply his troops. The following winter, John Rogers, the military commander at Kaskaskia in Illinois, constantly threatened the local and Virginia civilian authorities with the alternative of either supplying his command or having them seize what they needed.[3]

During the last year of the war, upon learning the South Carolina legislature was unable to supply his army with forage by means of impressment, Greene wrote Governor

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[2]Address from John Cadwalader et al., from Morristown to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 15, 1777, "Selections from the Military Papers of General John Cadwalader," PMHB 32, no. 2 (1808): 161.

[3]Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 131; John Sullivan to William Greene, January 5, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:482-485; Same to same, January 16, 1779, ibid., 493; John Rogers to the Magistrates of Kaskaskia, November 10, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 206-207; Same to same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 211; Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, ibid., p. 234.

Guerard a threatening letter. "Due respect shall ever be paid to the Laws of the State when it is possible," Greene maintained, but his horses were starving. "It has always been my wish, and it shall ever be my study, to act conformable to the Laws of every State where it is possible, but there are cases where it is not." This was one of those instances, Greene stated, threatening to impress on his own authority unless the state acted.[4] Although most of the threatening letters related to their physical needs, many involved state conduct towards the Tories. During March 1779, McDougall informed Clinton that if the New York civilian authorities did not assist him in handling the Tories, he would do so on his own, despite looking like a tyrant. Earlier in the war, General Lee informed the Virginia committee of Safety that if they did not act to remove peacefully the Tories from the Norfolk and Princess Ann areas he would do so at the point of a bayonet.[5] Frequently such threats were carried out, both with respect to the Tories and supplies.

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[4]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 9, 1783, Letters By and To General Nathanael Greene with some to his Wife (William A. Read Collection), 1:28, WLCL.

[5]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 14, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:632; Charles Lee to the President of the Virginia Committee of Safety, April 8, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 393-394; see also Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge, April 3, [1776], ibid., 372.

For the most part, as will be discussed, civilian leaders were upset with the military for taking unauthorized military action against the Tories, but they did not expend much energy in attempting to stop the military, nor in punishing them. As a rule, the civilian leaders only responded to unauthorized military action against the Tories when that action involved oaths, court martials, or in some way appeared to be a threat to civilian control. With respect to Tory property, the civilian leaders preferred the military not seize anybody's property, no matter what pretext. Property, after all, was a basic right for which the revolutionaries were fighting to protect.

Most Americans acknowledged the sacredness of private property, in part because of the wide ownership of land and property in America and in part because of their English Whig intellectual heritage. The economic context of the American Revolution is evident, as most of the ideological and political slogans were couched in an economic rhetoric that all Americans could understand, if not all agree upon. Property, with life and liberty, was what the American Whig was fighting to protect. That was what the Declaration of Independence declared during July 1776. A month later in northern New York, a flag with "Liberty" written on one side and "Property" on the other was raised over the newly

constructed Fort Dayton.[6]

From the beginning of the war, civilian leaders called for the protection of property, not only from British arms, but also from American military forces.[7] Most American military leaders realized the necessity of protecting property, for a variety of reasons, including the belief that they were fighting to protect the sanctity of property and the belief that unauthorized seizure of property might force those that had their property violated into the British camp. Nobody realized this more than Washington, himself a large owner of land and property.

"I never saw any Man so strictly observant of the preservation of private property," Tench Tilghman wrote of

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[6]William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 1-52; Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), p. 146; "Journal Kept During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. Printed from the Original Manuscript," PHNHS 2, no. 4 (1847): 183.

[7]Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to advise with thereon [January 1776], by Joseph Hawley in Paul Fullman and George M. Elsey, into., "More Hints from Joseph Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 34 (1937-1942): 402; Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 21, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:94.

Washington early in the war.[8] An example of Washington's concern for private property is evidenced by his stay at the Ford Mansion during 1779 and 1780. Upon moving in, he had all the house's articles appropriated for his use inventoried. Upon departing, and learning that one silver tablespoon was unaccounted for, he had one with his initials on it sent to Mrs. Ford from Mount Vernon. He also had the house replastered and thoroughly cleaned upon leaving.[9] Not only did he practice protecting private property, but he constantly urged others to do so. In one of his earliest general orders, he reminded the army they were fighting for "Rights, Liberty and Property." "Why did we assemble in arms?" he asked the army in his general orders of September 4, 1777. "Was it not, in one capital point, to protect the property of our country?"[10] He constantly reminded the army it was not only a disgrace to the name of an American soldier, but repugnant to the principles of the cause in which they were engaged, to violate private property.[11]

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[8]Tench Tilghman to [ ], September 9, 1776, Tilghman, Tench Tilghman, p. 136.

[9]Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washington's Headquarters (Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune, 1932), p. 207.

[10]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:312; ibid., 9:178.

[11]General Orders, ibid., 19:348; Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 491.

Additionally, he frequently reminded the officers of their obligation to impress upon their soldiers the necessity of protecting private property.[12]

Washington's officers complied with his orders with respect to protecting private property, for the orderly books are full of reminders to the soldiers to protect their fellow citizens' property.[13] Charles C. Pinckney told his soldiers late in 1775 they should look upon themselves as the "guardians of the property" of the inhabitants of South Carolina and "deem it an infamous breach of the trust reposed in them to destroy, or take away what they are bound to protect." The following year, Greene informed his soldiers that "we came here to protect the inhabitants &

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[12]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:514; Orderly Book of the Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:400.

[13]General Greene's Brigade Orders, "The Orderly Book of Colonel William Henshaw October 1, 1775, through October 3, 1776," PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947): 120; General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Company of Captain George Stubblefield, Fifth Virginia Regiment, From March 3, 1776, to July 10, 1776, Inclusive," VHSC, new ser., 6:146; "Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 34, no. 2 (1910): 186-187; "Orderly Book of Capt. Simeon Brown, Colonel Wade's Regiment, Rhode Island Campaign, 1778," HCEI 58, no. 3 (July 1922): 249; Regimental after orders, "Revolutionary Orderly Book of Capt. Jeremiah Putnam of Danvers, Mass. in the Rhode Island Campaign. July 10, 1779-December 19, 1779," ibid., 46, no. 4 (October 1910): 344; General Parson's Orders, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:309; Light Infantry Orders, "Revolutionary Army orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 19, no. 1 (January 1911): 43.

their property from the ravages of the enemy, but if instead of support & Protection, they meet with nothing but insult & outrage, we shall be considered as banditti & treated as oppressors & enemies." A wing of the army during the summer of 1780 was reminded "it is true we are Fighting for Liberty but it is with a View to the free Enjoyment of our Property and if we dont give Security to the People how can we Expect they can give Support to the Army, we are called to the Field not only to Oppose the Enemy but to give protection to the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants, and if we fail in the Latter we perform but half our Duty."[14]

During 1775, Heath, upon hearing complaints about the soldiers destroying private property, told Colonel Prescott that private property should ever be held most sacred.[15] It can be safe to assume that Prescott's soldiers continued to violate the sacredness of private property despite what actions Prescott may have taken after receiving Heath's admonition. Throughout the war, many soldiers and officers plundered their fellow citizens' property. Most of

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[14]Extract from the Orderly Book of Charles Lining, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 1:244-245; General Greene's orders in Colonel Moses Little's Orderly Book, Henry P. Johnston, The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn, pt. 2, pp. 6-7; Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 880.

[15]William Heath to William Prescott, October 8, 1775, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

military far from their home area, where property, particularly if the stranger dered less wrong in their eyes, as well This was especially true early in the antly New England-manned army plundered New York, and even in the New York City summer of 1776, Washington wrote Congress stop the plundering, "but under the lunder, and want of Laws to punish lmost as well attempt to remove Mount n had good cause to complain, for even somebody stealing and damaging his pistols. Other generals suffered as well. Charles Lee had four of his horses taken by Greene's soldiers; Schuyler had his property damaged and burned by Major Dearborn's soldiers; and General Lewis Morris had his Westchester County estate

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[16] Isaac J. Greenwood, ed., The Revolutionary Services of John Greenwood of Boston and New York 1775-1783 edited from the Original Manuscript (New York: De Vinne Press for Joseph R. Greenwood, 1922), p. 35; The Autobiography of Levi Hutchins: With a Preface, Notes, and Addenda, By his Youngest Son, private ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press, 1865), p. 28; Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:69; Edward Tilghman to William Heath, September 5, 1776, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #2).

[17] George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:114.

plundered by soldiers of Hand's regiment.[18]

Early in the war the military plundered both Whig and Tory alike, often simply to obtain booty or because they were too lazy to cut their own firewood or properly requisition foodstuffs, but just as often because they needed supplies to survive.[19] This was true during the winters of 1777-1778 and 1779-1780.[20] It was especially true during the summer of 1780 as the army suffered, starved, and

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[18]Charles Lee to Nathanael Greene, September 12, 1782, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 7 (1875): 35; Richard Varick to Horatio Gates, October 28, 1777, Howard Swiggett, War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers. Empire State Publication 20 (Port Washington, New York: Ira J. Friedman, 1963), p. 56; Lewis Morris, Sr., to Lewis Morris, Jr., September 6, 1776, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 442.

[19]Citizens of Montgomery County to President Thomas Wharton, August 15, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:118-119; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:428; St. Mary's [County] Committee to the Maryland Council, August 7, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 12:184; Division Orders, "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 21, no. 1 (January 1913): 30; George Washington to Henry Lee, November 29, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:357; George Washington to John Sullivan, July 25, 1777, ibid., 8:469; Joseph Reed to the Continental Congress Board of War, March 8, 1779, Martin I. J. Griffin, Catholics and the American Revolution, 3 vols. (Ridley Park and Philadelphia: Martin I. J. Griffin, 1907-1911), 3:90.

[20]General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, pp. 297-298; Lord Stirling to George Washington, January 16, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:381; Royal Flint to Jonathan Trumbull, January 6, 1780, Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 116.

eventually a portion mutinied.[21] Late in August 1780, Greene reported the plundering done by the Pennsylvania Line was "equal to anything committed by the Hessians." Two weeks later, a member of Congress reported that "The army now lives principally by plunder, . . . ; and will, if they keep together I fear, soon become free-booters. And I think every man must feel for the inhabitants where the army marches." In a circular letter to the chief executives of the northern states in August, Washington reported the army had assumed "the odious character of the plunderers instead of the protectors of the people."[22] Fortunately for the northern states, the war, and thus the army, moved southward during 1780 and 1781, and with them, the plundering.

After learning that soldiers had burned some of his property in Annapolis, Charles Carroll of Carrollton complained the "soldiers are very troublesome" and "a great

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[21]General Orders, West Point, "Orderly Book of Captain Daniel Livermore's Company, Continental Army, 1780," CNHHS, 9:215; Ebenezer Huntington to Samuel B. Webb, August 30, 1780, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:282.

[22]Nathanael Greene to George Washington, August 26, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:207; Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, September 10, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 312; Circular to the Governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, August 27, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:450.

nuisance, & I heartily wish they were gone."[23] This was a wish shared by many southerners, as the soldiers and their officers increased their plundering in the south after 1779.[24]

Most of the plundering in the south, and much of it in the north, was practiced by the irregular state forces and militia, who frequently did not discriminate between friend and foe.[25] One New Jersey resident reported early in

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[23]Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll of Annapolis, April 5, 1781, Ellen Hart Smith, Charles Carroll of Carrollton (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942), p. 208.

[24]Benjamin Lincoln to Charles C. Pinckney, July 24, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); William Henderson to John Rutledge, August 14, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:377; Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:531; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:344; Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, July 28, 1781, William Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:211; William Smallwood to Horatio Gates, October 21, 1780, Clark, NCSR, 14:720; John Jameson to George Washington, September 27, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:102; John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954): 126.

[25]Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," 5:234; Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779, ibid., 88-89; Wade Hampton to Nathanael Greene, July 29, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:342-343; William Smallwood to Horatio Gates, October 31, 1780, Clark, NCSR, 14:720; William Livingston to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, February 22, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:238-239; Aaron Burr to Alexander McDougall, January 13, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr. With Miscellaneous Selections from his Correspondence, 1:142-143; Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, January 20,

the war that "We have not had the enemy among us, but Staten-Island hath not suffered from the British troops scarcely the tenth part of the damage this town hath from the militia."[26] Greene complained that the militia in the south were "more allured from the hopes of plunder than from a desire to serve the public."[27] Sumter's irregular force plundered on a regular basis, in part because their booty was their compensation for military service.[28] Sumter's soldiers, as well as other irregular and Continental soldiers, took much of their plunder from Tories, or those living in so-called neutral areas, justifying it on the grounds that if they did not take the property it would be taken by the British or Tories and used against them.[29]

1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:502; Philip Schuyler to John Jay, February 1, 17[78], Morris, John Jay, p. 464; Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, pp. 130-131; "Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia, Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 196.

[26]Abraham Clark to [ ] Dayton, October 26, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 2:1249.

[27]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 4, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:352; see also Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 7, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:546.

[28]Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, pp. 202-204; M. F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene 1780-1781, p. 41.

[29]John M. Beeckman et al., to George Clinton, September 10, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:20; James Millen to Robert Howe, March 9, 1780, ibid., 552-553; William Heath to George Clinton, October 19, 1781, ibid., 7:418; Victor Hugo Paltsits, Minutes of the

Civilian leaders constantly complained about plundering and frequently asked that it be stopped.[30] So concerned about the plundering in their state, the Maryland Council declared "every Act of Violence or Invasion of private Property, by the Military, ought to be enquired into, redressed and, in future, prevented."[31] The states provided

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Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York: Albany County Sessions 1778-1781, 1:300-301; [Ebenezer Fox], The Revolutionary Adventures of Ebenezer Fox, of Roxbury, Massachusetts (Boston: Munroe and Francis, 1838), pp. 48-49, 51; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p. 131; Colonel William Campbell's General Orders, Draper, King's Mountain, Appendix, p. 532; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, April 15, 1781, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, p. 142.

[30]Henry Laurens to William Thomson, July 13, 1775, A. S. Salley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County, South Carolina from Its First Settlement to the Close of the Revolutionary War, p. 394; Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, Jr., January 12, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:344; Thomas Nelson, Jr., to Marquis de Lafayette, August 3, 1781, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:20; Proclamation by John Rutledge, August 1, 1781, Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter, p. 182; Minutes of the Executive Council, Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:148-149; Providence Town Council to Horatio Gates, August 3, 1779, Stone, Our French Allies, pp. 140-141; Joseph Reed to the Continental Board of War, March 8, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:230; Continental Board of War to Casimer Pulaski, March 9, 1779, ibid., 233, 234; The Maryland Council of Safety to Nathaniel Smith, January 18, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:58; The Maryland Council to William Smallwood, March 29, 1782, ibid., 48:117; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:428; Ford, JCC, 11:571; Proclamation of Governor William Livingston, The Pennsylvania Packet, or General Advertiser, February 11, 1777.

[31]The Maryland Council to David Poe, November 25, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:6.

in their articles of war and in resolutions prohibitions against plundering by the military. They also adopted policies they hoped would discourage plundering. New Jersey, for example, in 1777, ordered that no more than six militia were to go about without an officer. Colonels of regiments were expected to enforce this rule. Officers in Rhode Island were held responsible for the damage done by their soldiers. Connecticut soldiers, who went on expeditions to Long Island to capture prisoners, were required to give bonds not to plunder. To ensure soldiers did not plunder in a so-called neutral ground in South Carolina, they were removed by order of the government from that area.[32]

Realizing the importance of private property, and being chastised by the civilian governments because soldiers had violated private property, many officers took an active interest in the plundering problem. Washington and other commanding officers constantly reminded their subordinates of the necessity of keeping a careful watch over their soldiers so as to prevent plundering.[33]

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[32]Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:344, 495; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 2:346-347; The Pennsylvania Packet, or, General Advertiser, February 11, 1777; William Henry Drayton and William Tennet to the South Carolina Council of Safety, August 7, 1775, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 1:132.

[33]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:514; 6:8-9; 9:199, 243; 20:34; 25:309; George Washington to William Heath, March 19, 1776, ibid., 4:409; George Washington to Israel Putnam, August 25, 1776, ibid., 5:488;

Greene, for example, told one young officer that "You cannot treat the inhabitants with too much delicacy," . . . "nor should the least encouragement be given to the soldiers, either to invade the property of the people, or offer them any personal insults.-This conduct it is which has made the British so very odious."[34] The officers constantly issued orders prohibiting plundering, frequently accompanying such orders with the threat of swift and sure punishment.[35] The officers also issued orders prohibiting

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General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 27-28; General Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 402; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p. 54; Division Orders, Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:390; Ford, General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam, p. 37; Samuel H. Parson's Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 89; Henry Haller's Orders, Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, p. 94; Lachlan McIntosh's Orders, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799," GHQ 28, no. 3 (September 1954): 260; Nathanael Greene to Anthony Wayne, [December 1781], Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:277; Samuel H. Parsons to Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 263; William Fleming to William McClenechan, July 16, 1776, Thwaites, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777, p. 169; Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775, Don R. Gerlach, Philip Schuyler and the American Revolution in New York 1733-1777, pp. 284-285.

[34]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Egleton, October 21, 1781, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 46, WLCL.

[35]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:390, 477, 514; 9:178; 3:414; 5:501; 22:269, 443; Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 11:299; Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, pp. 32, 42-43, 65, 201, 205, 250-251, 297-298, 300-301; General Orders, Campbell, Orderly Book,

The officers also issued orders prohibiting the taking of property from Tories or property found in so-called neutral

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p. 2, General, Brigade, Division and Regimental Orders in Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 38-39, 94, 369, 440, 480, 534, 607-608, 695; General Greene's Orders, Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:594-595; General Wayne's Orders for the First and Second Pennsylvania Brigades, ibid., 2:356; General Orders of the Right Wing of the Army, ibid., p. 460; General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 72-73, 117; Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 1:245, 293, 294-295; General Parson's Orders, ibid., 309; General Parson's Brigade Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 216; General Orders, John W. Jordan, [ed.], "Orderly Book of the Pennsylvania State Regiment of Foot, May 10 to August 16, 1777," PMHB 22, no. 2 (1898): 203; ibid., 22, no. 3 (1898):306; General Wayne's Orders, "Notes and Queries," ibid., 25, no. 3 (1901): 424; General Orders, "Elisha Williams' Diary of 1776," ibid., 48, no. 4 (1924): 337, 344; Regimental Orders, "Revolutionary Orderly Book of Capt. Jeremiah Putnam of Danvers, Mass. In the Rhode Island Campaign. July 10, 1779-December 19, 1779," HCEI 46, no. 4 (October 1910): 339; ibid., 42, no. 1 (January 1911): 48; Brigade Orders, "Orderly Book of Capt. Simeon Brown, Colonel Wade's Regiment, Rhode Island Campaign, 1778," ibid., 58, no. 3 (July 1922): 254; Brigade Orders, Joseph Brown Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood of the Delaware Regiment of the Continental Line (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910), pp. 150-151; General Orders, ibid., p. 181; General Orders, "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB 18, no. 2 (April 1910): 171; Regimental Orders, ibid., 20, no. 1 (January 1912): 49; General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Company of Captain George Stubblefield, Fifth Virginia Regiment, from March 3, 1776, to July 10, 1776, Inclusive," VHSC, new ser., 6:146; General Orders of the Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 2 (April 1913): 101; Regimental Orders, Ford, General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam, p. 85; Christian Febiger's Regimental Orders in Captain Robert Gamble's Order Book, Jos. A. Waddell, Annals of Augusta County, Virginia, from 1726 to 1871, 2d. ed. (Staunton, Virginia: C. Russell Caldwell, 1902), p. 271; General Orders, M. E. Kinnan, Order Book Kept by Peter Kinnan July 7-September 4, 1776 (Princeton: Privately printed by Princeton University Press, 1931), p. 96; Colonel Brodhead's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"

areas, suggesting that if such property were to be seized it should be done by or with the approval of the civilian governments.[36]

The officers also took special precautions and other actions to curb plundering. When Stark took command of the garrison at Newport, Rhode Island, late in 1779, he had guards placed in the streets to prevent plundering. At West Point, because soldiers picked apples and fruit in nearby orchards, a guard was placed in the orchards to prevent such practices.[37] Besides having soldiers assigned to stop plundering, commanding officers often required junior officers to be quartered with the soldiers, believing their presence would be a deterrent.[38] As was discussed in chapter

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p. 425; General Greene's Orders, Henry P. Johnston, The Campaign around New York and Brooklyn, pt. 2, p. 24; General Sullivan's Orders, ibid., p. 28.

[36]Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan McIntosh, July 15, 1779, Banjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); General Orders Issued by General Lincoln, September 2, 1777, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #2); Tench Tilghman to [?], March 17, 1777, Tilghman, Tench Tilghman, p. 155; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:8-9, 104-105; 7:109-200; 22:327-328, 444; General Orders, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 16, no. 1 (January 1915): 42; ibid., 17, no. 1 (January 1916): 30.

[37]Stark, John Stark, p. 81; General Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 402.

[38]Division Orders, Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:390; Bliven, Under the Guns, p. 225.

six, frequent roll calls were employed as a means of keeping soldiers near camp where they had less chance to plunder. Additionally, soldiers were often restricted to the distance they could be from camp.[39] And besides punishing those found guilty of plundering, those indirectly involved were oftentimes punished. For instance, during the summer of 1780, Washington ordered that anybody found around fires of burning fences would be considered of plundering, whether or not they cut them down.[40] McDougall attempted to limit plundering by threatening those caught in the act with being turned over to civilian authorities for trial and punishment. "The consequence," he wrote Clinton, "had been that not a single panel of fence has been burned" as the soldiers were more fearful of civil punishment than military punishment, especially as the former would have the tendency to lessen their reputation at home.[41]

Plundering was the taking of an individual's property by force by individual or small groups of soldiers; impressing was the seizing of one or more person's property, often systematically, by a body of soldiers, with or without

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[39]General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, pp. 166, 168; Lauber, Orderly Books, p. 98.

[40]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:75.

[41]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, November 5, 1778, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 200.

civilian government approval. Most civilian leaders opposed impressing, authorized or not, and attempted to have their governments avoid it whenever possible.[42] Even the word "impressing," the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council told Sullivan, was "repugnant."[43] Washington and most officers also preferred not to impress, unless it was absolutely necessary. They did not desire to impress as to do so meant the soldiers were more likely to violate private property in the process. And more importantly, because taking property, even with civilian government approval, alienated from the revolutionary cause those from whom the property was impressed.[44] St. Clair believed that impressing had not only the disadvantages just mentioned, but as he told Robert

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[42]William Livingston to George Washington, February 16, 1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston, p. 261; Corner, Autobiography of Benjamin Rush, p. 147; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 3:288; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, p. 255; A Petition and Remonstrance from the Freeholders of Prince William County, December 10, 1781, by George Mason, Rutland, Papers of George Mason, 2:706-711; Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 21, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:94.

[43]The Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to John Sullivan, May 21, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:28-31.

[44]William Heath to John Sullivan, July 29, 1778, ibid., 2:146; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Sim Lee, April 17, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 47:197; Robert Lawson to Thomas Jefferson, January 28, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:460; Richard McCarty to John Todd, October 14, 1780, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1:380; George Washington to William Greene, August 27, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:217.

Morris, after learning the Board of War had authorized impressing, "The people are already not a little jealous of the army, and such an exertion of what will appear to them military power, can not but produce mischievous effects."[45]

The military often went to great lengths to avoid impressing. During the summer of 1781, Washington drew nine thousand dollars of the sum of monies sent by Massachusetts to pay their troops, and placed it in the hands of the Quartermaster General with orders to pay for the transportation of the army's supplies. Washington wanted to avoid impressing teams. Earlier that year, Lafayette to lessen the impressing burden, whenever possible, impressed oxen rather than horses. And later that year, to avoid imposing additional burdens on the citizens of Richmond, St. Clair seized some sixty horses being sent from Annapolis to Greene's army in the Carolinas.[46]

Despite their dislike of impressing and attempts to avoid it, the military were frequently forced into situations

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[45]Arthur St. Clair to Robert Morris, November 13, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:459; see also 458-459.

[46]John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799, 2:208; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781, Gilbert Chinard, [ed.], The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, The Johns Hopkins Studies in International Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 26; Same to same, April 17, 1781, ibid., p. 37; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, November 14, 1781, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:563-564.

where they requested permission from civilian authorities to impress. Such requests were often accompanied by a threat to impress, even if authority was not granted. Some officers, however, did not even request permission or even threaten before they impressed, as the exigencies of the war, particularly the lack of supplies, forced them to impress on their own authority.

In the south, especially after 1780, many commanding officers, including Armand, Gist, and Wayne, resorted to unauthorized impressing when the necessity arose.[47] Lafayette was perhaps the commanding officer in the Southern Department who impressed the most without authority. Almost immediately after arriving in Virginia, he sent word to Jefferson that circumstances would oblige him to requisition goods however unpopular it was. He made a similar declaration to Jefferson's successor, Thomas Nelson, informing him

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[47]Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress, January 11, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 4:25; Benjamin Harrison to Charles Armand-Tuffin, December 6, 1781, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:107; Same to same, January 3, 1782,, ibid., 120; Same to same, January 12, 1782, ibid., 127-128; Same to same, September 2, 1782, ibid., 315; Mordecai Gist to Thomas Sim Lee, March 3, 1781, J. Alexis Shriver, Lafayette in Harford County 1781: An Account of the Events Attending the Passage of the Marquis de La Fayette and his Troops through Harford County in 1781 and of Subsequent Events, to the Surrender of Cornwallis (Belair, Maryland: Privately Printed, 1931), pp. 53-54; Evans, Thomas Nelson, p. 108.

that Virginia's government must understand that often in sight of the enemy he had been forced to impress without their approval.[48]

Earlier in the war there was much unauthorized impressing in the northern theater of operations, particularly in the so-called neutral areas, such as Westchester County, New York. A considerable amount of unauthorized impressing also took place on the frontier, especially at Kaskaskia and Fort Pitt.[49]

Civilian authorities frequently reprimanded or punished those officers who impressed without their approval, especially when mechanisms to obtain needed supplies existed.[50]

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[48]Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 20, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:189; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Nelson, October 31, 1781, Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 4:434; see also Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:477; Same to same, April 21, 1781, ibid., 523.

[49]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, January 29, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:504; Alexander McDougall to William Hull, March 28, 1779, Campbell, William Hull, pp. 278, 279; Solomon Sherwood to William Hull, April 28, 1779, ibid., p. 281; Lachlan McIntosh to the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, October 21, 1778, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 147.

[50]Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 260-261; John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 10, 1781, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 3:186, 187; John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 10, 1782, ibid., 2:157; Same to same, April 18, 1782, ibid., 167-168; Bernard C. Steiner, Western Maryland in the Revolution, John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, vol. 20, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1902), p. 30.

Realizing they would probably be chastised or punished for impressing without civilian authorization, some officers attempted to soften the blow by apologizing immediately before or after they had done so.[51] They also gave explanations, or justified their actions on the basis of military necessity, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Just as protecting property from being ravaged by the American military forces was of great concern to the civilians, so too was their concern of keeping their homes protected from quartering by the military. Quartering was an important aspect of the Whig revolutionary rhetoric, so much so that many Whigs maintained that British quartering was one of the reasons for the break with the mother country.[52] So concerned were the Whigs about quartering that most state constitutions contained prohibitions against quartering of troops in times of peace in any house without the consent of the owner, and generally during war only with the consent of the legislature.[53]

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[51]Mordecai Gist to Thomas Simm Lee, April 17, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 47:197; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia, p. 7.

[52]William Hooper to Robert Morris, February 1, 1777, NYHSC, 11 (1878): 418; Patrick Henry's Speech before the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 16, 1788, Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, 3:411.

[53]"Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to advise with thereon," by Joseph Hawley, [January 1776], Paul Fullman and George M. Elsey, [eds.], "More Hints from Joseph

For the most part, the military shared the commonly held aversion to quartering and therefore went out of their way to avoid it, by building barracks, using public buildings, paying rent, and avoiding towns altogether.[54]

Despite their efforts to avoid the necessity of quartering troops among civilians there were instances of illegal quartering. Generally this was early in the war when the legislatures had not yet made provisions for other forms of housing arrangements. Such actions were condemned by the civilian authorities, as they had little tolerance for violations against the sanctity of the home.[55]

Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 34 (1937-1942): 402; Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, February 18, 1776, Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:162-163; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 9:857; Proceedings of the Convention of the Delaware State, p. 20; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, [eds.], The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, p. 447; Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:378, 431; William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS 9 (January-June 1897): 387.

[54]Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:86; Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:532; 9:469; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 1:471-472; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:296; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, pp. 115, 116; Balch, Journal of Claude Blanchard, p. 75; George Clinton to John Greaton, January 24, 1776, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:218; The Pennsylvania Evening Post, January 25, 1777.

[55]Nicholas Cooke to William Richmond, March 30, 1776, Matt. B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781," PAAS new ser., 36 (April 14-October 20, 1926): 313; Nicholas Cooke to Henry Babcock, March 30, 1776, ibid., 313; Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, April 23, 1776, ibid., 320-321; Robert

Just as plundering, impressing, and quartering were seen as challenges to civilian authority, so were the seizing of Tories and administering oaths by the military. Early in the war, fearing the military might take the Tory problem into their own hands, Congress recommended the states adopt measures to render the Tories harmless.[56] Although most states did adopt measures to control the Tories, the military usually found such measures were ineffective. Therefore, it is not surprising to find the military threatening to take matters into their own hands unless the civilian governments gave more force to their measures. General Lee often threatened to act if the civilian government did not. When the Virginia government refused to relocate Tories from an area of military operations, he forced many Tories to leave their homes, and even burned out one Tory family who refused.[57] Mostly, the military did not even threaten before they took Tory matters into their hands. They simply acted. This was certainly the way Lee operated.

Morris to Horatio Gates, April 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 388; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, pp. 90-91.

[56]Ford, JCC, 3:280; 4:18-20, 205.

[57]Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 467-469.

At the invitation of Rhode Island's chief executive, Lee went to that colony late in 1775 to assist them with their coastal defenses. Reaching Newport on Christmas day, he was appalled to find the town teeming with an active Tory element. Therefore, on his own authority, he arrested eight of the most prominent Tories and tendered to them "a most solemn oath of allegiance to the Continental Congress." The three who refused to accept it were jailed. Both Washington and the Rhode Island legislature congratulated him for his spirited efforts.[58] For Lee, this was license to continue seizing Tories without consulting civilian authorities. At least this is what Lee believed as he headed south to New York to assist in the fortification of New York City.

Once in New York, and seeing that the provincial government was taking no action against the Tories, Lee decided he would act against the Tories when an opportunity presented itself. Early in March, receiving news that he was to be reassinged to the Southern Department, he implemented his program against the Tories,

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[58] Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776, ibid., 233; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, January 22, 1776, ibid., 248; Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, January 6, 1776, Matt B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781," PAAS new ser. 36 (April 14, 1926-October 20, 1926): 300-301; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 31, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:197.

leaving the consequences to his successors if the civilian authorities objected. After notifying the Provincial Congress and Congress of his plan, but not waiting for their approval, Lee, on the fifth of March, ordered Isaac Sears to offer a test to every suspected Tory in Queens. Those that refused to take the oath were to be arrested and sent to Connecticut for confinement.[59] There was great opposition to Lee's oath. "To impose a Test," John Jay wrote, "is a sovereign act of Legislation and when the army becomes our Legislators, the People that Moment become Slaves."[60] In Congress, the New York delegates questioned Lee's actions. As they explained to the New York government:

> We took up the Subject on general Principles. There can be no Liberty where the military is not subordinate to the civil power, in every thing not immediately connected with their Operations. Your House, the natural and proper Tribunal for all civil matters within the Circle of your Jurisdiction, was assembled, and Congress itself within the General's reach, ready to enforce every reasonable Proposition for the publick safety. To one or other he ought to have applied. A Similar Effort in Rhode-Island had passed over unnoticed; reiterated Precedents must become dangerous; we therefore conceive it to be our unquestionable Duty to assert the Independence and

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[59] Charles Lee to Joseph Reed, February 28, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 333-334; Charles Lee to the President of the New York Provincial Congress, March 4, 1776, ibid., 345; Charles Lee to Isaac Sears, March 5, 1776, ibid., 346; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, March 5, 1776, ibid., 348.

[60] John Jay to Alexander McDougall, March 13, 1776, Richard B. Morris, Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny: The Founding Fathers as Revolutionaries, p. 185.

> Superiority of Congress to this unwarrantable Invasion of its Rights by one of their Officers.[61]

"However salutary such a measure might be, when governed on a legal and constitutional basis," they told Congress, "we were much alarmed that it should owe its authority to any military officer, however distinguished for his zeal, his rank, his accomplishments, and services." "There can be no liberty where the military is not subordinate to the civil power in everything not immediately concerned with their operations." Therefore, they requested Congress to "assert the independence and superiority of the civil power" with respect to Lee's action. Although most members of Congress saw the necessity of the oath in New York, they were opposed to the military imposing it, and therefore on the ninth of March they adopted a resolution prohibiting the military from imposing upon, exacting, or requiring of any inhabitant of the colonies, any oath.[62] Three days earlier, the New York Provincial Congress informed Lee that a Long Island resident had been apprehended in New York City by a military guard and forcibly taken to Connecticut without them being informed of such action. They wanted Lee to

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[61] James Duane, John Jay, Lewis Morris, and John Alsop to the New York Convention, March 15, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:389.

[62] Richard Henry Lee to Charles Lee, March 25, 1776, ibid., 408; Ford, JCC, 4:203-204, 195.

inform them of the charges so the prisoner could either be punished or released, and reminded Lee the right of apprehending, trying, and punishing citizens belonged to the civilian authorities. "This right we think it our duty to insist upon, as essential to the security of our constituents." They told Lee they hoped to be able to cooperate with him, but reminded him that "it becomes us, as faithful guardians of the people, to protect the liberty and property of our constituents as much as possible in our present unhappy situation." The same day, Lee, in a letter to the President of the Provincial Congress acknowledged their authority, explained why he had taken such hasty action, and expressed regret, but also stated he would continue to seize professed Tories who constituted a threat, as it was his duty to Congress, New York, and his own conscience.[63] Before the Provincial Congress could respond to Lee's letter, the general left town on the seventh of March to take command of the Southern Department.

Shortly after arriving in Virginia, Lee took action against the Tories in Princess Anne and Norfolk counties. To Virginia's Committee of Safety he explained his actions had been predicated upon military necessity and assured them

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[63]The New York Provincial Congress to Charles Lee, March 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 349-350; Charles Lee to the President of the New York Provincial Congress, March 6, 1776, ibid., 351-352.

that if they found him too much in the province of the civil power it would be entirely by mistake, not design. The Committee of Safety accepted his explanation and assurances, believing his action was "one of the inevitable consequences of this kind of war" and agreeing that "what the public safety seems to require, should be immediately done, even tho' some injury may arise to innocent individuals." They only asked they be kept informed, as they were the representatives of the people. Lee complied, even asking twice that specific actions be taken against the Tories without first taking the action on his own authority.[64] His dealings with Maryland, with respect to actions against the Tories, was not so amicable.

Early in April 1776, Lee, then at Williamsburg, Virginia, obtained a packet of letters containing correspondence between Maryland's royal Governor Eden and British officials, wherein Eden recommended that a British regiment be sent to Maryland to insure that colony's allegiance to the crown. Instead of sending the letters to Maryland's Council of Safety, which was chaired by moderate Daniel St. Thomas Jenifer, Lee forwarded them to Samuel Purviance, the radical chairman of the Baltimore County Committee of Observation.

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[64]Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, ibid., 467-469; Same to same, May 11, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 23; Charles Lee and Robert Howe to Edmund Pendleton, May 10, 1776, ibid., 21; Edmund Pendleton to Charles Lee, May 5, 1776, ibid., 4 (1872): 470, 471.

In doing so, Lee claimed ignorance of who should properly receive the letters, and suggested Purviance, using Lee's name as his authority, order the arrest of Eden. In characteristic style, Lee told Purviance "The sin & blame be on my head. I will answer for all to ye' Congress."[65] Receiving the letters from Lee on the fourteenth of April, Purviance ordered Samuel Smith to seize the Governor in Annapolis. Smith, upon arriving in Annapolis and reporting to the Maryland Council of Safety, was severely reprimanded by the civilian authorities. By evening he was sent back to Baltimore without attempting to arrest the governor.[66] The following day, William Paca and several other Maryland revolutionary leaders called on Eden, confronting him with the letters. Eden was able to assure them he did not intend to inflame the ministry. To a large extent, they wanted to be assured, for the Maryland Council of Safety desired to keep from having to seize the governor and thereby, they beleived, create a situation that could produce anarchy

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[65]Charles Lee to Samuel Purviance, April 6, 1776, ibid., 381; The Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), April 25, 1776; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution, p. 98.

[66]Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752-1839, pp. 14-15; John Silas Pancake, Samuel Smith and the Politics of Business 1752-1839 (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), p. 7.

in the colony.[67] Learning that the Council of Safety had not acted, Purviance sent copies of the Eden letters to the President of Congress, attaching an unsigned letter of his own, severely condemning the Council of Safety and taking responsibility for sending Smith to Annapolis. President Hancock read Purviance's letter aloud to Congress and, despite attempts by Maryland's delegates to stop them, Congress approved Maryland's seizure of the royal governor.[68]

The Council of Safety, upset with both the Baltimore civilian leaders and the military, ordered Purviance, Smith, and several others to appear before them to defend their presumptuous action. After examining them, the Council of Safety reprimanded Purviance and excused Smith, as he had only been following orders. The real culprit, they declared, was Lee, because he did not send them the original correspondence and had encouraged Purviance to act. The Maryland Convention, which assembled in May, censured Purviance for

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[67]The Maryland Council of Safety to John Hancock, April 18, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 11:349-350; Governor Eden to Charles Carroll, John Hall, and William Paca, April 16, 1776, ibid., 337-338; The Maryland Council of Safety to Governor Eden, April 18, 1776, ibid., 338-339; The Maryland Council of Safety to the Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, [April 18, 1776], ibid., 339-341; Same to same, [April 19, 1776], ibid., 354-356.

[68]Thomas Johnson, Jr., to the Maryland Council of Safety, April 17, 1776, ibid., 347-348; Thomas Johnson, Jr., Thomas Stone, and Robert Alexander to the Maryland Council of Safety, April 18, 1776, ibid., 351-352; John Hancock to the Maryland Council of Safety, April 16, 1776, ibid., 334-335.

usurping the power to control the military forces of Maryland, which they declared properly belonged to the Council of Safety, when the convention was not sitting.[69]

Lee, learning that Maryland's revolutionary government had condemned his actions, informed Maryland's Council of Safety that he had been mistaken in not applying to them but, believing there were no troops stationed in Annapolis, he had applied to the Baltimore Committee of Observation because he knew there were troops stationed in that city. He maintained he acted for what he took to be the common good. Typically, he concluded by assuring them that "if they suppose me capable of aiming or wishing to extend the military authority, or trespass on the civil, they do me the most cruel injustice. Although I was bred in the army, I thank God the spirit and principles of the citizen were ever predominate." "If I thought it possible I should ever be so far intoxicated by military command, as to harbour a wish injurious to the civil supremacy in all things, I would not, whilst I retain my senses, beg leave to divest myself

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[69] Ibid., 11:357, 362, 372, 373-382, 387-392; Maryland Council of Safety to the Maryland Delegates to the Continental Congress, April 22, 1776, ibid., 368-370; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:216-217; Purviance, Baltimore Town During the Revolutionary War, pp. 54-55; Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland, held at the City of Annapolis in 1774, 1775, & 1776, pp. 137-138, 143-144.

of my present office, and serve as a volunteer." He also explained his actions to Congress.[70]

In July, after the Maryland Convention had asked Eden to leave the colony the previous month, the chairman of the Maryland Council of Safety wrote Lee that the Maryland government had forgiven him, for Eden's conduct had justified his sentiment about having him seized. However, Lee was additionally informed that the manner in which he had adopted to have Eden seized was not palatable to them.[71]

Although Lee was probably the most active officer taking the Tories to task on his own authority, many others did so, including Washington. Isaac Sears, in November 1775, with a force of seventy-five horsemen, on his own authority began waging war on New York's Tories. He seized and confined several leading Tories in Westchester County, and in New York City he destroyed the printing press of the Tory printer, Rivington, Sears believed his actions would motivate New York's Provincial Congress to take actions of their own against the Tories. The Provincial Congress did not act, fearing to do so would result in civil war and social

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[70]Charles Lee to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, May 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 472-474; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, May 7, 1776, ibid., 477.

[71]Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Charles Lee, July 17, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 141.

disorder, and eventually anarchy and military tyranny.[72] On their own authority during the first months of 1776, Lord Stirling had New Jersey's royal governor, Franklin, placed under arrest, and New Jersey Colonel Nathaniel Heard seized four New York Tories and marched them off to confinement in New Jersey. The four were later returned to New York for trial and Governor Franklin was given a parole by Stirling at the insistence of Chief Justice Smythe, but was eventually arrested by Heard upon the order of the Provincial Congress.[73] Also early in 1776, the Rhode Island Assembly freed four suspected Tories General William West had confined. In doing so, they stated they would "ever approve the conduct of their military commanders, in exerting themselves for the securing and bringing to trial all persons conducting in a suspicious manner, . . . at the same time carefully observing not to encroach upon, infringe, or supersede the civil authority, by exertions of the military."[74]

Early in the war, Washington also took Tory matters into his own hands. On January 25, 1777, he issued a

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[72]Isaac Sears to Roger Sherman, Eliphalet Dyer, and Silas Deane, November 28, 1775, Feinstone Collection #1254; Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, November 26, 1775, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:176-178; Journal of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety, and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1:333,335, 343, 355.

[73]Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling, pp. 160-161; Bliven, Under the Guns, pp. 148-149, 299.

[74]Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:467-468.

proclamation requiring that anybody who had taken an oath of allegiance to the crown must either take an oath of allegiance to the United States or be treated as an enemy. He also required all who had received Lord Howe's protection passes to deliver them up to the nearest military officer or withdraw themselves and their families into the British lines. Those that failed to comply with the proclamation within thirty days were to be treated as enemies.[75] A week later, when General Parsons asked Washington what actions he should take against the Connecticut Tories with respect to an oath, Washington sent him a copy of his proclamation, suggesting he modify it for his own use.[76]

Washington's action raised two important questions. One was whether any oath be to the United States or to a particular state and the other was whether or not the military should give oaths. Upset with Washington for making the oath to Congress rather than to the states, and for violating the March 9, 1776, congressional resolution prohibiting the military from imposing or requiring oaths of citizens, two New Jersey delegates introduced a resolution in Congress on the sixth of February questioning Washington's actions and authority. One of them wrote the Speaker

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[75] Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:61-63.

[76] Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, February 3, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 78; George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, February 8, 1777, ibid.

of New Jersey's Assembly that the state should "not tamely Submit their Authority to the Controul of a power unknown in our Constitution." Washington, however, was not chastised by either Congress or New Jersey, in part because of his recent victories at Trenton and Princeton and in part because they believed Washington understood he was not to administer any more oaths. Not only was he not chastised, but a congressional committee reported on the twenty-seventh of February that "considering the situation of the Army," his action "was prudent and necessary."[77]

While Congress was debating what to do about Washington's proclamation, General Putnam, who disliked Quakers because of their neutral stand, sent an officer to Salem County, New Jersey, which was populated by many Quakers, with instructions to collect fines from persons refusing to march with New Jersey's militia. Governor Livingston, with Washington's backing, persuaded Putnam to stop this practice.[78] During 1777, Washington also persuaded the Commissary General of Prisoners from seizing a suspected

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[77]Abraham Clark to John Hart, February 8, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:243; Abraham Clark to Elias Dayton, March 7, 1777, ibid., 292; William Livingston to George Washington, February 15, 1777, Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, p. 276; Ford, JCC, 7:95, 165-166.

[78]Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, pp. 240-241; George Washington to William Livingston, February 22, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7:186-187; George Washington to Israel Putnam, February 22, 1777, ibid., 189.

Tory and chastised General De Borre for having executed a Tory for an offense not cognizable by martial law.[79] It was also in 1777 that a mob, assisted by soldiers, ran William Goddard, publisher and editor of the Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, out of town for printing what they considered unpatriotic news. Although Maryland's governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the people from associating for the purpose of taking suspected traitors to task, a mob came together again during the summer of 1779, with the assistance of Continental officers and soldiers, to threaten Goddard for publishing a piece, written by Charles Lee, critical of Washington. Although Goddard would later retract his apology to Washington, his initial apology was enough to satisfy the mob.[80]

Frequent unauthorized military actions against the Tories took place during the winter of 1777-1778, as the military seized individuals trading with the British in Philadelphia. Those seized often received corporal

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[79]Boudinot, Elias Boudinot, 1:51; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, pp. 63-64; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:230-231.

[80]William Galbraith to the Council of State, March 26, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:190; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:306-308, 308n.1, 338; Clayton Colman Hall, gen. ed., Baltimore: Its History and Its People, 3 vols. (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1912), 1:31-32, 34-35, 709; Purviance, Baltimore Town During the Revolutionary War, pp. 83-84; John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 282-283.

punishment and had their supplies confiscated.[81] Often this was done without benefit of trial, and when a trial was held, it was a court martial. The Pennsylvania government and Congress were not in a very good position to halt these actions by the military, nor were they really inclined to do so. Many citizens, however, were concerned about the military trying and punishing suspected traitors and Tories. Earlier in the war, when Roger Sherman learned that the military had executed a spy, he complained to Governor Trumbull that the spy should have been tried by the superior court of the colony, not by court martial. He reminded the governor, "We cant be too careful of military incroachments."[82]

This view was certainly shared by the Delaware Council, who, during the spring of 1778, drew up a remonstrance against Smallwood for seizing Tories and transporting them out of the state, and confining them, all without due process of law.[83] When Arnold imposed martial law in Philadelphia during June 1778, after the British evacuation, there were few objections, as most citizens realized the

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[81]Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:374; Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p. 228; George Washington to John Lacey, April 11, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:410.

[82]Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:52.

[83]Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792, pp. 213, 216-218.

necessity of it. However, several months later, when a court martial sentenced a citizen to death for treason, Chief Justice McKean and others strenuously objected, maintaining a civilian trial should have been held. The Supreme Executive Council took the matter to Congress, which ruled that a civilian trial be held and vacated the sentence of the court martial.[84]

Attacks against the Tories continued throughout the remainder of the war. They were particularly severe in the south during 1781 and 1782, and often resulted in Tory attacks against Whig citizens.[85] Even once victory was assured, the Tories continued to have their lives, properties, and liberties threatened. The military frequently intimidated the Tories at elections, trials, and during other civilian proceedings.[86] In many such instances, the civilian governments did not reprimand or punish the military, believing

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[84]Thomas McKean to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, August 22, 1778, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 11:561-562.

[85]Enos Reeves to [ ], April 16, 1782, John B. Reeves, [ed.], "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 4 (1897): 474-475; Otho [H. Williams] to [Elie Williams], June 12, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 46; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:351.

[86]Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the Revolutionary War, p. 288; William Thompson Read, Life and Correspondence of George Read (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1870), p. 325; Harold B. Hancock, ed., "The Revolutionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2 (October 1968): 165, 165n.46.

they were justified in their actions. But in many more instances the civilian governments reprimanded and punished military officers for overstepping their authority, despite justifications.

The military, with a desire not to offend the civilian authorities nor to be punished by them, generally provided justifications and excuses for their actions which had violated laws or tenets of civil supremacy. Often these excuses were simply pleading ignorance;[87] sometimes military necessity was held forth; and infrequently the military reminded the civilians that without an army there could not be a successful revolutionary war.

Frequently the military complained they could not be expected to comply with congressional and state policies, resolutions, and articles of war if they did not have copies of them.[88] "We are much in the dark with regard to the resolution of Congress," General Moultrie complained. "We

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[87]Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, April 21, 1777, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:235-236; John Sullivan to the New Hampshire General Assembly, January 18, 1776, Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:37.

[88]Hugh Mercer to Charles Lee, April 14, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 419; John Stark to William Heath, September 20, 1781, Stark, John Stark, p. 257; Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:298; [Otho Holland Williams] to Baron von Steuben, October 12, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 24.

may be guilty of errors and neglect of duty," he explained to Henry Laurens, "without the least intention of either." In asking Jefferson for a complete set of Virginia's laws, Lafayette explained they were needed so he would not interfere with the authority of "or through ignorance Be deficient in Respect to the Civil Authority."[89]

To some degree this excuse by the military was justified. For most of the war they experienced great difficulty in obtaining copies of the resolutions of Congress, as well as the state laws. This was due to the fact that both Congress and the states were dilatory in both publishing and distributing their resolutions and laws.[90]

The military also complained that the civilian leaders did not keep them informed of policies, events, and other matters which would better enable them to comply with the wishes of the civilian authorities.[91] Part of the

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[89]William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, June 5, 1778, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:217; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia, pp. 7-8.

[90]Herbert Friedenwald, "The Journals and Papers of The Continental Congress," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), 1:94-102; Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1781, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:240; George Clinton to Robert Morris, November 24, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 7:523.

[91]Lachlan McIntosh to George Washington, February 16, 1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:150-151; Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, November 4, 1779, Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio 1779-1781,"

reason for the state chief executives and legislators not adequately keeping the military informed was because they lacked the necessary staffs to perform correspondence functions; lacked funds to pay express riders; and because their governments and themselves were often incapacitated, being, in the latter instances, killed, captured, and pursued by the British army.[92] Part of the reason also can be attributed to an ineffective postal system, which subjected the mail to being lost, stolen, delayed, and captured.[93]

Most of the excuses the military used for having violated the various tenets of civil supremacy involved

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p. 109; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, March 6, 1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:212; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, August 26, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:383; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 27, 1782, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:378; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, October 10, [1775], "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 211-212; George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson, February 3, 1779, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1:315.

[92]Benjamin Harrison to George Rogers Clark, December 20, 1781, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:114; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, April 6, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:139-140; Nicholas Cooke to Nathanael Greene, July 8, 1775, RIHSC, 6 (1897): 116.

[93]Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of the Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, pp. 153-171; John C. Fitzpatrick, New Light from Some of the Original Sources of American History, pp. 237-265; Wesley Everett, The History of the United States Post Office to the Year 1829, Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 27 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924), pp. 48-67; Francis Johnston to Nathanael Greene, September 11, 1781, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, p. 247.

justifications of military necessity. From the beginning of the war, both the civilian and military leaders realized the importance of the military to their revolutionary war. Without the military, there would be no victory.[94] As Greene reminded Pennsylvania's chief executive, "The army is the great object on which all political institutions must depend ultimately."[95]

This is not to suggest the military continually violated the tenets of civil supremacy and then justified it upon military necessity, for they supported the concept of civil supremacy and, as has been discussed, attempted to comply with the desires of the civilian authorities. But there were instances when they felt justified in taking actions they knew the civilian authorities would not approve.

Greene probably offered the excuse of military necessity more than anybody else. He began doing so the first winter of the war, explaining in one instance that

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[94]John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 72-73; Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 4; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Captain [ ] Rogers to Samuel B. Webb, May 17, 1782, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:398.

[95]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, June 29, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:217; see also General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:245.

"The Great Laws of Necessity must Justify the Expedient."[96] This was with respect to the army seizing private property to supply themselves. As Quartermaster General, he would be involved in many more seizures of private property. Upon leaving that position during the summer of 1780, he wrote his friend, Joseph Reed, that

> It is impossible to carry on a war without oppressing the Inhabitants in some degrees; and however disagreeable and inconvenient it may be to the people, and to those in power, a regard to the common good and general safety will justify the measure; and th'o the people may be a little restless & impatient in the present hour, they will have reason at a future day to bless those who had resolution enough to consult and persue their true interest.[97]

As commander of the Southern Department, he certainly acted upon this belief. Late in 1780, he told North Carolina's governor that it was his wish "to pay the most sacred regard to the laws and Constitution of the State, but the emergencies of war often so pressing that it becomes necessary to invade the rights of the citizens to prevent public calamities." He promised to preserve the property of the people from unjust invasion, but reminded Governor Nash that the liberties of the people was the great object, the security of

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[96]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Same to same, January 4, 1775 [1776], Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:177.

[97]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, August 1, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:475-476.

their property a little less so. Therefore, if property was seized and the people properly informed why it had been done, Greene believed they would not mind the inconvenience.[98] During the middle of February 1781, he wrote Virginia's governor that

> Necessity has and will oblige me to take many measures to effect the removal of our Stores contrary to the established laws of the different States; the occasion must justify the measure, and I trust the Legislature will make charitable allowances accordingly. The Army is all that the States have to depend upon for their political existence. I trust therefore whatever is necessary to its support will meet their approbation.[99]

A month later, he wrote Jefferson that "civil polity must accomodate itself to the emergencys of war, or the people submit to the power of the enemy. There is no other alternative." In a more detailed explanation of military necessity, late that April, he told Jefferson that "The rights of Individuals are as dear to me as to any Man, but the safety of a community I have ever considered as an object more valuable. In War it is often impossible to conform to all the ceremonies of Law and equal justice; and to attempt it would be productive of greater misfortune to the public from the delay than all the inconveniencies which individuals may

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[98]Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 6, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:552, 551.

[99]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, February 15, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:616.

suffer." That summer he made a similar explanation of actual and expected misconduct to Governor Nelson.[100]

As one might expect, General Lee often cited military necessity as justification for his unauthorized actions. Early in 1776, he wrote Congress that "These are times when it is impossible, without great danger to the publick cause, to wait for formal instructions; but as I shall never take this liberty, unless urged by necessity, and a view to the public service, I flatter myself I shall never incure the censure of Congress." A few months later, when he took unauthorized actions in Virginia, he wrote the president of their committee of safety "there are occasions when the necessity will excuse deviations, and this I hope will appear to the Committee to be one of these occasions." Later that year, he wrote the president of the Massachusetts Council that "Affairs appear in so important a crisis" that even the resolves of Congress should not always be followed. "We must save the community in spite of the ordinances of the Legislature. There are times when we must commit treason against the laws of the State for the salvation of the State. The

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[100]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, March 31, 1781, ibid., 5:302; Same to same [April 28, 1781], ibid., 568; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr., July 18, 1781, "Original Documents," MN 6, no. 4 (October 1907): 242.

present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of treason."[101]

Other officers, such as Generals Sullivan, Stephens, McIntosh, and McDougall, justified their unauthorized impressing on military necessity.[102] Staff officers responsible for supplies also justified their actions on military necessity. As a Deputy Quartermaster General told Pennsylvania's chief executive, after having impressed illegally, "You may be assured I will not incroach upon the Rights of Civil Authority, & exert Military force but in Cases that will not admit the Delay of an Application to you."[103]

Congress and the state governments often accepted the excuses and justifications and did not reprimand or punish the offending officers. It is important to remember

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[101]Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, February 27, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 331; Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, ibid., 469; Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts Council, November 22, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 303.

[102]John Sullivan to the President of the Council of Massachusetts, August 1, 1778, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:163; Minutes of the Maryland Council, October 5, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives, 12:232-324; Lachlan McIntosh to Archibald Steele, October 19, 1778, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 146; Lachlan McIntosh to the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, October 21, 1778, ibid., p. 147; Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, January 20, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 154.

[103]Jonathan Mifflin to Thomas Wharton, September 7, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:596; see also Charles Pettit to William Livingston, June 19, 1777, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, From 1776 to 1786, pp. 70-71.

that the civilian leaders were practical men, who realized that their principles relating to civil supremacy and civilian control would have to be bent or broken in order for the war to be won. Thus, they frequently allowed the military to take unauthorized actions, as long as such actions were infrequent, not long-lasting, did not question the dignity and ultimate authority of the civil authorities, and as long as the military acknowledged their wrong-doing. Congress certainly operated in this manner.

Congress often let the military take unauthorized actions without reprimanding or punishing them. Washington, for instance, without consulting Congress, on September 2, 1775, issued orders creating a Continental Navy and during October appointed prize agents. By the end of October his fleet had made several prizes. It was at that time Washington informed Congress of his actions. Congress, probably assured by their committee at camp of the necessity of his actions, approved his conduct. It probably did not hurt Washington naming three of his ships after the congressional committee to camp.[104]

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[104]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, October 5, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:11-12; Same to same, October 12, 1775, ibid., 23; Washington's Instructions to John Glover and Stephen Moylan, October 4, 1775, ibid., 6-7; Donald W. Beattie and J. Richard Collins, Washington's New England Fleet: Beverly's Role in its Origins, 1775-77, pp. iii, 1-2; William Bell Clark, George Washington's Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England Waters, pp. 3-6, 22-34; Ford, JCC, 3:364, 375.

Although Congress did not approve their actions, they certainly did not reprimand Washington or Greene for not investigating Gates' conduct at Camden as they had ordered. Congress also overlooked violations of their resolution of the fall of 1778 which prohibited soldiers and officers from performing in or attending the theater. This was probably because the military were often accompanied to the theater by members of Congress.[105] Congress also generally overlooked commanding officers, such as Schuyler, Montgomery, and McIntosh, who made unauthorized appointments of line and staff officers. In part, this was because Congress understood the military necessity, knowing to obtain congressional approval would take weeks or months, and because those making the appointments notified Congress of the fact, generally with the understanding that Congress would make the appointment permanent or would appoint someone else.[106] Congress was not, however, so generous with

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[105]William Croghan to Barnard Gratz, March 4, 1779, "Notes and Queries," HM 1, no. 6 (June 1857): 180; Lieutenant Enos Reeves to [ ], September [ ], 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897): 83; Samuel Adams to Samuel Phillips Savage, October 17, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:451-452.

[106]Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1683; Lachlan McIntosh to George Washington, February 16, 1776, White, Historical Collections of Georgia, p. 93; Don R. Gerlach, "Philip Schuyler and 'The Road to Glory': A Question of Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4 (October 1965): 350.

respect to a string of appointments Lee made during the spring of 1776 on his way south to take command of that department. Upon learning of his appointments, Richard Henry Lee wrote the general that Congress had "a jealous eye" with respect to "every instance of deviation (in a Military or Naval Commander) from the line of instructions, and every undertaking productive of expense which is not warranted by express of Congress." He reminded Lee that "the spirit of liberty is a jealous spirit, and that Senators are not always wise and candid, but that frequently they are governed by envy, enmity, and a great variety of bad passions." Therefore, where prudent, and where the common cause would not be threatened by delay, he suggested Lee obtain consent of Congress to make such appointments or simply make recommendations to Congress.[107]

There were many times when Congress did not ignore civil supremacy by the military, especially when it appeared the military were questioning a decision made by Congress, or its authority. Early in the summer of 1777, Knox, Greene, and Sullivan publicly announced they would resign rather

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[107]Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, March 21, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 360; Same to same, April 19, 1776, ibid., 434; Same to same, July 2, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 109-110; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee, April 12, 1776, ibid., 4 (1872): 416; Charles Lee to George Washington, July 1, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 102, 102-103; Richard Henry Lee to Charles Lee, May 11, 1776, ibid., 24, 25.

than have Congress appoint du Coudray head of the Continental artillery.[108] Some members of Congress shared their desire that Congress not acknowledge the agreement made in France between Silas Deane and du Coudray, but they believed the generals should have complained privately to individual members of Congress, rather than writing Congress in such a public and threatening manner. John Adams told Greene that the du Coudray problem was "one of the most delicate and perplexing Transactions that has ever fallen in our Way; but those three Letters instead of relieving Us has only encreased our Mortification." Adams informed him that not one member of Congress justified their letters, and very few could say a word in mitigation or excuse. "It was universally considered, as betraying the Liberties of the People, to pass them by uncensured. Some were even for dismissing all three of you instantly from the service, others for ordering you to Philadelphia, under arrest to answer for this offense." What Congress did do was give them the option of apologizing for questioning congressional

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[108] Henry Knox to the President of the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777, [copy], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #4); Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL; John Sullivan to the President of the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:403.

authority or resign. They apologized.[109] Three years later, Greene apologized again for having written a letter to Congress which that body considered improper, one member describing it as being "very insolant" in nature.[110]

During the summer of 1780, in the process of attempting to resign as Quartermaster General, Greene wrote Congress a letter he admitted contained "more tartness . . . than was prudent."[111] A congressional committee on the third of August reported that Greene's letter had been written in "very exceptional terms" and suggested he apologize. Two days later, the committee suggested Greene be relieved from duty. But, as Congress was busy with other matters and, as it was assumed by most members that Greene had or would acknowledge his letter may have been improper, Congress

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[109] John Adams to Nathanael Greene, July 7, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:404, 405; James Lovell to William Whipple, July 7, 1777, ibid., 403; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, July 7, 1777, ibid., 405-406; Same to same, July 8, 1777, ibid., 408; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, July 13, 1777, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #4); Ford, JCC, 8:537, 553-554; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, July 19, 1777, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:422-426.

[110] John Fell Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 4:292-293.

[111] Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, August [ ], 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:336; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, July 26, 1780, ibid., 314-316; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene, July 29, 1780, ibid., 320; Same to same, August 1, 1780, ibid., 322; Joseph Jones to George Washington, August 7, 1780, ibid., 327-328; John Cox to Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1780, ibid., 324.

allowed Greene to remain in the army, postponing the question of his conduct to another day. That day never arrived, as Greene went on to successes as commanding general of the Southern Department.[112]

Other generals risking the ire of Congress by their letters were Schuyler and Lee. The latter offended Congress when, after being taken prisoner, he wrote Congress requesting a committee of Congress visit him to arrange his release and discuss other matters. Congress refused, treating Lee's letter with what Elias Boudinot called deserved contempt.[113] Schuyler's letter had a stronger response. Upset Congress had removed the surgeon of the Northern Department in January 1777, Schuyler wrote Congress, suggesting he should have been notified or the reasons as he had appointed him. Most members of Congress, believing Schuyler's letter questioned their authority, on the fifteenth of March, resolved that Schuyler's letter had been highly derogatory and suggested that in the future he write them in a style more suitable to their dignity. Shortly thereafter, Gates was sent north to replace Schuyler who, elected as a delegate to Congress, arrived in Philadelphia in April to plead his

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[112]Charles Pettit to Nathanael Greene, August 20, 1780, ibid., 2:334-335; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene, [August 20, 1780], Burnett, LMCC, 5:323; Ford, JCC, 17:690-691, 697.

[113]Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections, p. 73.

case for reinstatement. In the process of pleading his case, he explained his letter had not meant to question or challenge the authority of Congress. Accepting this explanation, Congress, on May 15, 1777, reinstated him in command of the Northern Department.[114]

It was not just the generals who were threatened with reprimand and punishment for questioning the authority of Congress. For example, early in 1776, a major was made to apologize to Congress for having abused them for not giving him a higher rank. Additionally, naval officers ran afoul of Congress. Late in 1777, when the congressional naval committee instructed Captain Barry to sink his fleet in the Delaware, he lost his temper and demonstrated his insubordination to committee member Francis Hopkinson who had been sent to oversee the operation. When Hopkinson reported the incident to Congress, they resolved on February 21, 1778, that Barry had twenty days to acknowledge his wrongdoing or be relieved. Apparently acknowledgment

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[114]Philip Schuyler to the President of the Continental Congress, February 4, 1777, Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:165; see also ibid., 1:347; John Hancock to Philip Schuyler, March 18, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:304; William Duer to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid., 377; James Duane to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid., 387; Harvey E. Brown, The Medical Department of the United States Army from 1775 to 1873, pp. 21-23, 26, Ford, JCC, 8:336, 364; 8:375.

was made, for Barry was not punished or relieved.[115]

Besides threatening punishment, Congress simply exercised their prerogative to dismiss officers who violated the tenets of civil supremacy. During the summer of 1777, twelve naval lieutenants were ordered dismissed for making an improper demand for an increase in pay. The following summer, a lieutenant was ordered dismissed for opening packages from the British commissioners addressed to Congress.[116]

Early in 1777, John Trumbull, upset with the congressional decision of not making his commission as deputy adjutant general of the Northern Department effective the date he assumed that position, informed Congress that he wanted his commission backdated or they could accept his resignation. Congress immediately accepted the resignation. James Lovell, afterwards, wrote Trumbull that "Congress is greatly piqued at the style and manner of your demand." Similarly, Elbridge Gerry wrote Trumbull's brother that although the claim was proper, he could not altogether

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[115]Richard Smith Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 1:381-382; Ford, JCC, 4:188, 190; 10:189; "Memorials of the Revolutionary Navy," HM 3, no. 7 (July 1859): 202-204; George Everett Hastings, The Life and Works of Francis Hopkinson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 222-223, 225-226.

[116]Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, July 25, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:423-424; Orderly Book, First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:327.

approve the style in which the legislative authority of the continent was addressed. "It is the fixed Determination of Congress," he wrote, "to preserve the civil above the military, and the authority of that will not be surrendered, should it be necessary to disband the army in preserving the same."[117] It should not be surprising that Generals Lee and Conway, particularly the former, would eventually run afoul of Congress and be dismissed from service.

While Lee was suspended from command during 1779, he frequently questioned the propriety of the French alliance. This upset many members of Congress; so much so that, on December 4, 1779, one day before his suspension was to expire, it was moved and seconded that he not be taken back into service. Despite the motion being defeated, Lee, upset that Congress even considered dismissing him, wrote them an insulting letter expressing his displeasure. Congress responded by dismissing him, and refusing to change the decision despite Lee's explanations and apologies.[118]

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[117] James Lovell to John Trumbull, March 22, 1777, John Trumbull, Autobiography, Reminiscences and Letters of John Trumbull, from 1756 to 1841, pp. 43-45; John Trumbull to the President of the Continental Congress, February 22, 1777, ibid., p. 36; John Trumbull to James Lovell, February 22, 1777, ibid., pp. 40-42; Same to same, March 30, 1777, ibid., p. 46; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL, Ford, JCC, 5:753; 7:176, 185, 187, 281.

[118] Ibid., 15:1348-1349; 16:33-34; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, January 30, 1780, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 6 (1874): 407-409; Same to

Conway suffered a similar fate, when he attempted to resign early in 1778. Henry Laurens, on the first of May, reported to South Carolina's chief executive that Conway "lately for the second time taunted Congress by an application for leave to resign his Commission, and in notes so extremely rough as secured a Majority of 8 States of 9 in his favor." Indeed, with only four delegates supporting Conway, Congress, on April 28, 1778, accepted his resignation, and did not relent despite his subsequent attempts to be reinstated.[119]

Although Conway had his difficulties with Congress, he did not have trouble with any of the state governments. In this he was somewhat unique among the Continental generals. Most of them, and many other officers, at one time or another, ran afoul of the state governments with respect to violations to the tenets of civil supremacy. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the military often became engaged in difficulties with the state governments because of plundering, impressing and improperly dealing with the Tories. They also had their difficulties with respect to questions of authority and minor procedural points. The remainder of

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same, April 22, 1780, ibid., 423-426; John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 259-260, 282-283, 285.

[119]Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, May 1, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:211; Ford, JCC, 10:399; 11:536, 567.

this chapter will explain what the military did to irritate the state governments, and how the latter responded.

During the first two years of the war, there was much confusion among the army, the state forces, Congress, and the provincial and state governments with respect to their authority. As a result, the military often took actions which the provincial and state governments considered challenging their authority. As one might have guessed, the general who had the most difficulties with the provincial governments the first two years of the war was Charles Lee.

Throughout 1776 Lee antagonized the provincial governments of New York, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, as he consciously and unconsciously took unauthorized actions. The latter two instances, relating to impressing, quartering, and making war upon the Tories, have already been discussed, and it should be noted that, although Lee was not formally reprimanded by the provincial governments, they nevertheless made it perfectly clear that they would not tolerate repeat offenses. In the confusion of authority between Congress and the New York provincial government, Lee, during his short stay in New York state frequently offended the government, as he authorized actions the civilians believed they only had authorization to approve. Before a major confrontation took place between the general and the provincial congress, Lee was reassigned to the southward. Three months later, Lee had

similar difficulties in South Carolina, with similar results. Before a major confrontation took place, Lee vacated the state. Lee offended the North Carolina government by authorizing Georgia and South Carolina officers to fill up their battalions by enlisting troops from North Carolina then serving in Georgia and South Carolina. The civilian leaders were so upset with Lee's action that they had the legislature pass a resolution condemning his action and recalled their troops back to North Carolina.[120]

Although Lee was probably the general who most often consciously or unintentionally offended civilian leaders early in the war, he was by no means the only general having difficulty with the provincial congresses. Artemas Ward inadvertently offended the Massachusetts Committee of Safety during the latter part of June 1775 when he issued orders informing his officers who needed arms for their men to make application to the committee of safety. Taking a provincial congress resolution literally, he added that "the committee of safety are hereby ordered to deliver out arms to such commanding officers as make application to them for the

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[120]Bliven, Under the Guns, pp. 84-186; "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 234-352 passim; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:280; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 140-141; Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 15, 1777, Clark, NCSR, 11:357; Saunders, NCCR, 10:795-796, 858-859, 880; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 80, 80-81n.20.

same." The committee of safety reprimanded Ward, and despite his assurances that he had not meant to set the military above the civilian government, they complained to the provincial congress "that it is of vast importance that no orders are issued by the military, or obeyed by the civil power, but only such as are directed by the honorable representative body of the people, from whom all military and civil power originates." They stated they were satisfied with Ward's explanation of the misunderstanding, and that he "does not mean or intend to set up the military power above the civil, yet lest this order of the general, should be adduced as a precedent in future, we think it our indispensable duty to protest against the general's said order." Agreeing, the provincial congress made Ward reword his order.[121] Such misunderstandings continued throughout the war.

Another source of confusion, as well as a constant source of irritation between the civilian and military leaders was the matter of flags of truce under which people and goods moved between the American and British camps. The military generally viewed flags as a means by which unscrupulous men were able to trade with the enemy and thus, they frequently undertook operations to prevent their use,

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[121] Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, pp. 579, 580.

even when they had been properly authorized by the civilian governments. These actions, as well as those instances when the military authorized flags without civilian knowledge or approval, upset the state governments.[122] Because of the ill feelings surrounding the use of flags, Washington and his subordinates often issued instructions and reminders to their officers, stressing the need to be cognizant of the rules of each state governing flags, and to cooperate with the state executives in the issuance and use of them.[123] Despite such orders, the matter of flags continued to be a problem till the end of the war, as the military viewed flags as a military function, and the civilians viewed them as coming within their purview.[124]

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[122]Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, March 8, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:98-99; Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, March 10, 1781, ibid., 117-119; George Clinton to William Denning, November 29, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:377; George Clinton to William Heath, November 29, 1779, ibid., 378-379; Same to same, December 2, 1779, ibid., 393-394; William Heath to George Clinton, December 2, 1779, ibid., 390-391; Same to same, December 3, 1779, ibid., 397.

[123]George Washington to Alexander McDougall, November 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13: 321; George Washington to Israel Putnam, November 27, 1778, ibid., 341, George Washington to William Maxwell, January 7, 1779, ibid., 483; Instructions to Samuel H. Parsons, December 13, 1779, ibid., 17:257; George Washington to Benedict Arnold, August 13, 1780, ibid., 19:370; George Washington to Elias Dayton, March 28, 1782, ibid., 24:92; Instructions to John Greaton, June 14, 1782, ibid., 340.

[124]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, April 9, 1783, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 86, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to [Otho Holland Williams], April 11, 1783, Calendar

The return of captured property was another source of confusion of authority. General Greene and the South Carolina government, who had their problems over the matter of flags, were also at odds on the matter of the return of captured property. In 1782, the governor and council demanded that Greene return to private ownership horses that Kosciuszko had carried off during a raid on James Island. Rather than give the horses to citizens who claimed the British had taken them from them, Greene wanted to auction the horses, and use the money to support the army. Congress finally adjudicated the matter by ruling that the recaptured property be returned to its original owner after one-fourth of the value of the horses was given to the army.[125]

Another source of difficulty between the military and the state governments involved the question of whether

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of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 80; Nathanael Greene to the Sheriff of Charleston, April 6, 1783, Adele Stanton Edwards, Journals of the Privy Council 1783-1789 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press for the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1971), p. 16; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, April 6, 1783, ibid., pp. 16-18; Minutes of a Council of War, April 7, 1783, ibid., pp. 22-26; Minutes of the Privy Council, April 9, 1783, ibid., pp. 19-21, 27-28.

[125]Nathanael Greene to John Mathews, October 22, 1782, Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution, Polish Institute, ser. no. 4 (New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1943), p. 132; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, pp. 662-664; Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Founding Father, p. 74; Ford, JCC, 23:825-827.

or not soldiers should be turned over to state courts to face civilian charges. Although the military generally resisted turning over soldiers to state courts, they usually complied with a court order to do so. But not always. When they resisted, the state government normally exerted itself. Early in the war, when Colonel Gilman refused to turn one of his soldiers over to the civil magistrate, stating that soldiers were only subject to military law, the New Hampshire legislature resolved that Gilman "is ignorant of the Laws & received Rules & Regulations always practiced in the English Constitution; and the military Power setting up an authority uncontrollable by the Civil magistrate is Subversive of Laws, Rights & Privileges of Englishmen, and what our inveterate Enemies never attempted." Gilman was made to appear before the General Assembly, and the situation was resolved to the satisfaction of the civilians.[126]

Inadvertent violations of civil supremacy and debates over authority were generally resolved without too many recriminations and with the civilians generally successfully exerting the principle of civil supremacy. Not so were the

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[126]Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:182, 190; Robert Gorden to Philip Schuyler, August 4, 1775, Howard Swiggett, War out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers, p. 56; John Stark to George Clinton, [ ], 1781, Stark, John Stark, pp. 213-214; John Stark to William Heath, September 11, 1781, ibid., p. 248; Division Orders, First Pennsylvania Orderly Book, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, pp. 364, 366.

more direct violations of civil supremacy. Throughout the war, civilians complained about the military trampling on civilian authority.[127] This was particularly true on the frontier, where the military acted forcefully where the civilian government was weak.[128] Frequently the civilian authorities, because of the weakened condition of their government, did not respond to military violations of civilian authority.[129] Additionally, they often overlooked

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[127]John Dowdney et al. to Thomas Wharton, July 26, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:111-112; Joseph Donaldson et al. to Thomas Wharton, August 6, 1777, ibid., 1st ser., 5:496; Thomas Burke to John Rutledge, March 6, 1782, (extract) Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, 3:265-266; John Davenport to Joshua Huntington, January 28, 1779, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 111; Same to same, February 3, 1779, ibid., 114; Same to same, February 28, 1779, ibid., 123-124.

[128]Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 83-89; Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 234-238; The Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Rogers, November 10, 1780, ibid., p. 208; Same to same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Memorial of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to Mottin de la Balme, September 29, 1780, ibid., pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd, October 17, 1780, ibid., p. 195; Richard McCarty to John Todd, September 18, 1779, Alvord, "Cahokia Records 1778-1790," pp. 614-615; Richard McCarthy to John Montgomery, September 19, 1779, ibid., p. 616; Memorial of the Inhabitants of Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21, 1780, ibid., pp. 537, 543, 545; John Todd to Thomas Jefferson, January 24, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1:460; Richard McCarthy to John Todd, October 14, 1780, ibid., 380; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of Illinois 1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections, 5 (1908): 19-20.

[129]Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, pp. 89-90; John W. Jackson, The Pennsylvania Navy, 1775-1781: The Defense of the Delaware, pp. 62-66.

violations when they believed them necessary. Such were the instances when Washington had citizens around his Morristown camp innoculated against smallpox and when he seized money the Massachusetts legislature had sent to pay their troops and used it to pay for the transportation of supplies.[130]

Most violations of civil supremacy, however, were met with prompt civilian action. The offending party was generally informed that such violations would not be tolerated, and often this notification was accompanied by a reprimand. Thus, one officer was reprimanded by the Pennsylvania Council of Safety for having violated the privacy of bawdy houses in the process of searching for deserters. Three years later, the Pennsylvania government rebuked Colonel Brodhead for his conduct toward the civilian authorities of Westmoreland County. Earlier in the war, when Arnold refused to cooperate with a committee the Massachusetts Provincial Congress sent to oversee the military activities at Fort Ticonderoga, the committee chastised him and forced him to resign his commission. In 1775, the New Hampshire Committee of Safety reprimanded Sullivan for suggesting the military were better qualified to appoint

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[130] Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1:320; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 1, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 22:21; John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799, 2:208.

officers than the provincial congress. When he went ahead and made appointments without authorization, New Hampshire sent a committee to Washington to complain about Sullivan usurping their authority. Learning the government was not pleased with his actions, Sullivan assured them of his subordinate position in a letter that could have been couched in more conciliatory terms. Nevertheless, the committee of safety decided not to take disciplinary actions against him.[131]

Offenses against the civilian governments, such as Sullivan's, were often more directly addressed by the civilian authorities, than offenses against the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. Generally, the state governments were greatly irritated when the military

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[131]Brooke Hindle, David Rittenhouse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 176-177; Joseph Reed to Daniel Brodhead, February 14, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:466-467; Samuel Mott to Jonathan Trumbull, June 30, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1140; Same to same, July 6, 1775, ibid., 1592; Walter Spooner to the President and Members of the New York Convention, July 3, 1775, ibid., 1539-1540; Walter Spooner to Jonathan Trumbull, July 3, 1775, ibid., 1540-1541; Walter Spooner's Report to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, July 6, 1775, ibid., 1596-1598; The New Hampshire Committee of Safety to John Sullivan, September 28, 1775, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:92; Same to same, October 10, 1775, ibid., 107; John Sullivan to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, September 29, 1775, ibid., 96, 96-97; Same to same, October 4, 1775, ibid., 101; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:48, 54, 56, 118; John Sullivan to the New Hampshire General Assembly, January 18, 1776, ibid., 37; John Sullivan to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, March 14, 1776, ibid., 92-93.

made improper suggestions, did not keep them informed, and when they verbally or physically abused members of the government. Of a more serious nature, which will be discussed in the next chapter, were instances where the military interfered with the political, electoral, governmental, and judicial processes.

Civilian leaders often complained about the lack of information received from their military commanders.[132] They and Congress both urged military leaders to keep them informed of their plans and actions, reminding them of their obligation to do so. Some officers were even reprimanded for not doing so, such as William Smallwood, who was taken to task by the Maryland state convention during the fall of 1776 for not reporting to them in a timely manner.[133]

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[132]William Hooper to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., August 6, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:40; Cornelius Harnett to William Wilkinson, December 8, 1777, ibid., 584; John Banister to George Washington, April 16, 1778, ibid., 3:169; Pierce Butler to James Irdell, April 6, 1782, Griffith J. McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Irdell, One of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 2:9; John Adams to Abigail Adams, August 30, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:114; Same to same, September 22, 1776, ibid., 131; Same to same, October 8, 1776, ibid., 140.

[133]William Smallwood to Mathew Tilghman, October 12, 1776, David Ridley, ed., Annals of Annapolis, Comprising Sundry Notices of that Old City from the Period of the First Settlement in its Vicinity in the Year of 1649, Until the War of 1812; Together with Various Incidents in the History of Maryland (Baltimore: Cushing and Brother, 1841), pp. 256-257; see also Thomas Burke and Henry Laurens to George Washington, March 15, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:104-105; Thomas Nelson to Nathanael Greene, September 5, 1781, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:35; Benjamin Harrison to George Rogers Clark, October 14, 1782, ibid., 340.

As has and will be discussed, the military frequently took the opportunity to keep the civilians advised of their needs, plans, and actions, as well as occasionally offering political suggestions. Political suggestions were generally made in an informal manner, and when they were formally made, they were usually done so with apologies and explanations, generally to the effect that military and political questions were blended and that the exigencies of the moment demanded they go out of their province to make such suggestions.[134]

As one might have assumed, Charles Lee often made such political suggestions. In giving Congress his views on Howe's peace overtures, he voiced his hope they would not think him impertinent and presuming, but would attribute his views to his "anxiety and zeal for the publick welfare." Similarly, in his giving his views to Rhode Island's chief executive about the selection and quality of New England generals, he stated, "I must entreat you not to impute the freedom with which I shall offer my thought upon this occasion, to a petulance of disposition, but to the most

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[134]Hugh Mercer to the President of the Continental Congress, September 4, 1776, Force, American Achives, 5th ser., 2:158; Robert Howe to John Rutledge, October 6, 1776, Hemphill, Journals of the General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780, p. 130; William Moultrie to Rawlins Lowndes, November 14, 1778, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:241-242; Rufus Putnam to Jeremiah Powell, April 22, 1780, (copy), Buell, Rufus Putnam, pp. 145-146.

pure and disinterested zeal."[135] Washington was hesitant early in the war to publicly express himself on political topics, but by 1780, he increasingly did so, always explaining why he was stepping into the political realm and asking that he not be thought impertinent.[136]

Most suggestions of a political nature were received without charges that the military were violating the principle of civil supremacy. However, certain subjects did cause the civilians unrest. One such was the impost. Washington's circular to the states calling for support of the impost was not well received in Virginia, nor was Greene's letter to South Carolina's chief executive calling on him to have the legislature support the impost.[137] Greene wrote that his letter was met with "some alarm and much disgust," and

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[135]Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, October 10, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 260; Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, December 7, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:111; see also Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, January 22, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 247, 249.

[136]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:413; Same to same, January 30, 1783, ibid., 26:82; Circulars to the States, October 18, 1780, January 22, 1782, May 4[-8], 1782, and June 8, 1783, MHSC, 5th ser., 10:212, 258; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:237; 26:486.

[137]Edmund Randolph to James Madison, June 28, 1783, ibid., 491n.30; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 8, 1783, Autograph Letters of General Nathanael Greene, 1:27, WLCL.

caused the legislature to reject immediately the impost. Despite subsequent apologies, Greene was widely condemned in South Carolina, and was frequently referred to as a Cromwell.[138]

Upsetting the civilian leaders even more than improper suggestions were those instances where the military verbally or physically abused civilian authorities, as well as those instances where the military insulted the state governments. Such abuses and insults were generally acknowledged and punished. With respect to insulting governments, during the May 1775 session of the Connecticut Assembly, a captain was cashiered for speaking contemptuously of the General Assembly's measures. John Stark avoided a similar fate the first winter of the war, after having written what he described as warm and illiberal reflections upon some of the members of the New Hampshire Provincial Congress. He was saved from being punished by asking forgiveness, stating the remarks came from passion not from settled design, and subsequently making the same acknowledgement of wrong-doing to a military court of inquiry. Later

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[138]Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:252; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 15, 1783, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 4:4; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 14, 1783, Autograph Letters of General Nathanael Greene, 1:29, WLCL; Captain [ ] to Nathanael Greene, April 9, 1783, ibid., 2:64; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, pp. 690-694.

in the war, General Maxwell came very close to being disciplined by the New Jersey legislature, after having written them a letter they considered as containing indecent and undeserved reflections upon themselves. Not so fortunate was Commodore Oliver Bowen, commander of Georgia's navy, who was suspended from command in 1778 for having written an insulting letter to Governor Houston.[139]

Physical abuses were also generally acknowledged and punished. This was particularly true in Pennsylvania where Chief Justice McKean and President Reed did not tolerate the military physically abusing the civilian authorities in any manner whatsoever. McKean and Reed were quite upset with the military during 1778 and 1779 as the state's attorney general was beaten up three times by

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[139]Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 15:54; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:71, 96; Stephen Moylan to Matthew Thornton, February 7, 1776, ibid., 70; John Sullivan to the Court of New Hampshire, January 17, 1776, ibid., 32; Samuel Hobart to the New Hampshire Provincial Congress, January 1, 1776, Lawrence Shaw Mayo, "Colonel John Stark at Winter Hill, 1775," PMHS 57 (October 1923-June 1924): 331-333; William Maxwell, April 25, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 146-148; Isaac S. Mulford, History of New Jersey. Civil and Political, p. 457n.11; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:78-88, 92, 118-119; Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789, pp. 111-112.

military officers.[140] McKean himself was even struck by General William Thompson, who believed McKean and Congress had not been aggressive enough in getting him exchanged while he was a prisoner of war. When Thompson was called before Congress on November 20, 1778, to answer for his conduct, he admitted he had called McKean a rascal and a villain, but denied being disrespectful to Congress. After much debate, Congress, late in December, ordered Thompson to apologize to Congress, which he did. But when the apology appeared in print, it contained the accusation that McKean was a coward. Although a duel was discussed, McKean settled the matter by taking Thompson to court for libel and won a judgment in the amount of £5,700, which he declined taking.[141]

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[140]Thomas Wharton to Thomas McKean, February 15, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 6:266-267; Joseph Reed to George Washington, May 8, 1779, ibid., 7:382; Nathanael Greene to Thomas McKean, June 3, 1778, Coleman, Thomas McKean, p. 225; Thomas McKean to Nathanael Greene, June 9, 1778, ibid., p. 225; Roberdeau Buchanan, Life of Hon. Thomas McKean (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Inquirer Printing Company, 1890), p. 60.

[141]Ford, JCC, 12:1146-1147, 1148, 1149, 1151-1152, 1153, 1161, 1199, 1200, 1227, 1239, 1249-1250; Nathaniel Scudder to Richard Henry Lee, December 9, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:523; Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, December 16, 1778, ibid., 537; William Thompson to Joseph Reed, January 7, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:262-263; G. S. Howe, "A Valuable Acquisition in Congress: Thomas McKean, Delegate from Delaware to the Continental Congress, 1774-1783," PH 38, no. 3 (July 1971): 234n.20; The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser, December 29, 31, 1779.

The Pennsylvania courts also took two other officers to task for striking public officials. Upset at being asked at the 1782 election poll to show his certificate of having taken the oath to the Constitution, Thomas Proctor assaulted the poll inspector, maintaining that as a veteran he considered demonstrating a certificate an insult. Brought to trial, Judge McKean fined him £80, stating "You gentlemen of the army hold your head too high, but I will bring you down, we shall be overrun else." At the same term of the court, Colonel Francis Nicholas was fined £50 for assaulting a member of the council.[142]

When a state government was unable to have a Continental officer acknowledge his wrongdoing, or when they were unable to properly chastise or punish him, or when they believed Congress should administer the rebuke, they called upon Congress to determine the degree of guilt and the appropriate punishment. Thus, upon the complaint of the Pennsylvania government, Pulaski, for resisting the serving of a writ upon him by the Sheriff of Philadelphia County, was ordered during the fall of 1778 to submit to the state authority and was informed Congress was determined to resent any opposition made by any officer to the civil

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[142] The Independent Gazetteer, October 1, 1782, Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:426.

authority.[143] Already, the previous year, Congress had resolved that it would "discountenance and punish any indecent behaviour of any officer . . . towards the civil authority of the several states." Such a statement would be made again during 1779.[144] And Congress was true to its word, as many officers were reprimanded and punished by them for their actions against the state governments and state officials.

Late in April 1777, Congress received complaints from Maryland that naval Captain James Nicholson had impressed citizens of their state and had been disrespectful to the civil authority of the state when queried about his actions. Congress, believing Nicholson had acted improperly, suspended him, giving him five days to provide such satisfaction as the governor and council of Maryland shall accept, and failing that, he was to be dismissed from the navy. In giving him this ultimatum, one member of Congress wrote that it had been done so as to "convince officers that they were very inferior to the Magistrates of States, and must treat them with the most profound respect." Nicholson made amends

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[143] Samuel Adams to James Warren, October 20, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:458-459; Ford, JCC, 12:974.

[144] Ibid., 8:656; 13:413.

with the Maryland state officials and Congress lifted his suspension.[145]

Later that year, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Carrington faced a similar dismissal, for having unduly attempted to influence the Virginia government's appointment of officers for the Virginia Continental regiment of artillery. Upon Governor Henry's complaint, Congress gave Carrington five days to apologize to the governor or be dismissed. Carrington complied. The following year, as has already been discussed, General Thompson was forced by Congress to apologize to Chief Justice McKean for having verbally and physically abused him.[146]

Benedict Arnold and his aide-de-camp, Matthew Clarkson, after the former became military commander of Philadelphia, constantly ran afoul of the Pennsylvania

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[145]Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, May 2, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:354; William Paca to the Governor and Council of Maryland, May 24, 1777, ibid., 372; Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Purviance, May 3, 1777, ibid., 372n.3; Maryland Council to James Nicholson, April 24, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:226-227; Same to same, May 8, 1777, ibid., 244; Maryland Council to the President of the Continental Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 229-230; Maryland Council to the Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 230; Robert Morris to Thomas Johnson, May 1, 1777, ibid., 237; Thomas Johnson to William Paca, May 29, 1777, ibid., 264; James Nicholson to Thomas Johnson, April 25, 1777, Beverly W. Bond, Jr., "State Government in Maryland 1777-1781," p. 22, Ford, JCC, 7:312, 318; 8:665.

[146]Ibid., 8:655-656, 675; 11:527-529; 12:1146-1147, 1148, 1149, 1151-1152, 1153, 1161, 1199, 1200, 1227, 1239, 1249-1250, 1250-1255.

government. When that government had no success in curbing what they considered violations of civil supremacy by the two officers, they turned to Congress. When Congress learned that Clarkson had been disrespectful to the Pennsylvania government, they suspended Clarkson on February 18, 1779, and a week later resolved they would "not countenance any military officer in disrespectful conduct to the civil magistracy."[147] Clarkson offered to serve in the southern theater as a volunteer and was allowed to do so, but before leaving, he was called before Congress late in March and reprimanded.[148]

With respect to Arnold, the Pennsylvania government formally complained to Congress during February 1779, charging the general with profiteering and misconduct towards the Pennsylvania government. Two months later, after an acrimonious debate, Congress ordered Washington to have Arnold court-martialed. Eventually, during January 1780, a court-martial found Arnold guilty of being "imprudent and improper" in using public wagons to transport his personal property and having given permission for a ship to leave Philadelphia without permission of the state authorities,

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[147] Ibid., 13:250, 206, 249-250.

[148] Ibid., 360-362, 363; Donald W. Whisenhunt, [ed.], Delegate from New Jersey: The Journal of John Fell, pp. 60-61, 61.

and was ordered reprimanded by Washington. Congress approved the sentence and he was reprimanded during April 1780.[149]

Arnold, as we know, was so dissatisfied with the civilian authorities, that within six months of his reprimand, he switched sides. Many American officers and soldiers shared Arnold's dissatisfaction with the civilian authorities, and with the American people, as has been discussed in the preceding chapter, but few joined Arnold in becoming traitors. Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, many American soldiers violated the principles of civil supremacy, as well as the liberties and properties of the people they were fighting to defend. The next chapter will show how the military, dissatisfied with the American revolutionary governments, including Congress, attempted to influence, change, and even overthrow them. Like the Puritans of English Revolution, many in the military, and some civilian leaders, believed the military offered the only hope of guiding the revolution to a successful conclusion.

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[149]Nathanael Greene to [ ], July 25, 1778, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:103; John Cadwalader to Nathanael Greene, December 5, 1778, NYHSC, 3:270; Francis Lewis to Governor George Clinton, March 8, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:92; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:222-225; Ford, JCC, 13:184, 188-189, 324-326, 379, 412-417, 16:161-162.

C H A P T E R IX

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AND INTERFERENCE WITH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Throughout the war the military involved themselves in and interfered with the civilian governments and the political process. They did so individually and organizationally. To some degree, as will be demonstrated, their involvement and interference was encouraged and expected, for, after all, these military leaders to great extent had been civilian leaders before the war. The military involved themselves in the operations of the governments and interfered with them in the belief they could make them function more effectively. In a few isolated instances some civilian and military leaders actually contemplated the military replacing established governments, or at least controlling them. And in a few instances the military did control or replace the civilian governments for a limited time or on a limited basis. The military also interfered with the actual operations of all branches of governments and with the operation of the political process. Most military involvement in government and politics, however, related to

individuals participating directly or indirectly in their operations.

Just because Americans put on uniforms, they did not discard their civilian beliefs nor their desire to participate in the political process and government. The military, with a few exceptions, were first and foremost civilians, with civilian concerns and desires. During 1775 and 1776 many civilian leaders, temporarily in uniform, played active roles in forming the revolutionary wartime governments. Those that decided to take permanent positions in the military continued to express their interest in the adoption of the new state constitutions and the implementation of the governments under them.[1]

Many in the military, reflecting the desires of their communities, desired that Congress declare independence. This desire was prompted in part by ideological considerations, and in part because the rebellious soldiers realized

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[1]Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, April 26, 778, [Copy], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); John Sullivan to Meshech Weare, December 12, 1775, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1:141-148; John Haslet to Caesar Rodney, [Fall 1776], Harold B. Hancock, ed., "Letters to and from Caesar Rodney," DH 12, no. 1 (April 1966): 72; Lachlan McIntosh to George Walton, December 15, 1776, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799," GHQ 38, no. 3 (September 1954): 256; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 31, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:92; Charles Lee to Patrick Henry, July 29, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 178.

they were representing revolutionary governments unrecognized by any nation and, should the war be lost, legally they would be traitors. Thus, the soldiers, even more than their civilian leaders, were potentially more apt to lose their life, liberty, and property should independence not be established and the war lost. "We are high Gamblers," one officer wrote two weeks before independence was declared, "who are playing for all we are worth."[2]

Although Washington did not express his desire for independence, many of his subordinates did. As early as October 1775, Greene informed his colony's civilian leaders that the people wanted independence and that they might as well declare that fact, for they should begin the war in earnest, "for we have no alternative," he told Samuel Ward, "but to fight it out or be slaves."[3] Stephen Moylan, after reading the King's speech calling the Americans rebels, wrote Joseph Reed, who had left the army early in November to lobby for independence, asking whether Congress would "not declare what the Most Gracious Majesty insist on they have already done?" In another letter, Moylan asked "shall

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[2]Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 26, 1776, Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS; see also Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of My Tour to the Camp, and the Observations I Made There," PMHS 4 (1858-1860): 78.

[3]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.

we never leave off debating and boldly declare independence?" He believed "That and that only will make us act with spirit and vigour."[4] James McHenry learning of the King's speech, and believing reconciliation impossible, wrote that "Strength must decide the present dispute."[5] For many, strength could only come by having direction, and direction meant independence. One person who certainly believed this was Charles Lee. He had much to gain if America won the war--honor and fame. But if she lost, as a retired British regular officer, he had much to lose, including his life. Thus, from the beginning of the war, he pleaded with the civilian leaders to declare independence.

After hearing the King's statements concerning the war, he wrote Robert Morris that "We must be Independent or Slaves." Three months later, with independence not declared, he again wrote Morris, urging Congress to act, reminding him that if Congress would not act the people would, and this, he added, "must produce a noble anarchy." In May, he again pleaded with Morris. "For God's sake," he wrote, "declare yourselves at once what you really are and must be-an

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[4]Stephen Moylan to Joseph Reed, January 2, 1776, Griffin, Stephen Moylan, p. 27; Same to same, January 30, 1776, ibid.

[5]James McHenry to John McHenry, January [ ], 1776, Steiner, James McHenry, p. 6.

independent state."[6] Several days later, he told Patrick Henry that if independence was not declared, the people might take the direction of the war into their own hands.[7] During April and May, he also appealed to Richard Henry Lee and Edward Rutledge, writing the latter that "unless you declare yourselves independent, establish a more certain and fixed legislation than that of a temporary courtesy of the people you richly deserve to be enslaved."[8] Lee, like Washington, also took actions which pushed the colonial governments towards independence.[9]

By June, the call for independence had increased, with the military continuing their appeals on a larger scale. Early that month, over two thousand officers and soldiers of four battalions of Associators of Philadelphia

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[6]Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 233; Same to same, April 16, 1776, ibid., 426; Same to same, May 3, 1776, ibid., 467; See also Same to same, January 23, 1776, ibid., 255-256.

[7]Charles Lee to Patrick Henry, May 7, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 1-3.

[8]Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge, April 3, [1776], ibid., 4 (1872): 372-373; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee, April 5, 1776, ibid.; 380; Same to same, May 10, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 20; see also Charles Lee to John Dickinson, January 18, 1776, John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 91-92; Same to same, February 22, 1776, ibid., pp. 93-94; Same to same, July 3, 1776, ibid., pp. 116, 327n.52.

[9]E.g., Benjamin Rumsey to William Rumsey, June 3, 1776, James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian, eds., "'A Jurisdiction Competent to the Occasion': A Benjamin Rumsey Letter, June 1776," MHM 67, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 152.

and its suburbs were polled on the question of independence. Less than thirty voiced any opposition. Later that month, Mifflin pleaded with a member of Congress, "For Gods sake Mr[.] Gerry, give a little more velocity to Congress-you do not know the situation of your Country, or your conduct would be more Decisive."[10]

From the first days of the war, the military were not content to let the provincial governments and Congress make military and political decisions without contributing their ideas and beliefs, usually in the form of suggestions. These suggestions were generally conveyed in a polite and decorous manner, but, as was noted in the preceding chapter, some suggestions were, or were thought to be, threatening or in some way improper. Civilian leaders, as we have already seen, generally chastised the military for such intemperate behavior. For the most part, military suggestions were properly made, and generally were well received, often being encouraged and expected by the civilian governments.

Realizing how closely military and political questions were often intertwined, Washington did not hesitate publicly and privately to suggest to Congress and its members courses of action he wished them to take. He made

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[10]The Pennsylvania Evening Post, June 11, 1776; Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 29, 1776, Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS.

suggestions relating to the organization and operations of the support departments; the recruitment of foreign officers; military and naval strategy; recruitment of soldiers, apprehension of deserters; powers of congressional committees at camp; test oaths; promotions; the refugee problem; exchanges of prisoners; and the status of Vermont.[11] With respect to Vermont, Washington did not publicly get involved in its status, but he did so privately, writing members of Congress and state officials of New York and New Hampshire, as well as the leaders of Vermont, expressing his desire to see the problem of its status resolved.[12]

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[11]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 4, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:216; Same to same, July 10, 1775; ibid., 3:324; Same to same, December 18, 1775, ibid., 4:172; Same to same, July 22, 1780, ibid., 19:236; Same to same, November 19, 1782, ibid., 25:350-351; Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid., 4:197; George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24, 1778, ibid., 12:224; George Washington to James Duane, December 26, 1780, ibid., 21:15; George Washington to Benjamin Franklin, August 17, 1777, ibid., 9:85-87; George Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777, ibid., 9:63; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, November 27, 1775, ibid., 4:117; George Washington to John Jay, April 23, 1779, ibid., 14:435-437; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 7, 1782, ibid., 25:240; Ford, JCC, 8:593; President of the Continental Congress to the Several States, June 15, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:120; Arthur Lee to James Monroe, August 23, 1783, ibid., 7:277.

[12]George Washington to Philip Schuyler, November 28, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:361-362; Same to same, January 8, 1782, ibid., 432; Same to same, February 6, 1782, ibid., 487; Same to same, January 29, 1782, ibid., 468; Same to same, May 14, 1781, ibid., 22:81-82; George Washington to Joseph Jones, July 10, 1781, ibid., 354; George Washington to Thomas Chittenden, January 1, 1782, ibid., 23:419-421; George Washington to Meshech Weare,

Washington was frequently successful in having Congress adopt his suggestions and recommendations. James Duane wrote him during 1779 that "You will find that most of the Acts you recommend are passed in Congress."[13]

Other Continental officers were also relatively successful in having Congress consider and adopt their suggestions and recommendations. This was particularly true of Charles Lee, who could not resist giving his opinion on a variety of matters, including the size of the army, strategy, opening up ports to foreign trade, and the treatment of Tories.[14] Greene also made frequent suggestions, generally when he was the Quartermaster General. Early in the war, he suggested to one member of Congress that if northern and southern troops were exchanged it would cure the itch for them wanting to go home on furloughs. In the same letter, he expressed hope Congress would send Continental soldiers to every colony to "support the spirited, confirm the weak and wavering, and awe our Opposers into submission, for there

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July 31, 1782, ibid., 24:449-450; George Washington to Jacob Bayler, September 29, 1782, ibid., 25:216.

[13]James Duane to George Washington, March 16, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:106; see also Curtis P. Nettles, George Washington and the American Independence, p. 166.

[14]Charles Lee to John Adams, October 5, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 210; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee, December 12, 1775, ibid., 229; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress, October 10, 1776, ibid., 259-260; Charles Lee to Samuel Ward, [January 1776, ibid., 259-260; Charles Lee to Samuel Ward, [January 1776], Knollenberg, Correspondence of Governor Samuel Ward, p. 170.

are no Arguments however well supported by Reason that carries such conviction with them as those that are enforced from the Muzzle of a Gun or the Point of a Bayonet."[15] Hamilton also frequently contacted members of Congress giving them his opinion on promotions and financial matters.[16] Other Continental generals, such as Benedict Arnold and Lafayette, also made suggestions to Congress about policies that legislative body should adopt.[17]

The military probably made more suggestions and recommendations to the provincial and state governments and their leaders than they did to Congress. Washington was quite active in contacting state leaders, making recommendations and suggestions relating to political, military, and other matters. Eleven times during the war Washington sent circulars to all the states, and thirty times to a particular

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[15]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Nathanael Greene to John Jay, February 1, 1779, Morris, John Jay, pp. 542-543.

[16]Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246; Same to same, June 18, 1778, ibid., 498; Alexander Hamilton to [ ], [December 1779-March 1780], ibid., 2:236-251; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], ibid., 400-418, Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781, ibid., 604-635.

[17]Benedict Arnold to the President of the Continental Congress, June 13, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:976-977; Marquis de Lafayette to the President of the Continental Congress, April 21, 1778, "Letters from the Marquis de Lafayette to the Hon. Henry Laurens, 1777-1780," SCHGM 8, no. 1 (January 1907): 65-66.

region or state.[18] He also wrote letters to state leaders. He urged state governments to give more powers to their executives; made recommendations for promotions; suggested Virginia send more and better qualified delegates to Congress; suggested laws be adopted to stop trade with the enemy and allowing the military to administer an oath and swear any person to the truth of matters relative to public service; suggested Virginia delay opening her land office in the west, for to open it would cause officers to leave the service to become land adventurers; and requested New Jersey prohibit their chief justice from rendering decisions regarding the status of the enlistments of New Jersey's Continental soldiers. He was careful to always couch his letters in the most unoffensive manner, and normally prefaced or concluded his remarks by apologizing for interjecting himself into civilian affairs.[19]

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[18]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:443-444.

[19]George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, December 18, [-30], 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13:466-467; Same to same, October 25, 1779, ibid., 17:22-23; George Washington to William Livingston, February 19, 1780, ibid., 18:28-31; Same to same, May 27, 1781, ibid., 22:117; Same to same, November 13, 1782, ibid., 25:337; Same to same, October 4, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 188-189; George Washington to William Greene, January [ ], 1782, Circular, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:525; Same to same, May 4, 1782, ibid., 555; George Washington to Nicholas Cooke, March 17, 1776, ibid., 7:503; Same to same, October 12, 1776, ibid., 8:34-35; Same to same, January 6, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:216-217; George Washington to Joseph Reed, May 28, 1780, ibid., 18:439; Same

Throughout the War, General Greene was quick to express his opinion regarding civilian matters, and frequently informed civilian leaders and state governments of them.[20] With the encouragement and assistance of General Wayne, Greene lobbied the chief executive of Georgia during the winter of 1781-82 to allow the "disaffected" to return to Georgia from Florida, if they would give their allegiance to the state, or at least remain neutral during the remainder of the war. Wayne, supported by Greene, appealed to the Georgia legislature to issue a proclamation opening the door for absent citizens and encouraging desertion from the enemy. The legislature agreed.[21] Earlier in the war, several

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same, July 4, 1780, ibid., 19:113-114; Same to same, May 5 [-7], 1781, ibid., 22:50; Same to same, May 27, 1781, ibid., 118; George Washington to John Trumbull, November 13, 1782, ibid., 25:334-334; Circulars to the states May 24, 1781, January 22, 1782, March 5, 1782, and June 8, 1783, in ibid., 22:111; 23:458-461; 24:44-46; 26:487-488.

[20]Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:130; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 16, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:37; Nathanael Greene to Henry Marchant, November 17, 1777, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:511.

[21]Nathanael Greene to John Martin, December 27, 1781, "Original Documents," MH 14 (1911): 204; Same to same, January 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, March 12, 1782, ibid., Same to same, January 7, 1782, "Letter from General Greene to Governor Martin," GHQ 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 336; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:272; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:320.

policies the states should adopt with respect to the Tory problem.[22] Even Washington got involved in the Tory problem, calling on the provincial governments to seize and try those who were inimical or suspected to be.[23]

Steuben lobbied the Virginia legislature and chief executive frequently during the winter of 1780-81. He made so many suggestions regarding recruiting, drafting, preventing desertion, the militia law, the supply system, and strategic policies that he was generally considered a nuisance. He even suggested that Jefferson call the assembly into session so they could adopt the proper measures, including those he had suggested, to prevent the loss of the state.[24]

Other generals in the south, including Gates, Moultrie, Lafayette, and Lee, made suggestions to the chief

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[22]William Smallwood to [ ] Jenifer, March 3, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:157-159; William Maxwell to the New Jersey Legislature, April 26, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 151-154; Charles Lee to the President and Council of the State of Georgia, August 28, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 248.

[23]George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, November 15, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:90; George Washington to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, November 9, 1775, ibid., 78.

[24]Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, December 28, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:244, 245; Same to same, December 9, 1780, ibid., 193-194; Same to same, December 16, 1780, ibid., 213-214; Same to same, December 18, 1780, ibid., 216; Same to same, January 2, 1781, ibid., 299; Same to same, January 21, 1781, ibid., 423; Archibald Cary to Thomas Jefferson, February 13, 1781, ibid., 596-597.

executives respecting policies their states should consider and/or adopt.[25] Generals also made suggestions in the northern theatre of operations and on the frontier. Putnam, for example, early in 1777, suggested to Pennsylvania's Council of Safety they consider adopting price controls similar to those adopted by the New England states. George Rogers Clark lobbied with Virginia's chief executive to have a certain individual appointed County Lieutenant of the newly created Jefferson County. Later that year, 1781, and the following year, General William Irvine lobbied with both the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council and Virginia's governor to have their respective states run a mutually satisfactory boundary line.[26]

The military were probably the most active in lobbying for a more effective Congress. On one hand this meant

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[25]Charles Lee to Cornelius Harnet, President of the North Carolina Council of Safety, July 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 164; Charles Lee to John Rutledge, June 16, 1776, ibid., 71-72; Same to same, August 1, 1776, ibid., 187; Horatio Gates to Abner Nash, July 19, 1780, "Original Documents," MAH 5, no. 4 (October 1880): 284; William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 14, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:262; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, July 1, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia, pp. 19, 19-20.

[26]Israel Putnam to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 31, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 5:209; George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson, January 21, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:420; William Irvine to William Moore, December 3, 1781, Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, appendix g, p. 232; William Irvine to Benjamin Harrison, April 20, 1782, ibid., appendix h, p. 267.

making it more efficient, and on the other, and more importantly, making the whole system of Continental government equal to the exigencies of the war. With respect to the former, a good example is the military's desire that Congress give more authority into the hands of single executive department heads, or at least boards with sufficient power to properly conduct the public's business.[27] The military's lobbying efforts for these changes were somewhat successful, as Congress did improve the functioning of some of their boards and in 1781 did create relatively strong executive departments. The military were not as successful in getting the states to give Congress sufficient authority to conduct the war as the military wished.

Although most revolutionary leaders looked to Congress to play the primary role in directing the military forces of the continent, few were willing to give Congress the necessary authority to oversee properly the military and economic fortunes of the continent. From 1775 until 1781, the powers of Congress were exercised by an authority based solely on the

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[27]Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:298; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1778], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:404-405; Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, October 12, 1780, ibid., 472; Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781, ibid., 604-605; George Washington to James Duane, December 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:15; George Washington to Robert R. Livingston, January 31, 1781, ibid., 164.

tacit acquiescence of the states. Even after the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, for the most part, sovereignty, authority, and power remained in the states. Congress did not raise revenue nor levy taxes, but only had the delegated authority to make requisitions on the states. If the states ignored them, Congress had no coercive force to require the states to comply. Congress, similarly, had limited war-making powers. Under the articles, it took nine states to act on many things, and frequently nine states were not even represented. Because of these deficiencies, the military were very critical of Congress and the Continental system of government, both before and after the adoption and implementation of the Articles of Confederation. As will be discussed later, some members of the military actually contemplated gaining partial or total control of Congress in order to make it function more effectively. Most, however, lobbied peacefully for change, desiring the civilian leaders would realize that only with a nationalistic program, even a temporary one, would Congress be able to effectively give direction to the war effort.

Americans, to a large extent, lacked a sense of nationalism before 1775. The Revolutionary War changed that. As the Americans came into closer contact with one another, a feeling of nationalism developed, especially among the

military.[28] In his The American Crisis No. 10, dated March 5, 1782, Thomas Paine wrote "The union of America is the foundation-stone of her independence."[29] Most Continental officers agreed with this assessment, as the war had given a nationalistic outlook towards themselves and the central government. This was more true as the war progressed and many in the military began to lose their local attachments. Only a unified army under a unified central government was victory possible, so believed many in the military. Thus they desired the influence of the individual states to decrease, and that of Congress to increase.[30] Captain Samuel Shaw wrote that unless power was "vested in some supreme head, sufficient to enforce a compliance with such regulations as are evidently calculated for the general good,

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[28]Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realized the Enlightenment, pp. 182, 185.

[29]Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 1:204.

[30]Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21, 1783, Callahan, Henry Knox, p. 200; Nathanael Greene to Charles Pettit, December 21, 1782, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 407-408; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, September 14, 1780, Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 277; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, January 24, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 4:109; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, July 25, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:229-230; Timothy Pickering to [Joseph] Orne, August 18, 1782, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); Timothy Pickering to Stephen Higginson, April 17, 1783, ibid.

adieu to all government-[.]" He believed that the "Thirteen wheels require a steady and powerful regulator to keep them in good order, and prevent the machine from becomming useless." Similarly, Greene wrote one of New Hampshire's principal civilian leaders that Congress "must have powers to control all the States, or America is forever lost."[31] Hamilton, sharing this belief, was most active in lobbying for the nationalistic point of view, most notably in a series of letters to the newspapers, as "The Continentalist."[32] He wrote James Duane during the summer of 1780 that "the confederation itself is defective and requires to be altered; it is neither fit for war nor peace." "It may be appre-hended," he wrote, "that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people."[33]

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[31]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Major Samuel Shaw, p. 100; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2:374.

[32]The New-York Packet, and the American Advertiser, July 12, 19, August 9, 30, 1781; April 18, July 4, 1782; Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, [October 12, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:472.

[33]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], ibid., 402.

Washington was perhaps the most active in lobbying for a stronger and more effective central government. During the summer of 1780, he wrote the President of Congress that it was the wish of the army "that every matter which relates to it should be under the immediate direction and providence of Congress."[34] Throughout 1780 and 1781, he complained constantly that Congress did not have sufficient power to properly conduct the war effort, and called for power to be given or taken by Congress.[35] As the summer of 1780 began, he wrote Joseph Jones that unless Congress was vested with powers by the states competent to the great purposes of the war, or assumed them as a matter of right, and unless Congress acted with more energy, "our Cause is lost."[36] He continued the same theme that fall in letters

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[34]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:412.

[35]George Washington to George Mason, October 22, 1780, ibid., 20:242; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, October 22, 1780, P.S., ibid., 246; Same to same, March 25, 1781, ibid., 21:375-376; George Washington to John Parke Custis, February 28, 1781, ibid., 320; George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374; George Washington to Philip Schuyler, February 20, 1781, ibid., 261-262; George Washington to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 20:117; Same to Same, December 26, 1780, ibid., 21:14; Same to same, February 19, 1781, ibid., 248; George Washington to Fielding Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid., 19:131; Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:210; George Washington to John Sullivan, February 4, 1781, ibid., 21:183; George Washington to Robert R. Livingston, January 31, 1781, ibid., 164.

[36]George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780, ibid., 19:412.

to members of Congress and other civilian leaders. "Unless there is a material change both in our military, and civil policy," he warned George Mason late in October 1780, "it will be in vain to contend much longer."[37] After Congress appeared to be straightening itself out by creating executive boards and giving the Superintendent of Finance extraordinary powers, Washington curtailed his lobbying efforts for a stronger Congress. His attention during 1781 was primarily focused upon military matters. However, after the victory at Yorktown, he renewed his lobbying efforts. He believed there should be a stronger union of the states, under a Congress with sufficient powers; otherwise, he warned, the states would be like a rope of sand with the result being anarchy and confusion. "It is clearly my opinion," he wrote one member of Congress during the spring of 1783, "unless Congress have powers competent to all 'general' purposes, that the distresses we have encountered, the expences we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing."[38]

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[37]George Washington to George Mason, October 22, 1780, ibid., 20:242; see also George Washington to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 117; George Washington to John Mathews, February 14, 1781, ibid., 21:226-227; George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374.

[38]George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:279; see also George Washington to Archibald Carey, June 15, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:347; George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 4, 1783, ibid., 26:184, 184-185;

In many instances the military made their recommendations and suggestions without invitation to do so, but most times they did so because a public official had asked them to, either publicly or privately. Members of Congress frequently asked Washington to privately correspond with them, desiring he would share things with them that he could not publicly.[39] Washington appreciated the attention shown him, as well as the practical effect such communication afforded.[40] Members of Congress wrote other officers, soliciting their thought about political, economic, and other non-strictly military matters. Hamilton, for example, having

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George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 1783, ibid., 276-277; George Washington to Tench Tilghman, April 24, 1783, ibid., 359; Circular to the States, June 8, 1783, ibid., 487, 488; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.

[39]Thomas McKean to George Washington, July 14, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:146; John Hanson to George Washington, November 10, 1781, ibid., 261; Elias Boudinot to George Washington, November 27, 1782, ibid., 550; John Mathews to George Washington, April 16, 1781, ibid., 56; John Sullivan to George Washington, November 9, [-30], 1780, ibid., 5:463-464; Same to same, May 2, 1781, ibid., 6:74; Same to same, June 11, 1781, ibid., 114; Robert Morris to George Washington, May 29, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:97; Samuel Ward, Sr., to George Washington, September 17, 1775, John Ward, "Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Ward, of the Revolutionary War," NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 115; Thomas Lynch to George Washington, January 16, 1776, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:687.

[40]George Washington to John Mathews, June 7, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 22:176; George Washington to John Jay, April 23, 1779, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 3:132.

just been elected to Congress, wrote Greene, "I shall be happy to correspond with you . . . and I shall entreat you not to confine your observations to military subjects but to take in the whole scope of national concerns."[41] Civilian leaders frequently urged military leaders to voice their opinions respecting purely political matters. Early in the war, Benjamin Rush, for instance, urged Wayne to join Generals St. Clair and Thompson in publicly condemning Pennsylvania's constitution. Gouverneur Morris later in the war urged Greene to lobby with the governments of the southern states to agree to a congressional plan for raising revenue for the central treasury.[42]

Many in the military wanted to do more than just give their opinion about public affairs. They wanted to participate in a more active manner. After all, some military leaders had been active in political life before they donned their uniform. Frequently those with political inclinations were encouraged by their peers to leave the military for positions in government, believing they could influence the legislative bodies to take actions which

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[41]Alexander Hamilton to Nathanael Greene, [October 12, 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:183.

[42]Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, May 19, 1777, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 68; Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:241.

would benefit the military.[43]

Civilian leaders also believed the country would benefit from having military men serving in the political arena. John Adams, for one, believed that annual elections of generals would result in many generals being removed from military command and many of them would eventually serve in the civil government, thereby benefiting the governments by their military experience.[44] James Duane, however, was opposed to military men, particularly his friend, Philip Schuyler, coming to Congress. "Your lips," he told Schuyler, "will be sealed; and your knowledge and Abilities in a great Measure lost to your Country."[45] Schuyler did not heed this advice and took his seat in Congress. William Ellery told

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[43]Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 2 (1873): 263; [Edward] Giles to Otho Ho[lland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 56; Elias Boudinot to Mrs. Boudinot, March 15, 1778, Boudinot, Elias Boudinot, 1:109; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, October 26, 1778, Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 149; George Washington to James McHenry, December 11, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 33:381; George Washington to Alexander McDougall, October 24, 1780, ibid., 20:254; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion, The Swamp Fox, pp. 265-266; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:29; William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1779, ibid., 26; Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid., 28-29; Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, [August 15, 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:145.

[44]John Adams to Nathanael Greene, March [ ], 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:300-301.

[45]James Duane to Philip Schuyler, January 3, 1779, ibid., 4:4.

his friend, William Whipple, a general of New Hampshire's militia, that he preferred him to serve in the cabinet, not in the field, but would support him in either.[46] Whipple would serve adequately and often in both, being a member of Congress for over four years, a member of the state legislature for numerous years, and commanding New Hampshire's militia at Saratoga and those serving in Rhode Island.

Many revolutionary leaders did not believe military officers should hold civilian positions while holding military commissions, not even after they departed military service. Benjamin Rush, before the war, wrote that military men, because of their "knowledge in arms and their popularity with the soldiers and common people would give them great advantages over every other citizen, and would render the transition from democracy to anarchy, and from anarchy to monarchy, very natural and easy." Thus, Rush believed, "it would be best that military officers should be entirely excluded from having any share in the legislature."[47] When Greene learned that Schuyler might be made president of the Continental Congress and allowed to retain his military

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[46]William Ellery to William Whipple, October 30, 1777, Brotherhead, ed., The Book of the Signers: Containing Fac-Simile Letters of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence (Philadelphia: William Brotherhead, 1861), p. 73.

[47]Benjamin Rush to Catherine Macaulay, January 18, 1769, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:70.

commission, he wrote John Adams in objection. "No free people," he wrote, "ought to admit a junction of the civil and military." "I will not hold a commission under that State who blends those two characters together. I Think them incompatible with the safety of a free people, and I can assure you, I am not fighting for a change of masters, but to have not but the law." Responding, John Adams told him not to worry because no member of Congress would allow an individual to hold two positions simultaneously.[48]

Governor Henry wrote George Rogers Clark he thought it improper to put the top civil and military authority in the same hands, otherwise Clark would have been made county lieutenant of Illinois County.[49] Frequently during the war, Congress ruled that an individual could not hold a Continental commission while holding a state office.[50]

Because many colonial governments had restrictions regarding plural military-civil office holding, it is not

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[48]Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 28, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 3 (July 1942): 74; John Adams to Nathanael Greene, June 2, 1777, ibid., 75; see also John Adams to Benjamin Rush, February 8, 1778, Revolutionary War Correspondence, BPL.

[49]Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15, 1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 64.

[50]Ford, JCC, 14:861; Thomas Jefferson to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, March 26, 1781, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 3:31-32, 32n.1; The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1781, ibid., 74-75.

surprising to find the issue debated in the provincial congresses and constitutional conventions.[51] Elbridge Gerry, during December 1775, informed Samuel Adams that the revolutionary legislature had before it a bill to "Exclude Gentlemen of the Army from the legislative, that military Influence may never reach our senate."[52] Many states during the war adopted restrictions regarding the military holding civilian positions, to keep, for the most part, the military influence from having too large a role in civilian deliberations.[53]

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[51]William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS 9 (January-June 1897): 389-390.

[52]Elbridge Gerry to Samuel Adams, December 13, 1775, Gerry-Knight Papers 1713-1825, MHS; see also John Cary, Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, Patriot, p. 200; Brennan, Plural Office-Holding in Massachusetts, p. 27; John Wendell to Elbridge Gerry, June 25, 1776, Jere R. Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism: New Hampshire Politics and the American Revolution, 1741-1794, p. 165; Portsmouth Instructions to their Representatives in the New Hampshire General Assembly, July 31, 1776, Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 8:301; Proposed New Hampshire Constitution of 1779, ibid., 9:840.

[53]Saunders, NCCR, 10:210, 579, 1010; Foote, Sketches of North Carolina, p. 71; Hemphill, Extracts from the Journals of the Provincial Congresses of South Carolina 1775-1776, passim, 63-259; A. S. Salley, ed., Journal of the General Assembly of South Carolina, September 17, 1776-October 20, 1776 (Columbia, South Carolina: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1909), pp. 154-155n.2; Delaplaine, Thomas Johnson, pp. 184, 198; Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland (1774-1777)," p. 49; Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland, p. 167; Rowland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, 2:47; Browne, Maryland Archives, 11:71, Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:277, 288, 289; Peyton Randolph to George Washington, September 6, 1775, Sparks,

Despite the restrictions and beliefs against the military serving in the government, or being involved in the governmental affairs, the military did involve themselves in the governments. They were involved in several ways, including voting and holding office.

John Adams told a friend during the early summer of 1776 that to open a controversy on suffrage would be asking for trouble. Once opened, "there will be no end of it" he maintained. "Women will demand a vote," as well as men without a farthing.[54] But it was opened, particularly by men in arms, who believed their willingness to shed their blood in the revolutionary cause entitled them to the vote.[55] This was especially true in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

During the summer of 1776, Maryland was beset by disturbances by the militia who demanded suffrage for all who were willing to support independence by shouldering arms. They maintained that bearing arms and paying taxes should entitle an individual to vote, but the revolutionary

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Correspondence of The American Revolution, 1:33; Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 1:488, 495, 551; "The Militia Resolves," The Maryland Gazette, July 18, 1776.

[54]John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:378.

[55]Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 103.

legislature declared that in order to vote for members of the convention which would write the constitution, one would have to possess fifty acres or property worth £40 sterling. Upset with this decision, a large number of the militia and members of the Flying Camp attempted unsuccessfully during August 1776 to vote in Frederick, Prince Georges, and Kent Counties, and in Annapolis. Frightened by this outburst by the military, the conservative faction who controlled the convention wrote a constitution, which to some degree, was far more restrictive and less democratic than the proprietary charter.[56]

When the Pennsylvania Assembly convened in February 1776, they were met by demands from the disenfranchised Associators for more representation and greater suffrage. These demands continued throughout the spring and into the summer, as committees of privates lobbied for the suffrage, maintaining those risking their lives for the state should be entitled to vote for the civilian leaders who would be making decisions respecting their lives as soldiers. The Provincial Congress on June 20, 1776, agreed, allowing all military Associators who had paid a tax or who had been assessed, to vote in the ensuing elections to create a new

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[56]Ibid., pp. 108-109, 109; David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, pp. 181-182, 182, 190-191, 194-195; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 30.

machinery of government.[57]

Most states provided for those eligible to vote before they had entered military service to be allowed to do so while in the army.[58] Maryland was a notable exception, denying the military the right to vote and to hold seats in the convention during the summer of 1776.[59] It is impossible to calculate how important the military vote was during the war; however, it is safe to suggest that on occasion their vote played an important role in certain elections.[60]

Besides voting for public officials, many soldiers during the war left military service to take positions in the government. This was primarily a southern phenomenon,

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[57] The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser, July 1, 1776; The Pennsylvania Gazette, March 6, 1776; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, p. 86; see petitions in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:640; ibid., 8th ser., 8:7397-7405, 7406, 7409, 7422, 7438-7439, and 7449.

[58] Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 2:948, 957, 957-958; Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York, 4:169; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, p. 143.

[59] Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland (1774-1777)," p. 46; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 30; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:239-240.

[60] Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York, 4:169; Spaulding, George Clinton, p. 92; Gerlach, Philip Schuyler, pp. 309-310; Charles Coleman Sellers, The Artist of the Revolution: The Early Life of Charles Wilson Peale (Hebron, Connecticut: Feather and Good, 1939), pp. 101-103, 221.

especially during 1781 and 1782 when many officers left the military, either temporarily or permanently, to take positions in the state legislature. During those years over two dozen South Carolina officers, including Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens, left military service to take positions in the state legislature.[61] Many North Carolina officers also left the military to take civilian positions.[62] Among them were Colonel Alfred Moore who became Attorney General in 1782, and Colonel Alexander Martin who became a senator and subsequently governor in 1782.[63] Virginia officers also left military service for positions in the state government. Captain John Marshall left to serve in the House of Eleegates and Privy Council; Brigadier General Andrew Lewis also served on the council after leaving the military. Major General Adam Stephen, after leaving the military, served in the assembly and senate. Militia

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[61]Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox, pp. 262, 265, 270; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, pp. 215, 217; Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, pp. 172, 222, 239, 244, 261, 292, 293, 299; David Ramsay, Ramsay's History of South Carolina from its first Settlement in 1670 to the year 1808, 2:257-258.

[62]Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, pp. 134, 212-213; Draper, King's Mountain, pp. 475-476; J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina (Greenville, South Carolina: Shannon and Company, Printers and Binders, 1897), pp. 167-169.

[63]Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:303-305; 3:275-277.

General Andrew Moore, who served earlier as a Continental officer, served in the House from 1780 until the end of the war. James Monroe, after leaving the Continental Army, served in the House before going to Congress. John Francis Mercer, who spent time as both a militia and Continental officer, left military service for a position in the Congress. Also going to Congress was John Walker, who had served as an aide-de-camp to Washington. Another Washington aide-de-camp, Edmund Randolph, left military service to serve as Attorney General and as a member of Congress. John Tyler, who served as a militia and Continental officer, left military service to serve in the House and Council. And Archibald Cary served as a militia colonel during 1775 and 1776, before becoming Speaker of the Senate during the latter year.[64] Many Maryland officers left military service for positions in government.[65] Among the most notable were James McHenry, who left service in 1781 to serve in the senate and later in Congress; Robert Hanson Harrison became Chief Justice in 1781; and Alexander Contee Hanson, who, in

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[64]Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, 1:161-164, 209; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:25n.2; BDC, pp. 1399-1400, 1425, 1429, 1584, 1870; Leon G. Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, 3 vols. (Richmond and Williamsburg: Whittet and Shepperson, 1884-1896), 1:54, 64, 67; Brock, Archibald Cary, pp. 100, 133, 153; Thwaites, Documentary History of Dunmore's War, p. 191n.35.

[65]Scharf, History of Western Maryland, 1:455, 479.

1778, became a judge of the Supreme Court.[66] Georgia officers also left military service to take positions in the government.[67]

Many officers from the middle states, particularly Pennsylvania, left the field for the cabinet during the war.[68] Among the more notable examples are Joseph Reed, who served as military secretary to Washington and Adjutant General of the army before going to Congress and serving as chief executive of Pennsylvania. Samuel Atlee and John Armstrong both served as Continental officers before going to Congress in 1778 and 1779, respectively. And William Bradford, Jr., left the army during 1780 to become the state's Attorney General.[69] New Jersey, Delaware and New

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[66]Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:575n.1, 560n.1; BDC, p. 1378.

[67]Thomas Gamble, Savannah Duels and Duellists 1733-1877 (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1923), pp. 37-38; William Omer Foster, Sr., James Jackson: Duelist and Militant Statesman 1757-1806 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960), p. 17.

[68]Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 1:238n., 397, 646; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, pp. 262-263; W. A. Dorland, "The Second Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry," PMHB 45, no. 3 (1921): 289-290n.65; George R. Powell, Continental Congress at York, Pennsylvania and York County in the Revolution (York: York Printing Company, 1914), pp. 252-254; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:101n.3.

[69]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:413; BDC, pp. 523-524, 531-532, 1594.

York had several officers leaving military service for positions in the civil government. Among those from the latter state were Alexander Hamilton who went to Congress, and George Clinton, who became governor, taking the oath while in military uniform.[70] The New England states also had their military leaders leaving the field for positions in the cabinet.[71] Two examples were Generals Ezekiel Cornell and James M. Varnum, who both left the field for seats in Congress.[72]

Several officers left military service to take administrative positions with Congress. Colonel William Grayson, who retired during 1779, immediately became a commissioner on the Board of War. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Troup, Major Peter Scull, and Captain Benjamin Stoddard all

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[70] Ibid., p. 1056; New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 3:415n.1, 485n.1; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799, p. 147; George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and Statesman 1740-1821 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 102; J. Thomas Scarf, History of Delaware 1608-1888, 1:208; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governors in the American Revolution, p. 49; Hanson, Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County, p. 111n.10; Henry B. Dawson, Westchester-County, New York, During the American Revolution, p. 107n.14; Edwin Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons of Livingston Manor, pp. 227, 527-528.

[71] Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 235; R. W. G. Vail, ed., The Revolutionary Diary of Lieut. Obadiah Gore, Jr. (New York: New York Public Library, 1929), p. 11.

[72] BDC, p. 1855; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, p. 259.

left the field for positions as secretaries to the Board of War. Colonel John H. Stone became a clerk in the office of the secretary of foreign affairs. And Lieutenant Colonel Henry Brockholst Livingston left the army in 1779 to accompany John Jay to Europe as his secretary and Major David Franks left the army the following year and, during 1781, carried messages to Europe for Congress.[73]

About three weeks before the Declaration of Independence, a Maryland delegate to Congress introduced a motion that members of Congress not be allowed to hold any office under the new governments. John Adams seconded the motion, with an amendment that no member hold any office, civil or military, under any government, old or new. "This," he wrote Samuel Chase, "struck through the assembly like an electric shock, for every member was a governor, or general, or judge, or some mighty thing or other in the militia, under the old government or some new one." The motion was dropped, and as Adams wrote Chase, "I have never heard another word about it."[74] John Adams was, for the most part, accurate in his

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[73]Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:571n.1; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County, Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, pp. 268-269; Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:286-287; John G. Van Deusen, "Robert Troup; Agent of the Pultney Estate," NYH 23, no. 2 (April 1942): 167.

[74]John Adams to Samuel Chase, June 14, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:397.

observation about members of Congress holding several military and civilian positions at the same time. He would have been just as accurate if he had expanded his observation to include revolutionary leaders serving in the provincial and state governments. Despite some opposition to members of the military being involved in the political process, especially holding civilian office while possessing a military commission, many revolutionary leaders served in a military and civilian capacity at the same time.

It was a common colonial practice to have civilian officials hold militia positions, and this practice carried over into the early revolutionary civilian bodies, especially the provincial congresses and committees of safety.[75] In Massachusetts, for example, over 60 percent of the delegates to the 1774 Essex County Convention and over half of the Salem Committee of Correspondence held militia commissions. And approximately one-third of the members of the Provincial Congress that met in May 1775 held military positions.[76]

Serving in the military and in a civilian capacity remained a frequent occurrence in Massachusetts, as well as

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[75]Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, p. 154.

[76]Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775," MA 36, no. 4 (December 1973): 127; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1375-1379.

throughout New England, during the war.[77] Timothy Pickering, for example, in declining the position of Adjutant General of the Continental army, informed Washington that he already commanded a regiment of militia and held numerous civil offices, citing judge of a maritime court, judge of the Inferior Court, and acting Justice of the Peace and Register of Deeds for Essex County. Another example, Solomon Lovell, served simultaneously as a militia general, member of the Massachusetts General Court, and Justice of the Peace and selectman of Weymouth, during most of the war.[78]

Dual service was also prevalent in New York throughout the war. Many members of the New York provincial congresses and subsequent legislative bodies held military

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[77]J. E. A. Smith, The History of Pittsfield, (Berkshire County,) Massachusetts, from the year 1734 to the year 1800, pp. 244-245n.1; Brennan, Plural Office-Holding in Massachusetts, pp. 112, 117; Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, pp. 503-504; Walker, New Hampshire's Five Provincial Congresses, Appendix pp. 46-47, 59, 64-65; Offutt, Patriotic Maryland, p. 182; Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 11 (1906-1907): 242n.2; Walton, Records of Vermont, 1:128; 2:2; Henry P. Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 210; Mark Mayo Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (New York: David McKay Company, 1966): p. 534; E. W. Nesmith, "Memoir of Ebenezer Webster, Father of Daniel Webster," HM 2, no. 11 (November 1858): 324-326; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, pp. 44-45.

[78]Timothy Pickering to George Washington, April 9, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1:365; see also Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:59-60, 79, 93, 139; Gilbert Nash, The Original Journal of General Solomon Lovell, Kept during the Penobscot Expedition, 1779: With a Sketch of His Life, Weymouth Historical Society Proceedings 1 (Weymouth: Weymouth Historical Society, 1881), pp. 44-47, 51, 84-85.

commissions.[79] For example, Alexander McDougall, during 1775 and 1776, served in the provincial congress and on the committee of safety while holding a military commission, and later he would sit in Congress while retaining his major-general's commission.[80] Nathaniel Woodhull, during 1775, served as president of the provincial convention and the following year served as chairman of the committee of safety. During those years, he also served as a brigadier general of militia, dying after being captured in 1776.[81] Similarly, Abraham Ten Broeck, who served in the provincial congress during 1775, was president of the state convention in 1776, and was a senator beginning in 1777; was a colonel and brigadier general between 1775 and 1781.[82] And Christopher P. Yates served almost the whole war as a member of the New York legislature, while at the same time serving between 1775 and 1778 as a Continental officer and between 1778 and 1781 as a militia lieutenant colonel.[83] It was not just at

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[79]Hough, The New-York Civil List, pp. 49-54; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governors in the American Revolution, p. 233.

[80]Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 92-94, 104-105, 167-168.

[81]Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:23n.3; Jones, History of New York, 2:331-332.

[82]Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 409.

[83]Hanson, Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County, pp. 108-109n.7.

the state level where individuals in New York held military and civilian positions at the same time. At the county level there were many individuals serving in dual roles.[84] For instance, four members, including James Clinton, of the New Windsor nine-member Committee of Safety were active in the military.[85]

New York's neighbor, New Jersey, particularly early in the war, had numerous individuals serving in civil and military roles at the same time. Militia officers, who were active in the field, General Philemon Dickinson, Colonels Elijah Clark, Ephraim Martin, and Theunis Dey all served in either or both the Provincial Congress and first state Assembly.[86]

Pennsylvania probably had as many, if not more, individuals holding both military commissions and civil positions as any other state. During 1776, approximately half of the members of their provincial conference and later

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[84] Ibid., pp. 104-146.

[85] Russell Headley, ed., The History of Orange County, New York (Middletown, New York: Van Deusen and Elms, 1908), p. 82.

[86] New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 3:2n.1; 1:170n.2; Joseph Fulford Folsom, "The Preakness Valley and Reminiscences of Washington's Headquarters in the Dey Mansion," PNJHS, new ser., 6, no. 4 (October 1921): 222; Edmund J. James, "Some Additional Information Concerning Ephraim Martin, Esquire, Colonel of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment of the Continental Line." PMHB 36, no. 2 (1912): 146-149.

constitutional convention held military titles.[87] Colonels John Nixon, Thomas Hartley, and Timothy Smith were all quite active in the field and in the cabinet. The latter, during 1779, served as a Deputy Quartermaster General, a militia colonel, and as a member of the assembly.[88]

Delaware and Maryland also had many individuals serving in a military and civilian capacity at the same time.[89] During December 1777, fifty of the eighty members of the Maryland convention were field grade or general officers.[90] Two of the three Delaware militia generals, John McKinly and Caesar Rodney, during late 1776, were active in both the field and cabinet, with the former being the chairman of the Council of Safety.[91]

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[87]James E. Gibson, "The Pennsylvania Provincial Conference of 1776," ibid., 58, no. 4 (1934): 328-330; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 136-137, 147-148.

[88]Charles Henry Hart, "Colonel John Nixon," PMHB 1, no. 2, (1877): 194; John W. Jordan, "Biographical Sketch of Colonel Thomas Hartley of the Pennsylvania Line," ibid., 25, no. 3 (1901): 303-304; Burton Alva Konkle, The Life and Times of Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member of the Continental Congress (Philadelphia: Campion and Company, 1904), pp. 113, 115, 123, 126.

[89]Delaware Archives, 3:945; Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792, p. 35; Clayton Colman Hall, gen. ed., Baltimore: Its History and Its People, 3:514; "Committee of Observation for Elizabeth Town District," MHM 12, no. 4 (December 1917): 324, 325, 345; 12, no. 3 (September 1917): 266; 13, no. 1 (March 1918): 29.

[90]David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, p. 167.

[91]Christopher L. Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, pp. 111-112.

The southern states also had many individuals serving simultaneously in civilian and military positions. Numerous Virginia militia officers served also in the state's legislature.[92] Edward Stevens, for example, served from 1776 until 1790 as a member of the senate; from 1776 to 1778 as a Continental colonel; and from 1778 until 1782 as a militia brigadier general.[93] Militia generals Evan Shelby and William Campbell served often in the legislature, with the former also serving in the North Carolina legislature.[94]

North Carolina also had many militia officers serving in the legislature during the war.[95] During the first two years of the war, North Carolina had many officers holding militia or Continental commissions, who served at the same time in Provincial Congress or committees of safety.[96]

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[92]Thwaites, Documentary History of Dunmore's War, pp. 106-107n.53; Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest Virginia 1746-1786, Washington County 1777-1870, pp. 817-820.

[93]Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 393n.2.

[94]Draper, King's Mountain, pp. 383, 387, 396-397, 412, 414; J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina, pp. 221-223.

[95]Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:74, 84, 86, 110; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 1:154-155; 2:17-19; Leora McEachern and Isabel M. Williams, eds., Wilmington-New Hanover Safety Committee Minutes 1774-1776, Appendix, 4:123, 124, 128, 132.

[96]Ibid., 121, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:65-66, 178-179, 307-311; 3:168-170; 5:31-32, 368-369, 398; 6:114-116.

Benjamin Cleveland, Isaac Gregory, and Griffith Rutherford were North Carolinians who served in civil and military capacities at the same time during the war. Cleveland, while a member of the House and later the Senate, was active in the field as a militia colonel. Gregory, who served as a colonel and general of the militia, served at the same time in the Provincial Congress, and from 1778 until 1782 in the Senate. And Rutherford, who served during 1775 and 1776 as a militia colonel and general, was also a member of the Provincial Congress; and between 1777 and 1780, he served as a militia general and as a member of the Senate.[97]

South Carolina, probably more than any other southern state, had more individuals serving in the military and as state officials at the same time.[98] Among them were Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Andrew Pickens, William Moultrie, Isaac Huger, and Stephen Bull. Pinckney served as a Continental officer the whole war, while serving in the Provincial Congress, Council of Safety, Assembly, and House of Representatives. Pickens, who served most of the war as a militia

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[97]Ibid., 1:139-140; 5:70-71; J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina, pp. 224-227; Wheeler, Sketches of North Carolina, 2:71; J. G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, ed., "Revolutionary Diary of William Lenoir," JSH, 6, no. 2 (May 1940): 250n.5.

[98]Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, pp. 195, 198, 207, 209, 218, 230, 242, 231, 239, 212, 251, 255, 269, 299, 305, 311, 319, 321, 324, 328, 329, 330, 337.

officer, and as a general of state troops, frequently served in the House of Representatives between 1778 and the end of the war. Moultrie, who served throughout the war as a Continental officer, served frequently in the Provincial Congress, the Assembly, the Legislative Council, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Huger, who served the whole war as a Continental officer, frequently served in the House of Representatives between 1778 and the end of the war. Stephen Bull, who served the whole war as a militia officer, also served in the Provincial Congress, Assembly, Legislative Council, and the Senate.[99]

Georgia also had military officers serving in their state government. James Jackson, for example, commanded the Georgia State Legion the last years of the war, while at the same time, serving in the legislature. During the summer of 1782, he voted with the minority in the successful attempt to reduce his legion.[100] During 1775, John Martin served in the Provincial Congress and on the Council of Safety while a Continental officer. The following year, as a militia officer, he continued to serve on the Council of Safety. While

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[99]Ibid., pp. 190, 279, 289, 290; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:283.

[100]Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 3:25, 64-65.

a lieutenant colonel of the militia, he served in the legislature during 1782, and in January 1783, he became governor.[101]

Because of the lack of leaders on the frontier, individuals were often required to hold various civil and military positions at the same time. This was particularly true in the western areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and New York.[102]

Dual serving did create some problems. Frequently, state legislatures could not obtain quorums to meet because many of their members were in the field with the military, in their military capacity.[103] Often the military was weakened when many of its officers had to leave the field to

[101]"Official Letters of Governor John Martin, 1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 282-282; White, Historical Collections of Georgia, p. 214.

[102]Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier 1760-1783 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 167, 167n.10; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, new ed., passim; William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County or, The Border Warfare of New York, During the Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1924), p. 5; John Floyd to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1781, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781," p. 541; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of Illinois 1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections, 5 (1908): 18.

[103]John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, July 14, 1779, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:103; George Clinton to John Jay, June 7, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:54; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 235-236; Burton Alva Konkle, The Life and Times of Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member of the Continental Congress, p. 87.

return to the sessions of the legislature.[104] Another set of problems related to whether a person was acting his military or civilian capacity. Early in 1777, for instance, Washington was informed that Artemas Ward was present in Boston, but whether he was acting as a member of the council or a Continental general was "difficult to say." About the same time, Maryland's Thomas Johnson was confused as to whether his first duty was to Congress or to the Maryland contingent of the Flying Camp, of which he was a brigadier general. General McDougall was more certain of his status, upon being elected to Congress during the fall of 1780. He informed Washington that the New York legislature considered his civilian responsibilities secondary to his military duties.[105] Often dual service created interesting situations. For example, after the failure of Spencer's 1777 Rhode Island expedition, the Rhode Island Assembly appointed a committee to investigate Spencer's conduct. At the first meeting, one of the committee members, Senator John Sayles, was absent, standing guard as a militia private at Spencer's headquarters. When a sheriff was sent to fetch

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[104] William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:26; Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid., 28-29.

[105] Henry Knox to George Washington, February 1, 1777, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 41; Delaplaine, Thomas Johnson, pp. 209-231; Alexander McDougall to George Washington, October 30, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3: 126.

him, Sayles declined to attend the committee meeting, stating he could not leave until relieved. Upon learning of this situation, Spencer had him relieved, and Sayles made his appearance at the committee meeting, ready to pass judgment on his commanding general.[106]

Although some problems did result from this intermingling of the civilian and military functions in single individuals, it is my belief that, to some degree, it explains why the American Revolution did not suffer a military tyranny as had beset England during the seventeenth century and would the French Revolution. This belief will be discussed in some depth in the last chapter.

The military involvement in politics and government did have its negative aspects, such as the military interfering with the electoral process, the operations of the government, and in some isolated instances, the existence of the governments.

Often during the war, the military interfered with the electoral process, at times preventing people from voting, intimidating voters, and in other ways disrupting elections. This happened despite both a heritage and state prohibitions against such activities. Part of the Whig heritage was prohibitions against the military being present or near polling places during elections. In their recent

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[106]Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island, pp. 249-250.

past, many revolutionaries recalled the great outcry when the British troops attempted to interfere with the Massachusetts general election of 1769.[107] Most states adopted a variety of provisions in their constitutions prohibiting the military being present at polling places, having armed persons at polling places, holding muster day on election day, having the military voting by units, and setting the distance from and time at which the military could be at a polling place.[108]

The military interfered with elections when they thought it was necessary to prevent those they suspected of being Tories from voting; when they desired to vote, and were not authorized to do so; and in a partisan manner, supporting one candidate over another. Tories, or those suspected of being so, were generally prevented from voting during most of the war. However, beginning in 1782, many

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[107] Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 1:433; Samuel Adams in an unsigned letter in The Boston-Gazette, February 13, 1769, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 1:306; A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston containing the Boston Town Records, 1758 to 1769, p. 278; Boston Selectmen to Governor Francis Bernard, February 16, 1769, A. L. Elwyn, Papers Relating to Public Events in Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolution, p. 116; Same to same, February 23, 1769, ibid., pp. 120-122.

[108] Proceedings of the Convention of the Delaware State, p. 34; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:239; Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland (1774-1777)," p. 46; Saunders, NCCR, 10:874; Albert B. Saye, New Viewpoints in Georgia History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1943), p. 181; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:286-287.

state governments, hoping to rehabilitate the Tories, gave them the right to vote. This was displeasing to many in the military and they responded, particularly in Delaware and Pennsylvania, by preventing Tories from voting or, at least, helping anti-Tory tickets to prevail.[109]

Problems with the military interfering with elections began the first year of the war, as that summer at Braintree, Massachusetts, one company of militia opposed another in support of different candidates for that city's representative to the Congress. The following summer in Georgia, Continental Major Joseph Habersham, while working at the polls, became involved in a squabble in counting ballots, and in the process killed another officer of the opposing political faction. A grand jury found no cause for trying him and he was promoted soon thereafter. Complaints about the military being illegally involved in elections were numerous during the middle years of the war, especially in New York and the middle states, where there were many soldiers during those years. Pennsylvania experienced

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[109]Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the Critical Period 1781-1789, Rutgers Studies in History, no. 6 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), pp. 76-77, 76n.23, 93; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:432; Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation [1783-1784], trans. and ed. by Alfred J. Morrison, 1:374-375; Harold B. Hancock, ed., "The Revolutionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2 (October 1968): 165, 165n.46.

difficulties with the military at the 1781 and 1783 elections.[110] For most, the military's involvement in the electoral process was more of a nuisance than a real threat to civilian control. Similarly was their unwanted presence at the seat of government.

In keeping with James Otis' opinion, expressed during November 1768, with the British troops occupying Boston, that it was "utterly derogatory" to the people to have government administered "at the point of bayonets, and mouths of cannon," most chief executives did not desire the military to be present at the seat of government, particularly when it appeared the military would influence the operations of government.[111] Governor Clinton objected to

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[110]Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 16, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:248-249; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 99-100; David Forman to George Washington, November 7, 1777, Worthington C. Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, pp. 92-93; George Washington to George Reed, February 22, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:497; George Read to George Washington, March 2, 1777 [1778], Read, George Read, p. 303; Memorial of the Citizens of Philadelphia to the Supreme Executive Council, unsigned, undated [1778], Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:220-223; Jno. Graham et al., to George Clinton, April 18, 1781, Hastings. Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:786-878; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 1:419; Staughton Lynd, "The Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May 1777," NYHSQ 48, no. 2 (April 1964): 175; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, pp. 105-107, 144.

[111]William Tudor, The Life of James Otis of Massachusetts: Containing Also Notices of Some Contemporary Characters and Events from the Year 1760 to 1775 (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1823), p. 338.

General McDougall's efforts to billet a regiment at Poughkeepsie, then the seat of government. Clinton relented when McDougall assured him that "sooner than they should interrupt the Delibertations of the Legislature, I will remove them to the most dreary valley in the Highlands, altho they, and I, should share the fate of their unfortunate Brethern last Winter, at the Valley Forge."[112]

The military's presence at the seat of government did influence the operations of government at times, but for the most part their involvement was more of a nuisance than a threat to civilian control. Nevertheless, there were occasions when the military's presence and influence was believed to pose a threat of military control. This was especially true in Pennsylvania and Georgia.

Georgia had many difficulties between the military and their chief executives, especially between General Lachlan McIntosh and Governor Button Gwinnett.[113] Both had strong personalities and belonged to opposing political factions. If this was not enough to create a tense situation

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[112]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, December 15, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:386; see also Same to same, earlier letter of same date, ibid., 377; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, December 15, 1778, ibid., 382-383.

[113]John Wereat to Henry Laurens, August 30, 1777, Frank Moore, Materials for History, Printed From Original Manuscripts. With Notes and Illustrations, 1st ser. (New York: Zenger Club, 1861), pp. 39-52.

between them, there were other problems involved in their relationship. For instance, George McIntosh, brother of the general, as a member of the council refused to sign Gwinnett's commission as governor and was later jailed by Gwinnett for treasonable activities. Additionally, Gwinnett believed he should have been made general of the Continental line, not McIntosh. Thus, on many occasions he interfered with military affairs and undermined McIntosh's authority.[114]

The problems between them, and between Gwinnett and General Howe, began in March 1777, when the governor did not desire McIntosh to lead an expedition against Florida and Howe refused to allow Continental soldiers to go on such an expedition. Upset with the military, Gwinnett wrote Congress reminding them that the Declaration of Independence addressed the issue of the military affecting to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. And because Howe and McIntosh had such a poor opinion of the civil authority, he asked they be removed from the state. Not waiting for Congress to act, and seeing the necessity of using McIntosh's troops, Gwinnett led an expedition against Florida in April, with McIntosh commanding them. The

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[114]Hugh M'Call, The History of Georgia Containing Brief Sketches of the Most Remarkable Events up to the Present Day (1784), 2 vols. (Savannah: Seymour and Williams, 1811-1816), p. 334; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 51, 94, 95; Button Gwinnett to President John Hancock, March 28, 1777, ibid., pp. 215-220.

campaign faltered way short of its goal because of the constant bickering between Gwinnett and McIntosh. This bickering continued later in April, when McIntosh actively supported Gwinnett's opponent for the governorship. Hoping to settle the difficulties between them, the Assembly called them before the legislature to explain their actions. When the Assembly vindicated Gwinnett's conduct, McIntosh publicly called the governor a scoundrel and a lying rascal. This resulted in Gwinnett challenging McIntosh to a duel. It took place on May 16, 1777, with both parties being wounded in the leg. McIntosh's wound healed, but not so Gwinnett's, as he died of gangrene three days after the duel.[115]

The civil-military dispute did not end with Gwinnett's death, as his supporters did their best to discredit McIntosh. McIntosh did not help matters. Shortly after the duel, Continental officers sent to arrest his brother, George McIntosh, were, on the general's orders, arrested by Colonel Joseph Habersham, and George McIntosh was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia to plead his treason case. It should be added that by the end of 1777 George McIntosh was cleared, although the evidence would suggest he was somewhat guilty by association, as his business

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[115] Same to same, March 28, 1777, ibid., pp. 220-221; Lyman Hall to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1777, ibid., pp. 228-229; see also ibid., pp. 151-154.

connections were often Tories.[116] In June, Governor Treutlen wrote Congress complaining that Habersham and McIntosh had subverted the civil power by allowing George McIntosh to escape answering charges levelled against him by the state's executive council. "Such a stretch of military Power will undoubtedly be taken notice of by . . . Congress, who have always asserted & shewn the greatest tenderness to the Liberty of the Subject & are duly convinced of the necessity of the Subservience of the military to the Civil Authority." Gwinnett, according to Treutlen, had "lost his life in endeavouring to maintain the civil Power in opposition to the cunning & subterfuges of a designing man." "While the Command of the Continental Troops remains in the hands of the McIntoshes," he concluded, "our People will never think themselves safe."[117] Later in the summer, the Georgia Assembly sent a petition to Congress calling on them to remove McIntosh, and about the same time they sent to Congress a petition signed by over five hundred residents of Chatham County with a similar request.[118]

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[116] Ibid., pp. 138, 159-160; John Adam Treutlen to John Hancock, August 6, 1777, ibid., pp. 244-249; Ford, JCC, 8:9, 757; 9:764-765, 787-789.

[117] John Adam Treutlen to John Hancock, June 19, 1777, Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 244-245, 245, 245-246.

[118] Petition of the Georgia Assembly to Congress, September 13, 1777, ibid., pp. 265-266; Petition of Chatham County to Congress, July 1, 1777, endorsed by the Governor and Council on September 26, 1777, ibid., pp. 266-271.

McIntosh responded to the various charges against him by writing Henry Laurens that the civilian leaders, by criticizing him, were undermining his authority which was sapping the foundation of the military and the subordination and respect so necessary in the army. "Unless the Congress," he wrote, "fixes some line between the government of their army and the interference of the civil government of this restless and unsettled State, it will not only become useless, but a nuisance to the inhabitants."[119] In mid July, he wrote a Georgia delegate to Congress that "the unhappy divisions of our State now infect the army who are takin[g] sides and I fear will ruin all military order and subordination." He maintained he had not been disrespectful to the civil authorities. In fact, he argued, the civil authorities were trying to subvert his officers to their views on all matters. "In short," he complained, "officers now are at a loss who to obey properly." Therefore, he requested Congress fix some line between the authority and responsibility between the civil and military officials.[120] Congress did address this question and also addressed the pleas of the Georgia officials by removing McIntosh from their borders, assigning him duty elsewhere.

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[119]Lachlan McIntosh to Henry Laurens, May 30, 1777, ibid., p. 254.

[120]Lachlan McIntosh to [ ], July 14, 1777, ibid., pp. 256, 258.

Before going on to discuss the civil-military difficulties involving politics in Pennsylvania, it should be noted that the Gwinnett-McIntosh situation was not unique. There were numerous quarrels between military and civilian leaders over both political and personal matters. Several were settled by duels, or involved the threat of duels. During 1780, another chief executive of Georgia, George Wells, was killed in a duel by a member of the opposing political faction, Major James Jackson. During the summer of 1778, General Howe fought a duel with South Carolina state leader, Christopher Gadsden, who had been critical of him. Although they shook hands after having fired at each other, Howe would be removed from his southern command for having upset the South Carolina government. General Sullivan, believing that Thomas Burke, a member of Congress, had been critical of his actions at Brandywine, challenged him to a duel. The duel did not take place and the two men would eventually serve together in Congress on a somewhat amicable basis. And Charles Lee challenged member of Congress William Henry Drayton to a duel as he had criticized Lee's actions at Monmouth. Drayton, though sanctioning duelling, declined, explaining that duels should not be participated in by members of the judiciary.

He was also South Carolina's chief judge.[121]

Probably nowhere else did the military involve themselves in the political and governmental affairs more than in Pennsylvania. This involvement began early in the war, as the Associators were quite active in lobbying to be recognized as the legitimate body of the colony and that a committee of safety be appointed to oversee their military activities. Their efforts resulted in the House recognizing them and appointing a committee of safety. The Philadelphia Associators urged throughout the spring of 1776 that a provincial conference write a state constitution. They were joined in their lobbying efforts by some of the more radical members of Pennsylvania's navy, by a Philadelphia Committee of Privates, and by Associator battalions throughout the colony. With Associator backing, county committees

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[121]William Omer Foster, James Jackson: Duelist and Militant Statesman 1757-1806, p. 6; Thomas Gamble, Savannah Duels and Duellists 1733-1877, pp. 37-38; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major James Jackson (Augusta, Georgia: Geo. F. Randolph, and Company, 1809), p. 18; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1905), p. 52; John H. Wheeler, Reminiscences and Memoirs of North Carolina and Eminent North Carolinians (Columbus, Ohio: Columbus Print. Works, 1884), p. 135; Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, p. 204; John Sullivan to Thomas Burke, April 18, 1778, [draft], Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:35; John Sullivan to Alexander McDougall, January 27, 1781, ibid., 3:271-275; Same to same, March 16, 1781, 296-298; Alexander McDougall to John Sullivan, May 22, 1781, ibid., 320-321; Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:xxiii-xxv.

early in June 1776 elected representatives for a provincial conference, which would decide what should be done about lack of energy in the existing government. Over half of its members held military titles. Faced with the call for a new government, the conference assumed the powers of government and issued a call for a constitutional convention. With a majority of its members Associators, the convention met on July 15, 1776. A constitution was adopted two months later and elections for its approval were called for on the fifth of November. Organized opposition to the constitution began in mid October, with members of the military playing active roles as detractors and supporters of the document. The common Pennsylvania Continental soldier and the Associators were perhaps the most ardent supporters of the new constitution, and it was charged in The Pennsylvania Packet on October 22, 1776, that like Cromwell, the convention was defending its work with armed men, allowing no opportunity for the people to pass free judgment on it.[122]

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[122]Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 78-79, 117-118, 126-128, 136-137, 147-148, 212n.23, 223, 225, 227; Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution, p. 89; Roberdeau Buchanan, Life of the Hon. Thomas McKean, LL.D., Member of the Continental Congress from Delaware, Chief Justice and Governor of Pennsylvania, Signer of the Declaration of Independence, and President of Congress, p. 50; The Pennsylvania Evening Post, May 21, June 1, 6, 1776; The Pennsylvania Gazette, May 22, June 5, 12, 19, 1776; The Pennsylvania Journal; and the Weekly Advertiser, June 5, 1776; The Pennsylvania Packet, or, the General Advertiser, June 17, 1776.

Debate on the constitution was limited during the fall and winter when the British army was in New Jersey and again during the spring of 1777, when it appeared they would invade Pennsylvania. In May, when fear of a British invasion abated, the debate was renewed. To demonstrate their opposition to the government operating under the constitution, several military leaders, including Joseph Reed, John Cadwalader, and Samuel Miles, refused positions under it, and numerous officers resigned their commissions. Others, including Generals Mifflin, St. Clair, Thompson, and Wayne, publicly condemned the constitution. "I pronounce it," Wayne wrote during the summer of 1777, "not worth defending."[123] At the prompting of Thomas Mifflin and others, Wayne left the army for a short period during the winter of 1778-1779 to return to Pennsylvania to lobby against the constitution.[124]

During 1779 and 1780, opposition to the constitution and the government operating under it by the military

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[123]Anthony Wayne to Benjamin Rush, [June or July] 2, 1777, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 71; Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, May 19, 1777, ibid., p. 68; Rossman, Thomas Mifflin, pp. 87-88.

[124]Thomas Mifflin, Mark Bird, Jonathan Potts, Edward Biddle, Samuel Potts and James Wilson to Anthony Wayne, [Fall 1778], Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 72; Anthony Wayne to Thomas Mifflin et al., November 23, 1778, ibid., p. 73; Anthony Wayne to George Washington, February 10, 1779, ibid., pp. 75-76.

continued.[125] Many in the military, particularly the militia, supported the constitution and the government, at times demonstrating their support by physically attacking its opponents, such as during the riots of the fall of 1779, which culminated in the "Fort Wilson" riot. James Wilson, fearing that his opposition to the constitution would result in his being run out of Philadelphia by the militia, gathered about thirty supporters in his house to fend off the militia. Among his supporters included Colonel Stephen Chambers, a militia officer and member of the supreme executive council; General William Thompson; Thomas Mifflin; David Franks, General Arnold's aide; Robert Morris; George Clymer; and Mark Bird, Wilson's brother-in-law and colonel of the Berks County battalion. The attack on Wilson's house resulted in the defenders having one killed and three wounded and the attackers having five killed and fourteen wounded. The fighting was stopped by President Reed and the City Troop of Light Horse, with the assistance of some of Baylor's Dragoons. Arrests were made and Wilson left town for several weeks until tempers calmed. Those arrested were soon released by the authorities when it appeared they might be released by military force. The

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[125] Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6, 1779, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:62; Roche, Joseph Reed, pp. 188, 262n.105; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, October 16, 1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907): 250.

following spring the supreme executive council granted a general pardon to all those involved in the riot.[126] The military opponents to the constitution were somewhat more circumspect in their actions of opposition. Progressively, they tempered their criticism, believing as did Generals Wayne and St. Clair, that they should concentrate on winning the war, and once won, they could devote their energies to adopting a constitution more to their liking.[127]

In a few instances, for the most part at the insistence of the civilian authorities, the military leaders were the supreme authority for a state or area. There were instances when some individuals desired the military to take over the whole country, and at two critical times, during 1780 and 1783, the possibility of this happening existed. But in only one instance did the military actually seize control of a civilian government, and that was on the frontier, and just for a limited period of time.

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[126] C. Page Smith, "The Attack on Fort Wilson," ibid., 78, no. 2 (April 1954): 177-188; Samuel Patterson to Caesar Rodney, October 9, 1779, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, pp. 323-324; Jacob Cox Parsons, ed., Extracts from the Diary of Jacob Hiltzheimer, of Philadelphia 1765-1798 (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Fell and Company, 1893), p. 41.

[127] Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:466-467; Anthony Wayne to Robert Morris et al., October 17, 1780, Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 120.

During the summer of 1778, George Rogers Clark's Virginians captured the western cities of Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes. Early in December 1778, the Virginia legislature provided for the newly captured area to be consolidated as Illinois County and established a government for its inhabitants, which were mainly French-speaking. Governor Henry named John Todd Colonel and County Lieutenant, and instructed him to prevent the military from alienating the French inhabitants.[128] Todd believed he could control the military, as Clark was instructed by the governor and council to cooperate with him, and because he and Clark were friends.[129] Todd arrived in the area during the late spring of 1779, and found that the military did pretty much what they pleased. Todd, not able to control the military, nor able to get Clark to control them, as he was involved in other projects, such as an expedition against Detroit and laying out the town of Louisville, resigned in November,

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[128]Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 9:552; Patrick Henry to John Todd, December 12, 1778, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781," pp. 83-87.

[129]The Virginia Council to George Rogers Clark, December 12, 1778, ibid., pp. 78-81; Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15, 1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 61; Speech of George Rogers Clark to the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia, May 12, 1779, ibid., p. 82.

leaving behind Richard Winston to act in his stead.[130] While Todd was present, Colonel John Montgomery showed the minimum of respect to the civilian authorities, but once Todd left, Montgomery became an absolute dictator at Kaskaskia. When the magistrates reminded him that the thirteenth article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights provided "that in all cases the military must be under the most exact subordination to and governed by the civil power," Montgomery increased his tyranny.[131] Throughout 1780, Montgomery controlled the Illinois country with a strong hand, paying little or no attention to the civilian authorities.[132] Montgomery's successor, Captain John Rogers, assisted by Captain Richard McCarthy, during the winter of 1780-1781, continued to ignore the civil authorities,

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[130]Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779, ibid., pp. 83-89; John Todd to the Governor of Virginia, August 18, 1779, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781," p. 357.

[131]Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Montgomery, December 9, 1779, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 142; Citizens of Kaskaskia to the Magistrates of Kaskaskia, December 8, 1779, ibid., p. 137; John Montgomery to Richard Winston, March 5, 1780, Alvord, "Cahokia Records," p. lxxxii.

[132]Memorial of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to Mottin de la Balme, September 29, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd, October 17, 1780, ibid., p. 195; Memorial of the Inhabitants of Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21, 1780, Alvord, "Cahokia Records," pp. 537, 543, 545.

despite their pleas they obey Virginia's laws.[133] When Rogers departed, John Dodge, the Indian agent, became the Captain-Commandant of the militia at Kaskaskia, and during the winter of 1781-1782 attempted to be the supreme ruler of the area. This resulted in a debate with Deputy County Lieutenant Richard Winston, which ended in late April 1782 when Dodge had Winston arrested and jailed for treason. For the two weeks Winston was jailed, Dodge ran the government. His domination of affairs continued even after Winston was found innocent by a Kaskaskia court and released. This domination by the military finally ended early in 1783 when the military finally departed. Thus ended the only example where friction between the civilian and military authorities resulted in the military supplanting the civilian authority with their own power.[134]

The military's involvement in civilian affairs in the Ohio country was the rare exception to general positive

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[133]The Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Rogers, November 10, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 208; Same to same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 236, 238; John Todd to Thomas Jefferson, January 23, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1:460; Richard McCarthy to John Todd, October 14, 1780, ibid., 380.

[134]John Dodge to Israel Dodge, April 29, 1782, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 272; see also ibid., pp. 274-284, 293, 304, 320-322; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of Illinois 1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections, 5 (1908): 41-42.

military involvement in civilian affairs throughout the war. As we have seen in this chapter, and in earlier chapters, the military's relationship with the civilian governments, though often stormy, for the most part had the positive influence of allowing the military to participate in civilian affairs without the necessity of seizing power or using military force to have their views heard or accepted. It also had the influence of reinforcing the belief that the civilian governments were the supreme authority and if any changes were to be made, especially those relating to how the military was controlled and directed, they would be made by the civilians, not by the military. Additionally, such involvement had a way of reinforcing civilian values, especially when the military assumed civilian roles, either while in the military or once leaving the military; or upholding the civilian governments.

Although the civil-military relationship was relatively tranquil throughout the first five years of the war, it became sorely tested beginning with the winter of 1779-1780 as the army suffered, and it appeared to them that the civilians were incapable or unwilling to assist them. In the next chapter, this testing will be discussed.

C H A P T E R X

A DELICATE BALANCE: THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TIME OF CRISIS 1779-1781

The American military, as we have seen, frequently involved themselves in civil affairs and in a few instances subordinated the civilian authority to their own. But at no time did they, as the military in England in the previous century, take control of the primary civilian governments. There were times during the war, however, when this might have happened. The first was during 1780, when the collapse of the civilian governments and the war effort seemed imminent. The other was during 1783, when it appeared that the military was to be disbanded without being compensated sufficiently for their efforts. This and the following chapter will analyze why a military take-over might have taken place during 1780 and 1783 and the reasons why military control did not replace civilian control of American affairs during the last years of the Revolutionary War.

A military take-over of civilian affairs was on the minds of the revolutionary leaders throughout the war, not just during the last years of the war. From the beginning,

many Americans feared a Cromwell rising from the military to assume the authority of the weak Congress and state governments.[1] Americans were quite familiar with James Burgh's admonition that "when a country is to be enslaved, the army is the instrument to be used."[2] They were ever mindful that a parliamentary army in England a little more than a century before had turned upon its creator and erected a military dictatorship under Cromwell and the major generals. From Paris, late in 1777, Arthur Lee wrote his brother that "next to entire slavery, a standing army is the greatest evil than can exist in a young state; and the continuance of a civil war . . . may kindle the fatal ambition of some Cromwell." By the end of 1778, many Americans shared Benjamin Rush's belief that there was no longer serious danger of tyranny from Great Britain, and that if any tyranny was to take place it would be "only in the shape of a Whig."[3]

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[1]See Ebenezer Elmer's August 7, 1776, speech in The Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, August 28, 1776; William Tudor's March 5, 1779, Boston Massacre Oration in Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, p. 37; Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, October 28, 1778, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:176.

[2]Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:349.

[3]Arthur Lee to Richard Henry Lee, October 4, 1777, Lee, Arthur Lee, appendix 8, pp. 114-115; Benjamin Rush to William Gordon, December 10, 1778, "Excerpts from The Papers of Dr. Benjamin Rush," PMHB 29, no. 1 (1905): 21-22.

Although some Continental officers thought about taking temporary control of the government if the civilians could not properly manage the war effort, such thoughts were not often openly expressed, nor seriously contemplated during the first five years of the war.[4] After all, most of the officers were former civilians who shared generally held fears of military tyranny.

There was, however, one foreigner, the Comte de Broglie, who, early in the war believed that if he had control over the civilian authorities he could produce military victory. A born intriguer and lover of adventurous schemes, he had served in the French army as a general and as France's Ambassador to Poland. During 1776, using his protege, Baron De Kalb, as his spokesman, he attempted to get Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin to back his plan to have Congress make him a Stadtholder of the American states. Broglie, knowing that Deane and Franklin would be somewhat chary of his proposal, informed them that he would only hold the position for three years. On the other hand, he demanded that Congress agree to grant him absolute control over the army, without interference, and that he be allowed to carry on negotiations with foreign powers. Franklin and Deane did

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[4]E.g. "A Continental" in The Connecticut Courant, November 25, 1777; Alexander McDougall to John McKesson, January 24, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 151; Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 2:306.

not support Broglie's plan, nor did De Kalb, once he arrived in America. He wrote his mentor that it would be an injustice to Washington and an affront to America's honor to lobby for the plan. Congress, learning of the plan early in 1777, did not consider it.[5]

Although few in the military contemplated military dictatorship during the first years of the war, and few civilians were amenable to military control, by 1779, the number of leaders who wanted some type of military control increased as it was believed that the revolutionary war would be lost otherwise.

Financially, America was in poor shape by 1779, and the condition worsened during 1779 and 1780. Both Congress and the states had their paper money depreciate to the point

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[5]Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, Sepgember 24, 1777, Henri Doniol, Historie de la Participation de la France a l'Establishment des Estats-Unis d'Amerique. Correspondance Diplomatique et Documents, 5 vols. (Paris, France: Imprimerie Nationale, 1886-1892), 3:227; Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, December 6, 1776, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC 19 (1887): 404-405; Baron De Kalb to Silas Deane, December 17, 1776, ibid., 427-431; Comte de Broglie to Baron De Kalb, [December 19-20?, 1776], Charles J. Stillé, "Comte de Broglie, the proposed stadtholder of America," PMHB 1 (1888): 380-381; A. E. Zucker, General De Kalb, Lafayette's Mentor, pp. 94-107; Louise Burnham Dunbar, "A Study of 'Monarchical' Tendencies in the United States from 1776 to 1801," University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 10, no. 1 (1922), pp. 27-35; James Breck Perkins, France in the American Revolution, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), pp. 193-203.

of worthlessness during these years.[6] By the end of 1780, one member of Congress reported that Continental bills were "fit but for little else but to make the tail of a paper kite with." The previous spring, Washington complained that a wagon load of money would scarcely purchase a wagon load of provisions.[7] Instead of alleviating their financial plight by taxing and confiscating Tory estates, the states experimented with anti-monopoly laws, prohibitions on export of necessities, laws requiring the acceptance of paper money, loans, wage restrictions, and price controls; as well as continuing to print large sums of paper money.[8]

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[6]Anne Bezanson, Prices and Inflation During the American Revolution: Pennsylvania, 1770-1790, University of Pennsylvania Research Studies, no. 35 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 67; ibid., Table 1, pp. 334-337; Bulloch, "The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," pp. 133, 135; George Washington Greene, Historical View of the American Revolution (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1865), appendix, pp. 455, 457.

[7]Oliver Wolcott to Jonathan Trumbull, December 18, 1780, p.s., MHSC, 7th ser., 3:168; George Washington to John Jay, April 23, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:437; see also Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation, p. 15; Richard S. Rodney, Colonial Finances in Delaware (Wilmington, Delaware: Wilmington Trust Company, 1928), pp. 50-51.

[8]Ralph Volney Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary Finance, 1775-1783," AHR 25, no. 1 (October 1929): 66; chart between pp. 50-51; William G. Sumner, The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company,1892), 1:29, 55, 59, 60, 65, 74, 84, 92, 93; Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States from 1774 to 1789: Embracing the Period of the American Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896), pp. 158-173; Ralph V. Harlow, "Economic Conditions in Massachusetts During the American Revolution," Publications of

Congressional attempts to improve the nation's finances during 1780 were ineffective and, in some instances, worsened the situation.[9] By the summer of 1780, the states were financially exhausted, the Continental treasury was nearly empty, and the central government lacked any real credit.[10] This financial exhaustion resulted in the diminishing activity and influence of Congress.[11]

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the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions (1917-1919), 20:168-183; Kenneth Scott, "Price Control in New England During the Revolution," NEQ 19, no. 4 (December 1946): 472.

[9]Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, January 25, 1780, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 124; Philip Schuyler to George Clinton, November 29, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:529; Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11, 1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nicholson, 1757-1800, p. 6; Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of the Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, pp. 73-74.

[10]Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., December 29, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1896): 475; James Duane to George Washington, December 9, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:477; John Sullivan to Meshech Weare, November 15, 1780, ibid., 447; Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke, October 9, 1780, ibid., 413; Elbridge Gerry to John Adams, May 5, 1780, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:189; Nathanael Greene to Jonathan Trumbull, May 7, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:36-37; Oliver Wolcott to Jonathan Trumbull, December 18, 1780, ibid., 168; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers of Major-General Nathanael Greene," HM, 2d ser., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133; Ford, JCC, 16:326.

[11]Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 3, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:258; Robert R. Livingston to Philip Schuyler, January 27, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:19; Philip Schuyler to Nathanael Greene, March 22, 1780, ibid., 90.

The continent was suffering from other causes than financial exhaustion. States were quarreling over western lands. New state movements were on the rise in the west. There were boundary disputes between states. The Articles of Confederation still had not been adopted by all the states. The internal war was at its zenith. The army was living off impressments and by plundering. Greene resigned as Quartermaster General, disgusted with Congress. Benedict Arnold defected. Cornwallis was on the move in the south. During the summer, Gates was defeated at Camden and Lincoln surrendered his army at Charleston. Colonel Burfort's Virginia regiment was annihilated at Warhawks and Fort 96 was captured. And the French still had not arrived in force.

If the country suffered and was demoralized, the army suffered even more so during 1779 and 1780. The winter of 1779-1780 was the coldest in memory, and the army at Morristown suffered greatly. Its condition continued to worsen during 1780, so that by the summer, the northern army was in a desperate shape. This situation continued through the summer and fall, despite increased impressing.[12]

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[12]John Paterson to William Heath, May 7, 1780, Egleston, John Paterson, p. 115; William Irvine to Joseph Reed, May 26, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:201; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 10, 1780, ibid., 191; Nathanael Greene to Clement Biddle, June 29, 1780, ibid., appendix, p. 469; Samuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell, July 15, 1780, "Unpulbished Letter from the Camp, July 1780," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 2 (August 1870): 102; Rufus Putnam to Robert Howe, July 14, 1780, Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 172; Eb[enezer]

Conditions in the Western Department were just as bad, as soldiers at Fort Pitt suffered from the lack of food and clothing.[13] During the summer and fall of 1780, the southern army also suffered from the lack of supplies.[14]

Besides not receiving supplies and clothing, the military received little or no pay, and when they did, it was generally depreciated to the point of worthlessness. Not only did this result in the soldiers suffering, but also their families. Thus, there were many pay complaints beginning during the winter of 1778-1779.[15] Certain categories

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Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 7, 1780, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 87; Ephraim Blaine to Isaac Carty, May 20, 1780, Delaware Archives, 3:1355; Ephraim Blaine to Samuel Huntington, October 17, 1780, [copy], Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:298-299; William Heath to George Clinton, November 17, 1780, ibid., 418; Ephraim Blaine to George Clinton, August 14, 1780, ibid., 100-101; The Congressional Committee at Camp to the Several States, May 25, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:165; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, May [ ], 1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362-363.

[13]Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, September 16, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:558-559; Same to same, October 17, 1780, ibid., 589.

[14]Baron De Kalb to Chevalier de la Luzerne, August 14, 1780, Garden, Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War, p. 298; Horatio Gates to Peter Muhlenberg, October 12, 1780, Paul A. W. Wallace, The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania, p. 201; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, December 28, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:191; Same to same, December 7, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:543; Nathanael Greene to Baron von Steuben, December 7, 1780, ibid., 541.

[15]Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, October 10, [1778], "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 212; Anthony Wayne to Richard Peters, October 21, 1778, "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 2 (1881): 231; Anthony Wayne to

of officers suffered more than others, such as those of the sixteen additional regiments which had no particular state to look after their interests.[16] The generals also suffered disproportionally.[17] Lord Stirling, for example, who entered the war in debt, had creditors hounding him throughout the war, and was unable to get his tenants in New Jersey and New York to pay their rent. By the end of 1779, his farm had been sold to pay his debts and he was virtually broke.[18] McDougall, who also had financial problems, complained to

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Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 162-163; Charles Pope to Caesar Rodney, October 28, 1778, Harold B. Hancock, ed., "Letters to and from Caesar Rodney," DH 12, no. 2 (October 1966): 155; Eb[enezer] Huntington to Ja[bez] Huntington, December 21, 1778, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 77; Israel Putnam to Jonathan Trumbull, [ ], 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:339; Egleston, John Paterson, p. 110; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, p. 285; George Washington to the Congressional Committee of Conference, January 29, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:26-32; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 27, 1780, ibid., 18:430; George Washington to John Sullivan, November 20, 1780, ibid., 20:374; The Congressional Committee at Camp to the Several States, May 25, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:165; Other citations on this subject found later in this chapter on threats of and actual resignations and on lobbying by officers.

[16]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 27, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 15:330; Same to same, April 3, 1780, ibid., 18:207.

[17]George Washington to Joseph Reed, October 22, 1779, ibid., 17:10; Ford, JCC, 15:1286; 17:689.

[18]Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling, pp. 137-143, 239; Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, pp. 88-89.

Greene that the generals had been "insulted and neglected."[19] Not only did the officers complain about pay deficiencies, but they were upset with the civilian leaders and the American people for a variety of reasons, many of which have been discussed earlier.

Many officers were upset with the whole country. Early in September 1780, Hamilton wrote, "We begin to hate the country for its neglect of us." Five weeks earlier, an officer described his plight as being "Injured by my country, destitute of money & consequently Friends." Also during July, Ebenezer Huntington wrote "The Insults & Neglect which the Army have met with from the Country, Beggars all description, it must Go no farther they can endure it no longer." His brother, Jedediah, two weeks later, complained that "the Country are triffling with their Army or Rather with their own salvation."[20] The army was also upset with the American people.

During 1779 and 1780, the military became increasingly upset with the lack of virtue demonstrated by the

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[19]Alexander McDougall to Nathanael Greene, May 29, 1780, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 159.

[20]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:406; James Duncan to John Clark, July 28, 1780, "Original Documents," MH 2 (1905): 67; Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 7, 1780, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 88; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 17, 1780, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 441.

American people.[21] McDougall wrote Greene during the summer of 1780 that he told a member of Congress that "our Army no longer considers themselves as fighting the Battles of 'Republics in principle,' but for Empire and Liberty to a people whose object is property." General Davidson believed the people were so tied to their property that the loss of it seemed "to touch them with more Sensibility than the loss of their Country's Freedom."[22] The military, by 1779, had lost faith in Congress.

"O-the C[o]ngress-I wish my cursing them would make them better-" one officer complained during the summer of 1779.[23] Many officers shared a similar view, as the military developed an increasing frustration and dissatisfaction with

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[21]Alexander McDougall to John McKesson, January 24, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 151; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson, February 9, 1779, ibid., p. 150; John Paterson to William Heath, October 23, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:114-115; Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2, 1779, Coffin, The Lives and Services of Thomas, Knowlton, Scammell, Dearborn, p. 90; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, July 25, 1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 30, no. 1 (1906): 115; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers of Major-General Nathanael Greene," HM, 2d ser., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.

[22]Alexander McDougall to [Nathanael] Greene, August 8, 1780, Feinstone Collection #844; William L. Davidson to Horatio Gates, October 6, 1780, Davidson, William Lee Davidson, p. 82.

[23]Samuel B. Webb to Jeremiah Wadsworth, July 9, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 128, CHS.

that body, and the state governments, who seemingly were letting the army suffer unnecessarily and were seemingly indifferent to the exigencies of the times. For many, this frustration and dissatisfaction turned to hatred, a term used by some officers.[24] During the spring of 1780, Greene complained that "The [Congress] are a great set of [rascals] as ever got together." Later that year, General Parsons observed that "the wretches who have crept into Congress are almost below contempt."[25]

By the summer of 1780, many in the army believed the people had lost faith in Congress to direct successfully the war effort, and certainly many in the army had

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[24]Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, September 29, 1779, [extract], "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 144; Anthony Wayne to William Irvine, March 10, 1780, "Letters of General Wayne to General Irvine, 1778-1784," ibid., 6, no. 10 (October 1862): 323; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers of Major-General Nathanael Greene," ibid., 2d ser., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133; James Craik to Andrew Cragie, [August 1780], "Letter of Dr. James Craik," PMHS 35 (1901, 1902): 373; Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, [September 12, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:428; Nathanael Greene to Samuel B. Webb, July 4, 1780, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:269; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, April 29, 1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:172; Samuel H. Parsons to Benedict Arnold, September 5, 1780, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 303.

[25]Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11, 1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; Samuel H. Parsons to Benedict Arnold, September 5, 1780, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 303.

lost confidence in Congress.[26] During September 1780, Hamilton wrote one member of Congress that the army had "lost all confidence in them, and give the worse construction to all they do" and Greene wrote an ex-member of Congress that "there is hardly remaining the shadow of confidence in Government."[27]

A primary reason the military had lost confidence in Congress was that they believed they had been led astray by false or unfulfilled promises. "Promises," one officer wrote during May 1779, "cannot feed or Clothe a Man always- Performance is sometimes necessary to make a man believe you intend to Perform." Later that year, a member of Washington's staff asked a member of Congress, "Does Congress mean to make the officers any permanent consideration? or do they intend to coax them on by doing a little and promising them a great deal, till the war is over, and then leave them without money (consequently without friends), without estates, and many without property or constitutions, the two latter

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[26] Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11, 1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; George Washington to John Laurens, [January 15, 1781], Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:109-110; Marquis de Lafayette to Joseph Reed, May 31, 1780, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 3:147.

[27] Alexander Hamilton to James Duane [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:406; Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 469.

of which they have generously sacrificed in the defence of their country."[28]

This lack of confidence, coupled with the sad state of the country and the suffering of the army, caused many contemporaries to see this period, from the spring of 1780 until the following spring, as the most critical period of the war.[29] Late in April 1780, Washington wrote General Howe that "We are at a most delicate crisis; I dread with you the consequences." In a circular to the northern states in June, he wrote "The present crisis is by far the most important and delicate that this Country

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[28]Eb[enezer] Huntington to Joshua Huntington, May 3, 1779, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 81; and Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, September 29, 1779 [extract], Coffin, The Lives and Services of Thomas, Knowlton, Scammell, Dearborn, p. 90.

[29]Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, p. 248; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, May [ ], 1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362; James Craik to Andrew Cragie, [August 1780], "Letter of Dr. James Craik," PMHS 35 (1901, 1902): 363; Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, September 5, 1780, [extract], "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1776 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 144; James Craik to Jeremiah Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:67; Nathanael Greene to Alexander McDougall, February [ ], 1780, Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:152; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:273; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, February 14, 1780, ibid., 266; Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 456.

has ever experienced."[30] "Our present situation," John Hanson wrote in September, "is truly alarming-our Army in want of every thing; no money in the Treasury, and our Credit exhausted."[31] Early in February 1781, James Varnum wrote that unless Congress exercised its powers, "a few months will put an end to their existence."[32]

What would make things better? Many believed a stronger army, a stronger central government, and the means of bringing forth the wealth of the continent would bring a successful conclusion to the war.[33] Most agreed a

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[30]George Washington to Robert Howe, April 28, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:308; Washington's circular, June 30, 1780, ibid., 19:104-105; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 18, 1783, ibid., 26:231.

[31]John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954): 126.

[32]James M. Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781, Wilkins Updike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston: Thomas H. Webb and Company, 1842), pp. 157, 163.

[33]Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 457; John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954): 127; John Sullivan to George Washington, January 29, 1781, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:227; Jesse Root to Jonathan Trumbull, December 27, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:172, 173; Oliver Wolcott and Jesse Root to Jonathan Trumbull, January 16, 1781, ibid., 188; Joseph Jones to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 5:469-471; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781, ibid., 473-474; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire 2, no. 12 (December

stronger central government was a prerequisite to the other two. "Our perplexities," one member of Congress wrote early in 1781, "do not arise from poverty, or the want of men, but from the absolute want of government."[34] But there was, however, little hope of a stronger government being adopted or Congress adequately using the powers they possessed. "To effect an entire reformation of the plan and politics of this country," Greene observed late in 1780, "would be a greater task than that attempted by Martin Luther in the Romish church. What is the true interest of this country appears to be least likely adopted." John Sullivan who left camp for a position in Congress, wrote Washington early in 1781 that he was not hopeful for change, believing that the old members of Congress would be in heaven or at home before they adopted powers to bring forth the resources of the continent. Gouverneur Morris wrote Greene that he had no expectation that Congress would acquire adequate powers and no hope that the union of the states could subsist under the current arrangement. Robert Morris was somewhat more optimistic. He wrote Greene "That more power ought to be given to Congress is evident now to many, and will probably

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1823): 374, 375; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane,[September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:401-402, 408-409.

[34]James M. Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781, Wilkins Upkike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar, p. 157.

become soon very apparent to all." Many military and civilian leaders did not share this belief, nor did they see the war being successfully concluded. "I fear," General Huntington wrote during the summer of 1780, "the period of our Deliverance is at a great Distance."[35] With little or no expectation of the civil governments, particularly Congress, being able to bring forth the resources of the continent many feared the military, like Cromwell the century before, would turn on the civil governments.

Early in 1779, the president of Harvard College wrote that "it is to be feared our Soldiers, who have been greatly oppressed while fighting for their Country, will become mutinous and turn their Arms against their Neighbors, or disband."[36] Such fears grew during 1779 and 1780 as the condition of the army worsened. Early in April 1780, Washington wrote Congress that "There never has been a stage

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[35]Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 12 (December 1823): 374; John Sullivan to George Washington, March 6, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:12; Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:240; Robert Morris to Nathanael Greene, October 3, 1781, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 4:765; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 17, 1780, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 441; see also Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, May 30, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 293.

[36]Samuel Langdon to William Whipple, March 9, 1779, Charles F. Wetherell, "Samuel Langdon's Critique of Early Revolutionary War Era Finance," HNH 28, no. 3 (Fall 1973): 193-194.

of the War in which the dissatisfaction has been so general or alarming."[37] By the summer, there were great fears the accumulated distresses in the army would cause their patience to give way to "some violent convulsion."[38] After the Connecticut Line mutinied during May, Washington wrote that state's chief executive "there are certain bounds beyond which it is impossible for human nature to go" and that he believed the army had reached that point.[39] The following month, from his retirement home, Charles Lee wrote "We have neither monarchy, Aristocracy, nor Democracy." "I am . . . fully persuaded that after some months or at highest a couple of years' anarchy and confusion, an absolute Tyranny will be the conclusion of the Piece; but whether the Tyrant will be foreign or democratic is out of the reach of foresight."[40]

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[37]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:209.

[38]Philip Schuyler, Nathaniel Peabody, and John Mathews to the President of the Continental Congress, May 10, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:133; Circular from the Congressional Committee at Camp to the Several States, May 25, 1780, ibid., 166; Philip Schuyler to Ezra L'Hommedieu, May 20, 1780, "Letter of General Schuyler to Ezra L'Hommedieu," PMHS 10 (1867-1869): 488; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:273; Nathanael Greene to Clement Biddle, June 29, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:appendix, 469; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 197.

[39]George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1780, MHSC, 5th ser., 10:165.

[40]Charles Lee to James Monroe, June 25, 1780, Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, pp. 117, 118.

Two months earlier, in a coded letter, Greene observed that affairs were verging on revolt, as the people no longer had confidence in Congress, and there was nothing else left to save them. In March, William Gordon expressed his fear to Washington that "the unhappy state of our currency and finances may occasion some internal convulsion among ourselves." During the summer, one member of Congress informed its president that he soon expected the army to disband or turn upon their civilian leaders. A month later, Greene confided in Pennsylvania's chief executive that "The change of sentiment which has taken place in the army respecting civil government, has for the first time given me apprehension." Early in October, a member of Congress observed, "In short, I know not what is to become of us."[41]

Out of this situation grew the belief that extraordinary power ought to be placed in someone's hands. If this was not done, Robert R. Livingston wrote James Duane, the people would take matters into their own hands and "will vest elsewhere what Congress are unwilling to trust

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[41]Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11, 1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; William Gordon to George Washington, March 1, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930): 428; John Mathews to the President of the Continental Congress, August 6, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:310, 311; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 2, 1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:166-167; Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke, October 9, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:414.

themselves with-Or some daring Genious, with necessity for his plea, shall seize what they dare not give." Many believed that this extraordinary power should be lodged in Congress. After all, as one member of Congress wrote Greene, "This power is certainly more safely lodged in the hands of such a body as Congress, than any other."[42]

Many military, and some civilian, leaders did not believe that Congress, even with additional powers, would be able to guide America through this critical period. They believed, as did young Lewis Morris, that the spirit of their governments were "illy adapted" to the spirit of war.[43] What they desired was some form of military dictatorship.

By 1779, many civilian and military leaders believed that a limited military dictatorship needed to be established in order to prevent anarchy and to bring a successful conclusion to the war, even at the expense of civil supremacy and civilian rights. As General Moultrie stated early in 1779, "it has always been the maxim of all communities to abridge the people of some of those liberties for a time, the better

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[42]Robert R. Livingston to James Duane, May 2, 1780, George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York 1746-1813 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960), pp. 123-124; John Mathews to Nathanael Greene, May 20, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:94.

[43]Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., June 7, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 487.

to secure the whole to them in the future." Two days previously, McDougall wrote a civilian leader it was one of his first wishes to see the "civil at all times superior to the military," but he believed the military may have to seize control of government to ensure victory. Earlier, he wrote the people would have to support the army, or else the generals would take over, or they would be conquered--either way, the people would lose their liberties.[44]

Calls for some form of military dictatorship continued during 1780.[45] During September of that year, Lafayette wrote Luzerne that there was much talk of making Washington a dictator, and though by nature he was opposed to it, he believed Washington shared his belief that it might be necessary for the public welfare.[46] Such talk by the military declined the following year, with the approval of the Articles of Confederation and the establishment of executive departments, but nevertheless some in the military

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[44]William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, February 11, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 1:311-312; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson, February 9, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 150; Alexander McDougall to John McKesson, January 24, 1779, ibid., p. 151.

[45]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 2, 1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:166-167.

[46]Marquis de Lafayette to Chevalier de la Luzerne, September 10, 1780, Waldo G. Leland and Edmund C. Burnett, eds., "Letters from Lafayette to Luzerne, 1780-1782," AHR 20, no. 2 (January 1915): 374.

still believed a military dictatorship was necessary.[47]

Some civilian leaders believed that extraordinary power needed to be placed in the hands of the military in order to save the country from military defeat and anarchy.[48] As was pointed out earlier, the congressional committee at camp during the summer of 1780 favored a limited military dictatorship and that fall the Hartford Resolves called on Congress to give the military extraordinary power.

Many Americans, fearing anarchy, were willing to sacrifice their civil supremacy principles and republican beliefs for a strong government which would be able to prevent anarchy. And if not a strong government, a strong man on horseback, a military dictator. Many revolutionary leaders did not believe America had the virtue to experiment with democracy, while others believed that their only hope lay in the form of an absolute monarchy. "There are some amongst us," Thomas McKean complained to Samuel Adams, "who

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[47]John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr., May 10, 1781, "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 1 (1881): 109; Simeon DeWitt to John Bogart, May 8, 1781, The John Bogart Letters: Forty-Two Letters Written to John Bogart of Queen's College now Rutgers College and Five Letters Written by Him, 1776-1782, pp. 29-30.

[48]William Livingston to John Witherspoon, December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Philip Schuyler to James Duane, May 13, 1780, "The Duane Letters," Southern History Association Publications 8, no. 5 (September 1904): 380-381; Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, August 1, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:305; James Lovell to Elbridge Gerry, November 20, 1780, ibid., 451-452; Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 460.

are so fond of having a great and powerful Man to look up to, that, tho' they may not like the name of king, seem anxious to confer kingly powers."[49] Washington was the most likely candidate for such powers to be conferred upon, for by the critical period the army was devoted to him and most civilian leaders saw in him the glue that held the revolutionary cause together.

By 1779, Washington was honored, respected and loved by most of the army. He had slowly won their respect and gained their confidence. This was most aptly demonstrated during the Conway Cabal, when they rallied to his support. John Laurens wrote his father, then President of Congress, that "If ever there was a man in the world whose moderation and patriotism fitted him for the command of a republican army, he is, and he merits unrestrained confidence." A week later, the adjutant of the First Connecticut Regiment wrote that any general could be replaced but Washington, The country, even Congress, he believed, "are not aware of the Confidence the army Places in him."[50]

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[49] Thomas McKean to Samuel Adams, July 8, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:139; see also Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:240; Silas Deane to Simeon Deane, May 16, 1781, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC, 22 (1890): 340-342; Silas Deane to Jesse Root, May 20, 1781, ibid., 367; Silas Deane to Benjamin Tallmadge, May 20, 1781, ibid., 388.

[50] John Laurens to Henry Laurens, May 7, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, p. 170; Ezra Selden to Samuel Mather, May 15, 1778, Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 88.

The younger officers, especially, had great faith in General Washington. "When I contemplate the virtues of the man," a young Massachusetts officer wrote of Washington during the spring of 1778, "uniting in the citizen and soldier, I cannot too heartily coincide with the orator of the Fifth of March last who so delicately describes him, as a person that appears to be raised by Heaven to show how high humanity can soar." Another young officer, on learning that Washington might be replaced, wrote a friend that the army, almost to a man, had the highest opinion of their commander in chief, and he doubted they would submit to another. "They," he added, "love" and "adore him."[51]

The army's confidence and adoration increased during the critical period, so that by the summer of 1781 the Abbé Robin observed that Washington's subordinates were "rivals in praising him." Other Frenchmen made similar observations during 1781. One wrote in July that the soldiers regarded Washington as their "friend and father," and earlier that year another wrote Washington was "beloved and respected by his men." By the time of the Yorktown campaign, a young French officer observed that the army had "supreme confidence

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[51]Samuel Shaw to John Eliot, April 12, 1778, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 45; Nathaniel Chipman to Elisha Lee, April 10, 1778, Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 86; see also Mercy Otis Warren to James Warren, March 10, 1778, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 7.

in General Washington." The following year, young Prince Broglie noted that around Washington his officers exhibited an air of "respect," "confidence," and "admiration."[52]

On July 4, 1779, Steuben wrote that Washington's "authority is as unlimited as that of a Stadtholder in Holland can be."[53] Although this is an exaggeration, certainly with respect to control over the civilian government, Washington, nevertheless, during the critical period had great authority over his officers and soldiers. They looked to him for leadership and were quite willing to follow wherever he lead.[54] What of the civilians?

During the spring of 1779, a young officer wrote that Washington's "fortitude, patience, and equanimity of soul, and the discouragements he has been obliged to encounter, ought to endear him to his country." It already had, he added, done so "exceedingly to the army."[55] After the

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[52]Robin, New Travels Through North America, p. 34; Acomb, Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 102; Rice, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:25, 152; E. W. Balch, trans., "Narrative of the Prince de Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 5 (May 1877): 309.

[53]Baron von Steuben to Baron De Frank, July 4, 1779, Kapp, Steuben, Appendix, p. 654.

[54]James Craik to Andrew Cragie, [August 1780], "Letter of Dr. James Craik," PMHS 35 (1901, 1902): 363; Samuel H. Parsons to Benedict Arnold, September 5, 1780, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 303.

[55]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, April 12, 1779, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 45.

battles of Trenton and Princeton, Washington's popularity grew, and he was perceived by many to be the savior of his country.[56] One member of Congress wrote early in 1777 that "America has been rescued from ruin by the mere strength of his Genius, conduct, and courage," and believed "an Impartial world will say with you that he is the Greatest man on Earth."[57] So popular was Washington that early in 1777 one person observed that "The ignorant and deluded part of the people look up to him as the Saviour and Protector of their Country, and have implicit confidence in everything he does."[58]

Washington's popularity increased during the middle years of the war, even though victories were few and far between.[59] "A Citizen," in the April 1, 1778, issue of the New-Jersey Gazette wrote that Washington's uncommon abilities, patience, fortitude, and humanity "furnished the most convincing proofs that Heaven directed their choice" of him

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[56]Caesar Rodney to William Killen, January 27, 1777, [draft], Delaware Archives, 3:1439.

[57]William Hooper to Robert Morris, February 1, 1777, NYHSC, 11 (1878): 416.

[58]Nicholas Cresswell, Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777, p. 256.

[59]John Mathews to Jonathan Trumbull, August 19, 1780, Circular, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:113; Charles Lee to Horatio Gates, April 4, 1779, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 6 (1874): 322.

as commander in chief. Just keeping the army together without them turning on the civilians earned him much praise. And, as soldiers and officers came and went, only Washington remained, and was thus seen by many as the revolution itself.

"While Washington survives," Caesar Rodney wrote early in 1777, "the great American cause cannot Die."[60] Actually, from the beginning of the war, many people viewed Washington in this light.[61] Lacking national symbols, Washington, especially after his dramatic successes at Princeton and Trenton, came to be viewed as the national symbol, the embodiment of the aspirations of the American revolutionaries and their revolution.[62]

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[60]Caesar Rodney to William Killen, January 27, 1777, [draft], Delaware Archives, 3:1439.

[61]Catherine L. Albanese, Sons of the Fathers: The Civil Religion of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), pp. 143-181; Bernhard Knollenberg, Washington and the Revolution: A Reappraisal. Gates, Conway, and the Continental Congress (New York: Macmillan Company 1940), p. 109.

[62]Opinion of Henry Knox to George Washington, November 26, 1777, Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, p. 194; Elisha Boudinot to George Washington, April [ ], 1783, George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and Statesman 1740-1821, p. 121; Charles Armand-Tuffin to George Washington, February 4, 1781, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 320; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, December 30, 1777, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 14; Same to Same, June 12, 1779, ibid., p. 74; Count Mathieu Dumas, Memoirs of His Own Time: Including the Revolution, the Empire, and the Restoration, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1839), 1:29-30; William Alfred Bryan, George Washington in American Literature 1775-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 87n.2.

By 1781, before Yorktown, Washington had endeared himself to most Americans.[63] Greene, early that year, reported that wherever he went Washington was "little less than ador'd; and universaly admir'd." During the summer, the Abbé Robin observed that in all the states Washington was considered in the light of a "beneficient God." "The Americans," he observed, "that cool and sedate people, who in the midst of their most trying difficulties, have attended only to the directions and impulses of plain method and common reason, are roused, animated and inflamed at the very mention of his name."[64] This was certainly true during the Yorktown campaign, as everywhere he traveled, people vied with one another "in demonstrations of joy and eagerness to see their beloved countryman."[65]

Despite this adulation for and confidence in Washington, most civilian leaders were loath to give him dictatorial powers. As was noted earlier, Washington and some other generals were given dictatorial powers for a

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[63]Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 8, 1781, MHSC, 5th ser., 2:87; Ebenezer Hazard to Jeremy Belknap, April 17, 1781, ibid., 87.

[64]Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:530; Robin, New Travels Through North-America, p. 35.

[65]St. George Tucker to Frances Tucker, September 15, 1781, Coleman, St. George Tucker, p. 70; See also Same to same, September 5, 1781, ibid., p. 68; The Maryland Gazette, November 29, 1781.

limited time, but these grants were reluctantly given, as it was feared once given, it would not be relinquished, even by Washington.[66]

As has been pointed out throughout this dissertation, the revolutionary generation, which was a jealous one, had a strong fear of military tyranny in any form. They were especially fearful of generals who were too popular or powerful. When Gates was victorious at Saratoga, John Adams was pleased Washington had not been present, for had he been in command, "Idolatry, and Adulation would have been unbounded, so excessive as to endanger our Liberties."[67] But as we have seen, by 1779, there was great adulation by both the army and the civilian population for Washington, so much so that the civilian leaders feared that Washington would seize power.

"Are you sure we have no Caesars nor Cromwells in this country?" 'Leonidas' asked in The Pennsylvania Packet on July 3, 1779.[68] Earlier that year there were some who

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[66]Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 2:262.

[67]John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 26, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:361; see also Benjamin Rush to David Ramsay, November 5, 1778, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:220; and Benjamin Rush to Horatio Gates, September 5, 1781, ibid., 265.

[68]"Leonidas," according to one source was Benjamin Rush. David Freeman Hawke, Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly, p. 231.

believed Washington was to become a Caesar or Cromwell and dissolve Congress. Francis Dana, a member of Congress, spread the story in Philadelphia that he had heard said that Hamilton had stated that "it was high time for the people to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of doors." It is probable that Hamilton did not make this statement; however, it was very easy for civilian leaders to believe such rumors.[69]

During May of 1779, the French minister to the United States reported the eastern party in Congress, i.e., Adams, Lee, had affected a dread of the army's power "and allowed itself every sort of proceeding and imputation in justification of this pretended dread."[70] Although this was a slight exaggeration, Congress nevertheless attempted to limit the military power when they believed it was getting too powerful. Late in 1779, for example, John Sullivan wrote Washington that the faction in Congress which had raised against him during the Conway Cabal was still alive, waiting to "collect Strength & Seize Some favorable moment, to appear in force." "Their plan is," he explained, "to take Every method of proving the Danger, arising from a

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[69]John Brooks to Alexander Hamilton, July 4, 1779, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:91; for related correspondence see ibid., 99, 108-109, 127-128, 141-143, 149, 153-156, 187-188, 222, 224, 313, 313-315, 316-317.

[70]Conrad Alexandre Gerard to Comte de Vergennes, May 7, 1779, Durand, New Materials for the History of the American Revolution, p. 204.

Commander, who Enjoys the full & unlimited Confidence of his Army, & Alarm the People with the Prospects of Imaginary Evil." Sullivan believed this faction intended to persuade Congress that the military power of America should be placed in three or four different hands, each having a separate quarter of the continent to command, answerable to Congress, not to a supreme military commander. Sullivan told Washington that this faction believed splitting the military power would prevent an aspiring commander from enslaving the country.[71] This plan was not adopted.

During 1780, there were also rumors of a military coup. That summer, Joseph Reed wrote Greene to explain such rumors. "I have made inquiry at headquarters whether there was such a proposition made to the general, either by an officer or officers of any rank, to assume dictatorial powers," Greene wrote, "and am assured by Colonel Hamilton that no such thing ever took place. And you may depend upon it, that the principal officers of the army are far from proposing any such thing to the general. Nor can I see what he could effect by dictatorial powers, without the helping hand of civil-government."[72] As we know, the civilian helping hand was present in the form of the congressional

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[71]John Sullivan to George Washington, December 1, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:169, 170.

[72]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 8, 1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:167.

committee to camp, which supported some form of dictatorial powers being authorized. It was pointed out earlier this committee was recalled when it appeared they were becoming too attached to the military, and when one of its members, John Mathews, attempted to introduce legislation giving Washington dictatorial powers he was severely condemned by the members of Congress. This concern continued into 1781.

Early in 1781, John Adams told a European nobleman that the American people were "keeping a watchful eye over the army to see that it does not ravish from them that liberty for which all have been contending." Samuel Adams certainly kept a watchful eye. John Armstrong, Jr., wrote his father that Adams, because of the continued discussions of making Washington a dictator, had left Congress "much displeased and in a temper to awaken the jealousies if not the resentments of his countrymen and constituents."[73] A loyalist newspaper that summer played on this fear of making Washington a dictator by reporting the French had given Washington a considerable amount of money and intended to make him the king of the United States.[74] Although the

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[73]John Adams to Baron Van Der Capellen, January 21, 1781, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:357; John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr., May 10, 1781, "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 1 (1881): 109.

[74]William Emmett O'Donnell, The Chevalier De La Luzerne: French Minister to the United States 1779-1784 (Louvain, France: Desclée De Brouwer, Bruges Biblioteque De L'Université, 1938), p. 178.

story was far-fetched, there was a small grain of truth contained in it, one that certainly touched on the jealousies and fears of the civilian leaders. During the late spring the French king made a substantial loan and guaranteed another from the Dutch, with the stipulation that it be drawn by Washington. Luzerne, realizing how upsetting this was to the Americans, told Congress that Washington could be interpreted to mean Washington or some other person. Congress designated Robert Morris as the person authorized to receive the loan.[75]

The civilian leaders had reasons to be fearful of a military dictatorship or anarchy taking place, other than those that have been mentioned. During the critical period, the military often made threats, officers threatened to resign, the military was often unruly, and at times mutinous.

"Without a speedy change the army must dissolve; it is now a mob, . . . , without cloathing, without pay, without provision, without morals, without discipline," Hamilton wrote James Duane early in September 1780. Two days later, St. Clair wrote Pennsylvania's chief executive that if the army was not helped, it would either disband or turn "'free-booter'." "If relief cannot be afforded," Heath wrote Rhode

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[75]Silas Deane to Jesse Root, May 20, 1781, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC, 22 (1890): 377; William G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, 1:296-297.

Island's chief executive later in September, "I cannot hold myself answerable for consequences to which necessity will drive the troops to sustain life."[76] Such threats were made frequently during 1780, even by Washington. Early that year, knowing of the military's dislike of the inequality of the terms of enlistments and bounties, their growing distrust of the civilian authorities, and realizing some soldiers and officers had not been paid for lengthy periods of time, Washington wrote Congress he was afraid the "seditious combinations" would result in the army becoming uncontrollable.[77] During May, he informed Congress that he had ever tried to "preserve order and promote the public service," but in the accumulation of present distresses, it would be difficult to continue to do so. Late in August, he wrote Congress that something must be done or else the army would cease to exist, or it would stay together, exhibiting "an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance than perhaps ever yet been parallelled in . . . history." A week later, he informed the states that, if they did not act, he

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[76]Alexander Hamilton to James Duane [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:406; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, September 5, 1780, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:523-524; William Heath to William Greene, September 28, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9: 307-308.

[77]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:207-211.

would soon be forced to disband the army or let it remain intact by plundering.[78]

These threats increased the fears of the civilian leaders, who desired neither anarchy or military tyranny to subvert the war and the revolution. Also of great concern to them was the fact that officers, who they placed great faith in to control the army, began threatening during 1779 and 1780 to resign unless their situation was improved.[79]

Not only were there threats, there were actions by the military which raised great concern and fear among the civilian leaders. During the summer of 1780, one member of Congress reported that "The army now live principally by plunder" and that if they were kept together, will "soon become free-booters."[80] During 1780, the army, especially

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[78]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 27, 1780, ibid., 431; Same to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 19:412; copy of Washington's August 27, 1780, Circular to the States in MHSC, 5th ser., 10:198-200.

[79]Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:462-466; Josiah Harmer to Anthony Wayne, March 8, 1779, ibid., 463n.; Clark, NCSR, 14:80; Delaware Archives, 2:897; Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 156-157; John Noble Cummings and John Anderson to the New Jersey Legislature, [n.d.], ibid., pp. 157-159; William Maxwell to George Washington, May 6, 1779, ibid., pp. 159-160; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, April 8, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:65-66.

[80]Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, September 10, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 312.

the southern forces, lived by plunder.[81] This was in great part because of necessity, but also because of lack of discipline, and continued plundering further eroded discipline.

Between the summer of 1779 and the spring of 1781, the discipline of the army was at its lowest point, as evidenced by numerous instances of mutinous behavior and several mutinies.[82] During 1779, there were numerous potential and actual mutinies. The most serious, as far as the civilians were concerned, were the threats by Huntington's brigade to march on the Connecticut legislature to present their grievances and Pawling's regiment to march on the New York legislature to present theirs.[83]

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[81] John Henry, Jr., to Thomas Sim Lee, September 5, 1790, Browne, Maryland Archives, 45:80; A. E. Zucker, General De Kalb, Lafayette's Mentor, pp. 213-214.

[82] [Otho Holland Williams] to General [Nathanael Greene?], December 18, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 31; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, December 6, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:183; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:405.

[83] Return Jonathan Meigs to Titus Hosmer, December 26, 1778, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:325; Brown, Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, p. 142; William Edgar Grumman, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Redding, and the Record of their Services (Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Brainard Company, 1904), pp. 80-82; Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle, pp. 150-153; George Washington to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 22, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 17:163; for other potential and actual 1779 mutinies see George Washington to John Sullivan, February 14, 1779, ibid., 14:111; George Washington to James Varnum, February 14, 1779, ibid., 112, George

The chief executive of Pennsylvania early in December 1779 wrote General St. Clair that it gave him "great satisfaction to see harmoney so prevailing in the military line. God grant it may continue and increase."[84] This did not happen. Throughout 1780, the army, after having suffered through the coldest winter in memory, frequently exhibited mutinous behavior and in several instances threatened to march on the civilian authorities for redress of their grievances.[85] As 1780 came to a close, there was a

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Washington to William Maxwell, May 10, 1779, ibid., 15:32-33; Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 89; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall, p. 214; John Ashe to Richard Caswell, March 17, 1779, Clark, NCSR, 14:43; William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 2:27; Israel Angell, Jeremiah Olney and Simeon Thayer to John Sullivan, March 3, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:525-526; John Sullivan to George Washington, March 3, 1779, ibid., 528; [Samuel Smith], Memoirs of the Life of Samuel Smith: Being an Extract from a Journal Written by Himself from 1776 to 1786 (Middleborough, Massachusetts: n.p., 1853), pp. 12-14; Edward Field, ed., Diary of Colonel Israel Angell, Commanding the Second Rhode Island Continental Regiment during the American Revolution 1778-1781, p. 47; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, July 25, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:481.

[84]Joseph Reed to Arthur St. Clair, December 9, 1779, ibid., 1:492-493.

[85]John Glover to William Heath, December 12, 1779, George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, p. 181; Same to same, January 1, 1780, ibid., pp. 181, 232n.29, 21; Elias Boudinot to Timothy Pickering, January 7, 1780, George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and Statesman 1740-1821, p. 82; Eben[ezer] Huntington to Samuel B. Webb, August 19, 1780, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 208; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 2, 1780, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 2:38; William Heath to George Washington, January 10, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:8-9;

growing concern that if the army suffered through another winter a major mutiny would take place. A major mutiny, it was feared, could result in the revolution being undone, by military defeat, or even worse, by anarchy or military tyranny. Two weeks before the end of the year General Wayne wrote, "I sincerely wish the Ides of Jany was come & past-I am not superstitious, but can't help chershing disagreeable Ideas about that period."[86]

Abbatt, Memoirs of Major-General William Heath, p. 208; Benians, A Journal by Thos. Hughes, pp. 79-80; George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:425; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 28, 1780, ibid., 428-432; Same to same, June 20, 1780, ibid., 19:36-37; George Washington to Goose Van Schaick, June 20, 1780, ibid., 45; William Irvine to Joseph Reed, May 26, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:201; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 197-198, 242; [Samuel Richards], Diary of Samuel Richards; Captain of Connecticut Line: War of the Revolution 1775-1781 (Philadelphia: Leeds and Biddle Company, 1909), pp. 67-68; Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle, pp. 182-187; Christopher Kucker and Thomas Edwards to Samuel J. Atlee, September 30, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 13:545-546; Edgar W. Hasler, Old Westmoreland: A History of Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution, pp. 110-114; Henry Augustus Muhlenberg, The Life of Major-General Peter Muhlenberg of the Revolutionary Army, pp. 218-219; Edward W. Hocker, The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg, p. 110; Anthony Wayne to Francis Johnston, December 16, 1780, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 241; John Glover to John Sullivan, November 19, 1780, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:209; John Stark to John Sullivan, December 10, 1780, [draft], ibid., 240.

[86]Anthony Wayne to Francis Johnston, December 16, 1780, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 240; see also John Stark to John Sullivan, December 10, 1780, [draft], Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 3:240; Anthony Wayne to Robert Morris et al., October 17, 1780, Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 120.

Wayne's worst fears came true on January 1, 1781, as over one thousand soldiers of his division mutinied, and began a march on Philadelphia, after having wounded and killed several officers, and even fired upon him. Within two weeks this mutiny was quelled after the civilian authorities promised the soldiers would receive some of the monies owed them: clothing; those that had enlisted for three years or the war, having served three years would be discharged; and many others would be furloughed until April. When the mutiny began, Wayne commanded 2,500 soldiers; by the summer when he headed south, he commanded less than half that number.[87] The New England troops almost mutinied as well, but the promise of pay and supplies calmed them.[88] Not so

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[87]Anthony Wayne to George Washington, January 2, 1781, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 242; Same to same, January 29, 1781, ibid., p. 260; Enos Reeves to [ ], January 2, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897): 72-75; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 247; George Kyte, "General Wayne Marches South, 1781," PH 30, no. 3 (July 1963): 302, 305; Diary of Joseph McClellan, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 2:631; see also ibid., 649-673.

[88]William Heath to George Washington, January 23, 1781, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:159-160; William Heath to John Hancock, January 17, 1781, ibid., 165; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, January 31, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 324; Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton, January 25, 1781, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:542; John P. Wyllys to Hezekiah Conneet, February 10, 1781, Seymour, A Digressive History, p. 196; Washington Circular to the New England States, January 5, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:61-63; George Washington to Timothy Pickering, January 5, 1781, ibid., 60.

easily quelled was the New Jersey Line, which mutinied on the twentieth of January, when nearly three hundred soldiers marched on their brigade headquarters with the intention of continuing on to Trenton to make demands upon the civilian authorities.[89] Mutinies and the spirit of mutiny continued throughout 1781, despite the increased military activity and the numerous provisions made by Congress and the states for the physical well-being of the military.[90]

These threats of and actual mutinies were of great concern to the civilian leaders, but even more so to the

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[89] The New-Jersey Gazette, February 7, 1781; Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, p. 441; Abbatt, Memoirs of Major-General William Heath by Himself, p. 252.

[90] John Taylor to Thomas Jefferson, December 5, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:180-181; James Innes to Thomas Jefferson, February 21, 1781, ibid., 675; Same to same, February 24, 1781, ibid., 699; Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 9:365; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major General James Jackson, pp. 34-36, 91; James Clinton to George Clinton, July 11, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 7:70; William Gordon, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment, of the Independence of the United States of America: Including an Account of the Late War: and of the Thirteen Colonies, from their Origin to that Period, 4 vols. (London: printed for the author, 1788), 4:172-174; John Stark to William Heath, December 12, 1781, Frederic Kideer, History of the First New Hampshire Regiment in the War of the Revolution, p. 75; Moore, John Stark, p. 474; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, April 3, 1781, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:544; Joseph Reed, to Arthur St. Clair, April 3, 1781, ibid., 544n.1; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, July 10, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 375; George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, August 3, 1781, p.s., ibid., pp. 387.388.

military leaders who believed that, with a well-disciplined army and the help of the French forces, they could win the war. And, like their civilian brethren, they also feared anarchy and military tyranny. This was especially true of Washington.

It has been suggested that Washington, by 1780, was held in the highest esteem by most Americans and that, if he desired, could have imposed his will upon both the military and the civilian authorities by force of personality and arms. In 1847, a biographer of General Lincoln observed that if Washington "had willed it, the revolutionary war might have ended in the establishment of a military despotism." This view was held at the time as well. The Abbé Robin, during August 1781, wrote that Washington's "reputation has at length arisen to a most brillant pitch; and he may now grasp at the most unbounded power without provoking envy, or exciting suspicions." Two years earlier, the French minister to America reported to Vergennes that if Washington was ambitious and intriguing it would have been entirely in his power to lead a coup, but that nothing on Washington's part had justified the shadow of suspicion. In fact, Washington, he wrote, was constantly operating under the principle that one must be a citizen first and a soldier

afterwards.[91]

Washington indeed put the citizen before the soldier. A neighbor wrote in his diary on May 23, 1776, that he "never knew but one man who resolved not to forget the citizen in the soldier or ruler and that is G. W."[92] The civilian leaders greatly appreciated this. The Maryland legislature addressed him on November 22, 1781:

> Your military talents, eminent as they are, form not the most admired part of your character; your inviolate regard to the civil authority manifested on all occasions, and in situations the most trying, claims the warmest acknowledgements of the guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.[93]

Washington had no desire for any form of military coup, for the various reasons discussed in this dissertation; but primarily because of his fear that the revolution would be subverted by anarchy and military tyranny. Although his family motto was "Exitus Acta Probat" (the end justifies the means), Washington placed great importance upon the means of accomplishing his ends. He had no desire to shake the

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[91]Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln, p. 373; Robin, New Travels Through North-America, p. 34; Conrad Alexandre Gerard to Comte de Vergennes, March 8, 1779, Meng, Despatches and Instructions, p. 569.

[92]Jack P. Greene, ed., The Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, Virginia Historical Society Documents 4 & 5, 2 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Virginia Historical Society, 1965), 2:1042-1043.

[93]Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:463.

social or political order by military means, even if such means shortened the war.

"I do most heartily pity General Washington," Jedediah Huntington wrote late in 1777. "He bears his disappointments with the greatest equanimity, and is anxious to do the best he can in his circumstances."[94] One historian has noted "the patience and forbearance displayed by Washington in his relations with Congress are perhaps not the least of his titles to greatness; he might well be accorded rank alongside Job."[95] Washington indeed took his disappointments in stride, believing that things would work out for the best. Early in the war, he wrote that "Time only can eradicate and overcome customs and prejudices of long-standing; they must be got the better of, by slow and gradual advances."[96]

Self-restraint and patience were among the most notable aspects of Washington's character.[97] He, for the

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[94]Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, November 10, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:190.

[95]John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783, p. 242.

[96]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 11, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5:33.

[97]Henry T. Tuckerman, Biographical Essays. Essays, Biographical and Critical; or, Studies of Character (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company, 1857), pp. 5-28.

most part, accepted things he could not or did not desire to change. As he told Joseph Reed, "I will not lament or repine at any act of Providence because I am in a great measure a convert to Mr. Pope's opinion, that whatever is, is right." When Schuyler complained about his plight, Washington wrote him, "I must recommend to you what I endeavour to practice myself, Patience and Perseverance."[98] He told the army in his general orders of January 30, 1781, after the mutinies of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Lines:

> We expected to encounter many wants and distresses and we should neither shrink from them when they happen nor fly in the face of Law and Government to procure redress. There is no doubt the public will in the event do ample justice to men fighting and suffering in its defence. But it is our duty to bear present Evils with Fortitude looking forward to the period when our Country will have it more in its power to reward our services.[99]

Most soldiers did not want military tyranny, and were willing to wait to be compensated.[100] For the most part, they shared Washington's belief they should not take matters into their own hands, for the result would inevitably

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[98] George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 7, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:380; George Washington to Philip Schuyler, July 28, 1775, ibid., 3:374.

[99] Ibid., 21:159.

[100] Samuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell, July 15, 1780, "An Unpublished Letter from the camp, July, 1780," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 2 (August 1870): 102; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers of Major-General Nathanael Greene," ibid., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.

be the subversion of the revolution, by a form of anarchy or military dictatorship, or both. Thus, while some officers contemplated or wished for more power, most were content to adjust themselves to their circumstances. This is not to suggest they did nothing, for as we have seen, the military frequently lobbied for change and involved themselves in the political process. But they did not, except in rare instances, effect change themselves.

During the critical period, Washington and his generals were well aware of the plight of the country and the army, and although they could not always improve the former, they knew they could improve and control the latter. As was dicussed earlier, the military officers went to great lengths to control the army. This was especially true during the critical period, when the army was as great a threat to the success of the revolution as was the British army.

Washington and other officers frequently used force during this period to quell mutinies and mutinous behavior.[101] This was especially true during 1781. Soldiers, and even officers, were confined, sentenced to death, executed, or

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[101]John Glover to William Heath, January 1, 1780, George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, pp. 181, 232n.20, 21; William Heath to George Washington, January 10, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:8-9; Abbatt, Memoirs of Major-General William Heath, p. 208, Benians, A Journal by Thos. Hughes, pp. 79-80.

in some other way punished for mutinous behavior.[102] Washington showed great restraint when the Pennsylvania Line mutinied early in January 1781, but such was not the case when the New Jersey Line mutinied later that month. Washington believed he needed to act immediately, as "This spirit of mutiny will spread itself through the remainder of the Army, if not extinguished by some decisive measure." This decisive measure was to send General Howe with over five hundred well-clothed and properly officered New England troops to New Jersey to force an unconditional surrender with orders to "instantly execute a few of the most active and incendiary leaders."[103] To ensure his orders were complied with, Washington went to the scene of the mutiny. Once the mutiny was quelled, two of the leaders were executed, by twelve of the foremost participants, who were

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[102] James Clinton to George Clinton, July 11, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 7:70; William Gordon, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America, 4:172-174; John Bell Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," PMHB 19, no. 1 (1895): 52; The New-Jersey Gazette, March 28, 1781; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major-General James Jackson, pp. 34-36, 91.

[103] George Washington to John Sullivan, January 21, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:128; George Washington to Robert Howe, January 21, 1781, ibid., 128; see also David Humphreys to William Heath, January 21, 1781, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:165.

sentenced by a court-martial to be the executioners.[104] When the Pennsylvania Line threatened mutiny during May, General Wayne was also severe in his punishment. He had twelve leaders court-martialed on the spot. Friends of six of them were forced to be the executioners. With tears running down their cheeks, they obeyed the order to fire. Five died instantly, and the sixth, badly wounded, was bayoneted by another of the mutineers by order of Wayne. Wayne then marched the Line, by divisions, around the dead and, to make the point plainly clear, he ordered the remaining six mutineers hanged.[105]

Early in May 1779, twenty-one officers of the New Jersey brigade sent a memorial to their legislature threatening to resign if the depreciation due them was not made good. Washington, very upset by this action, told their commanding general that the officers had used the wrong means to obtain their desired end.[106] Washington and most of the officers believed that threats, mutinies, and military coups were not the best way to improve things. The means they

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[104]George Washington to William Livingston, January 27, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:149; The New-Jersey Gazette, February 7, 1781; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 251-253.

[105]William J. Livingston to Samuel B. Webb, May 28, [1781], Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:341-342; Anthony Wayne to [ ], [ ], Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 265-266.

[106]George Washington to William Maxwell, May 7, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 15:13-16.

considered most effective was by lobbying peacefully and forcefully.

Many generals and officers went to their state's executives and legislative bodies to personally plea for assistance or to present petitions on behalf of their soldiers and themselves.[107] For example, during the late summer of 1779, General Paterson and Colonel Tupper left their Highlands camp to visit the General Court of Massachusetts on behalf of their officers.[108] The next year, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ward appeared before Rhode Island's General Assembly and Colonel Marinus Willett and other officers went to the New York state legislature to lobby on behalf of their respective line's officers.[109] Also in 1780, Heath went to the Massachusetts General Court to lobby on behalf of the officers and that year and the

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[107] Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 26, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 370-371; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, p. 193; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 366; NHHSC, 7:250.

[108] William B. Weeden, "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, DD., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 212, 214.

[109] John Ward, "Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Ward, of the Revolutionary War," NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 122; After Brigade Orders, September 18, 1780, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 499-500, Committee Instructions, September 7, 1780, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:217-221; Marinus Willett, Nicholas Fish, and Thos. Machin to George Clinton, September 12, 1780, ibid., 216-217.

next Knox personally lobbied with the legislatures of several of the New England states.[110] And the Pennsylvania Line sent three colonels to Philadelphia to lobby the legislature on behalf of the officers.[111] Some officers, unable to personally lobby their state legislatures, frequently sent memorials and petitions to them.[112] Others wrote

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[110]William Heath to the Massachusetts Council, March 3, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:43; William Heath to the Massachusetts General Assembly, April 7, 1780, ibid., 51-54; William Heath to George Washington, March 2, 1780, ibid., 36; Same to same, March 27, 1780, ibid., 38; George Washington to Henry Knox, January 7, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:66-68; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, April 24, 1781, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #6).

[111]Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, October 31, 1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 29, no. 4 (1905), 496-497; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, September 20, 1780, "Notes and Queries," ibid., 30, no. 1 (1906): 116; Enos Reeves to [ ], October 23, 1780, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," ibid., 20, no. 4 (1896): 456-457; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, September 5, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:539.

[112]Petition signed by 51 New York Continental officers to the New York State Legislature, [ ], 1780, Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, 2:350-351; Petition of John Doughty on behalf of his officers and soldiers in Lamb's Regiment of Artillery, September 1, 1779, ibid., 336; Memorial of the Maryland Line to the House of Assembly of Maryland, "Grievances of the Maryland Line," MHM 4, no. 4 (December 1909): 364-366; James McSherry [ed. and cont. by Bartlett B. James], History of Maryland (Baltimore: Baltimore Book Company, 1904), p. 202; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:352-353; Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 143-146; John Marshall and 115 others to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, August 26, 1779, Herbert A. Johnson et al., eds., The Papers of John Marshall, 1:31-32; William Heath to Jeremiah Powell, September 2, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:316; Committee of Officers (signed by Bagley, Graton, Putnam, Jackson, and

directly to the legislatures or councils.[113] During the critical period, some officers wrote state executives, hoping they could use their influence with the state legislatures to make immediate and future provisions for the officers and their soldiers.[114] Washington, besides sending

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Marshall) to William Heath, August [ ], 1779, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Marinus Willett to George Clinton, October 23, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:327-329; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, pp. 314-315; J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888, 1:250; William Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware, Addenda B, pp. 52-53; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 9, 1780, (copy), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5), copy of unsigned circular by the New England general officers to the New England states, October 7, 1780, ibid.

[113] William Heath to the Massachusetts General Assembly, April 7, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:51-54; William Maxwell to the New Jersey Legislature, April 25, 1779, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, pp. 146-148; Rufus Putnam to Jeremiah Powell, April 22, 1780, (copy), Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 143.

[114] Udny Hay to George Clinton, May 8, 1780, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:693; Israel Angell to the Governor and Council of Rhode Island, October 1, 1780, RIHSC, 6 (1897): 270; William Heath to William Greene, September 28, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:307; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:131; Daniel Morgan to Thomas Jefferson, March 13, 1781, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 2:100; Marquis de Lafayette to James Bowdoin, May 30, 1780, "Letters of Lafayette and Bowdoin," PMHS 5 (1860-1862): 349; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 5, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 324-325; Same to same, July 10, 1781, ibid., 375; Same to same, July 12, 1781, ibid., 376; William Irvine to Joseph Reed, May 2, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:225; Baron von Steuben to Joseph Reed, May 25, 1780, ibid., 270; Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, November 2, 1780, ibid., 596; Francis Johnston to Joseph Reed, July 25, 1779, ibid., 7:581-582; Anthony Wayne to

circulars to the states, wrote personal letters to the chief executives, asking them to help their states comply with past promises, as well as to encourage them to have their states adopt new provisions for the officers and soldiers of their respective state lines.[115]

Washington continually wrote Congress about the plight of the army.[116] So did his generals, often in the form of a memorial or petition.[117] Others wrote to individual members of Congress, hoping they could influence their

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Joseph Reed, November 19, 1780, Moore, Anthony Wayne, pp. 121-122; Same to same, December 16, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:316; Marquis de Lafayette to Joseph Reed, May 31, 1780, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 3:756-747; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:462-466, 464n.5; Same to same, July 25, 1779, ibid., 480; Same to same, September 5, 1780, ibid., 5230524; Same to same, April 8, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 1:65-66.

[115]George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, June 28, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 371-372; Same to same, May 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:425; Same to same, December 19, 1780, ibid., 20:495; George Washington to Joseph Reed, October 22, 1779, ibid., 17:10; Same to same, August 13, 1780, ibid., 19:368; George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, August 29, 1780, ibid., 470.

[116]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 27, 1779, ibid., 15:330; Same to same, April 3, 1780, ibid., 18:209-210; Same to same, May 27, 1780, ibid., 431; Same to same, June 20, 1780, ibid., 19:36; Same to same, October 11, 1780, ibid., 20:158-159.

[117]Ford, JCC, 17:689; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 157-158, 160; Samuel H. Parsons to John Jay, August 6, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 263-265; Ephraim Blaine to Samuel Huntington, October 17, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 45:150-151.

colleagues to support the army.[118] And some, like Lafayette and McDougall, did not hesitate visiting Congress to personally plea on behalf of their officers and soldiers.[119]

These lobbying efforts not only had the effect of keeping the army's dissatisfaction within peaceful bounds, but also made the civilian leaders realize that something needed to be done for the military, before the military took matters into their own hands. Having the same effect on the civilian leaders was the large number of desertions and officer resignations during the critical period.

During 1780 and 1781, the desertion rate was very high.[120] Numerous officers resigned during the summer and

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[118]Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2, 1779, Coffin, The Lives and Services of Thomas, Knowlton, Scammell, Dearborn, p. 90; Samuel H. Parsons to Jesse Root, August 29, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 265-266; Samuel H. Parsons to Samuel Atlee, August 6, 1779, ibid., 265; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:410.

[119]Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, p. 193; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 160, 161.

[120]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 8, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:431; John Paterson to William Heath, May 7, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:62; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 243; James Clinton to George Clinton, July 11, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 7:71; Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge, p. 67.

fall of 1779.[121] The winter of 1779-1780 took its toll on the officers. Rather than suffer in poverty and nakedness, or continue to listen to complaints from their families and soldiers, many officers resigned before the spring.[122] The number of resignations declined somewhat during the summer, but nevertheless, Washington reported during October that 160 officers had resigned since January.[123] These desertions and resignations served somewhat as a safety valve, as many of the discontented in the army departed. They also served to show the civilian leaders that they must do something for the present state of the army, as well as to make provisions for the future veterans.

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[121]William B. Weeden, "Diary of Enos Hitchcock; D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 185; Enos Hitchcock to [Captain Batchelder], July 13, 1779, Edwin M. Stone, History of Beverly [Massachusetts], Civil and Ecclesiastical . . . from Its Settlement in 1630 to 1842, p. 278; Same to same, October 12, 1779, ibid., p. 279; John Cropper to the President of the Continental Congress, August 16, 1779, Stewart, William Woodford, 2:1070-1071.

[122]Samuel H. Parsons to John Jay, May 30, 1780, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 289; John Paterson to William Heath, March 31, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:44; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 194-195; Letter of resignation, dated February 1, 1780, and addressed to General George Washington in Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:478-480; Michael Jackson to William Heath, April 13, 1780, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 184-185.

[123]Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:210-211; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid., 412; Samuel Adams to Sally Adams, August 17, 1780, Feinstone Collection #44.

Many civilian leaders agreed with Oliver Wolcott that "To pay and Provide for the Army ought certainly to be the primary Objects in every Deliberate Council." Fearing the consequence of not making such provisions, James Lovell wrote they must get money to the army so as to "prevent stupid plans of creating absolute Dictators to get supplies without paying for them."[124]

Congress and the states frequently responded to the pleas for helping the officers and soldiers, and improved their own affairs, so the army would not have to intercede. With respect to the latter, Congress certainly improved itself. The critical period caused many leaders to realize that Congress had to have more power, and many of those once leery about giving Congress too much power were now willing to do so. This was especially true after the January 1781 mutinies.[125] During February, Congress established a Department of Finance and elected Robert Morris its Superintendent. Morris accepted the position that summer after obtaining from Congress almost unlimited control over

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[124]Oliver Wolcott to Tapping Reeve, January 16, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 5:537; James Lovell to Samuel Holten, September 5, 1780, ibid., 363; see also Pierre Van Cortlandt to Philip Van Cortlandt, February 8, 1780, Judd, Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 146.

[125]John Sullivan to George Washington, January 29, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 5:548; James Duane to George Washington, January 29, 1781, ibid., 551.

the expenditure of public monies.[126] With the support of Congress, Morris set about to increase and expend the public revenue in the most frugal, fair, and honest manner possible. In May, at his prompting, Congress authorized a national bank, believing it would revive public credit.[127] That summer, Congress placed in Morris's hands all the monies borrowed from France; gave him authority to import and export goods on the account of the United States; placed the Marine Department under his control; allowed him to replace the specific supply system with a contract system, as well as the authority to secure and dispose of any specific supplies; and granted him other economic powers.[128]

During the summer and fall, Morris worked diligently to meet the needs of the army, particularly their pay. Helping in this regard was the arrival of the French loan. This hard money not only paid the army a small portion of the monies due them, but also provided the capital for the Bank of North America which was chartered by Congress on

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[126]Young, Robert Morris, p. 92; Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of the Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, pp. 128-132.

[127]Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, May 17, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:66, Ford, JCC, 20:545-548.

[128]Ibid., 19:290-291, 180, 432-433; 2-:545-548, 597-598, 721, 723, 724-725, 734; 21:813-814, 908, 943, 954-955, 1024-1025, 1027, 1062, 1068, 1070, 1135, 1149-1150.

the last day of 1781, and opened its doors for business during January 1782. This quasi-public institution began loaning the government money in anticipation of revenue and was, because of Morris's solid reputation and prospect of high dividends, able to attract merchants to invest in its stock.[129] Morris was successful in reducing the cost of operating the government, and making it more efficient. He also helped the financial state of the government by transferring his own money to the government and issuing money under his own name.[130]

Congress did not sit still and expect Morris alone to solve all their problems. They also took actions and adopted measures to improve their operations and the Continental finances, realizing that an effective Congress and adequate funds would inevitably result in the improved condition of the army.[131] In February 1781, Congress asked for an impost on all goods imported into the states, with

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[129] Ibid., 1186-1190; Young, Robert Morris, pp. 95, 98; Lawrence Lewis, Jr., A History of the Bank of North America, the first Bank Chartered in the United States (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1882) pp. 27-30, 32-34, 35, 36, 37.

[130] Young, Robert Morris, pp. 137, 139-140; Ver Steeg, Robert Morris, p. 87; Robert Morris to Benjamin Harrison, January 15, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 4:46.

[131] Joseph Jones to George Washington, October [2], 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:396; Thomas McKean to Samuel Adams, August 6, 1782, ibid., 6:430; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, p. 181.

the revenue raised to be applied to discharging the principal and interest of debts arising from the war. Two months later Congress devalued the Continental money, and later that year abandoned the paper money program and asked the states to repeal all laws making any kind of bills a legal tender. Also, because the monies had depreciated so badly, Congress, to help calculate the debt and help people holding the worthless money, urged the states to set up tables of depreciation. Most did so during 1781. Early in 1781, Congress created executive departments for marine and war, as well as for finance; and, with Morris's help, they reorganized the medical and treasury departments, and consolidated the clothier general's department. Realizing the seriousness of the times, Congress, although opposed to impressing and having only authorized it infrequently earlier in the war, now felt compelled to make such authorizations.[132]

The states also became actively involved in authorizing impressing, and in a few instances, even authorized the military to plunder.[133] The states did more

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[132]Ford, JCC, 17:758-759; 18:1157-1164; 19:102-103, 110-113, 126, 225; 20:501, 516, 555-556, 598; Ralph Volney Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary Finance, 1775-1783," AHR 35, no. 1 (October 1929): 62, 64, 64n.75.

[133]Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during the American Revolution," Vera Largent, ed., The Walter Clinton Jackson Essays in the Social Sciences by members of the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942), pp. 99-109;

than just authorize impressing and plundering to help the army. Pennsylvania authorized Robert Morris, already the Superintendent of Finance, to use their monies to procure specific supplies for the Continental Army.[134] The army was also helped by the fact that some states, particularly those no longer actively battlegrounds, improved both politically and economically during the 1779-1781 period.[135]

Realizing the importance of mutual cooperation, and prompted by political expediency, the states during this period increasingly took a Continental position. During 1780, New York ceded her western land claims and Virginia did so the following year. These actions, as well as

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Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, pp. 144-146.

[134]Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 97; Victor Leroy Johnson, The Administration of the American Commissariat During the Revolutionary War (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1941), pp. 199-200; Ver Steeg, Robert Morris, p. 70.

[135]James Wilson to Silas Deane, January 1, 1781, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC, 22 (1890): 270; Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 10th ed. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928), p. 47; Bullock, "The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," p. 147; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern States to 1860, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1933), 2:589, Table 16; P. E. Du Simitiere to George Clinton, May 15, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 6:870; Thomas McKean to George Washington, July 14, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:146; Charles Lane Hanson, ed., A Journal for the Years 1739-1803 by Samuel Lane of Stratham, New Hampshire (Concord, New Hampshire: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1937), p. 52.

because of diplomatic and military pressures, prompted Maryland to ratify the Articles of Confederation early in 1781.[136] These actions had a positive influence on the army, as they must have believed that they were indeed fighting a Continental war for a nation's independence. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Continental outlook with respect to the western lands was a very important factor in the army's mind, as they were fighting for their own stake in society in many respects, for a piece of land.

Help for the army not only came from the governments, it also came from private citizens, in the form of loans and voluntary contributions, and from some military officers, who supplied their soldiers from their own funds.[137]

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[136] Ford, JCC, 17:806-807; 18:915-916; 19:208; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, pp. 260-264.

[137] Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, p. 217; Young, Robert Morris, p. 102; Charles Edward Russell, Haym Salomon and the Revolution (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1930), p. 160; Burton Alva Konkle, Thomas Willing and the First American Financial System (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), p. 91; The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser, July 15, 1780; Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, June 27, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:239; [John P. Becker], The Sexagenary, or Reminiscences of the American Revolution, p. 132; Draper, King's Mountain, p. 412; Thomas G. Frothingham, Washington: Commander in Chief, p. 171; James McHenry to Nathanael Greene, April 16, 1781, Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:446; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, April 18, 1781, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 185, Thayer, Nathanael Greene, pp. 414-417.

John Adams did not fear a military coup led by a general as he believed "It was not attachment to men, but to a cause, which produced, and has supported, the revolution; it was not attachment to officers, but to liberty, which made the soldiers enlist."[138] Adams might have also added that the soldiers were fighting to protect and gain property. It was certainly an important consideration when it came to rewarding the soldiers. It was considered politic to give them property, in the form of land, slaves, material goods, monetary bonuses, and pensions, as a means of not only rewarding them, but also giving them a stake in society, something to fight for, something to protect.[139] The military leaders certainly believed in the necessity of this.[140]

Congress, seeing the necessity, especially after independence was declared, on September 16, 1776, provided land bounties ranging from one hundred acres for a private to five hundred acres for a colonel. Two days later, the bounty was extended to soldiers already enlisted in the army,

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[138] John Adams to Mr. Calkden, October 4[-27], 1780, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:308.

[139] Silas Deane to the Secret Committee of Congress, October 1, 1776, "The Deane Papers," NYHSC, 1 (1887): 293.

[140] Alexander McDougall to [Nathanael] Greene, August 8, 1780, Feinstone Collection #844; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, September 5, 1780, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:523.

and on the twentieth, as a means of keeping the soldiers ties to the cause, Congress prohibited them from transferring the bounties during the war.[141]

The states, almost from the beginning of the war, were rather generous in giving land bounties as a means of not only recruiting, but giving those already enlisted a stake in society; making them truly citizen-soldiers.[142] During the war, eight states gave land to the soldiers, often with the provision that it would be given at the end of the war or the soldier's enlistment, provided he had not been punished for plundering.[143]

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[141]Ford, JCC, 5:762-763, 781, 788.

[142]William Hooper to Robert Morris, May 27, 1777, "unpublished Letters by William Hooper," HM, 2d ser., 4, no. 1 (August 1868): 90; Hemphill, Journals of the General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780, pp. 149-150, 151; Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," MHM 42, no. 3 (September 1947): 188; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution, University of Virginia Institute for Research in the Social Sciences Monograph No. 25 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937), p. 211; C. H. Laub, "Revolutionary Virginia and the Crown Lands (1775-1783)," WMQ, 2d ser., 11, no. 4 (October 1931): 308; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 9:375; 10:23; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 1:279-280; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 309-310; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799, p. 142.

[143]Paul V. Lutz, "Land Grants for Service in the Revolution," NYHSQ 48, no. 3 (July 1964): 223, 230.

Most southern states provided slaves in addition to other inducements, hoping that by having slaves, the soldiers would believe their status would be increased once their military service was completed.[144] Northern states, with no slaves to give, joined the southern states in providing the soldiers with other forms of property, such as confiscated estates.[145]

Another important factor in controlling the army by self-interest was by giving the officers a special stake in the cause. This was done by granting them pensions, usually in the form of half-pay for seven years or life. Many believed that by granting such pensions the officer's commission would become more desirable, which would make for a more disciplined officer corps, which in turn would result

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[144] Ibid., 232; Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:326, 331; Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, February 14, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, [ed.], "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 1 (January 1926): 5; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 236, 377; Clark, NCSR, 15:8; 24:337-339; Richard Hampton to John Hampton, April 2, 1781, Peel, Historical Collections, 1:94-95.

[145] Ibid., 94-95; Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789, p. 140; Israel Angell to the Governor and Council of Rhode Island, October 1, 1780, RIHSC, 6 (1867): 270; William B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England 1620-1789, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1890-1891), 2:802; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:462.

in a more disciplined army.[146] Elbridge Gerry believed that the pension system would "introduce that subordination to civil authority which is necessary to produce an internal security to liberty, and to the high officers of the military department such authority as to enable them to establish discipline, without which an army can be neither vigorous nor successful."[147] Despite some opposition to a pension system, which was not in keeping with republican ideology, Congress, believing in the absolute necessity of the measure, on May 15, 1778, granted half-pay for seven years after the war to all line officers.[148]

During the critical period, 1779-1781, realizing something must be done for the army, five states extended the promise of half-pay to life. Pennsylvania, during this time, gave pensions to widows and exempted all lands given to officers and soldiers from taxation. North Carolina also

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[146]Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 9, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:162; James Lovell to Samuel Adams, December 20, 1777, ibid., 593-594.

[147]Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 13, 1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:67.

[148]Ford, JCC, 11:495-496, 501-503; Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, May 26, 1778, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 120; Henry Laurens to William Livingston, April 19, 1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston, pp. 272-276; Same to same, May 6, 1778, ibid., p. 284; Henry Laurens to George Washington, May 5, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:220-221; Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver Wolcott to Jonathan Trumbull, May 18, 1778, ibid., 255; James Lovell to William Whipple, May 25, 1778, ibid., 262; William Ellery to William Whipple, May 31, 1778, ibid., 270.

gave a tax exempt status to land given to soldiers. Georgia provided that soldiers be given a tax exempt status for ten years after leaving military service.[149]

Congress also realized they needed to make provisions for the military during this critical period; or at least encourage the states to do so. During the first part of 1779, Congress authorized special bonuses for soldiers who had enlisted before that year, so they would not feel penalized for having enlisted early in the war when bounties were much smaller. That summer, Congress strongly urged the states to extend half-pay to life; provided to pay up deficiencies of food and clothing in cash; provided for pensions for orphans and widows; and increased the pay of officers. During the latter part of the year, Congress made

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[149] Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2, 1779, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters from 1768 to 1781, Including his 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 143; Joseph Reed to William Irvine, April 11, 1780, "Letters of Gen. Joseph Reed to Gen. Irvine," ibid., 8, no. 4 (April 1864): 131; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, October [ ], 1779, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907): 248; Sam[uel] Smith to Otho Holland Williams, April 4, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 12; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6, 1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:462-466, 464n.5; Stillé, Anthony Wayne, pp. 65, 165; Clark, NCSR, 14:301-302, 335; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783, pp. 285-286; Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, p. 508; Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792, pp. 434-436; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:73-74; Wm. H. Glasson [ed. by David Kinley], Federal Military Pensions in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 18.

attempts to make up arrears in pay and to provide for depreciation losses. The following year, Congress promised to make up all depreciation losses and adopted a scale of depreciation allowances. On August 12, 1780, Congress increased the land bounties for generals and recommended to the states they make up compensation to the officers and soldiers for the depreciation losses they had incurred, as well as to pay their respective lines for arrears of pay for the period before August 1, 1780. Later that summer, Congress extended half-pay for seven years to orphans and widows, repealed a restricting clause prohibiting half-pay officers from holding public office, provided for the half pay of the general officers to be in proportion to their pay, and provided for hospital officers to receive land bounties.[150]

Probably the most important provision made by Congress for the officers during 1780 was to extend half-pay from seven years to life. Late in August, and again early in October, Washington told Congress that the most politic

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[150]Ford, JCC, 13:299; 14:758, 826, 908, 946-949, 952, 971, 973-978; 15:1304-1306, 1335-1337; 16:344; 17:725-727, 770-773, 773, 778; 18:847-848; John Fell Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 4:345, 363; James Lovell to Samuel Adams, August 17, 1779, ibid., 381; William G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, 1:91; "Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the Continental Congress, May 1778, to August 1780," HCEI 56, no. 2 (April 1920): 91.

and effective thing they could do would be to grant half pay for life. Hamilton, early in September, wrote a member of Congress that granting half pay for life "would be a great stroke of policy, and would give Congress a stronger tie upon them than anything else they can do."[151] Although some members of Congress believed that half pay for life would create a pensioner class, and thus was "inconsistent with the genious & spirit of our constitution," as one member of Congress wrote, most members of Congress saw the absolute necessity of granting half pay for life; as a means of retaining their officer corps, and thereby ensuring the continued discipline, as well as the existence of the army.[152] On October 21, 1780, by a substantial majority, half pay for life was voted for company and field grade officers. The following month, it was extended to generals; in January 1781, to officers of the medical department; and in May 1781, to chaplains.[153]

With the army relatively passive after the mutinies of January 1781, Congress made fewer provisions for them.[154]

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[151] George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:412; Same to same, October 11, 1780, ibid., 20:158-159; Alexander Hamilton, [September 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:410.

[152] Samuel Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, October 26, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:153.

[153] Ford, JCC, 18:958-962, 1100; 19:68-69; 20:488.

[154] Ibid., 19:204; 21:1187.

But Congress frequently called upon the states to make up depreciation and pay owed the army. With respect to the latter, the states were quite dilatory in complying.[155] But the states were not inactive in making other provisions for the officers and soldiers.

To keep the military calm during the critical period, the states frequently voted special one-time monetary grants to their officers and/or soldiers. Most often the money and other material goods were to be given the military at the end of the war. However, often seeing the immediate need to get the money in the military's hands, the states sent specie to camp.[156]

The states, especially toward the end of the war, made numerous attempts to settle the depreciation problem of their soldiers, by establishing depreciation tables and

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[155] Ibid., 20:702-704; 21:1020, 1186-1187; William G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, 1:272.

[156] Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792, pp. 575-577; John Palsgrave Wyllys to Hezekiah Wyllys, February 10, 1781, "Wyllys Papers 1590-1796," CHSC, 21 (1924): 469-470; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 376; Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 254-255; Larry R. Gerlach, "Connecticut and Commutation, 1778-1784," CHSB 33, no. 2 (April 1968): 52; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:352-353; James McSherry [ed. & cont. by Bartlett B. James], History of Maryland, p. 202; Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution, pp. 437-438; Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 2:180, 181; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:373; Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 12:431.

making promises to make good the depreciation.[157]

The most important provision the states made for recruiting and rewarding their veterans during this period was the granting of land bonuses, including increasing previous grants of land. The southern states were particularly generous during this time as their states were the ones most involved in the fighting, and needed the support of the military more than ever. In most instances, the land was not to be given until the end of the war, thereby ensuring, supposedly, the good behavior of the military.[158]

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[157] Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 95; Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 183; Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," MHM 43, no. 3 (September 1947): 190; Frederic Kidder, History of the First New Hampshire Regiment in the War of the Revolution, p. 79; Paul V. Lutz, "Land Grants for Service in the Revolution," NYHSQ 48, no. 3 (July 1964): 234.

[158] Ibid., 224, 225, 232; Clark, NCSR, 24:337, 338, 368-369, 419-422; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:23, 159, 326, 331; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799, p. 142; Alex M. Hitz, "Georgia's Bounty Land Grants," GHQ 38, no. 4 (December 1954): 345-346; Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," MHM 43, no. 3 (September 1947): 188, 190-191; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780, pp. 299-300; Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, pp. 494-496; Thomas Cochran, New York in the Confederation: An Economic Study (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), pp. 108, 108n.117; Joseph Reed to William Irvine, April 11, 1780, "Letters of Gen. Joseph Reed to Gen. Irvine," HM 8, no. 4 (April 1864): 131; Division Order, Orderly Book of Colonel Walter Stewart of the Pennsylvania Line, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 27, no. 4 (1903): 504; General Orders, "Order Book of John Faucheraud Grimke, August 1778 to May 1780," SCHGM 19, no. 2 (April 1918): 104.

To demonstrate that their promises of land would be fulfilled, several states during this critical period set aside land to be given to the soldiers.[159]

Another way by which the military were tied to the civilian institutions and kept under control was by the civilian governments and institutions recognizing and rewarding them for their bravery and fidelity. This was done in the form of presentations of medals, swords and horses; granting honorary degrees; erection of monuments; naming geographical areas for them; and giving them individual grants of land and money. This was especially true during this critical period.

Early in the war, Greene wrote John Adams that giving the military medals was a great idea, especially since they did not cost much to produce and "They will also serve to fix the honors of the Army, dependent upon the dignity of Congress; and I conceive it an object of great importance to unite the wishes of the army with the views of Congress."[160] Congress, agreeing, during the war

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[159]Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:564-566; Philip A. Crowl, "Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 57; Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, p. 494.

[160]Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 2, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH no. 2 (April 1942): 50.

authorized eleven different medals for thirteen individuals.[161] They also voted swords, horses, and stands of colors to numerous officers and authorized monuments for several fallen heroes.[162]

The state governments also especially rewarded individual members of the military. South Carolina voted Marion a medal; North Carolina voted Evan Shelby and Sevier swords and pistols, and Elijah Clark thirty thousand dollars; Virginia voted William Campbell a horse, furniture, and a sword; New Hampshire voted Joseph Cilley a pair of pistols; and Georgia voted James Jackson a house.[163] The states also rewarded individual officers with land.[164] The most generous grants were made by Georgia, which during the spring of 1782 granted Generals Greene and Wayne two-thousand acre plantations; by South Carolina, which voted Greene an estate plus slaves; and by North Carolina, which voted him 25,000

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[161] T. Bailey Myers, "Our National Medals," MAH 2, no. 9 (September 1878): 530.

[162] Ford, JCC, 7:243, 323, 379; 8:579-580, 580; 9:862; 15:1324, 1357; 18:923; 19:246-247; 21:978-979, 1085, 1081, 1082; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:310.

[163] Ibid., 2:219; Draper, King's Mountain, pp. 390, 413; John Scales, Life of Gen. Joseph Cilley, p. 53; William Omer Foster, Sr., James Jackson: Duelist and Militant Statesman 1757-1806, p. 24; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799, pp. 139, 158.

[164] Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 3:116.

acres; and by Virginia, which granted Gates 17,000 acres.[165] Geographical areas were also named after military leaders. North Carolina, for example, named counties after Generals Wayne, Lincoln, and Gates, in 1779, and Greene and Davidson in 1783.[166]

Throughout the war, Congress never really gave Washington symbolic or personal awards or gifts. During 1779, they gave him a suit of clothes and after Yorktown they voted him a stand of colors. At war's end, they provided for an equestrain statue of him to be located at the seat of government.[167] The state governments were somewhat more generous. Virginia, during 1778, presented him with four geldings. Pennsylvania in 1779, and Maryland in 1781, commissioned Charles Wilson Peale to paint portraits of Washington for their respective legislative chambers.[168]

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[165] Ibid., 108-109, 109, 171; Johnson, Nathanael Greene, p. 400; Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, pp. 283-284.

[166] Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:159, 225, 454; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, pp. 232-233, 233; Clark, NCSR, 19:421; 24:569.

[167] Ford, JCC, 21:1081; 24:494-495; George Washington to Samuel Griffin, November 6, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 17:80.

[168] George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, December 18, 1778, ibid., 13:422-423; The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser, August 26, 1780, Chastellux, Travels in North-America, 1:222-223; William S. Baker, "The History of a Rare Washington Print," PMHB 13, no. 3 (1889): 257-258, 260, 262; Thomas Sim Lee to Charles Wilson Peale, December 7, 1781, Helen Lee Peabody, "Revolutionary Mail Bag:

Virginia, early in the war, named a county for Washington.[169] Civilian institutions also made acknowledgements of Washington's efforts. Several schools gave him honorary degrees. And during 1782, a college was even named after him.[170]

By continuing to make the army feel a part of civilian society, by giving them a stake in society, the civilian leaders were able to keep the army from turning against the existing political and social structure. But there were several other factors which kept the army from becoming the source of military tyranny. Many of these have been discussed in earlier chapters. And in this chapter we have seen the various means and factors by which the army kept itself from turning on the civilian governments and the civilians were able to prevent a military coup. Perhaps the most important factor was that the army, for the most part, did not desire a military tyranny of any form for even a short period of time. Often the opportunity was there for

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Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 50, no. 2 (July 1955): 104.

[169] Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest Virginia 1746-1786, Washington County 1777-1870, p. 254.

[170] George Washington to Ezra Stiles, May 15, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 22:90, George Washington to William Smith, August 18, 1782, ibid., 25:37-38; George Washington to the Trustees of the University of the State of Pennsylvania, [December 13, 1783], ibid., 27:267-268.

the military to directly involve themselves in the political process, but as we have seen, the military did not desire to intervene. This was especially true during the 1779-1781 critical period.

As we will see in the next chapter, the opportunity for military tyranny again was present during the winter of 1782-1783 and the following spring. But, as before, the military did not take matters into their own hands, despite a greater desire by some civilians for them to do so.

C H A P T E R XI

THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TESTED

1782-1783

With Yorktown behind them, most Americans believed the war had been won, and that it was only a matter of time until a peace treaty was signed and ratified, and the army disbanded. Therefore, they turned their attention away from the war and the army, and only thought of domestic concerns as a free and independent people.

For the most part, the military shared the same beliefs about the peace and disbanding, hoping that both would soon take place. They desired, however, to be properly compensated before disbanding, or at least guaranteed they would be in the not-so-distant future. As we will see in this and the following chapter, the military became upset with their civilian brethren the last year of the war because it appeared they would not be compensated before they were disbanded; nor would they obtain everything that was due them once they were home. This situation, as we will see, created the conditions whereby the civil-military relationship was greatly tested during the last year of the war. And tested it was, as some civilian and

military leaders attempted to use the discontent in the army to further certain political aims. That the discontent did not develop into mutiny or some form of military tyranny, was the result of numerous factors, which will be discussed in this and the last chapter.

The army was pleased with the money they had received from Robert Morris during the fall of 1781, particularly since it was in the form of hard specie.[1] Not all the military, however, got paid, nor were the amounts received enough to offset the large amounts owed to the officers.[2] In December, Glover complained that he had not been paid in over two years. Another officer early in 1782 complained that he had received only $120 since January 1780. Also,

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[1]William Popham to George Clinton, September 8, 1781, Henry P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis 1781, appendix 5, p. 174; Enos Reeves to [ ], October 4, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 2 (1897): 237.

[2]Robert Wharry to Reading Beatty, January 5, 1792, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., [ed.], "Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," ibid., 54, no. 2 (1930): 163; William Allen to Theodore Foster, December 15, 1781, RIHSC, 6 (1897): 291; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, March 9, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1206; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, p. 615; John Lamb and Ebenezer Stevens to George Washington, February 12, 1782, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 255-256.

early in 1782, McDougall complained that he had only been paid twice since 1775, and was owed about seven thousand dollars.[3]

Throughout 1782, financial problems continued to plague the officers, and by the fall many had been driven to despair and poverty.[4] St. Clair complained that he was not the "master of one single shilling." "I am," he wrote Washington, "in debt, and my credit exhausted, and, were it not for the rations I receive, my family would actually starve."[5] One officer wrote his brother during November

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[3]John Glover to Benjamin Lincoln, December 11, 1781, "Letter of General John Glover," HCEI 36, no. 1 (January 1900): 39; Stephen Abbott to Joshua Ward, February 12, 1782, "Revolutionary Letter Written by Maj. Stephen Abbott," ibid., 38, no. 2 (January 1902): 54; Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 28, 1782, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 182-183.

[4]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); Henry Knox to [ ], October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington, November 11, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 166, Samuel Shaw to Mr. Shaw, November 13, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 98; George Washington to James McHenry, October 23, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:285; George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr., January 10, 1783, ibid., 26:26; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2, 1782, ibid., 25:227-228; Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, December 9, 1782, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 102; George Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, pp. 190-191.

[5]Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, November 26, 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:572.

that he was "entirely destitute of money."[6] This same officer, receiving his discharge that December, wrote that he was now a "private gentleman, 'gentleman indeed,' destitute of 'money' 'Horse' or anything that this World calls Valuable-[.]"[7] Another officer that fall wrote "To enter into a detail of my circumstances would not be entertaining to you, and must be painful to myself."[8] Especially when payment had been promised so often it was particularly upsetting to the military not to be paid.[9]

The military were not only upset because they did not get paid, but also because it appeared they would not be fully compensated until Congress and the states resolved their differences with respect to whose responsibility it was to pay them, as well as provide their pensions.[10] And

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[6]Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, November 15, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1208; see also Same to same, October 23, 1782, ibid., #1207.

[7]Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, December 25, 1782, ibid., #1209.

[8]Robert Gamble to Peter Muhlenberg, November 7, 1782, "Correspondence of Col. James Wood," TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July 1921): 37.

[9]William Heath to George Washington, March 13, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:354; William North to Baron von Steuben, October 29, 1782, Kapp, Steuben, p. 503; Baron von Steuben to Benjamin Walker, December 27, (1782), "Notes and Queries," PMHB 42, no. 3 (1923): 278.

[10]Benjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, September 13, 1782, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Alexander McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 7, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:35-36n.3.

it appeared that the differences would not be expeditiously resolved. Initially, Morris refused to pay the army on the grounds it was a state responsibility and thus had to come out of Continental requisitions. Consequently, the army received only a little over $500,000 from the central government during 1781 and 1782, an amount less than two months' pay. When the states attempted to pay their soldiers directly, Morris and Congress informed them these monies would not be counted toward their Continental requisitions.[11] Doubtless many in the military approved this, particularly those officers attached to independent commands who were not paid by a particular state. And undoubtedly many New England officers favored Continental funding of their pensions, knowing their own states' opposition to pensions.[12] Some officers, of course, did not care who paid them, as long as they got paid, and it appeared they were more likely

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[11]Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:176n.2; Ford, JCC, 24:206-210; 23:630-631; Robert Morris to Nathanael Greene, April 24, 1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:328; Robert Morris to the Governor of Rhode Island, June 26, 1782, ibid., 524; Robert Morris to William Livingston, July 29, 1782, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, p. 318.

[12]Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:576; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [April 8, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:320; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, p. 331.

to be taken care of by the state governments. St. Clair feared if the army split on the issue, nothing would be done by either Congress or the states, for "Congress will want the power, and the States," he wrote, "I fear, will want the will."[13] As happened, very few officers got paid.

Also upsetting the officers was Morris's policies for paying no debts until the Continental funding system was established, and paying the civilian creditors before the military.[14] One officer complained the latter decision was "adding insult to injury."[15] Other Morris policies, such as supplying the southern army by specific supply requisitions, rather than by contract agreements, also upset the military.

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[13] Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:576.

[14] George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, June 16, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:350-351; George Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, ibid., 25:269; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2, 1782, ibid., 226-227; George Washington to Theodorick Bland, April 4, 1783, ibid., 26:295-296; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 351-352; Charles Armand-Tuffin to George Washington, September 10, 1782, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 350; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, pp. 328-329.

[15] Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 99.

Many officers were also quite upset with Congress and the confederation system itself.[16] With respect to Congress, the small attendance by its members was, for Knox, "a good proof of the badness of the present Constitution."[17] One officer complained early in 1783 that Congress was "weak as water and impotent as old age."[18] Another officer complained that, although his soldiers have confidence in their officers and Washington, they had "not the least confidence in the government-[.]"[19]

This lack of confidence in government also applied to the state governments, with whom the army became increasingly dissatisfied the last years of the war. Most of the reasons related to the inability or lack of desire of the state governments to directly support the army or to indirectly support them, by failing to support Congressional requisitions.[20] Rhode Island's objection to half-pay

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[16]General Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:575.

[17]Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March 3, 1783, Drake, Henry Knox. p. 79.

[18]John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May 9, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:160n.3.

[19]Charles Armand-Tuffin to George Washington, September 10, 1782, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 350.

[20]Otho Holland Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7, 1782, Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:486-487; Benjamin Harrison to the President of the Continental Congress, January 21, 1782, Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during the American Revolution," Vera Largent, ed., The Walter

pensions and its failure to adopt the impost elicited strong opposition from the military.[21] Washington complained early in 1783 that the states seemed perfectly indifferent to the cries of the army and late that spring a young officer complained the states were "obdurate and forgetful."[22]

Besides being upset with the Congress and the states, the military were particularly upset with the American people. As one officer observed, "I think with you that every honest good citizen are our friends, but the honest and good compose but a very small part of the world at this day."[23] Most Americans appeared to the military to be too

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Clinton Jackson Essays in the Social Sciences by members of the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina, 3:316, 323; Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:310, 315; David Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 285; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, April 23, 1783, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:395; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6, 1782, Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795, p. 25; George Washington to James McHenry, October 23, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:289.

[21]Caleb Gibbs to Henry Knox, July 13, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #13); George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 4, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:184; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:31-34.

[22]George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr., January 10, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:26; John Arstrong to Horatio Gates, May 9, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:160n.3.

[23][Joseph] Wright to Samuel B. Webb, February 28, 1783, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 3:4.

self-interested, more concerned about their own well-being than that of the military.[24]

The civilian leaders feared this would happen; that revolutionary virtue would turn to materialistic vice. John Warren, in his July 4, 1783, oration, warned that peace and tranquility at war's end was bringing with it a time of great danger as virtue may be given over to luxury and corruption. Fearing this had happened, the Reverend Oakes Shaw of Barnstable, Massachusetts, told his congregation on April 25, 1782, that the Revolution had been a moral failure, for it had brought vice and iniquity into the land.[25]

Self-interest, corruption, and vice were indeed abundant in the land the last years of the war, as the business of the country shifted from supporting the war and the army, to business itself.[26] Also abounding in the

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[24]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 101.

[25]Gordon Wood, ed., The Rising Glory of America 1760-1820, p. 67; Lemuel Shaw Papers, MHS.

[26]Mercy Warren to Winslow Warren, December 18, 1782, Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, July 10, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL: James Manning to John Ryland, November 8, 1783, Reuben Aldridge Guild, Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Early History of Brown University (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864), pp. 308-309; Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, September 9, 1783, Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:286; Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1978), pp. 56-

country was an interest in the western lands. Thus, the last years of the war found many giving more attention to moving west or profiting from the westward movement than to the plight of the army.[27] Also of great interest to the civilians the last years of the war was their social life. While the military barely survived during 1782 and 1783, Philadelphia took on a gay appearance with balls, theaters, and new women's fashions capturing its citizens' attention.[28]

When the military reminded the civilians, who were now busy in their own pursuits, of the obligations to the army, they were met often with indifference and, not infrequently, with contempt. The army, for many civilians, were now considered, according to one officer, as the "Harpies & Locusts of the Country." Indeed, for many Americans, the

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60; John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty, July 16, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB 44, no. 3 (1920): 229.

[27]William Croghan to Michael Gratz, April 20, 1782, Byars, B. and M. Gratz, p. 208; John Neville to George Rogers Clark, April 14, 1782, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1781-1784," pp. 57-58.

[28]Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, February 1, 1783, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL: Lynn Montross, The Reluctant Rebels: The Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1950), p. 328; Bonsal, When the French Were Here, pp. 218-222; William S. Dye, "Pennsylvania Versus the Theatre," PMHB 55, no. 4 (1931): 360-361; J. Thomas Jable, "The Pennsylvania Sunday Blue Laws of 1779: A View of Pennsylvania Society and Politics During the American Revolution," PH 40, no. 4 (October 1973): 424.

army had become the last enemy to rid themselves of. As the French minister observed, "No voice is raised in favor of the army."[29]

This indifference and contempt was of great concern to the army, as they were afraid they would be soon forgotten and not provided for, once they were discharged.[30] They were all too aware of the old refrain:

> God and a Soldier all men doth adore
> In time of War, and not before;
> When the War is over, and all Things righted,
> God is forgotten, and the Soldier slighted.[31]

For officers visiting Philadelphia late in the war, this seemed very true. Visiting that city during December 1781

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[29]Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 106; Chevalier De la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes, August 4, 1783, William Emmett O'Donnell, The Chevalier De la Luzerne: French Minister to the United States 1779-1784, p. 244.

[30]Mercy Warren to Winslow Warren, December 18, 1782, Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Anthony Wayne to Robert Morris, October 26, 1781, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 283; Walter Stewart to Anthony Wayne, December 24, 1781, ibid., p. 284; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 10, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:243; Nathanael Greene to [Daniel Morgan?], October 9, 1782, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 14, no. 1 (1890): 83-84; Joseph Orne to Timothy Pickering, June [ ], 1782, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:365; William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:582.

[31]Malcolm Decker, Brink of Revolution: New York in Crisis 1765-1776, p. 106; Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washington's Headquarters (Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune, 1932), p. 300.

and seeing that nothing was being done for the military, Chaplain David Jones observed "The old adage is true, 'Out of sight out of mind.'" A little over a year later, McDougall reported the people of Philadelphia had their minds on two things, rejoicing at the news of peace and hoping for profits; their concern for the army was minimal.[32]

Some officers expected this attitude on the part of the civilians. During late December 1782, St. Clair told the army's committee to Congress that he had seen it written somewhere that "kings may be ungrateful, but republics must be." Similarly, Washington told General Putnam that ingratitude seems common to republics.[33]

Most officers, however, believed they were owed a debt of gratitude, as well as the monetary debt by the civilians. "It appears to me," Knox wrote the Secretary at War, "to be highly reasonable that America, who under heaven is indebted to the army for her existence." Samuel Shaw, who had served since May 1775, wrote a civilian friend during

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[32]David Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781, Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 285; Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, February 19, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

[33]Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:576; George Washington to Israel Putnam, June 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:462.

May 1783, that many civilians "think the distinction of a uniform coat and the spleandor of a military character a sufficient compensation for the hardships and dangers it is obliged to encounter." Shaw wrote, however, we do not expect gratitude, "but we have a right to justice." Similarly, Washington sent a circular letter to the states a month later explaining the officers deserve the half-pay they had been promised, as it was a reasonable compensation, and that it should not be seen in the odious light of a pension.[34]

The military were quite upset with the American people as the war came to a close, learning that they would probably not be compensated and the fact that this did not appear to bother the civilians; now that they were more concerned about their own affairs than those of the army.[35]

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[34]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, August 19, 1782, Callahan, Henry Knox, p. 196; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, May 3, 1783, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 107; Washington's Circular of June 8, 1783, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:492.

[35]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 10, 1782, ibid., 24:243; Nathanael Greene to John Barnwell, July 31, 1781, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:351; John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty, July 16, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB 44, no. 3 (1920): 229; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, November 15, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1208.

"The hour of danger is past, and avarice and meaness have usurped the places of gratitude and justice," Pickering complained during May 1783.[36] Ebenezer and Jedediah Huntington held similar feelings about the American people. The former wrote that he hoped a return to a private life "with all the care & Comfort, . . . an ungrateful Countryman will permit-[.]" A month later, September 1783, Ebenezer Huntington wrote that he and Joshua Huntington would probably head west, "for we can not be very happy to continue with a people who criminate us for making them free." Jedediah Huntington, also in September, wrote that the value of the commutation they expected to receive "bears no Proportion to a Sense of the Ingratitude of the People."[37]

Despite the financial plight of the army, there was little the civilian governments or populace could do to support them; to a large extent as they had their own problems. Jeremiah Wadsworth observed late during 1782 that Robert Morris was a good financier, "But he cannot create Money."[38] This was true. For money, he had to rely on

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[36]Timothy Pickering to Horatio Gates, May 28, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:468; see also Timothy Pickering to [ ] Pickering, September 22, 1782, ibid., 376.

[37]Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 106; Same to same, September 2, 1782, ibid., p. 107; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, September 3, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 465.

[38]Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL.

requisitions from the states. And they had little to give. Between July 1781 and April 1782, he continually sent circulars to the states, reminding them of the sad state of the nation's finances, and the necessity of them complying with congressional requisitions. These appeals fell on deaf ears as, by the beginning of 1782, the civil departments did not have any money to pay their creditors. And, by March 1782, it became impossible to pay even the interest on the loan office certificates. Late that month, Morris complained that since his appointment the year before, he had not received a single farthing from any state. Also upsetting to Morris was his inability during 1782 to get Congress to adopt various taxes to fund the public debt.[39]

Continental finances continued to suffer into and through 1783, as the states failed to meet their requisitions.[40] The national debt was over $35 million as the year began, and by March, Morris reported to Congress that there

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[39]Robert Morris Circulars, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 1:305, 380-383; 3:83-87; 4:191, 375-376, 519-520; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, February 11, 1782, ibid., 205-213; Robert Morris to William Smallwood, March 28, 1782, ibid., 472-473; Ephraim Blaine to Robert Morris, February 19, 1782, Ephraim Blaine Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #2); Bullock, "The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," p. 145; Ford, JCC, 22:439; 23:545-546.

[40]Samuel Huntington and Benjamin Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, July 30, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:437; Lynn Montross, The Reluctant Rebels: The Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, p. 362.

could no longer be any doubt "that our public credit is gone."[41]

The states could do little to help Congress meet its financial obligations during the last years of the war as most were financially exhausted.[42] The southern states suffered in part because their wealth was tied up in slaves, a commodity that was not so easily converted into the sinews of war. And, to make matters worse, many slaves were lost during the war.[43] Southern trade was hurt by not only the British army and navy, but by pirates operating out of St. Augustine.[44] The northern states had their unique financial problems, such as the illicit trade with New York City,

[41]Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, March 17, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:309; Young, Robert Morris, p. 142.

[42]Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, January 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:176; Stillé, Anthony Wayne, p. 287; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 386; William H. Masterson, William Blount, p. 65; Stephens, A History of Georgia, 2:336; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, April 12, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 4:564-565, 565.

[43]Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Ggeene, January 21, 1782, McIlwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia, 3:132; Benjamin Guerard to John Hancock, October 6, 1783, Feinstone Collection #438; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, 2:596.

[44]Thad[deus] Kosciuszko to O[tho] H[olland] Williams, February 11, 1783, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 78.

which drained off what little hard currency that existed.[45]

Internal problems also plagued the states the last years of war. Besides the domestic war with the Tories, other internal problems tore at the social, economic, and political fabric of the states.[46] Additionally, problems continued to exist between and among the states during the last years of the war, generally relating to boundary disputes.[47]

These domestic factors which prevented the states and Congress from supporting the army were made perfectly clear to the military during the fall of 1782 and the following winter. Such civilian leaders as the Superintendent of Finance and Secretary at War frequently informed the military leaders of the inability of Congress to act on behalf of the army, particularly with respect to pay and pensions. Morris,

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[45]John Taylor Gilman to Meshech Weare, June 19, 1782, Burnett, LMCC, 6:374; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, June 18, 1782, ibid., 373.

[46]Robert E. Moody, "Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays," NEQ 5, no. 1 (January 1932): 108-109; John Dickinson to [ ] Finley, February 6, 1783, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 10:163-165; [ ] Finley to John Dickinson, April 28, 1783, ibid., 40-41; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid., 41-44; W. S. Long, "Judge James Moore and Major James Moore, of Chester County, Pennsylvania," PMHB 12, no. 4 (1888): 470.

[47]Adele Stanton Edwards, Journals of the Privy Council 1783-1789, pp. 4, 9, 101-103, 107-110; William Irvine to George Washington, April 20, 1782, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:503, 504; William Croghan to Michael Gratz, April 20, 1782, Byars, B. and M. Gratz, p. 208.

in doing so, painted a bleak picture for the military and the country. He wrote Washington in September 1782, that, unless revenues were forthcoming, "I need not describe the consequences." A month later, he wrote Washington that "if the States cannot be prevailed on to make greater Exertions if is difficult to forsee where the Thing is to terminate."[48] During January and February, Morris and other nationalists in Congress informed the army's committee to Congress of the unlikelihood of the army being compensated, at least until a nationalist funding system was established.[49] And that was not likely.

Because of the poor condition of the army, and the apparent inability or desire to help them, many officers feared the army might turn on the civilians, as plunderers, mutineers, or even worse, as an organized military tyranny.[50]

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[48]Robert Morris to George Washington, September 9, 1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5: 715; Same to same, October 15, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:231n.42; see also Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, October 13, 1782, ibid., 229n.38; Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, December 3, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10).

[49]Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #11); Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, February 19, 1783, ibid.,; Same to same, March 15, 1783, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).

[50]Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, April 23, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 502; Nathanael Greene to Otho Holland Williams, June 6, 1782, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:Appendix, 470; Benjamin Walker to Baron von Steuben, November 20, 1782, Kapp, Steuben, p. 501; William Van Lear to Reading Beatty, June 9, 1782, "Letters

"The patience and forbearance of the army," General Greene wrote during the summer of 1782, "under their sufferings, have no equal; but, despair will, in time, break through the best disposition, all the force of discipline."[51] Throughout the spring and summer of 1782, military officers informed the civilian leaders of this potential explosive situation, warning them of the dangers, and urging them to action.[52]

Such warnings continued throughout the fall and winter, as the military officers informed their civilian friends and the civilian leaders of the uneasiness of the army and the possible consequences if the army was not calmed by expeditious civilian action.[53] During October, Washington wrote Lincoln the "patience and long sufferance

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from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," PMHB 54, no. 2 (1930): 168.

[51]Nathanael Greene to General [John?] Barnwell, July 31, 1782, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:351.

[52]Nathanael Geeene to Benjamin Harrison, April 22, 1782, Nathanael Greene Collection 58, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:488; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, January 24, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 4:109; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9, 1782, Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 396; Also, O[tho] H[olland] Williams to T[homas] S[im] Lee, July 7, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 67.

[53]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 100; Arthur St. Clair to Thomas Fitzsimmons, January 21, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:579.

of this Army are almost exhausted" and that there "never was so great a spirit of Discontent as at this instant." He believed that while in the field they could be kept under control, but once in winter quarters, there could be bad consequences.[54] During mid December, he warned one member of Congress that the army had "become more irritable than at any period since the commencement of the War."[55] A week later, Knox wrote the Secretary at War that "The expectation of the Army, from the drummer to the highest officer [are] so keen for some pay, that I schudder at the idea of [them] not receiving it."[56]

Such warnings were also frequently made to members of Congress by the army's committee to Congress during January 1783. At one of their first meetings with members of Congress, Colonel Brooks declared that "the temper of the

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[54]George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:230.

[55]George Washington to Joseph Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 430; see also George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, October 2, 1782, ibid., 230.

[56]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, December 20, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); missing portions provided from Knox's copy in his papers in the MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); see also Henry Knox to the Hon. [ ] esq., October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Copy of the same letter, addressed to John Lowell in Sidney Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Power: Economic Grievances of the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution," BPLQ 3, no. 1 (January 1951): 31; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6).

army was such that they did not reason or deliberate cooly on consequences and therefore a disappointment might throw them blindly into extremities." A week later, on the thirteenth of January, Colonel Ogden told a congressional committee that he would hate to go back to camp with news that Congress was unable to do anything for them. He explained the problem of maintaining discipline among the soldiers was becoming more difficult and that the officers were becoming more unruly themselves. Mutiny, he explained, was a real possibility. McDougall and Brooks informed them the officers were ready to resort to extreme measures.[57]

Early in March, worried by the temper of the officers, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., wrote his father that "affairs are in a more critical situation, perhaps, than they have been for some time." A week earlier, Knox wrote the Secretary at War a private letter telling him of the impatience of the army, stating

> Let the public only comply with their own promises, and the Army will return to their respective homes, the Lambs and Bees of the Community. But if they should be disbanded previous to a Settlement, without knowing who to look to, for an adjustment of accounts and a responsibility of payment they will be so deeply stung by the injustice and ingratitude of their country as to become Tygers and wolves.

A little over a week later, after an anonymous letter was circulated throughout camp urging drastic action, Knox again

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[57] Ford, JCC, 25:846-847, 850-853; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Papers of James Madison, 6:31-34.

wrote Lincoln, explaining the impatience of the army had turned to despair and urging Congress to act. Washington, on the twelfth of March, wrote similar letters to two members of Congress.[58]

In the south, Greene informed the chief executive of South Carolina that "Nothing short of permanent and certain revenue can or will keep them subject to authority," referring to the army. He explained that the northern army was in a high state of discontent and that unless the states acted to support Congress, there could only be bad consequences.[59]

Despite efforts to keep the army under control after Yorktown, there were many instances of lack of discipline on the part of both the northern and southern armies during 1782 and 1783. In part, this was because many of the soldiers were new recruits, not used to military discipline.[60] It was also the result of the lack of leadership in the army

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[58]Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., March 10, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:405; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 3, 1783, (copy), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Same to same, March 12, 1783, ibid., George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:213-216; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12, 1783, ibid., 217.

[59]General Nathanael Greene to [Benjamin] Guerard, March 8, 1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection), 1:27, WLCL.

[60]David Richard Palmer, The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress West Point 1775-1783, p. 342.

at the end of the war, as many experienced officers had retired or left active duty on extended furlough. Most instances of undisciplined conduct on the part of the soldiers was the result of inadequate supplies. During the last years of the war, soldiers frequently plundered foodstuffs and firewood, and sold their uniforms in order to buy food and other needed supplies.[61]

Lack of adequate supplies plagued the army during 1782 and 1783, as it had throughout the war. This was especailly true of the southern army. Greene's army was not that well fed, clothed, or housed during most of 1782.[62]

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[61]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:130; Jer. Clark to Henry Knox, October 16, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #14); General Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 695, 702-703, 706, 732; Regimental After Orders, ibid., p. 621; Acomb, Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 259; Regimental Orders, January 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special Collections, USMAL; Timothy Pickering to [ ] Pickering, September 22, 1782, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:376; D[ ] Brooks to David Humphreys, August 22, 1782, Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:248-249.

[62]Nathanael Greene to Jethro Sumner, February 2, 1783 [1782], Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Otho H. Williams to George Washington, June 2, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 65; Otho H. Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7, 1782, Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:486-487; Nathanael Greene to John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:448; Nathanael Greene to Otho H. Williams, June 6, 1782, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:Appendix, 470; Same to same, September 7, 1782, ibid., Appendix, 472; Nathanael Greene to Clement Biddle, September 1, 1782, ibid., 380; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, April 22, 1782, Nathanael Green Collection, vol 58, WLCL; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, April 24, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 502; Nathanael Greene to the President of the

This contributed to much sickness, including Wayne and Greene, who were both quite ill for a period of time during the summer of 1782. In all, some two hundred soldiers in the south died from sickness during 1782.[63] Early that year, Greene described his army to Washington as "really deplorable." Later, another officer informed his brother that "The troops are naked and discontented, and the spirit of mutiny and desertion prevails to a very great degree."[64]

Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, p. 615; Alexander Roxburgh to William Smallwood, May 31, 1782, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 182; Alexander Dick to Benjamin Harrison, June 18, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, p. 196; John Belfield to William Davies, March 21, 1782, ibid., p. 105; Churchill Jones to William Davies, January 17, 1782, ibid., p. 30; William Ronald to Benjamin Harrison, January 20, 1782, ibid., p. 39; Christian Febiger to William Davies, January 23, 1782, ibid., p. 44; Same to same, March 10, 1782, ibid., p. 94.

[63]Alexander Dick to William Davies, January 17, 1782, ibid., p. 30; Christian Febiger to William Davies, March 10, 1782, ibid., p. 94; Steward [John Stewart] to William Smallwood, July 11, 1782, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 186; Alexander Roxburgh to William Smallwood, July 14, 1782, ibid., p. 187; William McKennan to John Dickinson, July 8, 1782, Delaware Archives, 1:132; Same to same, August 16, 1782, ibid., 134; Nathanael Greene to [Daniel Morgan], October 9, 1782, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 14, no. 1 (1890): 83; [Nathanael] Greene to [Otho Holland] Williams, September 17, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 70; [Denny], Military Journal, pp. 47-48; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, pp. 406-407.

[64]Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, April 24, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 502.

Although some officers and soldiers believed that force of arms could resolve their problems, most were willing to lobby peacefully the civilian authorities for redress of their grievances. Using the traditional methods of appeal, during 1782 many officers petitioned their state legislatures, chief executives, and civilian leaders for redress of their grievances. They did so individually and as groups, in person and by memorial.[65] Many of the generals, including McDougall and Otho Holland Williams, by letter and in person, contacted chief executives and state legislatures about supporting their state's line, as well as themselves.[66] Some officers left military service for positions in their state legislatures, in the belief they could directly influence the legislature to provide for the military.[67]

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[65]William Davies to the Governor in Council, February 28, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:79-81; Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia. General Assembly Begun and Holden at the Public Buildings in the City of Richmond, on Monday the fifth of May, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-Three (n.p., n.d.), pp. 22-23, 39, 52; Commissioners on Behalf of the North Carolina Continental Line to the General Assembly, [April 1783], James R. Morrill, The Practice and Politics of Fiat Finance: North Carolina in the Confederation, 1783-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 58, 173n.9.

[66]Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 28, 1782, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 182-183; O[tho] H[olland] Williams to [George] Washington, June 2, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 65; O[tho] H[olland] Williams to T[homas] S[im] Lee, July 2, 1782, ibid., p. 67.

[67]Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter, pp. 219-221.

Probably the most active line in petitioning their legislature was that of Massachusetts, which had the largest number of Continental officers. During the summer of 1782, deciding that Congress would not be able to discharge the obligations due them, they turned to their state legislature, hoping they would discharge the half-pay debt, or at least pay them a lump sum commutation. They did so knowing they would be criticized by the nationalists, but they believed if they could get the state legislature to act, that other states, singularly, or in conjunction, would do likewise.[68]

During July 1782, the officers of the Massachusetts line drew up a petition calling upon the General Court of their state to adjust their depreciation claims and table of rations, and to make good on the depreciation of money promised to the soldiers in lieu of clothing. They requested the state send a committee to camp, with authority to adjust claims and to give the officers interest-bearing certificates for the amount due. They also asked the state to assume their half-pay obligation, or give them a lump sum in commutation. The petition indicated that if the state did not comply, they would make the request of Congress.[69] The petition, with a letter from General Knox to Governor

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[68]Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, August 26, 1782, Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, pp. 143-144.

[69]Petition in ibid., p. 144.

Hancock, asking for his help, was carried to Boston by Colonels Putnam, Brooks, and Hull.[70] Before the legislative committee to which it was referred could formulate a recommendation, the legislature learned from one of the Massachusetts delegates to Congress that Congress planned to take up the question of half-pay early in January 1783. That delegate, Samuel Osgood, informed them that although Massachusetts might make a special provision for her own officers, this would not free the state from its responsibility for contributing to the half-pay for the officers of the other states. Thus, the legislature tabled the issue, waiting to see what Congress would do.[71]

This action, or lack of action, caused the officers to turn their attention back to Congress for relief. Actually, throughout 1782, the officers, both in person and by letter, contacted Congress requesting financial relief.[72]

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[70]Henry Knox to John Hancock, September 2, 1782, ibid., pp. 144-145; George Washington to William Heath, August 29, 1782, MHSC, 5th ser., 4:277; John Brooks to Henry Knox, September 27, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); Same to same, October 17, 1782, ibid.

[71]Knox and Paterson, Greaton, Brooks, Crane, Maxwell, and Lowell to Benjamin Lincoln, November 28, 1782, PMHS 13 (1873-1875): 127; Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4, 1782, Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 146.

[72]Baron von Steuben to the President of the Continental Congress, December 4, 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 505-506; Henry Knox to Samuel Osgood, July 9, 1782, "Original Documents," MH 12 (1911): 239; John Paterson to Henry Jackson, February 3, 1782, Egleston, John Paterson, p. 128; Henry

Washington was quite active in lobbying on the army's behalf, especially for its officers.[73] During February 1782, he, Robert Morris and Robert Livingston signed a secret agreement with Thomas Paine to write essays on behalf of the army and the financial program of the nationalists.[74]

During October, many officers thought they would apply pressure to Congress by threatening to resign en masse in successive groups until their demands were met by Congress. Washington and several generals talked them out of this, suggesting they present their desires to Congress in a formal joint petition.[75]

Several meetings were held during November by the officers of the different lines at which they drew up petitions for redress.[76] On the first of December, a

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Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6), Same to same, December 20, 1782, ibid.

[73]George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, June 16, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:348-351; Same to same, October 2, 1782, ibid., 25:230; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2, 1782, ibid., 226.

[74]Robert Morris Memorandum on the Paine Agreement, and the agreement itself, dated February 10, 1782, are found in Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 4:327-328, 201.

[75]George Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:269; George Washington to Joseph Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 430.

[76]For reports of the meetings held by the Massachusetts Line, see Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10).

general committee, chaired by Knox, drafted an address and petition of the officers to Congress. Five days later, the committee selected McDougall, who was in a financial plight, and Colonels Brooks and Ogden, to take the address and petition to Congress. On the seventh and eighth, officers of the army affixed their names to the petition. It set forth the failure of Congress to meet their obligations to the army and the hardships the army had suffered as a result. It specifically mentioned their ration allowance, the clothing arrears, balance due for forage purchased, settlement of their accounts, lack of pay, and the unfortunate situation of those officers who had been previously retired. The officers stated they would accept commutation in lieu of half pay and begged Congress to include in any arrangement full provision for disabled officers and soldiers, and for the widows and orphans of those who had lost their lives in service. "Our distresses are now brought to a point," they informed Congress. "We have borned all that men can bear-our property is expended-our private resources are at an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with our incessant applications." The petition also warned that "The uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may have fatal effects."[77]

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[77]Ford, JCC 24:291-293; see also Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,

By the time the army's committee arrived in Philadelphia late in December 1782, several of the nationalist leaders had decided to use the plight and uneasiness of the army as an ally in their attempt to get Congress and the states to agree to a stronger central government and to the nationalist financial program. The army and the war were important factors in the nationalist's plans. They believed that America could only be secure with a stronger central government and this could only be accomplished during wartime, when the states needed a strong national government and its army for their survival. Once peace was established, there would no longer be a need for the army or a strong central body to direct it.[78]

After Yorktown, the nationalists realized their chances of getting approval of their program were slim, and by the time the committee arrived from the army, chances seemed non-existent, especially since Rhode Island rejected the impost and Virginia repealed its earlier approval.

MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); Results of the meetings of December 1, 5, 7, 8, and draft of the address and petition found in Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reels #10, 11).

[78]Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:239, 240; Gouverneur Morris to Matthew Ridley, August 6, 1782, BPL; Same to same, October 6, 1782, Young, Robert Morris, pp. 149-150; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Major General Nathanael Greene, December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL.

Several of the nationalist leaders decided the only way they could get their financial program enacted was for the army to be kept together, hoping the states would give Congress sufficient finances to provide for it. But with peace approaching, the only way to keep the army together was by having them refuse to disband until they were assured that they would be adequately provided for.

The way the nationalists attempted to use the army and the way the army responded has been labeled the Newburgh Conspiracy. The complete story of what happened will probably never be known.[79] From the available evidence, it is certain a group of nationalists wanted to join together the civilian and military creditors and use this alliance to coerce Congress and the states into accepting their funding system to pay off the wartime debts. It should be noted that this group, as well as the nationalists themselves, were not united in means and ends, nor were their efforts well organized.[80] Nevertheless, a small group of them believed

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[79]For good treatments of the Newburgh Conspiracy, see Richard Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd ser., 27, no.] (April 1970): 187-220; Paul David Nelson, with rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783, A Misunderstood Role," ibid., 29, no. 1 (January 1972): 143-158; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America 1783-1802, pp. 17-39.

[80]Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, p. 334; Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Attitudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789, p. 411.

they could use the army as the means to achieve their ends.

It is certain this small group did not want a military coup d'etat to take place, and thus they did not push the army in this direction. They knew all too well that if the army was pushed in this direction the result could very well be anarchy and military tyranny, the two things they, and the other revolutionary leaders feared most. As Hamilton explained to Washington, "any combination of 'Force' would only be productive of the horrors of a civil war, might end in the ruin of the Country & would certainly end in the ruin of the army."[81] These nationalists desired to strengthen the national government, not discredit it; something a threatened or actual coup d'etat would do.

This group wanted to take advantage of the potential and actual unrest in the army and play this off against the fears of the civilians. If necessary, they believed they could stir up the army, forcing them to declare they would not disband until they were provided for, including a commutation of the officers' half pay pension and the means of funding the commutation. With the help of the military leaders, they believed they could keep the army in check. Thus, they did not fear the army with the sword in its hand as the war came to a close. As Gouverneur Morris, a member of this group of nationalists, wrote John Jay on the first

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[81]Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, March 7, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:293.

day of 1783, "Depend on it, good will arise from the situation to which we are hastening." He explained "that much convulsion will ensue, yet it must terminate in giving to government that power, without which is but a name."[82]

When the army's committee arrived late in December 1782, this small nationalist group, consisting of Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, Richard Peters, and several others, decided the time was right to implement their plans. Their plans consisted of getting the committee and the army's leaders to object to anything but a nationalist funding system and to have the military leaders stir up the army.[83]

With respect to the funding system, the nationalists lobbied both the army leaders and the army's committee from camp. Gouverneur Morris, during February, wrote Greene and Knox that the states could do nothing for the military and therefore the military should stop wasting their time

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[82]Gouverneur Morris to John Jay, January 1, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:249.

[83]Ibid., 249; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, March 17, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:290-293; Same to same, April 8, 1783, ibid., 318-319; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, January 12, 1783, ibid., 240-241; Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); James Madison to Edmund Randolph, December 30, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 5:473; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid., 6:355-356; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 348; Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd ser., 27, no. 2 (April 1970): 191-192.

appealing to them. "It is . . . not my persuasion but my conviction," he wrote Knox, "that the only wise mode is for the army to connect themselves with public creditors of every kind . . . and unremittingly to urge the grant of general permanent funds." He suggested to Knox that "The army may now influence the legislatures and if you will permit me a metaphor from your own profession after you have carried the post the public creditors will garrison it for you."[84] Similar thoughts were expressed to Greene.[85]

Throughout February, Gouverneur Morris wrote Knox urging him to action and supplying him with information favorable to the nationalists' program.[86] Greene was told by Morris that "If the army, in common with all other public creditors, insist on the grant of general permanent funds for liquidating all the public debts, there can be little doubt that such revenues will be obtained." He was told also that Congress, with permanent funds, could obtain a degree of influence essential to the happiness of the country. But without the army's support, the public creditors

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[84]Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February 7, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

[85]Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, February 11, 1783, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:395.

[86]Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February 15, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:251; Same to same, February 28, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

could not produce relief for the army.[87] The army's committee to Congress were also lobbied, with the same arguments put forward. They were told the army's only chance of getting what was due them was for the army to join with the other creditors in urging the states to accept the nationalists' financial system to fund the national debt. They informed the committee if they did not support this position they would oppose referring the army's claims to the states till all prospect of obtaining Continental funds were at an end.[88] The committee was urged, therefore, to support the Continental funding of the national debt and to keep the army's uneasiness before Congress.[89]

It was left to Hamilton, Washington's former aide, to inform the commander-in-chief of the role the army needed to play, and to urge him to moderate the discontent of the army and to direct it into proper channels, i.e., nationalist ends.[90] During February, Hamilton wrote Washington several

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[87]Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, February 15, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:250-251.

[88]Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Alexander McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 5:35-36n.; Arthur Clairy to Alexander McDougall, John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, January 5, 1783, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 187.

[89]Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd ser., 27, no. 2 (April 1970): 192-193.

[90]James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:266.

times, urging him to have the army join the civilian creditors in demanding a nationalist funding system. He urged him to act discreetly in the forthcoming crisis. He must not forfeit the army's confidence by opposing any action it might take, but neither should he espouse the army's case too openly, or he would lose the confidence of the civilians. At the moment of decision, he would have to "guide the torrent" and "bring order perhaps good, out of the confusion." Hamilton told him that the army had confidence in Knox, and that he could be safely used; this based on Hamilton's belief that Gouverneur Morris had won Knox over.[91]

Hamilton's friend, John Brooks, a member of the army's committee, was indoctrinated with the nationalist's plans and was sent back to camp early in February with instructions to prepare the junior officers to support the nationalist's plans and to participate in some form of protest, if necessary. Brooks, however, apparently was not convinced of the nationalist's means to their ends, informed Washington and Knox of what was happening in Philadelphia, and did not stir up the officers.[92] Although Brooks was not

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[91]Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, February 7, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:33-35; Same to same, February 13, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:253-255.

[92]Forrest McDonald, The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 26; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:155n.3; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America, p. 312n.36.

willing to go along with the nationalist's plans, other officers were.

The nationalist conspirators found a few officers who, for a variety of reasons, were willing to support their plan of joining the army and civilian creditors together to force Congress into funding the debt. Arthur St. Clair, who was in Philadelphia, seems to have been won over by the argument of using the army as a lever by the civilian creditors. Additionally, he feared once the army was disbanded any resolutions adopted to pay them would not be implemented. Thus, he informed the committee from the army late in December 1782 that the debts due to the army had to be funded by the nationalist plan, and that the army should be kept together until that happened.[93]

Gates's aide, John Armstrong, Jr., also desired to keep the army together, in part because he did not, it appears, want to return to civilian life. Unlike many other officers, Armstrong did not have a set future to which to return. Late in February 1783, he wrote his father, asking what he was to do when the war ended, mentioning he was not suited for law or business, nor sure he wanted to be a farmer.[94]

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[93]Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:575-576; Arthur St. Clair to William Irvine, May 6, 1783, ibid., 583.

[94]John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr., February 26, 178[3], "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 1 (1881): 108.

Armstrong's mentor, Gates, was also amenable to the nationalist's plans, but for different reasons. Gates, in many respects, was an unlikely candidate to be used by the nationalists, as all his congressional friends were anti-nationalists. And, according to his most recent biographer, Gates would not have allowed himself to be used as a tool, especially by the nationalists.[95] Nevertheless, he got involved. Although not a proponent of a coup d'etat, he "knowingly launched into activities that bordered upon mutiny," according to his biographer.[96] Gates probably went along with the nationalists as he saw an opportunity to replace Washington if the commander-in-chief did not support the officers in their demands and was ousted as a result. He explained after the collapse of the nationalist plan to use the army that his only reason for supporting the nationalists was that he saw having the army cooperating with the civil creditors "as the way most likely to obtain justice" for the army.[97] Sharing this view was the officer who set the nationalist plan in action at camp, Colonel Walter Stewart, a former aide-de-camp to Gates.

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[95]Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, p. 271.

[96]Ibid., p. 277.

[97]Horatio Gates to John Armstrong, Jr., June 22, 1783, ibid., p. 274.

During the winter of 1782-1783, Stewart, a holder of a huge amount of public securities, spent sick-leave in Philadelphia. While there, he spent much time in conversation with the nationalist group. They were able to convince him he should go back to camp at Newburgh and stir up the officers, as well as sound out Washington as to his willingness to support them, and if he was unwilling, to get Gates to organize a military protest to being disbanded without being fully satisfied the debt due them would be paid. He arrived at camp on or about the eighth of March and, finding Washington would not support using the army as a tool, turned his attention to Gates.[98]

Many civilians, knowing of these plans, strongly objected to them, believing that once the military were unleashed in civilian affairs, the revolution could be undone by a military tyranny.[99] Horace Walpole predicted "the American leaders will not easily part with dictatorships and consulships to retire to their private ploughs" once the war ended.[100] In his March 5, 1779, Boston massacre oration,

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[98]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:436-437n.48; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 168.

[99]Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1783, Ford, Letters of Joseph Jones, pp. 99-100.

[100]John Richard Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1962), p. 266.

William Tudor warned that at the end of the war, a triumphant army, headed by a popular general "may become more formidable than the tyrant that has been expelled."[101] At the end of the war there was a great fear held by many that the army would not disband until they were assured they would be adequately provided for. A few even feared that not only would the army not disband, but would, by the force of arms, assure themselves of being compensated.[102] These fears

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[101]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, A Biography, 5:102-103.

[102]Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, January 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:176; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 259, 261, 265-266, 266; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 14, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:256; William Livingston to Ephraim Harris, February 16, 1783, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #8); Moses Hazen to William Henry, February 23, 1783, Francis Jordan, Jr., The Life of William Henry of Lancaster, Pennsylvania 1729-1786: Patriot, Military Officer, Inventor of the Steamboat; A Contribution to Revolutionary History (Lancaster: New Era Printing Company, 1910), p. 161; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, February 13, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:44; Same to same, February 25, 1783, ibid., 57; Hugh Williamson to James Irdell, [February 17, 1783], ibid., 46-47; Robert R. Livingston to John Adams, February 13, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:251; Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1783, Ford, Letters of Joseph Jones, p. 99; Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, December 3, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); Robert Morris to George Olney, August 20, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 408; Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein, (trans.), The Journals of Henry Melchoir Muhlenberg, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press for the Evangelical Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania and Adjacent States, 1942-1958), 3:535; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [March 25, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:307.

seemed all the more real early in 1783 as the civilian leaders learned from the army's committee to Congress of the discontent of the army and the possible consequences if Congress did not act soon to soothe the temper of the army. The army's committee was willing to let the members of Congress believe the worst was about to happen and did not try to dissuade their fears.[103]

As will be shortly discussed, some nationalists played on these fears in hopes that Congress would adopt their financial program. At a private meeting of members of Congress on the twentieth of February, Hamilton and Peters reported that the army had secretly determined not to lay down their arms until satisfactory measures were adopted.[104] Such reports prompted Arthur Lee to observe that "The terror of a mutinying Army is played off with considerable efficacy."[105]

The immediate response to these fears was the urging of the military to take no drastic action. As early as the fall, Congress sent, at Washington's prompting, the Secretary

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[103]Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 198.

[104]James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:266.

[105]Arthur Lee to Samuel Adams, January 29, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:28.

at War to camp to urge calm.[106] This visit was followed by letters to military leaders urging restraint. Hamilton wrote Washington that "Republican jealousy has in it a principle of hostility to any army whatever be their merits, whatever be [their] claims to the gratitude of the community. It acknowledges their services with unwillingness and rewards them with reluctance." What could be done? Hamilton told Washington the army must submit to its fate, for to seek redress by arms would mean its ruin. Elias Boudinot wrote Washington in March expressing his hope the army would not dishonor itself and explaining that violent measures would not help them. Several weeks earlier, Joseph Jones wrote Washington, expressing his hope the army would show patience in their plight. He wrote:

> To you it must be unnecessary to observe that when all confidence between the civil and military authority is lost, by intemperate conduct or an assumption of improper power, especially by the military body, the Rubicon is passed, and to retreat will be very difficult from the fears and jealousies that will unavoidably subsist between the two bodies. To avoid therefore the adoption by the army of any hasty and rash measure, should employ the attention and draw forth the exertions of every worthy officer in it; for from these alone can opposition be expected. The ambition of some, and the pressure of distress in others, may produce dangerous combinations, founded on the pretence that justice is delayed, and will be

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[106] Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 184-185; Ford, JCC, 23:657n.4; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:226-229.

> refused to them. The pretext is plausible and ensnaring, and may draw into engagements the unsuspecting, honest soldier, from which it will be difficult to extricate himself, even when he sees the dangers they lead to.[107]

Although a few officers were willing to let the army be used by the nationalist conspirators, most did not. Fortunately, those that did not included Washington, Greene, Knox, McDougall, and the Secretary at War, Lincoln; the military leaders of the continent. The latter was probably the only member of the executive leadership who refused to endorse the nationalist plan to use the army. Samuel Osgood, late in 1783, wrote John Adams it was fortunate that Lincoln "was a true Republican, & totally oppos'd to Intrigue & aristocratic Measures." Osgood feared that if Schuyler had been the Secretary at War the army might have been used by the nationalists. Robert Morris, according to Osgood, "wanted a Person in that Office who would go any Lengths with him." Lincoln, however, refused to be drawn into Morris's plans.[108] Greene, although sharing much of the philosophy of the nationalist conspirators, was against using the army as a tool. "When soldiers advance without

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[107] Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [March 25, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:306; Elias Boudinot to George Washington, March 17, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:84; Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1783, Ford, Letters of Joseph Jones, pp. 99-100.

[108] Samuel Osgood to John Adams, December 7, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:380-381.

authority," he wrote Gouverneur Morris, "who can halt them." "We have many Clodiuses and Catilinies in America, who may give a different direction to this business, than either you or I expect," he wrote Morris. He reminded Morris that using the army was "a critical business[,] . . . pregnant with dangerous consequences."[109]

McDougall and Knox also shared a nationalist philosophy, and both probably considered going along to some degree with the nationalist's desire to use the army, in a limited manner.[110] McDougall was heavily lobbied by the nationalists to declare openly the army would accept commutation only if it were funded by the nationalist funding system. He remained silent, knowing if he spoke out for the nationalist plan, the nationalists' opponents would kill the commutation. If he supported the anti-nationalists, the nationalists would block commutation. McDougall's first concern was getting both sides to agree to the principle of commutation, believing the funding part could be worked out later.[111] While walking a tightrope, McDougall kept Knox

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[109]Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:251, 251-252, 252.

[110]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 3, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #11).

[111]Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 188; Same to same, February 8, 1783, ibid., p. 194; Alexander McDougall, John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden to General Henry Knox, February 8, 1783, ibid., pp. 192, 192-193.

advised, and sought his advice, as well. On February 21, 1783, Knox wrote McDougall that he was opposed to uniting the army with the civil creditors against the government, and hoped the army would "never be directed but against the enemies of the liberties of America." He believed the best thing that could take place was a convention, called before the peace took place. Such a meeting could recommend ways of strengthening the national government, which would result in the army eventually being taken care of.[112] Three weeks later, he wrote McDougall his hope that "we shall not be influenced to actions which may be contrary to our uniform course of service for eight years. I know not how by any violence we can obtain a settlement of accounts, and the half-pay placed upon proper principles, except by the applications we have made."[113]

Knox shared similar thoughts with Gouverneur Morris. During February, he wrote Morris that "a hoop to the barrell" and "cement to the union" were favorite toasts of the army, and that the army would gladly help strengthen the government, but that it "must be directed in the mode by proper authority." He suggested that if the present constitution

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[112]Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, February 21, 1783, draft, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

[113]Same to same, March 12, 1783, draft, Henry Knox Papers, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).

was so defective the states hold a convention to form a better one. "This appears to us . . . the most efficacious remedy."[114] Knox's efforts to prevent the army from being used by the nationalists was seen by John Armstrong, Jr., as a primary reason that it was not used.[115] The person most responsible, however, for keeping the army from being used by the nationalists was Washington.

Throughout the war, Washington had opposed using the army in any unauthorized activity, as he believed strongly in the necessity of the subordination of the military to the civilian authorities. This was all the more important now that it appeared the Revolution would be safely concluded. Although Washington's beliefs were widely known, the nationalists hoped to have him use the army to further their plans. His response to them was the same as it had been to those that were suggesting the year before that he become a monarch.

Mercy Otis Warren in her history of the Revolution wrote that Americans had little desire for a monarchy when the war began, but such ideas were suggested during the war by aspiring individuals, nurtured by designing characters,

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[114]Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:256.

[115]John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 22, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:150n.4.

and matured by circumstances.[116] Monarchy was indeed a subject of some speculation during the last years of the war, as it was viewed as one solution to overcoming the defects of a weak Continental government.[117]

Gouverneur Morris, in a despondent mood, wrote Greene late in 1781 that he had "no expectation that the government will acquire force; and no hope that our union can subsist, except in the form of an absolute monarchy," but "this does not seem to consist with the taste and temper of the people."[118]

One person who believed that a monarchy, with Washington as the monarch, was the answer to America's salvation, was the commanding officer of the Invalid Regiment, Lewis Nicola. On May 22, 1782, believing a stronger form of government was needed to control both the military and civil authorities, Nicola wrote Washington proposing a monarchy be established by the military. Washington responded immediately, telling him it was "With a mixture of

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[116]Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution. Interspersed with Biographical, Political and Moral Observations, 3 vols. (Boston: Printed by Manning and Loring, for E. Larkin, 1805), 3:278.

[117]Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 3:76; "Proposals for Monarchy in the U. S.," June 28, 1781, unsigned, Feinstone Collection #1173; David Cobb to Timothy Pickering, November 9, 1825, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:431-432.

[118]Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:240.

great surprise and astonishment" he had read his sentiments. "You could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable," Washington wrote Nicola. He told him to banish such thoughts from his mind, and to never mention them again. In three letters, written between the twenty-third and twenty-eighth of May, Nicola assured Washington he would comply with his desires.[119]

Another person who suggested a monarchy was James M. Varnum, a general and member of Congress. During the summer of 1782, he suggested to Washington the only salvation of America lay either with a monarchy or a military state. Washington replied that he did not believe America was so badly off they had to resort to either form of government.[120]

Washington, learning of the plans of the nationalist conspirators, was quick to explain to Hamilton his opposition to using the army to further their ends, as it might result in civil discord. He told him that redress by force "is too chimerical to have had a place in the imagination

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[119]George Washington to Lewis Nicola, May 22, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:272-273; see also ibid., 273n.81, and Louise Burnham Dunbar, "A Study of 'Monarchical' Tendencies in the United States from 1776 to 1801," University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 10, no. 1 (March 1922), pp. 41-46; ibid., appendix A, pp. 129, 130-131, 131-134.

[120]James Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, June 23, 1782, ibid., p. 47; George Washington to James Mitchell Varnum, July 10, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:415.

of any serious Mind in this Army," reminding him that the army was "a dangerous instrument to play with."[121] Early in March, Washington told Hamilton it "Would be impolitic to introduce the Army on the Tapis; lest it should excite jealousy, and bring on its concomitants." What he would do, Washington explained, was to "pursue the same steady line of conduct which has governed me hitherto."[122] This was indeed what Washington did.

The military allies of the nationalist conspirators, realizing that Washington would not go along with their plans, decided to act without him. On March 10, 1783, Gates' aide-de-camp, John Armstrong, with the help of several officers, issued an anonymous address to the officers, inviting them to a meeting the following day to discuss securing redress of their grievances. The address called on them to "change the milk-and-water style" of their previous memorial and urged them to "Assume a bolder tone."[123]

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[121] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4, 1783, ibid., 26:292, 293; see also Same to same, April 16, 1783, ibid., 324.

[122] Same to same, March 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:278.

[123] The Newburgh Addresses are printed in Ford, JCC, 24:295-299; Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:440; George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:239-241.

Trying to avoid an unauthorized meeting of officers, Washington requested a postponement until the fifteenth, at which time they could hear the report from the committee of the army to Congress and adopt measures "best calculated to attain the just and important object in view."[124] He explained to Hamilton that he had taken this action "to prevent the Officers from being taken by surprise while the passions were all inflamed, and to rescue them from plunging themselves into a gulph of Civil horror from which there might be no recovering."[125]

Washington called for the general and field grade officers, one officer from each company, and a proper representation from the staff departments to meet at noon in the Public Building, "The Temple," and directed the senior officer present to preside and report the results to him.[126]

Armstrong responded to Washington's postponement by issuing, on the twelfth, a second address hinting that Washington was secretly in favor of the original meeting, but was prevented by his position from taking an open stand.

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[124] George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783, ibid., 208-215; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 12, 1783, ibid., 211-212.

[125] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12, 1783, ibid., 216-217.

[126] General Orders, ibid., 208.

By calling an official meeting, he was giving additional weight to any declaration by having it originated and transmitted by and through regular channels. Thus, despite Washington's seeming disapproval, the officers were told not to be deterred from acting boldly at the official meeting.[127]

There was great concern during the following days with respect to what would happen on the fifteenth.[128] Pickering wrote his wife that he believed if the meeting was conducted with prudence, it might have the effect of prompting Congress to settle with the army and the other creditors. "But," he worried, "should rashness govern the proceedings, the consequences may be such as are dreadful even in idea. God forbid the event be so calamitous."[129]

On the morning of the fifteenth, one officer, probably Rufus Putnam, released an address in reply to the anonymous addresses, stating the army could not extort the monies owed them. Not only would it be wrong, but there were not enough men in arms to carry out such an extortion.

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[127] Ford, JCC, 24:298-299.

[128] Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 12, 1783, (copy made from the draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March 12, 1783, draft, ibid.

[129] Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 13, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

Even if they had enough soldiers to support them, they would have to live by plunder and face the threat of civil war. Additionally, he correctly emphasized the soldiers simply wanted to return home, and would not support them. "Our business," he wrote, "lies within a very narrow compass-Viz. a warm & affectionate address to our 'Illustrious Chief'-pointing out the disadvantages that will arise to the Army if they should be disbanded before their Accounts are settled."[130]

The meeting began at noon as scheduled, with Gates, as the ranking officer present, in the chair. Before the meeting could begin in earnest, Washington arrived unexpectedly. Silence came over the room and every eye fixed upon the commander-in-chief, who "appeared sensibly agitated."[131] After apologizing for his appearance, he explained that he had not intended to come to the meeting, but the second anonymous address forced him to state personally his views on the role the army should play in obtaining redress of their grievances. He told the gathering to give greater

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[130] "To Officers of the Army," March 15, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12). On the back of the manuscript is the endorsement that it had been written by Rufus Putnam.

[131] J. A. Wright to Samuel B. Webb, March 16, 1783, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 3:6; for reports of the meeting, see Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:437-440; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, April [ ], 1783, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, pp. 103-104; Judd, 'Memoir' and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt. p. 68.

lucidity to his views he had committed them to writing and desired to read them. He bagan by criticizing the unmilitary character of the anonymous addresses, as they are addressed "more to the feelings and passions, than to the reason and judgment of the army." He told them the addresses only gave two alternatives; either deserting the country for western lands or turning arms against it, if Congress could not be compelled into instant compliance. Washington questioned the motives behind the person proposing these alternatives, suggesting they might have originated in New York City, as the British desired to sow the seeds of discord and separation between the civil and military powers.

Congress, Washington told them, would do them complete justice, once that body was able to establish funds for that purpose. He told them Congress would not cease attempting to get the funds until they had succeeded, but reminding them that "like all other large bodies, where there is a variety of different interests to reconcile" their deliberations were slow. He promised to help the army in any way he could to obtain justice and entreated them "not to take any measures, which, in the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained." "Let me request you," he asked, "to rely on the plighted faith of your country, and to place a full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress, that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they will

cause all your accounts to be fairly liquidated, as directed in their resolutions, which were published to you two days ago, and that they will adopt the most effectual measures in their power to render ample justice to you for your faithful and meritorious services." On the thirteenth, Washington had included in his general orders congressional resolutions of January 25, 1783, which indicated Congress's intent to provide funds for the army.[132]

Having finished reading his notes, Washington told the officers he would like to share with them the contents of a letter he received from a member of Congress. He then began to read a letter from Joseph Jones he had received earlier in March. After reading the first paragraph, he stopped, took out his spectacles, begging the indulgence of his audience while he put them on, observing at the same time that he had grown gray in their service, and now found himself growing blind. At that point, one officer noted, "There was something so natural, so unaffected, in this appeal, as rendered it superior to the most studied oratory; it forced its way to the heart, and you might see sensibility moisten every eye."[133] With the gathering softened by

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[132]Washington's address in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:222-227; General Orders, ibid., 221-222.

[133]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, April [ ], 1783, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 103; see also Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself, pp. 425-426.

sentiment, Washington continued reading the letter, which explained the plans and efforts by Congress to obtain revenue, declaring that if a discrimination was to be made in paying the public debt, it would be made in favor of the army; explained the delay in answering the officers' petition was due to the slowness natural to a body like Congress and referred to the dependence of Congress upon the states. Washington most emphasized that portion of the letter that pointed out that once the military assumed undue powers, there was no telling where they might be led, and they may be carried farther than at first they meant to go. Washington did not read all the letter, purposely omitting the negative portions of it.[134]

Finished reading the letter, Washington left the building, believing the temper of the officers had been sufficiently cooled so as to allow them to deliberate in moderation. Gates assumed the chair, and rather than attempting to sway the officers against Washington's call for a moderate appeal to Congress, he recognized a motion by Knox, seconded by Rufus Putnam, to have the gathering give their thanks to Washington for his "excellent address" and to assure him the "officers reciprocate his affectionate

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[134] Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1783, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3:554-560; For what Washington deleted, see Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:444-445n.; J. A. Wright to John Webb, March 16, 1783, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 60.

expressions with the greatest sincerity of which the human heart is capable." This was unanimously agreed to. Then the December memorial to Congress, the resolutions of Congress acknowledging the right of the soldiers to security and promising to obtain revenue, and the report of the committee to Philadelphia were read. That finished, Israel Putnam moved, and Edward Hand seconded, that a three-member committee be appointed to draw up resolutions and report back in half an hour. This approved, chosen were Knox, John Brooks, and a Captain Howard. They prepared three resolutions and presented them to the gathering. After a minimum of discussion, they were adopted.

The first resolution professed the patriotism of the officers and their resolution to preserve their reputation despite any distress or danger. The second affirmed their confidence in the justice of Congress and their country, and their conviction that the army would not be disbanded before its accounts were adjusted and adequate funds provided for securing the amount due, including the commutation for half-pay. The third requested Washington write Congress and ask for speedy action with respect to their December memorial. The third resolution declared prompt action "would produce immediate tranquillity in the minds of the army, and prevent any further machinations of designing men to sow discord between the civil and military powers of the United States." Two more resolutions were also adopted. The fourth thanked

the committee at Philadelphia for their work and requested McDougall remain in Philadelphia until the objects of his mission were accomplished. The fifth resolution stated "the officers . . . view with abhorrence, and reject with disdain, the infamous propositions contained in a late anonymous address to the officers of the army, and resent with indignation the secret attempts of some unknown persons to collect the officers together in a manner totally subversive of all discipline, and good order."[135]

With few exceptions, most officers were pleased the meeting had been conducted with "Order, Moderation and Decency," and that it had not resulted in the military turning to extreme measures to obtain redress of their grievances.[136] Knox believed the officers' performance would set the military character of America on a high point of view. "It was a proud day for the Army," Colonel Humphreys declared, and "aught not to be forgotten in the Annals of America."[137] Especially praised was Washington,

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[135]Ford, JCC, 24:31-311; Boynton, General Orders of George Washington, pp. 61, 103-104; Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:437-440.

[136]J. A. Wright to John Webb, March 16, 1783, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 60; George Washington to Lund Washington, March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:245; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 16, 1783, ibid., 228.

[137]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783, [copy made from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); David Humphreys to Benjamin Lincoln,

who was seen as the key in keeping the meeting from being the starting point of a form of military tyranny.[138] Knox believed Washington's address had been a "masterly performance." Schuyler reported on the seventeenth of March that "Never, through all the war, did his Excellency achieve a greater victory than on this occasion-a victory over jealousy, just discontent, and great opportunities." After the meeting, Schuyler reported that "I rode with Knox to his quarters in absolute silence, because of the solemn impression on our minds. I have no doubt that posterity will repeat the closing words of his Excellency's address,-'Had this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.'" Samuel Shaw was also impressed by Washington's address. He observed:

> I rejoice in the opportunities I have had of seeing this great man in a variety of situations;-calm and intrepid where the battle raged, patient and persevering under the pressure of misfortune, moderate and possessing himself in the full career of victory. Great as these qualifications deservedly render him, he never appeared to me more truly so, than at the assembly we have been speaking of. On the other occasions he has been supported by the exertions of an army and the countenance of his friends; but in this he stood single and alone. There was no saying where the passions of an army, which were not a little inflamed, might lead; but it was generally

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March 19, 1783, Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:270.

[138] Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, March 18, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 460.

> allowed that longer forbearance was dangerous, and moderation had ceased to be a virtue. Under these circumstances he appeared, not at the head of his troops, but as it were in opposition to them; and for a dreadful moment the interests of the army and its general seemed to be in competition! He spoke,-every doubt was dispelled, and the tide of patriotism rolled again in its wonted course.

Learning what had happened, General Weedon wrote, "Nothing rejoyces me more than to hear the disturbances in the Army are reconciled, it would have been a sad stain in the History of the war had they gone to extremes."[139]

Not all the military were pleased with what had happened at the meeting, especially when it seemed likely that the army would take a stand that would send a message to the nation that they would stand for nothing less than being fully compensated. Pickering believed his fellow officers had acted in a hypocritical manner at the meeting. Writing an assistant on the sixteenth, he reported that four days previously "most of them had read with admiration, and talked of with rapture" the anonymous addresses. Why the change? Pickering wrote his wife on the eighteenth that, like the greater part of mankind, the officers had been overawed by "'great men.'" Two days earlier, he had written her

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[139]Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 15, 1783, [copy made from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Philip Schuyler to [ ] Van Rensselaer, March 17, 1783, Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:427n.; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, April [ ], 1783, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 104; Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, p. 124.

the result of the meeting demonstrated the fickleness of popular assemblies and how easily a fluent orator, with only plausibility to support him, may govern at will. John Armstrong, Jr., was similarly upset, believing Washington lacked the will to support the officers' desire for compensation. He told Gates they should not have trusted Washington.[140]

The civilian leaders, on the other hand, were pleased they had trusted Washington as he had, in his actions at Newburgh, apparently prevented the military from undermining their revolutionary principles and goals. They really appreciated what Washington and the army had done, or actually had not done, at this critical moment of the Revolution.[141] John Jay, upon learning what had happened at Newburgh, wrote from France that "The general and the army have, by their late moderation, done themselves infinite honor." William Peartree Smith wrote the President of Congress that Washington's conduct had been "truly admirable" and "Superior to what the common principles of Human Nature

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[140] Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:439-440; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 18, 1783, ibid., 443; Same to same, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May 30, 1783, Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, p. 279; Same to same, April 29, 1783, ibid.

[141] The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Benjamin Harrison, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:155.

would have dictated to a Soaring Genius." "Had an Oliver commanded a republican army at such a delicate and critical Juncture," he wrote, "his towering brain would have traced out instantaneously a very different Line of Conduct. But Washington is the Patriot of Patriots. Talk of your Catos, y^{r} Brutus, & y^{r} Cassius-they are meer Fools to him." Smith suggested that each state erect a statue to Washington. Congress, which would itself make provision for a statue, voted Washington their sincere thanks for his actions at Newburgh.[142]

Washington and his officers believed their restraint and moderation in the face of adversity deserved more than appreciation and statues.[143] They believed once the American people learned what had happened at Newburgh, they would promptly and properly reward them, by paying them what was owed and making provision for post-war compensation. They consequently set about making sure all the facts about the

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[142]John Jay to William Livingston, July 19, 1783, Jay, John Jay, 2:122; William Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, April 22, 1783, "Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, on the Suspension of Hostilities Between the United States and Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849): 123, 124; Ford, JCC, 24:306, 305-306n.1.

[143]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:229-232; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., March 18, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:406.

Newburgh incident were made public, particularly Washington's address.[144]

The civilian leaders, for a variety of reasons, including the fear of military tyranny, believed the military were indeed entitled to what was owed them, and perhaps, even more. This belief was, of course, strengthened by what had happened at Newburgh. But it was a belief that was frequently expressed throughout 1782 and 1783, often with the provision that the compensation be consistent with republican principles.[145]

From January until early March, Congress debated the question of compensating the officers by way of a commutation of their half-pay pension to a specific number of years.

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[144]Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, July 25, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #13); Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

[145]Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); John Chester to Joshua Huntington, March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 171; William Paca, In Council, to the Maryland General Assembly, May 6, 1783, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:407; John Dickinson's message to the Delaware Assembly, January 19, 1782, Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792, pp. 695-700; William Gordon to Arthur Lee, April 2, 1783, "Letters of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930): 490; William Gordon to George Washington, February 26, 1783, ibid., 495; John Collins and Jonathan Arnold to William Greene, February 4, 1783, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 425; Edmund Randolph to James Madison, April 26, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:499.

There was much opposition to the commutation, as well as to the half-pay pension itself, but with the lobbying efforts of the army's committee and news of the Newburgh incident, Congress, on the twenty-second of March, agreed to a commutation of five years pay for the officers and voted the soldiers three months pay.[146] During the following two months, Congress also made provisions for the relief of disabled veterans and adjusted final rank of officers in meritorious cases. It should be noted that earlier, in January, Congress called on the states to complete settlements with the army up to August 1, 1780, and provided that they would take care of the rest, once the states paid Congress the monies they owed it.[147]

As has been noted, the states were very dilatory in paying Congress and their soldiers during 1782 and 1783. Nevertheless, some attempts were made by several states to pay their soldiers in specie, and when this was not possible, to pay them in goods, such as tobacco.[148] Some individuals,

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[146] James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 348, 355, 370, 375; Ford, JCC, 24:207-210, 253, 364; 25:926; Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, March 15, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, March 22, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6).

[147] Ford, JCC, 24:93-95, 321-324.

[148] John Montgomery to William Irvine, July 26, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:235; Clark, NCSR, 24:419-422, 484; Thos. Posey to Benjamin Harrison, July 30, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:241-242.

such as Haym Salomon, provided monies to several officers, including St. Clair, Steuben, and Kosciuszko.[149] The states also continued to provide land for the officers and soldiers, and in several instances, increased the size of previous grants. And to show they meant to give them the land as soon as possible, three states during 1782 and 1783, set aside land specifically for veterans and began the process of laying out boundaries.[150] Other provisions were made by the states. During 1782, Virginia, for example, provided that her soldiers would receive one-sixth in addition to all former bounties for every year of service beyond six, and North Carolina established a depreciation compensation allowance for its soldiers. During 1783, North Carolina adopted a law suspending for one year all legal actions involving debts contracted during the war, in hopes this would give the veterans a chance to get back on their feet.[151]

General Weedon, in Virginia, learning of Congress's decision to give the officers commutation, wrote a member of

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[149] Charles Edward Russell, Haym Salomon and the Revolution, p. 246.

[150] Alex M. Hitz, "Georgia's Bounty Land Grants," GHQ 38, no. 4 (December 1954): 345-346; Clark, NCSR, 24:420, 483; Paul V. Lutz, "Land Grants for Service in the Revolution," NYHSQ 48, no. 3 (July 1964): 223n.5, 234; Jeanette B. Sherwood, "The Military Tract," The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association 7, no. 3 (July 1926): 171-172.

[151] Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 11:84; Clark, NCSR, 24:485, 490-491.

Congress "the Liberal allowance of Congress in lue of half pay must give general satisfaction and will enable we poor Continentals to drink our Beer with a contented mind."[152] Had Weedon been with the main army, he would have seen there was not a general satisfaction, as the problem still remained as to how Congress was going to pay for the commutation and how the states were going to satisfy their financial obligations.[153] The army also had other concerns and were still upset with the civilian leaders for several reasons.

One of the first concerns of the military was the actual payment of the commutation, especially since there was great objection to it in New England and also in New York.[154] As the chief executive of Rhode Island explained

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[152]George Weedon to John F. Mercer, April 1, 1783, Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, p. 124; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, March 30, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:273.

[153]William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:582.

[154]Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 14, 1783, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:409; Noah Webster to Daniel Webster, September 6, 1834, Harry R. Warfel, Letters of Noah Webster (New York: Library Publishers, 1953), p. 434; William H. Glasson [ed. by Divid Kinley], Federal Military Pensions in the United States, pp. 43-49; Louie M. Miner, Our Rude Forefathers: American Political Verse 1783-1788 (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press, 1937), pp. 88-90; James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, September 8, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:306; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, September 8, 1783, ibid., 308; Same to same, July 21, 1783, ibid., 242; The New York Packet, July 24, 1783; Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 3:74; Van Beck Hall, Politics without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 152-155.

to their delegates in Congress, "The General Assembly . . . cannot comply with a requisition of this kind [referring to the commutation], because the measure tends to a military establishment in time of peace." He also cited several other reasons the Assembly refused to make funds available for the commutation.[155] At a Farmington, Connecticut, town meeting early in August, a resolution was adopted accusing the officers of attempting to profit at the expense of the people.[156] This attitude General McDougall described as a "dishonorable Spirit."[157] This dishonorable spirit was certainly not held by the non-commissioned officers of the Connecticut Line, who, during April, began demanding a half-pay pension for themselves; upset only the officers were getting this special provision.[158] They, as well as the other soldiers, were also upset during the spring that they had not received the pay they had been promised. The officers were as much, if not more, concerned about having their

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[155]William Greene to the Connecticut Delegates at Congress, May 10, 1783, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:703.

[156]The Connecticut Courant, August 12, 1783.

[157]Alexander McDougall to [ ] Wyllys, July 27, 1783, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 3:23.

[158]George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:351; Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 80.

accounts settled as they were about receiving the back pay due them. They were especially concerned that they were to be discharged before the accounts were settled.[159]

These concerns of the military caused several officers to believe that the army could still turn against the civilians.[160] Since there was little prospect of relief, this remained a continuing threat. Early in May, one officer described the soldiers as "loud and insolent" and the officers "broken, dissatisfied and desponding."[161] Such feelings, and the belief the nationalists could still stir the army to violence, prompted Washington to observe, "How far men, who labor under the pressure of accumulated distress, and are irritated by a belief that they are treated with

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[159] George Washington to Theodorick Bland, April 4, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:285-291; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 7, 1783, ibid., 478; George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783, ibid., 232-233; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4, 1783, ibid., 292; Same to same, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Edward Dunscomb to Peter Gansevoort, June 10, 1783, Feinstone Collection #291; William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:582; Arthur St. Clair to William Irvine, May 6, 1783, ibid., 583.

[160] John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29, 1783, Paul David Henson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, p. 279; Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 80; Jedediah Huntington to George Washington, April 16, 1783, ibid.; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Trumbull, April 21, 1783, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL.

[161] John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May 9, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:160n.3.

neglect, ingratitude, and injustice in the extreme, might be worked upon by designing men, is worthy of very serious consideration."[162]

Because of this unsettled state of the army, Washington decided to stay with the army, rather than retiring from military service, and required other officers to remain with the army to ensure that discipline was maintained.[163] Additionally, he and other officers informed the civilian leaders of the continued uneasiness of the army and the necessity of their fulfilling their obligations to the military.[164] Washington wrote a member of Congress that although the late "disturbance" had been quelled, the officers were too much pressed by their present condition and past sufferings to maintain their forbearance much longer. Early in April, he wrote Hamilton the suspicions of the officers were high. Any attempt to discharge them before their accounts were settled, he wrote, "will convey the most unfavorable ideas of the rectitude of Congress." The next month, Steuben wrote Lincoln that the "Officers and soldiers

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[162]George Washington to Lund Washington, March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:246.

[163]George Washington to Tench Tilghman, April 24, 1783, ibid., 358; George Washington to Henry Knox, May 14, 1783, ibid., 429-430.

[164]George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 19, 1783, ibid., 240-241; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, April 23, 1783, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:395.

are discontented in the highest degree," and stated "The officers can not stand it any longer." "I almost fear sometimes that the suffering lot of these brave men will prove too hard for their patient virtues," Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., wrote his father early in June. "Yet," he concluded, "the experience we have had of their patriotism & firm attachment to their duty hitherto gives us confidence in their perseverance to the end."[165]

Other officers shared the belief the military would persevere without turning on the civilians.[166] But to make certain, commanding officers constantly urged their officers and soldiers to remain peaceful and disciplined until the civilian governments could fulfill their obligations to the army.[167]

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[165]George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:232-233; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 3, 1783, ibid., 292; Baron von Steuben to Benjamin Lincoln, March 25, 1783, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 491, 492; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., June 4, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:423.

[166]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6, 1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Arthur St. Clair to William Irvine, May 6, 1783, "Letters of General St. Clair to General Irvine," HM 7, no. 5 (May 1863): 154-155.

[167]Baron von Steuben to Elias Dayton and the officers of the New Jersey Line, July 19, 1783, PNJHS, 1st ser., 5, no. 1 (1850): 14; General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, p. 171; General Greene's General Orders, June [ ], 1783, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 286-287.

Most civilians hoped, now that the war appeared over, the army would melt peacefully away. "We have no reason to apprehend," the Virginia Delegates to Congress wrote Governor Harrison, the army "will forget they are Citizens as well as Soldiers; or be dissatisfied with the best provision that can be made for them during the distress of the war."[168]

The belief the army would be disbanded without resorting to violence was not held by all the civilian leaders. Many still feared the army would turn violent.[169] Violence, they knew and feared, could result in anarchy and military tyranny, the things the revolutionary leaders feared most.[170] Thus, for many revolutionaries, the spring of 1783 was the most critical period of the war, as the

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[168]The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Benjamin Harrison, February 11, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:219.

[169]Edmund Pendleton to James Madison and Joseph Jones, June 30, 1783, Mays, Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 2:454; Abigail Adams to John Adams, June 20, 1783, Butterfield, The Book of Abigail and John, p. 353.

[170]John Jay to Philip Schuyler, September 16, 1783, Jay, John Jay, 2:129; John Chester to Joshua Huntington, March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 171; Richard Peters to Charles Thomson, October 20, 1783, NYHSC, 11 (1878): 178; Jonathan Trumbull's Farewell Address, October [ ], 1783, Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 304-312; William Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, April [ ], 1783, "Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, on the Suspension of Hostilities Between the United States and Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849): 122; Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, July 13, 1783, MHSC, 5th ser., 2:232.

things they were fighting for could be lost.[171]

The likelihood of the military subverting the civilian governments or in some other way undermining the Revolution during the last nine months of the war was minimal, as will be shown in the next chapter. For the most part, the military were occupied with thoughts of home, land acquisition, and post-war careers. With few exceptions, the officers and soldiers gave little or no thought to demanding by force what was owed them, believing they would eventually be compensated. Nevertheless, many revolutionary leaders still believed their restless and uncompensated army posed a threat to the Revolution.

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[171] James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:348; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, March 18, 1783, ibid., 356; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3, 1783, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:252.

C H A P T E R XII

THE REVOLUTION SAFELY CONCLUDED

Because of the fears that the army could still turn violent and undermine the Revolution, and because the cost of keeping the army in the field was such a strain on the limited resources of the continent, most civilian and military leaders wanted to have the army disbanded as soon as it could safely be done.

Discussion about disbanding the army actually began after Yorktown as peace seemed assured and therefore the army unnecessary. And some disbanding did occur during 1782 and early 1783.[1]

During the early part of 1783, there was apparently some thought given to weakening the power of the army by decentralizing it to various parts of the country until such time as peace was finally concluded. Alexander McDougall, late in February, writing under the name "Brutus," informed Knox there were some members of Congress who were considering dividing the army up by dispersing units to different parts of the country to lessen their influence and the threat of

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[1]Ford, JCC, 22:209, 210-212, 451-452; 23:797.

a military tyranny. To some degree, this was actually done, as during April, Congress ordered the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania Lines, as well as the artillery and cavalry units under Greene's command be removed to their home states.[2]

The first major congressional concern about disbanding the army came with the news on March 23, 1783, that a provisional treaty of peace had been signed. Immediately after receiving news of the peace, a congressional committee asked Washington his opinion of their proposal of disbanding the army with the promise to do them justice, reminding him how expensive it was to keep the army in the field, particularly if it were until their accounts were settled and permanent funds raised.[3]

Expense was a very important consideration for Congress, as Robert Morris continually reminded them of the lack of finances and the cost of keeping the army supplied.[4] Fear of what the army might do was another important consideration in congressional decisions with respect to disbanding

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[2]"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 27, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 195; Ford, JCC, 24:275-276.

[3]John Francis Mercer to George Weedon or William Fitzhugh, March 24, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:97; Theodorick Bland to George Washington, March 25, 1783, ibid., 106-108.

[4]Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton et al., April 14, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:323.

the army. It was a consideration that was also shared by the military leaders.

Because of the continued unrest in the army after the Newburgh incident, Knox and Huntington notified Washington on the sixteenth of April the sooner the "for the war" soldiers were discharged, the better. The next day, Washington informed Congress about the continued unrest and a week later wrote Hamilton that he wished all the troops, except those to be retained under a peace establishment, be discharged. If the army was not disbanded, he believed their claims would only increase, and "our perplexities multiply."[5]

Many officers and soldiers wanted to be discharged. Anxious to resume their civilian careers, they were unwilling to remain in camp until Congress fully compensated them.[6]

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[5]Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 80; Jedediah Huntington to George Washington, April 16, 1783, ibid.; George Washington to the General Officers of the Army, April 17, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:328-329; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 351.

[6]George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 350-351; George Washington to the General Officers of the Army, April 17, 1783, ibid., 328-329; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 18, 1783, ibid., 330; George Washington to Nathanael Greene, May 18, 1783, ibid., 443; George Washington to Jedediah Huntington, May 14, 1783, ibid., 429; Jedediah Huntington to George Washington, May 11, 1783, ibid., 429n.53; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:144n.3.

Thus, beginning during the summer of 1782, and especially after April 1783, when news of peace arrived in camp, many soldiers deserted, not waiting to be formally discharged.[7] Most officers and many soldiers, however, did not want to be discharged until they were compensated, or at least their accounts settled.[8]

Some civilian leaders also did not want extensive discharging to take place, for several reasons. Among them was the continued nationalist desire that the uneasiness of the army would compel the states to agree to their financial program; the practical necessity of the army as long as the enemy remained on the American shores; and the usefulness of a strong army as a bargaining chip to the American diplomats in their negotiations.[9]

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[7]Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, August 4, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:370; William Heath to Benjamin Lincoln, July 24, 1782, ibid., 5:379-390; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., September 21, 1782, ibid., 3:383; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 21, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 454; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:118-119, 212-213, 222, 252-253, 424; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, pp. 701-702; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 389-390; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:486; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL.

[8]Baron von Steuben to Henry Knox, February 25, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 14, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

[9]"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 12, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

On April 11, 1783, Congress proclaimed an end to hostilities, and four days later they ratified the peace agreement. Nothing was said to Washington about demobilization, for Congress at this point did not know what they wanted to do. They did know, however, as the Rhode Island delegates wrote their state's governor, "The disbanding of the army is a matter of great consequence." On the twenty-third of April, Richard Peters wrote Steuben the problem previously had been one of how to raise an army, "The only one which now embarrasses us is how to dissolve it."[10]

Compromising on the twenty-third of April, Congress decided that although the soldiers enlisted "for the war" would not be officially discharged until the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, Washington, at his own discretion, could grant furloughs to them. This decision, Madison observed, was a compromise "between those who wished to get rid of the expence of keeping the men in the field, and those, who thought it impolitic to disband the army whilst the British remained in the U. S."[11]

During May, Congress frequently debated the question of disbanding the army, and Morris constantly reminded them

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[10]Ford, JCC, 24:238-240; John Collins and Jonathan Arnold to William Greene, April 23, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:143; Richard Peters to Baron von Steuben, April 23, 1783, ibid., 150.

[11]Ford, JCC, 24:269-270; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:486.

of the cost of keeping the army in the field. Finally, on the twenty-sixth of May, Congress unanimously agreed to furloughing the "for the war" soldiers, and a proportionate number of officers. They would receive their discharges upon the ratification of the definitive peace treaty. Additionally, they agreed that the North Carolina troops who had enlisted for eighteen months and a proportionate number of officers also be furloughed, a provision that had already been made for the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania troops under Greene.[12] The latter decision had been made because of the continued unrest in the southern command throughout the spring.[13]

Congress, realizing they could not let the army leave without a reward, decided to give each soldier three months pay, a figure that had been suggested by Washington as appropriate. Three months pay, however, was a sizeable sum: estimated around $750,000--an amount that Congress did

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[12] James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 109n.13; 7:53-54, 66-67, 67n.2, 80; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, July 18, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:563-566; Morris's Diary, ibid., 432n; Ford, JCC, 24:358, 364-365.

[13] Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 80; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:486; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 389.

not have access to, without Morris issuing notes on his personal credit. Morris, however, had determined to resign by the end of May if no permanent source of revenue had been agreed to, and it had not. Nevertheless, he was prevailed upon to issue notes on his personal credit, in anticipation of loans.[14]

On the second of June, Washington, having received news of Congress's twenty-sixth of May resolution, issued furlough orders to the "for the war" soldiers and a proportionate number of officers.[15] Upset that the army was being released without pay, nor a permanent source of revenue to pay them, as well as to commutate the officers' half-pay pension, a committee of general officers and commanding officers of regiments met on the fifth of June and drew up a petition to Washington. In it they requested that no

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[14]George Washington to Robert Morris, April 9, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:309; George Washington to Theodorick Bland, April 4, 1783, ibid., 285-291; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 351-352; Robert Morris to a Committee of Congress, April 14, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:376-377; Same to same, May 15, 1783, ibid., 429-432; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, May 1, 1783, ibid., 399-403; Same to same, May 3, 1783, ibid., 405-406; Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton et al., April 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:323; Ford, JCC, 24:295-297, 283-285; 25:906-907; Young, Robert Morris, pp. 150-151; E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961), p.169.

[15]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:463-465; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., June 4, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:422.

forced furloughs take place until Congress had a chance to hear of their plight and that Washington urge Congress to ascertain balances, liquidate accounts, and provide adequate funds for all payments, including commutation.[16] Washington responded the next day by informing the army in his general orders that if the "for the war" soldiers did not want to be furloughed they would not, provided soldiers enlisted for three years took their place, and informed the army that three days previously he had called upon the Superintendent of Finance to provide the three months pay that had been promised.[17]

Washington made this unauthorized decision based on the fear that the army might revolt if it appeared they were being forced home without any hope of payment. With respect to those soldiers who might turn violent if they were not released, Washington, on the fourteenth of May, issued orders to Knox and Huntington, that if any soldiers showed a

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[16]Petition to Washington signed by William Heath on behalf of the generals and officers commanding regiments and corps in the cantonment of the Hudson River, June [5], 1783, Sidney Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Power: Economic Grievances of the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution," BPLQ 3, no. 2 (April 1951): 139-140.

[17]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:471-472; George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, June 3, 1783, ibid., 463-467.

mutinous disposition because of a desire to be discharged, they were to be immediately furloughed.[18]

Washington's fears about his army revolting were relieved as many officers and soldiers, eager to return home, peacefully disbanded, not waiting to receive their three months pay. By June 20, 1783, when Washington re-organized his army and ordered them to march to West Point, most of his army had melted away. The same was true of the general officers, with only Knox, Paterson, Greaton, Huntington, and Howe still remaining with the northern army.[19]

Late in April 1783, Steuben had called on Washington to have the discharging done with dignity, with appropriate discharges presented to the soldiers.[20] This did not happen, as the officers and soldiers were simply released. As Colonel Stewart observed, "the dissolution of our army was unexpected, as it was sudden, and I can assure you had you been a spectator of the scene, your heart would have bled for the poor fellows who were in so disgraceful a manner

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[18]George Washington to Jedediah Huntington, May 14, 1783, ibid., 429; George Washington to Henry Knox, May 14, 1783, ibid., 430.

[19]George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, ibid., 27:34; Boynton, General Orders of Geo. Washington, p. 75.

[20]Baron von Steuben to George Washington, April 26, 1783, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 511-512.

turned off."[21] The same was true of the southern and western armies.

By late June, when Greene received news of Congress's eleventh of June resolution ordering the furloughing of those soldiers of the Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia Lines agreeable to their resolution of the twenty-sixth of May, a good portion of his army had already departed peacefully, not waiting to be formally discharged. The rest would drift away during the summer, some waiting for water transportation home, others not. Greene, once Charleston was re-occupied and the rest of his army furloughed, left the south on the eleventh of August. During mid May, General Irvine arrived back at Fort Pitt and seeing the troops were restless because of the lack of supplies, furloughed most of them on the first of July. By the first of October, Irvine and the remainder of the western army, except a small garrison at Fort Pitt, had departed the west and were furloughed.[22]

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[21]Walter Stewart to Horatio Gates, June 20, 1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 8; see also Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, June 7, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:473; Same to same, June 12, 1783, ibid., Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, June 17, 1783, ibid., 474; Timothy Pickering to [ ] Pickering, June 18, 1783, ibid.; Baron von Steuben to [ ] [ ], 1783, Kapp, Steuben, Appendix, pp. 686, 688.

[22]Ford, JCC, 24:390; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, pp. 389-390; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783, p. 702; William Irvine to Benjamin Lincoln, August 17, 1783,

For the most part, the disbanding was peacefully done, as Washington and the other officers ensured it was done with strict discipline enforced, with soldiers leaving on furloughs properly officered.[23] There was some concern about letting the soldiers carry their arms with them, but Washington successfully prevailed upon Congress during April to let the soldiers leave with their arms and accoutrements.[24]

There were several reasons and factors why the disbanding was peacefully accomplished, and why the army remained relatively peaceful the last year of the war. One of the most important factors was the appearance that the civilian authorities were attempting to make good on their promises. This was the result of the improved economic condition of the states during the last years of the war.[25]

Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, appendix B, p. 194.

[23]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:471; John Lamb to George Clinton, May 2, 1783, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 8:163-164.

[24]Ibid.; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, April 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:332-333; Ford, JCC, 24:269-270; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:53-54.

[25]Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern States to 1860, 2:589, table 16; Ebenezer Hazard to John Eliot, June 13, 1783, Andrew-Eliot Collection, MHS; Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina 1763-1789, Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany 29 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), pp. 7, 157; William Columbus Hunter,"The Commercial Policy of New Jersey under the Confederation 1783-1789"(Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1922), pp. 27-29; Charles Henry Ambler,

And, although the finances of Congress were, for all practical purposes, non-existent, there were reasons for the military to be optimistic about eventually receiving all that was due them. Among them were the decision by Robert Morris not to resign at the end of May, as he had intended to; the adoption of the impost by Congress in April; and the late March decision to commutate the officers' half-pay to a fixed one time payment. The military were also pleased by receiving, in early June, three months pay, and by the efforts, during the summer, of the Paymaster General to settle their accounts. Particularly gratifying to the officers were the issuance that fall of commutation certificates and the decision by Congress in September to promote all officers who had served over five years without a promotion. This decision meant a larger commutation payment.[26]

Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), p. 48; RIHSC, 6 (1867): 87; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Between the American and the French Revolutions (1783-1789) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 27; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 150; David Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States, p. 47; Bullock, "The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," p. 147; William G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, 1:293-295.

[26]Robert Morris to the President of the Continental Congress, July 18, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:563-566; Elias Boudinot to the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, July 15, 1783, ibid., 546; Ford, JCC, 24:256-262, 268, 284-285; 25:632; Raphael P. Thian, Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States (Its Organization, Duties,

Another major set of factors in keeping the officers and soldiers from turning on the civilian governments were those relating to the civilian concerns held by them at this period. "The expectation of a speedy peace has greatly lulled the discontents of the army," a young officer wrote late in 1782.[27] Indeed, peace meant various things to the military. For many, it meant going home, even at the expense of what was due them. After many years of military service, the return to domestic tranquility was a great lure.[28] Major William North longed for peace, for it would allow him "to go to Virginia to Carolina-to marry-to kiss my wife-to go into business-& to do nothing[.]" Another officer, Lewis Morris, Jr., had similar goals. "A good girl and a little

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Pay, and Allowances), from 1775 to 1901 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 443; Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, p. 379; E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance 1776-1790, pp. 170n.59, 186-188; William H. Glasson [ed. by David Kinley], Federal Military Pensions in the United States, p. 49; Sidney Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Power: Economic Grievances of the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution," BPLQ 3, no. 2 (April 1951): 138.

[27] Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 101.

[28] Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, February 28, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, August 20, 1783, ibid.; Timothy Pickering to Robert Morris, April 1, 1783, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #5); Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, October 7, 1783, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:514.

farm will satisfy my ambition," he wrote.[29] Having served the whole war, Washington was especially eager to return home, to "the pleasure of a little repose and retirement."[30] In June 1783, he wrote that he was awaiting the definitive treaty, for it would end his military service, thereby allowing him to spend the rest of his life "in that kind of ease and repose which a man enjoys that is free from the load of public cares."[31]

Domestic concerns filled a large part of the minds of the military during the last two years of the war. Many officers were eager to marry and settle down to peaceful pursuits. Some officers, early in the war, decided they would not consider the questions of love and marriage until

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[29]William North to Benjamin Walker, [November 1783], Feinstone Collection #1031; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, December 10, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 497; John Lamb to Henry Knox, December 20, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); Sebastian Bauman to Henry Knox, November 7, 1782, ibid.

[30]George Washington to Tench Tilghman, April 24, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:358; see also George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, April 30, 1783, ibid., 369; George Washington to William Heath, February 5, 1783, ibid., 97; George Washington to James McHenry, December 10, 1783, ibid., 27:266.

[31]George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.

the war ended.[32] Now with Yorktown behind them, such considerations absorbed the attention of many. Courtships began in earnest, with some officers even set on courting and marrying well-to-do widows as a means of diminishing their financial plight.[33] Many of the courtships and lengthy engagements culminated in marriage during the last two years of the war, as many officers did not want to wait until the army was disbanded before beginning life in a married state. And most of these officers left the military service to do so.[34]

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[32]Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, September 10, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 367; "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1768 to 1781, Including his 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 129-146.

[33]Erkuries Beatty to John Pratt, November 27, 1783, John Pratt Collection, vol. 1, CSL: Isaac Van Horne to Reading Beatty, May 18, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., [ed.], "Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," PMHB 54, no. 2 (1930): 167; Same to same, October 4, 1782, ibid., 169; "Letters from Col. Lewis Morris to Miss Ann Elliott," SCHGM 40, no. 4 (October 1939): 122-136; ibid., 41, no. 1 (January 1940): 1-4; Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., August 26, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 506; Thad[deus] Kosciuszko to O[tho] H[olland] Williams, February 11, 1783, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 78; Lily Lee Nixon, James Burd: Frontier Defender 1726-1793 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941), p. 182.

[34]Blackwell P. Robinson, William R. Davie, p. 131; Noel B. Gerson, Light-Horse Henry: A Biography of Washington's Great Cavalryman, Henry Lee (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 149; Charles Miner, History of Wyoming, In a Series of Letters, from Charles Miner, to his Son William Penn Miner, Esq. (Philadelphia: J. Crissy, 1845), p. 331; Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The 'William' and 'Favorite'; The Post-Revolutionary Voyages of Two

While the minds of many officers were occupied with thoughts of love and impending marriage the last years of the war, many more officers were preoccupied with thoughts of their wives and children. Some officers, having spent months, and even years, away from home, were greatly concerned about the state of their marriages; a few even fearful their wives were having affairs in their absence.[35]

Philadelphia Ships," PMHB 98, no. 3 (July 1974): 325; Mrs. Washington Choate, "Experience of an American Educator in the First Years of the Republic," The Journal of American History 1, no. 4 (1907): 724; Mabel Ives, Washington's Headquarters, p. 294; Francis J. Brooke, A Family Narrative: Being the Reminiscences of a Revolutionary Officer Afterwards Judge of the Court of Appeals (Richmond: MacFarland and Ferguson, 1849), p. 27; Livingston, Israel Putnam, p. 409; Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:70, 193; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Arthur Middleton, April 24, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, "Correspondence to Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 2 (April 1926): 62; Edwin Martin Stone, Our French Allies, p. 241n.; Scharf, History of Western Maryland, 1:459, 461; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:256; James Minor Lincoln, The Papers of Captain Rufus Putnam of Wareham, Mass. Compiled from the Original Records (n.p.: privately printed, 1904), p. 55; Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:197; Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," 402n.1; Mary Carson Darlington, Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, p. 208; "Notes and Queries," PMHB 12, no. 4 (1888): 496; Erkuries Beatty to Reading Beatty, March 2, 1783, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," ibid., 44, no. 3 (1920): 233, ibid., 47, no. 2 (1923): 172-173n.272; White, Historical Collections of Georgia, p.218; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 326.

[35] Ethel Armes, ed., Nancy Shippen: Her Journal Book: The International Romance of a Young Lady of Fashion of Colonial Philadelphia with Letters to Her and About Her, p. 143; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, April 6[-8], 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

Others were just as concerned about the health and well-being of their wives, some of whom died the last year of the war. Gates even left the army in March to take care of his sick wife, who died that June.[36] Also occupying the attention and interest of the fathers in uniform, was the birth, well-being, and education of their children. Some officers, such as Rufus Putnam, left the army to be with their pregnant wives; while others, such as Sebastian Bauman, remained at camp, anxious about the impending birth of their children.[37] And all fathers must have simply missed their children. General Greene certainly did. Although his wife joined him during 1782, their children remained in Rhode Island. He wrote a friend late that year how much he missed his children and his desire to return home.[38]

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[36]Seymour, A Digressive History, p. 62; John Austin Stevens, "Ebenezer Stevens: Lieut. Col. of Artillery in the Continental Army," MAH 1, no. 10 (October 1877): 609; Patterson, Horatio Gates, pp. 332, 334-346, 347; Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography, pp. 268, 276, 277.

[37]James Minor Lincoln, The Papers of Captain Rufus Lincoln of Wareham, Mass. Compiled from the Original Records, pp. 43, 55; Mary C. Doll Fairchild, [ed.], Memoirs of Colonel Sebastian Bauman and His Descendants. With Selections from his Correspondence, p. 38; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 242; David Cobb to Robert Treat Paine, June 19, 1782, Robert Treat Paine Collection (Xerox copies), MHS; Same to same, August 28, 1782, ibid.; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, October 31, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1).

[38]Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Jr., December 21, 1782, Clifford P. Monahon and Clarkson A. Collins, 3rd, [eds.], "Nathanael Greene's Letters to 'Friend Sammy' Ward," RIH 17, no. 1 (January 1958): 18-19.

Washington also had personal and domestic concerns, which increased his desire to return home. Of immediate concern was his health, as both his eyesight and teeth had worsened during the war.[39] His family and relatives were also of great concern. When his stepson died late in 1781, he left behind a wife and four children. They, in part, became Washington's responsibility. His nephew, Bushrod Washington, had to be educated. So, in 1782, Washington arranged for him to study law under James Wilson. He was concerned about the debt his brother, Samuel, had accumulated and that Lund Washington had not done an adequate job of managing Mount Vernon during his absence, especially his not forcing the tenants to pay their rent. Although Martha being with him must have been of some comfort, he still worried about her, as she was sick with the fever during the summer of 1783. Washington was most concerned about his financial plight. Despite having made purchases of land in New York, which he was anxious about, he believed he had suffered considerably during the war. To some degree this was true as, with the 6 percent interest on money he laid out himself during the war, Washington was owed over $400,000 by Congress. For these reasons, he greatly desired to return

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[39]George Washington to William Stephens Smith, May 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:434; George Washington to Andrew Billings, June 17, 1783, ibid., 27:19.

to Mount Vernon, to take care of his family, his affairs, and himself.[40]

Jedediah Huntington observed early in 1783 from his West Point camp that "The Peace will undoubtedly bring about a great Revolution in Commerce; it will be difficult to know where & how to take Advantage of it."[41] Indeed, many officers' attention during the last years of the war focused on their economic futures. Some officers and soldiers, already by 1781, had started planning their post-war pursuits.[42] Others had business plans, such as Pickering, for a mercantile business and General Greene, for becoming

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[40] George Washington to Henry Knox, September 23, 1783, ibid., 165; George Washington to George Clinton, August 12, 1783, ibid., 99-100; George Washington to Lund Washington, June 11, 1783 [extract], ibid., 2-3; Same to same, February 12, 1783, ibid., 26:126-127; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, January 16, 1783, ibid., 41; George Washington to Bushrod Washington, January 15, 1783, ibid., 38-40; George Washington to James Wilson, March 22, 1782, ibid., 24:88; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 26:352-353; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 30, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:438; Same to same, August 6, 1783, ibid., 440; W. E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man, p. 391; Marvin Kitman, George Washington's Expense Account (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 31.

[41] Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, February 24, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 458.

[42] Bray, Diary of a Common Soldier, p. 199; Henry C. White, Abraham Baldwin: One of the Founders of the Republic, and the Father of the University of Georgia, the First of American State Universities (Athens, Georgia: McGregor Company, 1926), pp. 32, 33, 35.

a rice planter.[43] Some officers and soldiers started their business ventures at or near the end of the war.[44] Colonel Walter Stewart, for example, during 1782, set up a shipping company, and upon his discharge early in 1783, sent out ships for Havana and France.[45] Private Samuel Smith, of Providence, upon his discharge during mid 1783, shipped out on a whaling brig bound for the Brazilian coast.[46] During the spring of 1783, Washington allowed Colonel Matthias Ogden to go to France to begin a business venture on behalf of a number of New Jersey officers.[47] Also that spring, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ward, having left the military, sailed on the "George Washington" out of Providence for Canton, in hopes of beginning a trade with the orient. The following

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[43]Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 4, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Timothy Pickering to George Williams, February 17, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:401; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 405.

[44]Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge, p. 85.

[45]Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The 'William' and 'Favorite': The Post-Revolutionary Voyages of Two Philadelphia Ships," PMHB 93, no. 3 (July 1974): 325-328.

[46]Charles I. Bushnell, [ed.], Memoirs of Samuel Smith, Soldier of the Revolution, 1776-1786. Written by Himself (New York: privately printed, 1860), pp. 22-23.

[47]George Washington to Matthias Ogden, April 7, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:305; Same to same, April 19, 1783, ibid., 340; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Between the American and the French Revolution (1783-1789), p. 27.

February, he and another officer sailed out of New York City on the "Empress of China" with a similar view in mind.[48]

While many in the army thought about their families and post-war pursuits, many others turned their attention to obtaining the land they had been promised. Land was a major factor in preventing the military from taking other property from their fellow citizens. It served as a safety valve to the frustrations of the military. Instead of plotting a military overthrow of the central government or the state governments, many in the military during the last two years of the war, spent hours discussing their plans for the land they would obtain upon the peace. Before the end of the war, many even left for the new lands, frequently in the far west. This removed from the scene many who might have abetted, encouraged, and participated in some form of military tyranny.

Actually, some began consideration of moving westward as early as 1778, even before the war terminated.[49] Despite objections that to open the western lands to

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[48]Quincy, Samuel Shaw, pp. 110-112, 133; RIHSC, 6 (1867): 87.

[49]William Russell to William Fleming, October 7, 1778, Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution 1774-1781, pp. 199-200; Samuel H. Parsons to George Clinton, February 21, 1780, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 5:505; Francis Lewis, William Floyd, John Jay, and James Duane to George Clinton, February 3, 1779, Morris, John Jay, pp. 548-549.

settlement before the war ended would deplete the armies and provide an asylum for deserters, by the end of 1781, several states had not only set aside lands for their soldiers, but established land officers to distribute the land.[50]

The actual exodus to the west began after George Rogers Clark's success in the Illinois country, and continued at an increasing pace once land was opened for settlement in Kentucky and Tennessee.[51]

During 1782 and 1783, more land was opened and more land offices were established.[52] During those years a land rush to the west took place, as many veterans took advantage

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[50]Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24, 1780, "Letter of Genl. Gist to Col. Munford," MHM 4, no. 4 (December 1909): 371; Merrill Jensen, "The Cession of the Old Northwest," MVHR 23, no. 1 (June 1936): 37; Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:50, 445, 565; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, pp. 98-99.

[51]Clarence Walworth Alvord, The Illinois Country 1673-1818, vol. 1 of the Centennial History of Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1920), p. 340; Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779-1792 (New York: Atheneum for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 1972), pp. 18, 23; Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier 1763-1783, p. 133; William Davies to R. H. Harrison, March 20, 1780, Stewart, William Woodford, 2:1158; Lem'l Baritt to Thomas Sim Lee, September 26, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives 45:123.

[52]Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, 24:419-422; Alex M. Hitz, "Georgia Bounty Land Grants," GHQ 38, no. 4 (December 1954): 340.

of settling the lands they had been granted.[53] Interest in settling in the west picked up dramatically after the so-called Newburgh incident, as many officers believed their only future lay in the western lands owed them. If they were not to immediately receive their pay and pensions, at least they would receive their land.

Many officers undertook to have a tract of land set aside in the west specifically for veterans.[54] During May, over two hundred officers signed a petition, requesting that Congress set aside the Ohio country for the veterans, and that it eventually be admitted to the Confederation as a state. Early in June, Washington forwarded the petition to Congress, with the endorsement of it, reasoning that such an

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[53] Jos. A. Waddell, Annals of Augusta County, Virginia, from 1726 to 1871, p. 315; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clark 1733 to 1799, p. 171; John M. Roberts, [ed.], Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier (Clinton, Louisiana: Feliciana Democrat, Printers, 1859), pp. 68-72; Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1938), p. 42; Dorsey Pentecost to James Wilson, June 26, 1783, E. Douglas Branch, "Plan for the Western Lands, 1783," PMHB 60, no. 3 (July 1936): 288-289; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, pp. 225-231; Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," pp. 386n.3, 402n.1; James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson, p. 69; E. L. Anderson, Soldier and Pioneer: A Biographical Sketch of Lt.-Col. Richard C. Anderson of the Continental Army (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1879), pp. 41, 43; William Irvine to the Secretary at War, October 28, 1782, Burnett, LMCC, 6:542n.2.

[54] Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, April 7, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:457; see also ibid., appendix 3, 546-549.

area would protect their boundaries, especially since it would be primarily settled by veterans. His lobbying efforts were joined by many officers, who no longer desired to reside in the east once the war ended.[55]

Washington also kept himself busy during the spring and summer thinking about the development of the western lands, particularly since he owned approximately 58,000 acres of land beyond the Alleghenies and was in the process of purchasing several thousand acres in the Mohawk Valley.[56]

Congress did not accept the plan endorsed by Washington, in part because Virginia's cession of her western lands had not been accepted and peace had not been made with the Indian tribes in the Ohio country. Thus, by the time the army was disbanded, no arrangements had been made by Congress for the settlement of the west. Nevertheless, the veterans made other arrangements, involving themselves in other pursuits or going west on their own.

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[55]Copy of the petition in Buell, Rufus Putnam, pp. 215-216; names of signers in William Parker Cutler and Julia Perkins Cutler, Life[,] Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL.D., 2 vols. (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Company, 1888), 1:160-167; Rufus Putnam to Henry Knox, June 10, 1783, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Rufus Putnam to George Washington, June 16, 1783, Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 217; Henry Knox to George Washington, September 17, 1783, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 85; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 17, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:16-18.

[56]George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, ibid., 133-140; Charles H. Ambler, George Washington and the West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936), pp. 173-174.

The various factors just discussed kept the military busy, giving them less time to contemplate their concerns and problems, as well as less time to foment violent means of redressing their grievances. Also keeping the military occupied the last year of the war were another set of factors. These involved the military engaging in a variety of domestic, social, political, and military activities.

With respect to social and domestic activities, many officers kept themselves amused in a variety of ways. Several had their wives join them at camp, such as Washington and Greene.[57] Others found women for company wherever they could.[58] Steuben spent many hours fishing and playing chess.[59] One young officer, quartered near York, Pennsylvania, during 1782 and 1783, bought a flute with the intention of learning how to play it.[60] Some officers, including Washington, spent time reading and purchasing books.[61] Others, including Gates, Pickering, and David

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[57]Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:486.

[58]Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, October 19, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15).

[59]Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washington's Headquarters, p. 302.

[60]Erkuries Beatty to Reading Beatty, September 12, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB 44, no. 3 (1920): 230.

[61]Bray, Diary of A Common Soldier, p. 269; George Washington to William Stephens Smith, May 21, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:449-450; Same to same, June 20, 1783, ibid., 27:24-25.

Humphreys, wrote poetry and essays.[62] Although Washington did not write poetry, he did correspond on the subject during the summer of 1783.[63] He also spent time corresponding about food, furnishings, and furniture for Mount Vernon. And once New York City was occupied, he shopped for adornments with which to furnish Mount Vernon.[64] He also spent many hours during 1782 and 1783 writing thank you letters to American and foreign officers.[65] Several officers kept amused during 1783 by being tourists. During the fall, Pickering and several other officers took a tour of the northern battlefields. During the summer, Washington, Governor Clinton, and most of Washington's aides took a similar tour, traveling some 750 miles during a three week period.[67] That fall,

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[62]Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 12, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Horatio Gates to Richard Peters, February 20, 1783, Feinstone Collection #366; David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of Colonel Humphreys, pp. 11, 32.

[63]George Washington to Annis Boudinot Stockton, September 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:127-129.

[64]George Washington to Bushrod Washington, September 22, 1783, ibid., 160-161; Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:464-465.

[65]Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26; 27:passim.

[66]Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, September 8, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, October 2, 1783, ibid.

[67]George Washington to James McHenry, August 6, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:82-84.

Washington made plans for a grand tour of America the following spring.[68]

Another thing keeping the officers busy was their political careers, as many contemplated entering or re-entering the political world upon their discharge. Early in 1784, Edmund Randolph wrote Jefferson that "the elections for this year have proved the readiness of the citizens to incorporate the military with the civil."[69] This was indeed true of the elections held during the fall of 1783 and the winter of 1783-1784.[70] Jackson Turner Main, in his studies of political parties before the Constitution, found that over 40 percent of those elected to the Massachusetts Assembly between 1784 and 1788 served in the military during the war, and nearly 60 percent of those elected to the Virginia House for the same period were veterans.[71] He did

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[68]George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, October 12, 1783, ibid., 187.

[69]Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1784, Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, p. 54.

[70]Howard Thomas, Marinus Willett: Soldier-Patriot 1740-1830 (Prospect, New York: Prospect Books, 1954), p. 155; Isaac Q. Leake, Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb, an Officer of the Revolution, who Commanded the Post at West Point at the Time of Arnold's Defection and His Correspondence with Washington, Clinton, Patrick Henry and Other Distinguished Men of His Time (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1857): p. 296.

[71]Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties Before the Constitution, pp. 93, 246; for similar statistics for other states, see ibid., pp. 124, 159, 175, 214, 272.

not distinguish between Continental and militia service, but there is sufficient evidence to indicate many were Continental officers. The afterglow of apotheosis of military service endowed many veterans with political prestige. Samuel Smith reported early in 1782 that whenever an officer runs against a non-veteran, the veteran won. A year later, he reported that Maryland preferred to appoint officers, rather than civilians, to appointive posts in the state government.[72]

During 1783 and 1784, many officers, having just recently left the military, were elected sheriffs and judges. Among them were Colonels David Cobb, Samuel Elbert, George Handley, Ephraim Brown, John Faucherand Grimke, and Marinus Willett.[73] Other officers were elected to their state legislative bodies. Among them were Generals Wayne, Morgan, McDougall, Maxwell, and Colonels Edward Carrington, James Jackson, and John B. Ashe, and Surgeon Ebenezer

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[72]Sam[uel] Smith to Otho H[olland] Williams, February 14, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 60; Same to same, January 9, 1783, ibid., p. 75.

[73]White, Historical Collections of Georgia, pp. 215, 218; Edwin Stone, Our French Allies, p. 153n.; "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-1780)," SCHGM 13, no. 1 (January 1912): 42-43; Ralph Davol, Two Men of Taunton In the Course of Human Events 1731-1829, p. 176; Willett, Marinus Willett, p. 144; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 259.

Elmer.[74] Some officers were elected to the executive branch of the state governments. In Pennsylvania, for example, during 1783, the Council of Censors was composed of Generals St. Clair, Wayne, Irvine, and Major James Moore. In Georgia, during 1784, Major John Habersham became President of the Executive Council.[75] Other officers were elected to less important positions. General John Paterson in 1784 became town moderator of Lenox, Massachusetts, and Colonel Richard Varick, who would be elected to the state legislature during 1784, served during 1783 and 1784 as the Recorder of the City of New York.[76] Other officers were appointed to civilian positions. Major John Armstrong, Jr., and Lieutenant John Rose served as secretary and clerk respectively during 1783 for the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council

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[74] [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution, 1:126; Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 1961), p. 175; BDC, pp. 527, 912, 1371; J. H. Griffith, "William Maxwell of New Jersey, Brigadier General in the Revolution," PNJHS, 2d ser., 13, no. 2 (1894): 121; Garland Evans Hopkins, Colonel Carrington of Cumberland (Winchester, Virginia: privately printed, 1942), p. 33; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major General James Jackson, p. 50.

[75] Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," MH, extra no. 2, no. 7, pt. 2 (1886): 246.

[76] Egleston, John Paterson, p. 146; Baxter, A Godchild of Washington, p. 212.

and the Council of Censors.[77] The former body appointed Colonel Andrew Porter as commissioner to run the boundary lines with Ohio, Virginia and New York.[78] In the latter state, right after the war, Colonel John Lamb was made the Collector of the Port of New York and the Chief Geographer of the Army; Simeon DeWitt was made Surveyor General.[79]

Washington and the other commanding officers attempted to keep the minds of their officers off their problems and prospects by a variety of social and military activities. A public building was built during the winter of 1782-1783 at Newburgh. Besides keeping the soldiers busy building it, Washington had it built so it could be used for both military and social events. It was used for religious services, and such social gatherings as the anniversary of the French alliance.[80] Other celebrations were held at Newburgh, such as on April 19, 1783, when the declaration of the cessation

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[77]Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nicholson, 1757-1800, p.25; Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, 1:604n.

[78]David R. B. Nevin, Continental Sketches of Distinguished Pennsylvanians, pp. 135-136.

[79]Jones, History of New York, 2:342-343; Albert H. Heusser, ed. & Intro. by Hubert G. Schmidt, George Washington's Mapmaker: A Biography of Robert Erskine (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 185-186n.6.

[80]General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo. Washington, pp. 53-59; General Gates's General Orders, January 6, 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special Collections, USMAL; The New-York Packet, January 16, February 13, 1783.

of hostilities was proclaimed, and previously, on May 31, 1782, upon the news of the birth of the dauphin of France.[81] During the summer of 1783 at West Point, soldiers were kept busy erecting a colonnade and creating fireworks for the anticipated celebration of the news of the definite treaty of peace.[82] Celebrations were also held by the southern army. On April 23, 1783, Greene had a fireworks display at James Island for the soldiers and civilians from Charleston.[83] Other social activities were also engaged in by both the southern and northern armies.[84] For example, at the headquarters of the southern army at Ashley Hill, South Carolina, during 1782, the comedy, "Much Ado About Nothing," was performed by a cast composed of officers.[85] During December 1782, some officers held a fox hunt and dinner near their camp at New Windsor with citizens of the nearby

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[81]General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo. Washington, pp. 20-22, 66-69; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., April 23, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:414.

[82]Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, August 27, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:476.

[83]Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:489.

[84][Feltman], Journal of William Feltman, p. 40; [Denny], Military Journal, pp. 50-51; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals, p. 387; Robert Wharry to Reading Beatty, February 6, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr. [ed.], "Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," PMHB, 54, no. 2 (1930): 163; Samuel Story to Reading Beatty, March [6], 1782, ibid., 164.

[85]William Pierce to St. George Tucker, July 10, 1782, "Original Documents," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 442.

communities.[86] Social gatherings at Washington's headquarters were frequent occurrences, with Washington playing host to foreign visitors and to a weekly levee of officers and daily dinners for different officers.[87]

Another social activity were Mason meetings, which were held at Newburgh, West Point, Fort Pitt, and other military sites.[88] Throughout the war, freemasonry brought a stability to the revolutionary army, with its built-in prohibition against political participation.[89] Its primary influence was furthering the concept of an aristocratic and benevolent revolution.[90] Order was the hallmark of masonry. The 1723 Mason constitution stated "a Mason is a peaceable

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[86] The New York Packet and American Advertiser, December 12, 1782.

[87] Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, October 6, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15); Clement Biddle to Henry Knox, October 7, 1783, ibid.; Count Wengieski to Henry Knox, October 17, 1783, ibid.; J. T. Headley, "Last Days of Washington's Army at Newburgh," Harper's New Monthly Magazine 67, no. 401 (October 1883): 652, 654.

[88] Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in the Thirteen Colonies (New York: MaCoy Publishing and Masonic Supply Company, 1929), pp. 202, 215; Sidney Hayden, Washington and His Masonic Compeers, pp. 85-87; Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 172-173n.1; Carl H. Claudy, "Washington's Home and Fraternal Life," Pamphlet no. 14 in Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., [In] Honor to George Washington and Reading about George Washington (Washington, DC: United States George Washington Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 177.

[89] Ibid., p. 168; Bernard Fay, Revolution and Freemasonry 1680-1800, p. 315.

[90] Ibid., passim.

Subject to the Civil Powers, wherever he resides or works, and is never to be concern'd in Plots and Conspiracies against the Peace and Welfare of the Nation."[91]

Masonry was popular in the American Continental Army throughout the war. The first lodge was established in New York during July. In all, ten or eleven lodges were organized during the war. Washington, who had joined the Masons during 1752, encouraged the creation of the military lodges and personally participated in their activities.[92]

During the spring of 1783, several officers, including Knox, Steuben, and Huntington, organized the Society of the Cincinnati, as an institution that would perpetuate friendship among the officers once the war ended, and would provide funds for their future relief. Meetings were frequently held during April, May, and June at the Public Building and at Steuben's headquarters near Fishkill, to draw up a constitution and elect officers. The first officers included Washington, as president; McDougall, as treasurer; and Knox, as secretary. During the summer and

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[91] Ibid., appendix B, p. 320; for other masonic statements on the subordinate role of the individual to the civil magistrates, see ibid., appendix C, p. 321, and appendix D, p. 322.

[92] Ibid., pp. 245, 250; Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in the Thirteen Colonies, pp. 202-222; Sidney Hayden, Washington and His Masonic Compeers, pp. 42-45, 52, 73-74.

fall, most state Lines formed their state chapters of the organization.[93]

Keeping the military occupied during the last year and a half of the war, was the war itself. Victory at Yorktown did not bring an end to hostilities or the threat of such. During 1782 and 1783, the British still occupied wide tracts of land in the west, Savannah, Charleston, New York City, and Fort George, in Maine. The Indians were still of great concern, as warfare continued with them on all the frontiers during 1782 and 1783.[94] The domestic war

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[93]Drafts of the Institution and other related papers dated between April 15 and June 19, 1783, are to be found in the Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Charles Lukens, North Carolina Society of the Cincinnati (Boston: n,p., printed for the North Carolina Society of the Cincinnati, 1907), pp. 5-7, 24-26, 30, 32; Baron von Steuben to Henry Knox, November 11, 1783, Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 19.

[94]Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, pp. 252-253; William Irving to Benjamin Lincoln, April 16, 1783, C. W. Butterfield, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782, p. 280; Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:412-415; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, pp. 236-240; Joseph Doddridge, Notes on the Settlement and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virginia from 1763 to 1783, Inclusive, Together with a Review of the State of Society and Manners of the First Settlers of the Western Country. Republished with the addition of new and valuable material (Pittsburgh: John S. Ritenour and Wm. T. Lindsey, 1912), pp. 188, 207, 217, 232; Bodley, Our First Great West, p. 208; Isaac Craig to William Irvine, April 5, 1783, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 36, no. 4 (1912): 507; Isaac Craig to William Irvine, April 5, 1783, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, p. 283.

continued as well, especially in New Jersey and in New York.[95]

Washington kept actively involved in the preparation of the army for action, keeping them disciplined and planning future strategies should the need arrive.[96] Realizing the army, long-suffering, might take matters into their own hands if not properly controlled, Washington, Greene, and other commanding officers attempted to maintain a high state of discipline during 1782 and 1783. And, for the most part, the army was better organized, clothed, fed, and was better disciplined that at any other time of the war.[97]

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[95]Richard J. Koke, ed., "War, Profit, and Privateers Along the New Jersey Coast: Letters of 1782 Relating to an Obscure War Front of the American Revolution," NYHSQ 41, no. 3 (July 1957): 279-337.

[96]Benjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, February 18, 1783, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3).

[97]Samuel Cogswell to Mason Cogswell, August 29, 1782, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 272-273; Peter Clayes to Lieutenant [ ], January 24, 1783, Feinstone Collection #171; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, October 23, 1782, ibid., #1207; The New York Packet and the American Advertiser, [Fishkill], January 16, 1783; E. W. Balch, trans., "Narrative of the Prince de Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 5 (May 1877): 307; Acomb, Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 239; John Smith Hanna, A History of the Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, p. 159; Brown, Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, p. 236; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, March 14, 1783, Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution, 2:95; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington, November 11, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 166; George Washington to John Jay, October 18, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:275; George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, November 13, 1782, ibid., 336; George Washington to William Heath, February 5, 1783, ibid., 26:97; George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr., January 10, 1783, ibid., 27; Baron von Steuben to George Washington,

To make sure discipline was enforced, despite pleas for furloughs, Washington limited the number of officers he allowed to be away from camp.[98] He decided to stay with the troops, as well, explaining to James McHenry that he would "try like a careful physician to prevent if possible the disorders getting to an incurable height."[99] To keep the troops at Fort Pitt under strict discipline, during the spring of 1783, he sent General Irvine back to that post to take command.[100] To maintain discipline at his own army, Washington provided for a provost and two field officers of the day to superintend the police of the army; and to keep the army confined to camp, he provided for patrols, few passes, and roll calls at irregular hours at night.[101]

Another way Washington kept the army occupied, as well as instilling discipline, was by encouraging church service attendance. During the spring of 1783, he provided there would be no fatigue duty on Sundays, and that the

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January [ ], 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 484-485; Baron von Steuben to George Clinton, April 10, 1782, Spaulding, George Clinton, p. 137.

[98]General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:421-423.

[99]George Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, ibid., 269-270; see also George Washington to Joseph Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 430.

[100]George Washington to William Irvine, April 16, 1783, ibid., 26:322.

[101]General Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 702-703.

army would maintain a sense of decorum and order on the sabbath. Many of the sermons preached during the last year of the war discussed decorum and order, not just on Sundays, but every day of the week, and the necessity for remaining subordinate to civil and military leaders and avoiding any seditious or mutinous behavior.[102]

To keep the military occupied, Washington also authorized officers to engage in minor military adventures, if it appeared they would be successful. Most of these involved sending troops into the neutral area of New York and allowing officers to participate in special projects, such as a contemplated capturing of Prince William Henry, who was serving in New York City with the British navy.[103]

Even after news of peace arrived, Washington still actively involved himself in military affairs, especially making arrangements for the transfer of prisoners, property,

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[102] General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo. Washington, p. 62; Patrick J. Furlong, "A Sermon for the Mutinous Troops of the Connecticut Line, 1782," NEQ, 43, no. 4 (December 1970): 624-631; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 100-106.

[103] Peter Clayes to Lieutenant [ ], January 24, 1783, Feinstone Collection #171; George Washington to Matthias Ogden, March 28, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:91; Thos. F. De Voe, "Prince William Henry in New York," HM, 2d ser., 5, no. 2 (February 1869): 130-132; Lord Stirling to Marquis de Bouille, June 25, 1782, Duer, Stirling, pp. 248-249; Katharine Metcalf Roof, Colonel William Smith and Lady: The Romance of Washington's Aide and Young Abigail Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), pp. 36-37.

and territory. During the summer of 1783, he sent Ephraim Douglass to Detroit and Niagara to get the British to vacate the posts there, and Steuben to Canada to request the British to turn over their western posts to the United States.[104] Neither were very successful. However, Washington was successful in his dealings with Guy Carleton in making arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, keeping fighting to a minimum, and arranging for the evacuation of New York City.[105] Developing a recommendation for the post-war military establishment was another activity that kept Washington busy. Throughout the spring and summer, he, assisted by several officers, including Knox, Heath, and Pickering, formulated a recommendation for Congress to consider.[106]

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[104] Instructions to Baron von Steuben, July 12, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:61-63; Ephraim Douglass to William Irvine, July 6, 1783, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 37, no. 1 (1913): 126; Ephraim Douglass to Benjamin Lincoln, August 18, 1783, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 10:83-90.

[105] "Substance of a conference between George Washington and Sir Guy Carleton," May 6, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:402-406; Richard Varick to Henry Glen, May 18, 1783, "Original Documents," MAH 14, no. 5 (November 1885): 513-515; Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 5:441.

[106] Henry Knox to George Washington, April 17, 1783, (draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Lewis Nicola to Henry Knox, October 26, 1782, ibid. (Microfilm Reel #10); "Thoughts on the Military Establishment Proper for the United States at the Conclusion of the War in 1783," draft by Timothy Pickering, April 22, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 16, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of

With the army relatively busy and peaceful, occupied with thoughts of their post-war lives and careers, most civilian and military leaders believed that disbanding the army would be done without incident. This did not happen. Although most officers and soldiers believed they would eventually be compensated after leaving military service, a few did not. They believed the best time to obtain what was owed them was while in uniform, united and armed. They were fearful that once they were disbanded the civilian governments would renege on their promises of pay and other benefits. Acting on these beliefs during the summer, some soldiers decided to demand by force of arms that the civil governments immediately give them what they were owed.

During mid May, about one hundred troopers of Virginia's first regiment of cavalry marched off from their South Carolina camp to Richmond to lay their grievances before the legislature. Greene sent an officer after them to coax them back with a promise of a full pardon and wrote the chief executive of Virginia, warning him of the troops and urging that he punish them if they threatened the

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Washington, 26:323; Washington Sentiments on the Peace Establishment in Letter to Alexander Hamilton, May 2, 1783, ibid., 376; Observation on an Intended Report of a Committee of Congress on a Peace Establishment, September 8, 1783, ibid., 27:140-144; William Heath to George Washington, April 17, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:386; Buell, Rufus Putnam, pp. 205-209.

civilian government. Governor Harrison, after consulting with the legislature, had General Morgan and Colonel Baylor visit the mutineers in hopes they could bring them under some form of discipline. Additionally, he had foodstuffs sent to them, believing this would keep them from plundering. Although these measures quelled the mutinous spirit of the soldiers, it was not until the legislature late in June provided three months pay be given to them, as well as all other Virginia Line soldiers returning from the southward, that they were satisfied, and peacefully furloughed.[107] Also during May, another unit in Greene's command exhibited mutinous behavior, but did not march from camp. A more serious incident happened the first days of June, when many Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia troops threatened to resolve their grievances by force. Greene had the ringleaders taken into custody and quelled the mutinous soldiers by drawing up the army into battle formation and threatening

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[107] Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:486; Same to same, May 27, 1783, ibid., 493; Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates at Congress, May 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:96-97, 99n.12; Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia. General Assembly Begun and Holden at the Public Buildings in the City of Richmond, on Monday the Fifth of May, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighth-Three (n.p.: n.d.), pp. 41-42, 161, 177.

them.[108] Late in November, an officer of the Maryland Line warned Governor Paca that a body of soldiers planned to surround the legislature and seize the state treasury in hopes their grievances would be resolved. Paca reacted to this news by ordering a company of militia to stand by to put down any insurrection. None happened.[109]

This was not the case with the Pennsylvania troops. On June 13, 1783, some Pennsylvania troops at Lancaster, most of whom had been enlisted during late 1782, upset by the news of being furloughed and not receiving the pay that was due them, sent a memorial to the Secretary at War stating they they would not disband until their grievances, particularly pay, were met. When it appeared to these soldiers they would be marched further away from Philadelphia, approximately eighty of them marched on Philadelphia to lobby the civilian authorities. There they were joined by several hundred other soldiers then in town. Together they sent a memorial to Congress threatening to take action if that body did not act to meet their grievances. To demonstrate the seriousness of their demands, they surrounded the

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[108] Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Egleston, May 17, 1783, ibid., Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, June 3, 1783, ibid., vol. 78.

[109] William Paca to the General Assembly, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:483; William Paca to James Brice, November 25, 1783, ibid., 483-484; Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:502, 502n.1.

State House, where Congress sat, with their bayonets fixed. Since the Pennsylvania government was too weak to stop these soldiers, Congress vacated Philadelphia and relocated in Princeton, New Jersey. Before leaving, on the twenty-first of June, they ordered Washington to send troops to put down the mutiny.

When Washington received news of the mutiny, he immediately ordered General Howe with fifteen hundred soldiers and a detachment of artillery to Philadelphia to put down the mutiny. This force reached Philadelphia the first week of July, to find the mutiny had failed, its leaders having left the city, and probably the country. The mutiny had collapsed once the mutineers realized the civilian authorities would not consider their grievances until they disbanded and that the Pennsylvania militia, supported by Continentals, would be used against them. Although the mutiny had been quelled, Congress called on Howe to bring to trial all the mutineers and to examine all the circumstances related to it. In doing so, he was directed to consult with the Pennsylvania Council on all matters touching on civil authority. Howe and his force remained in the Philadelphia area for several weeks, ensuring that there would be no further outbreaks and rounding up and court-martialing the

mutineers.[110]

Not only did the military not turn on the civilian authorities at the end of the war, with the exception just mentioned, they, as they had the whole war, upheld the civilian governments and contributed greatly to the peaceful transition from war to peace. This prevented military tyranny and anarchy, two things they shared the same fear of as their civilian brethren. And, like many of their civilian brethren, the military wanted stronger governments, which would prevent military tyranny and anarchy. As Ebenezer Huntington wrote during the summer of 1783, "God grant us Government, as States, free & independent, or give us a king, even tyranny is better than Anarchy-[.]"[111]

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[110]For a comprehensive study of the mutiny, see Kenneth R. Bowling, "New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the War for Independence," PMHB 101, no. 4 (October 1977): 419-450; see also George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:32-33; Instructions to Robert Howe, June 25, 1783, ibid., 35-36; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, July 2, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:588-589; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:141; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, July 8, 1783, ibid., 216; Elias Boudinot to George Washington, June 26, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:200; Same to same, June 21, 1783, ibid., 194; Same to same, July 1, 1783, ibid., 208; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, June 16, 1783, ibid., 189n.4; Ford, JCC, 24:410, 411-413; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 2, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:432; Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 10, 1783, ibid., 433.

[111]Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington, August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington, p. 106.

Many in the military shared the nationalists' belief that only a strong central government would prevent those conditions which made for military tyranny and anarchy, both of which seemed possible if America continued to be governed by the weak Articles of Confederation.[112] One officer at West Point during December 1782, wrote that unless power was "vested in some supreme head, sufficient to enforce a compliance with such regulations as are evidently calculated for the general good, adieu to all government-[.]" He believed that "Thirteen wheels require a steady and powerful regulator to keep them in good order, and prevent the machine from becoming useless."[113] Early in 1783, Knox wrote Gouverneur Morris that something must be done about improving the government before a peace takes place or they would be in a worse situation than they were in at the beginning of the war. "As the present Constitution is so defective," he wrote, "why do not you great men call the people together and tell them so; that is, to have a convention of the States to form a better Constitution." Greene wrote Congress that "some alteration . . . must take place or ruin must follow." Lafayette told Washington he could spend his time in no better fashion than inducing the people

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[112]Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 8, 1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection), 1:27, WLCL.

[113]Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw. p. 100

of America to strengthen their union, by revising the Articles of Confederation. "It is," he wrote, referring to a stronger union, "the finishing stroke that is wanting to the perfection to the Temple of Liberty." Agreeing, Washington was quite active the last year of the war in urging a stronger central government. Competent powers must be given Congress, he wrote, "or Anarchy and Confusion will soon succeed." In the same vein, he wrote James Duane during the summer of 1783, suggesting a government be established in the west so as to maintain order among the frontiersmen.[114]

Although the military were unable to have a stronger central government created before the war was over, they were able to ensure the weak state governments were strengthened by active military participation, much as they had throughout the war. And they were able to prevent anarchy.

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[114]Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21, 1783, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 77; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, March 11, 1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, February 5, 1783, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 261; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:12; George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, ibid., 133-140; see also George Washington to William Gordon, July 8, 1783, ibid., 49-52; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 1783, ibid., 26:277; Same to same, March 15, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:310.

In the South, Wayne was responsible for ensuring the orderly transfer of authority in Savannah from the British to the Georgia officials on July 11, 1782. He did this by making sure the property and people of Savannah were not depredated and insulted by his soldiers, and by maintaining good order in Savannah and its vicinity until the civil government was re-established.[115] The South Carolina officials, wanting the evacuation of Charleston and the re-establishment of government in their state to go as smoothly, requested Washington to have the southern army remain in their state until such time as Charleston was re-occupied and government re-established. Washington referred this request to Congress who ordered it be done.[116] Because of the concern of the inhabitants of Charleston that when the city was evacuated there would be anarchy, Greene was adamant about keeping both the military and civilian populace under control until the civilian

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[115]General Wayne's General Orders, July 11, 1782, Stevens, A History of Georgia, 2:288.

[116]John Rutledge, Ralph Izard, David Ramsay, Arthur Middleton, and John Lewis Gervais to George Washington, August 17, 1782, Burnett, LMCC, 6:446; The South Carolina Delegates at Congress to John Mathews, September 10, 1782, ibid., 469; John Mathews to the South Carolina Delegates at Congress, August 17, 1782, Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the Confederation, p. 110; George Washington to the Secretary at War, September 2, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:105-106, 107; George Washington to the South Carolina Delegates at Congress, September 2, 1782, ibid., 109-110; Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 410.

government was re-established.[117] Charleston was evacuated on December 14, 1782, and was quickly occupied and secured by a force commanded by Wayne. Once the government was re-established, Greene maintained his army of fourteen hundred at James Island, near Charleston, where they were available to assist the civilian authorities, if necessary. While the army remained in Charleston's vicinity, the town remained relatively peaceful, but once the army began disbanding during the spring and summer of 1783, bitter hatreds, generally involving Tories, erupted into riots and violence. Fortunately, a small military force led by Colonel William Washington and Major Thomas Pinckney were able to keep the mob actions to a minimum.[118]

The military were also successful in keeping peace in the west and in New York. During the summer of 1783, General Irvine and Colonel Hull ensured their soldiers were correct in their dealings with the civilians in the Fort Pitt area and Westchester County, respectively. Hull,

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[117]Thaddeus Kosciuszko to Nathanael Greene, November 14, 1782, Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution, p. 137; Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, November 15, 1782, "Madison-Gadsden Correspondence," SCHGM 41, no. 2 (April 1940): 55.

[118]Richard Walsh, Charleston's Sons of Liberty: A Study of the Artisans 1763-1789 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 117-121; Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Founding Father, p. 75; The South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, June 10, July 12, 15, 19, 22, 29, 30, 1783; Gazette of the State of South Carolina, July 23, 1783.

assisting New York's chief justice, administered justice, and protected the inhabitants of the county from Tories until the civil government was re-established. To provide for the orderly transition of New York City from British to American control, Washington had nine hundred soldiers under General Henry Jackson occupy the city upon the British withdrawal on the twenty-fifth of November. This force remained in the city for a month, giving security to its inhabitants until elections were held and the civilian leaders assumed their offices.[119]

With the peaceful re-establishment of the governments and the expected news of the definitive peace, all that remained for Congress to do with respect to the army was to disband it, except for the peacetime establishment. On the nineteenth of June, Congress endorsed Washington's decision to make the furloughs voluntary for his army, and two months later directed the Secretary at War to furlough those troops

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[119]George Washington to Commanding Officer of the troops in Westchester County, May 21, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:447; George Washington to Ralph Izard, June 14, 1783, ibid., 27:10; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 345; Council of the State of New York to Henry Knox, December 18, 1783, ibid., pp. 554-555; Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, November 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:485-486; Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York, 4:268-270; Theodore Oscar Barck, Jr., New York City During the War for Independence. With Special Reference to the Period of British Occupation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), pp. 220-221; Inhabitants of Pittsburgh to William Irvine, September 13, 1783, C. W. Butterfield, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782, p. 303.

in Maryland and Virginia.[120] By August, Washington wanted to discharge the army, believing it was cheaper and safer than furloughing.[121] Agreeing with Washington, Congress on the twenty-fourth of September authorized him to discharge such part of the army as he deemed proper and expedient, and two days later authorized the furloughing of those general, medical, staff, and engineer officers no longer needed.[122] These decisions prompted the North Carolina delegates at Congress to write their state's chief executive that had they kept the army in the field a few weeks longer, they might have been faced with the army demanding at the point of a bayonet what was owed them.[123]

On the last day of July, Congress requested Washington personally give them his advice on the peacetime military establishment and discuss the disbanding of the remainder of the army. About three weeks later, Washington turned over command of the army to Knox and departed for Rocky Hill, New Jersey, where Congress had assembled after

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[120]Ford, JCC, 24:403, 496; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 7, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:478.

[121]George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:14; George Washington to Samuel Huntington, September 25, 1783, ibid., 167-169; Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the Revolution, p. 210.

[122]Ibid., p. 211; Ford, JCC, 25:606.

[123]Benjamin Hawkins and Hugh Williamson to Alexander Martin, September 26, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:310.

leaving Philadelphia as a result of the June mutiny. While there, Congress, learning that Carleton planned to evacuate New York City, on the eighteenth of October issued a proclamation announcing the definitive peace and provided for discharging the officers who had been furloughed. This discharging would take effect on the third of November in the north and, on the twenty-ninth of October, Congress provided that on the fifteenth of November all the troops in Pennsylvania, except for a small detachment at Fort Pitt, and the southern command would be discharged. Congress expected the only military that would still be serving by the end of November would be small detachments at Fort Pitt and West Point, and the force that would assist in the re-occupation of New York City.[124]

At Rocky Hill, on the second of November, Washington issued his farewell orders to the army. In them, he urged the army to go back to civilian life with conciliatory dispositions and to maintain a disciplined steadiness of conduct, and to be virtuous and useful citizens.[125] The army responded by an address to Washington on the fifteenth, thanking him for his efforts on their behalf and promising

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[124]Elias Boudinot to Robert Morris, October 23, 1783, ibid., 348; Ford, JCC, 24:452; 25:702-703, 753; George Washington to Henry Knox, October 23, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:206.

[125]Ibid., 222-227.

not to turn on the civilian authorities.[126]

Washington returned to West Point during the latter part of November and led what remained of his army into New York City. After seeing the town was peacefully occupied, and the civilian government re-established, Washington bid adieu to the army, leaving what remained of it under the command of Knox.[127] Leaving New York the first week of December, Washington traveled to Annapolis, where Congress was sitting to resign his commission, now that the war was won and the army peacefully disbanded.

Arriving in Annapolis on the nineteenth of December, Washington the following day asked Congress to resign. Congress agreed that he tender his commission to them on the twenty-third in a formal ceremony. At noon on the appointed day, Washington entered the senate chamber of the State House where Congress was sitting, and in a very dignified manner tendered his resignation in a short address. "Having now finished the work assigned me," Washington stated, "I retire from the great theatre of Action; bidding an Affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life." The

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[126] Signed by Alexander McDougall, Henry Knox, and Timothy Pickering, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:488-491.

[127] George Washington to Henry Knox, December 4, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:259.

ceremony was a solemn spectacle, with almost not a dry eye among those present. Even the usually unflappable Washington was moved by the event, his hands shaking as he read his address and once almost losing his composure. President Mifflin, on behalf of Congress, thanked Washington for everything he had done, observing that he had "conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through all disasters and changes." With this said, Washington retired from the chambers and the next day left Annapolis, in hopes of spending Christmas day at Mount Vernon.[128]

With Washington retired and most of the army disbanded, Congress now had to make arrangements for its peacetime military establishment. The question of the necessity of such a force was discussed and debated frequently during 1783, both in and out of Congress.[129] At

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[128]Washington's Address to Congress Resigning his Commission, [December 23, 1783], ibid., 284-285; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1783, ibid., 277-278; James Tilton to Gunning Bedford, December 25, 1783, ibid., 285-286n.68; Ford, JCC, 25:810, 818-819, 838-839; James McHenry to Margaret Caldwell, December [23], 1783, Steiner, James McHenry, pp. 69-70; Elihu S. Riley, "The Ancient City." A History of Annapolis, in Maryland. 1649-1887, pp. 201-203, 206, 221, Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:498-499.

[129]George Clinton to George Washington, April 17, 1783, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 4:29; George Washington to Henry Knox, October 23, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:203; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, September 20, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:354; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, October 3, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:466.

Yale, in March, seniors were required to give an extempore disputation on "Whether a standing army would be dangerous in America?" Thomas Welsh, in his Boston Massacre oration, certainly believed it was dangerous to rely on a standing army. Using all the cliches regarding standing armies, Welsh explained that reliance upon standing armies could result in a military tyranny.[130] Many Americans agreed, believing it was safer and cheaper to rely on the militia, the natural safeguard of a free people.[131] Some even questioned the legality of a peacetime standing army under the Articles of Confederation.[132] Despite opposition, many desired a strong standing army to protect the frontiers and to deter any foreign power from making war upon the weak American states.[133] Such difference of opinion prompted

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[130]Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, 3:63; Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 56-57.

[131]Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5, 1784, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 2:223; C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775, p. 44.

[132]William Ellery and David Howell to William Greene, September 8, 1783, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, pp. 444, 445.

[133]Samuel Shaw to Henry Knox, October 11, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15); Washington's "Sentiments on the Peace Establishment," Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:375-376; Lawrence Delbert Cress, "Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military Policy as an Ideology Problem, 1783 to 1789," WMQ, 3rd ser., 28, no. 1 (January 1981): 85-88.

Edmund Pendleton to observe "The question touching Garrisons in time of peace, is in its nature delicate as well as difficult and therefore I don't wonder there should be diversity of opinions about it." Standing armies, he wrote Madison, "seem useful & indeed necessary & yet have their certain evils, among which not the least considerable is that they lead to a standing Army, that bane of Society; nor is it less difficult to decide the question, if they are admitted, whether they ought to be Continental, or supported by & under the Government of the respective States where they are kept."[134]

Congress took up the question of the peacetime military establishment during the spring of 1783. During that time, they had the military give their opinion on the subject and appointed a committee to make recommendations.[135] The issue was hardly discussed during the summer as Congress was involved in other issues and was frequently on the move. By the fall, however, it was a major issue of debate, as the army still numbered over one thousand officers and soldiers;

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[134]Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, October 6, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:372.

[135]Committee's report in Ford, JCC, 25:722-744; see also Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 9, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:322; James McHenry to George Washington, July 31, 1783, Varnum Lansing Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1908), p. 95; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 7:159.

a figure that seemed too high to many members of Congress. The Virginia delegates reported to their state's chief executive on the first of November that Congress would only probably make a temporary provision for the peacetime military establishment, as "permanent measures on so important & delicate a subject, will no doubt be postpon'd untill our Constituents have time to deliberate & to express their sense on such plans as may be submitted to their considerations."[136]

After the British evacuation of New York City, Congress, having not made a definitive decision on the peacetime army, allowed Washington to make a temporary arrangement. Washington, late in November, began disbanding his army, and on the third of December discharged all the soldiers in New York except for five hundred; those with the longest time of service remaining. As 1784 began, the Continental forces numbered less than seven hundred. This figure declined during the winter as those that closed out their accounts were discharged. Thus, by the spring, the Continental Army was virtually non-existent.[137]

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[136]The Virginia Delegates in Congress to Benjamin Harrison, November 1, 1783, ibid., 393.

[137]Washington's Proclamation, November 20, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:247; George Washington to Henry Knox, December 3, 1783, ibid., 256; A Return of the Troops to be Continued in Service after the First of January 1784 under the command of B. Genl. H. Jackson as Colonel, December 10, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm

Congress finally provided for the peacetime establishment on June 2, 1784, when they voted for a standing army of eighty, doing so on the premise that "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." The following day, however, in a realistic vein, Congress called on four states to furnish seven hundred soldiers for one year frontier service.[138]

With the army disbanded the American revolutionaries had come full circle. Fear of standing armies, and the desire for civil control of them, were important factors in bringing about their revolutionary war. They were even more important factors during the war itself, influencing greatly the civil-military relationship. Now with the war concluded, these same concerns played an important role in shaping the post-war army, the constitution, and the army established

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Reel #16); Henry Knox to George Washington, January 3, 1784, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 86; William Lee, "Record of the Services of Constant Freeman: Captain of Artillery in the Continental Army," MAH 2, no. 6 (June 1878): 355.

[138]Ford, JCC, 27:518-519, 530-531.

under it.[139] And they remained important considerations in the American mind throughout the nineteenth century, influencing military policy until the first world war.

Throughout this dissertation the factors that prevented the Revolutionary War from collapsing from anarchy or being subverted by military tyranny have been discussed. What follows in the concluding pages is an analysis of those factors in the context of several current studies of civil-military relations and revolutionary armies.

In order for military forces to subvert the civilian authority in any society, the opportunity has to exist, and the military has to have the ability, motive, and desire to take advantage of the opportunity. To some degree, the opportunity was always present during the American Revolution in that Congress and the state governments were weak and ineffective most of the war, and in several instances barely functioning. Thus, they relied heavily on the army for their existence. According to Samuel Finer, the opportunity for military intervention in civil affairs increases

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[139] John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800, University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences no. 6 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 5; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802, pp. 40-303; Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 78-177.

with the increased dependence upon the military and with the increased popularity of the military. Studies by Morris Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington make similar observations regarding the status and prestige accorded the military.[140] As was discussed in this dissertation, the civilian governments relied heavily on the military, but the army was not very popular with the American people except for brief periods during the war. For the most part, they were viewed as a necessary evil, and often in a worse light, as they infrequently violated the lives, liberties, and properties of those they were supposed to protect. This, in addition to the belief in civil supremacy, resulted in the limiting of the power and authority given the military. And, although the military was heavily relied upon, it was done so in a limited and controlled manner. Thus, the opportunity for military intervention in civilian affairs was greatly limited during most of the war.

Also limiting the opportunity for military involvement in and interference with civil affairs was the overwhelming public attachment to civilian institutions. By no means was revolutionary America a militaristic society,

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[140] Finer, Man on Horseback, pp. 72-80; Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 34; Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 88-89.

dominated by military institutions and values.[141] America was very much a civilian society, with no history of a professional standing army, other than that forced upon them by the British. Finer makes the point that where public attachment to civilian institutions are weak or non-existent, military intervention in the political life of the country will find wide scope, both in manner and in substance.[142] As has been discussed in the early chapters of this dissertation, revolutionary Americans put great faith in their civilian institutions, and the concept of civil supremacy, for they realized to do otherwise was to provide an opportunity for anarchy or military tyranny, the two things they feared most and wished to avoid, probably even at the expense of renouncing their declaration of independence.

M. D. Feld states a general rule of civil-military realtions is that the need a society assumes it has for an armed force is inversely related to the degree of control it can exercise over its operations, i.e., the greater the

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[141] For brief discussion of what constitutes a militaristic society, see Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilians and Military, rev. ed. (New York: Meredian Books, 1959), pp. 11-12.

[142] Finer, Man on Horseback, p. 21.

dependence the lesser the controls.[143] The American Revolution presents an exception to this rule, as the civilians were able to exercise a great amount of control over the military, despite their great dependence upon them. The revolutionary leaders knew, as studies by Bengt Abrahamsson have shown, that the extent to which the civilian authorities wish to avoid military interference in politics they themselves would have to interfere in strategy.[144] As we have seen, the American civilian governments not only involved themselves in strategical decisions, but all facets of military activity. And, as important, the military leaders allowed themselves to be controlled and directed by the civilians with a minimum of objection.

"The one prime essential for any system of civilian control," according to Samuel P. Huntington, "is the minimizing of military power."[145] One major way this was accomplished by the American civilians was by relying on the militia and limiting the size of the Continental Army. Another way the military power was minimized was by the

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[143] M. D. Feld, "Professionalism and Politicization: Notes on the Military and Civilian Control," M. R. Van Gils, ed., The Perceived Role of the Military, Contributions to Military Sociology no. 1 (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 275.

[144] Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, p. 126.

[145] Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 84.

civilian leaders ensuring whenever possible that the officers were selected, and later promoted, based on their political, economic, and social backgrounds. The civilian leaders realized, as Kurt Lang's study shows, that one of the most effective controls over an army of revolutionary origin requires that it be penetrated by men ideologically committed to the new regime at every level.[146] Stanislav Andreski states the military is likely to be a decisive factor in politics in a society where there are no crystallized and universally accepted beliefs about the legitimacy of power.[147] As has been discussed in the earlier chapters of this dissertation, the officers accepted the legitimacy of the civilian governments, and for the most part, complied with the principles of civil supremacy. And, as has been shown, the civilian leaders ensured that their control, and civil supremacy, was complied with, thereby lessening the opportunity for military intervention in or interference with the civilian governments.

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[146] Lang, Military Institutions, p. 111; see also C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views, Contributions in Military History no. 5 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 21; Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 364; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 262.

[147] Andreski, Military Organization, pp. 105-106.

Another factor limiting the opportunity for military intervention during the revolution was the minimal amount of social unrest and anarchy that took place. According to Kurt Lang, the relative absence of popular unrest will keep the military politically neutral.[148] This certainly was the case with respect to the American Revolution, particularly as the military was used to ensure that social unrest and anarchy was kept to a minimum.

Although there was little social unrest and anarchy, there were many sectional and local differences in American society. According to Edward Luttwak, societal differences are an obstacle to military interference in the political process, particularly in the form of a coup d'etat involving the central government.[149] Even if the army had seized the central authority from Congress, it would have been impossible to have all the states give their allegiance to them, for they barely even gave it to Congress, let alone each other. America at this time was by no means a nation. Yet, according to one scholar, this lack of nation state development is a major factor in allowing military intervention in civil affairs, as the military fills the political vacuum

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[148] Lang, Military Institutions, p. 110.

[149] Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook (London: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 42; see also John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 46.

and becomes the central authority and power.[150] John Ellis, writing about the American Revolution, observes "the essential military features of the War of Independence derive from the fact that . . . feelings of nationalism were most significant by their absence."[151] Indeed, nationalistic feelings were, for the most part, absent during the American Revolution. The army was not fighting to create a national government, thus they did not feel the need to intervene in the political process to create or foster a national government, or to establish themselves as the central authority.

The American army was basically a conservative instrument, as has been discussed throughout this dissertation. But in any revolution there is social and political unrest, and there was some in the army during the war. Not only did the civilian leaders expend their energies to keep this unrest in check, but so did the military leaders, preventing the opportunity for any form of anarchy or military tyranny.

The officers kept the army in check by their professionalism and by their discipline. Although neither the

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[150] R. D. McKinlay, "Professionalization, Politicization and Civil-Military Relations." M. R. Van Gils, ed., The Perceived Role of the Military, p. 262.

[151] John Ellis, Armies in Revolution, p. 46.

military nor the civilians came to see the army as a distinct professional body, especially since the members of the army came and went with regularity, the American army did become a professional body, especially its officer corps. And professional bodies, as studies have shown, tend to be more conservative than liberal in their political behavior.[152]

Studies by Huntington, Abrahammson, and Katherine Chorley indicate the longer the service, the less likely the officer corps would be amenable to influence from the political left.[153] This is especially true of those officers, having risen in status, are not eager to undermine a system that provided the opportunity for them to rise in status. In the American Revolution, many officers came from middle and lower classes and they had risen in prestige by their military service, if only in their own eyes.[154] They

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[152]Huntington, Soldier and State, passim; Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, pp. 101, 101n.5.

[153]Ibid., pp. 108, 111; Bengt Abrahamsson, "Elements of Military Conservatism: Tradition and Modern," Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds. On Military Ideology, Contributions to Studies on Military Sociology no. 3 (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 68; Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p. 127.

[154]For discussion of the officer's prestige and status, see Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and the American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979), pp. 343-353, passim. Royster also devotes considerable space to a discussion of the professionalization of the Continental Army, see especially pp. 195-254, 319-320, 331-333.

certainly did not want to lose the reputation and status they had gained by subverting the system that had given them their reputation and status. The military leadership, composed primarily of the relatively well-to-do, did not want to undermine their own social status by undermining the political and social status quo. As one scholar has observed, the Continental Army was "the bastion of conservatism and privilege."[155] And as has been shown the officers ensured the army was well-disciplined, not only to be militarily successful, but also to keep the army from contributing to any form of anarchy or military tyranny. John Ellis observes that discipline was used during the American Revolution "as a counter-revolutionary tool to suppress any radical tendencies among the rank-and-file."[156]

Besides no real opportunity for the military to intervene in or interfere with the civilian governments, the military also lacked the ability. For the military leaders to have imposed their will upon the civilian governments, they would have had to have the support of their own soldiers, been able to defeat the British and the militia, as well as to neutralize the French forces on the continent. With respect to the latter, Luttwak observes that a military

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[155] John Ellis, Armies in Revolution, p. 72.

[156] Ibid., p. 71.

coup d'etat is not worth attempting if a great power has significant military forces in the country.[157] The French looked to Congress as their best guarantee that the war would be conducted and concluded to their best interest and that their loans would be repaid. Had the American army turned on Congress, the French army might have not only fought the Continentals, but used America's internal dispute to seize part, if not all, the American states.

Defeating and neutralizing all these military forces was unlikely primarily because the Continental Army lacked the necessary human and economic resources; resources according to Huntington the army must have to be able to influence the political life of a country.[158] As for economic resources, the army certainly lacked them. And had they attempted to obtain them by force, the revolution would have collapsed, as the Continental Army would have replaced Great Britain as America's primary enemy. As for human resources, the military was never that large or concentrated, except during the first and last years of the war. Additionally, the army did not have that much control over the militia. Abrahamsson states the closer and more intimate the connections of the army with the other military forces, the

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[157]Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook, p. 41.

[158]Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 88-89.

greater the military's resources for the exertion of power.[159] Although America's military forces were closely intertwined, at least from an individual standpoint, had the army threatened the state governments, the militia would have fought them.

As for a pretorian military intervention, such a force, under Washington or some other officer, would have had to have been not only completely loyal to their commander, but of sufficient size to seize power. And, as pointed out by Andreski, such a force would not have to be imbued with any particular ideology.[160] Additionally, they would have had to count on the other military forces remaining neutral, if they did not join them. This is the most important prerequisite for a successful military coup d'etat according to D. J. Goodspeed.[161] All of these conditions were not likely during the American Revolution. With some exceptions, most of the army shared the republican ideology which did not lend itself to military coups. Had a military force threatened the governments, not only would have the state forces opposed them, but so would have the remaining Continentals. With respect to a sufficient force loyal to a

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[159] Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, p. 141.

[160] Andreski, Military Organization, p. 105.

[161] D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 211.

military commander, few officers commanded such a force. Washington's personal guard rarely numbered over a hundred soldiers and the independent corps commanders rarely had a force of more than two hundred soldiers, often foreigners, subject to their orders.[162] And these soldiers were more often than not more loyal to the republican revolutionary ideology than they were to their commanding officer, especially the native born soldiers.

But even if the military had the ability, and even if the opportunity existed, rarely did the American army have the motive or desire to intervene in or interfere with civilian affairs, especially overthrowing the state governments or Congress.[163]

For the most part, the military had little motive because they shared the same goals and the means of achieving them as the civilians, and because the goals were not betrayed by the civilian governments. Unlike many revolutions, the American one was not begun to obtain social or unrealistic goals, such as "Peace, Bread, and Land," or "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." Therefore, the American Revolution never experienced the "revolution betrayed" phase

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[162] Carlos E. Godfrey, The Commander-In-Chief's Guard: Revolutionary War (Washington, DC: Sevenson-Smith Company, 1904), pp. 14-103.

[163] For a brief discussion of motives and desires of the military intervening in civil affairs, see Finer, Man on Horseback, pp. 23-24.

other revolutions would, where the military interjects themselves into the political process to ensure the initial revolutionary goals were obtained.

Another important reason why the American military did not attempt to undermine the civilian governments was their belief that to do so would bring about the collapse of their revolution and result in anarchy and military tyranny. For the most part, the military were content to let the civilians direct the course of their revolutionary struggle. In part this was due to the reasons just mentioned, and in part, because of their faith in the civilian leaders and General Washington.

The American army, for the most part, was composed of civilians in uniform; not professional soldiers, who had few or no ties to the civilian life of the country. The officers were particularly tied to the civilian society and many soldiers, by war's end, were, as they were given a stake in society in the form of land. Huntington maintains the "principle focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state."[164] As has been shown in this dissertation, the American officers, in many instances, were closely tied to the civilian leadership at all levels. Not only were they closely integrated with the civilian leadership because of personal connections, but

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[164]Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 3.

also because they themselves often held civilian positions of leadership before, during, and after their military service. This close association tended to support and reinforce conservative political values, keeping with the findings of Abrahamsson and Lang, who observe that the military will remain politically neutral if there is a close integration of the officer corps with the governing stratum.[165] Abrahamsson also points out the military will have no desire to undermine the political system if they have direct access to the civilian leadership.[166] The American military did have access, by their personal contacts, by their lobbying efforts to generally receptive civilian bodies, and by their ability to take positions in government. This access, particularly the ability to leave military service for a position in the government, according to Chalmers Johnson, is a very important factor in giving greater strength to the concept of civil supremacy and military subordination.[167]

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[165] Lang, Military Institutions, p. 110; Bengt Abrahamsson, "Elements of Military Conservatism: Tradition and Modern," Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., On Military Ideology, pp. 71-72; Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, pp. 106, 111.

[166] Ibid., p. 141.

[167] Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 101-102.

Thus, being able to bring their needs and desires directly to the civilian leaders, the military found it unnecessary to bring undue pressure on the governments, nor the need to supplant or replace them, things that would happen in other revolutions, particularly those involving less mature political cultures.[168]

The other major factor in keeping the military from desiring to interfere with or intervene in civil affairs was Washington's lack of desire. Washington's role in keeping the army within bounds should not be underplayed by anyone studying the American Revolution. Washington, for many civilians and most of the army, was the revolution itself. Many would have followed him in whatever direction he took them, even down the path of military tyranny. But fortunately for the revolutionary Americans, Washington shared the same goals as the civilian leaders, and more importantly, the same means to obtain them. As two historians have recently written, "Above all else, Washington did not want to see the republican cause undermined by a military dictatorship, and that turned out to be one of his greatest contributions to the Revolution and its legacy."[169]

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[168] Finer, Man on Horseback, p. 139.

[169] James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, p. 42.

Because the military leaders were so closely tied to the civilian governments and because the military shared the same goals as the civilians, as well as the means to obtain them, the army exhibited little desire to intervene in or interfere with the civilian governments. And when they did, it was relatively insignificant and was usually condemned by both the civilian and military leaders.

There was no one factor which kept the military from subverting the civilian governments during the American Revolution, but a number. These factors, when viewed in the context of the revolutionary Americans' fear of anarchy and military tyranny go a long way in explaining why the American Revolution was successful; successful in that the same men who began the revolution and who conducted the course of the Revolutionary War, were able to conclude the war without their revolution being undermined by the military as had happened and would happen in other revolutionary struggles.

Perhaps the most important factors in explaining the success of the American Revolution was the insistence by the revolutionary leaders that their military forces subordinate themselves to civilian control, and the willingness of those forces to be guided by the principle of civil supremacy. That the Continental Army remained subordinate is perhaps one of the greatest legacies of the American war

for independence. Since that time, civil supremacy has been the guiding principle for American civil-military relations. It is something we now take for granted. Because America has never been dominated by militarism, nor has the martial spirit long prevailed, most Americans are willing to assume their military forces will ever remain subordinate to civilian control.

Few Americans are sufficiently aware that civil supremacy is only a concept, one requiring constant attention if we are to avoid military power subverting or supplanting civilian authority. The American revolutionaries certainly realized that. They believed that in delicately balancing liberty and security, civilian control would have to be maintained if both liberty and security were to be achieved.

Before the point is reached where militarism has undermined civilian control, under the guise of "national security," Americans will have to have not only lost sight of their republican and revolutionary heritages, but also have become complacent about the role of the military in their society. The likelihood of this happening will always be minimized if Patrick Henry's warning that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" is remembered. It certainly was by the revolutionary generation.

BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

In writing this dissertation I have relied on hundreds of primary and secondary sources. As most of the secondary sources are cited only once, with full publication data provided in the footnotes, and because the frequently cited printed primary sources are included in the Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited, with full publication data, I have not provided a standard bibliography. More useful for anyone studying the civil-military relationship during the American war for independence is an analytical bibliographical essay.

For those who want a standard bibliography, John Shy's volume on the American Revolution in the Goldentree Bibliographies in American History and the bibliography published by the United States Army's Center for Military History are excellent.[1] Don Higginbotham's bibliographical essay in his The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971) is a valuable supplement, as is

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[1]John Shy, comp. The American Revolution (Northbrook, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1973); Robert W. Coakley and Stetson Conn, The War of the American Revolution: Narrative, Chronology, and Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1975).

the note on sources in James Kirby Martin's and Mark Edward Lender's A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1982). Also useful are the essay on sources in Richard H. Kohn's Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America 1782-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975), and the standard bibliography in Lawrence Delbert Cress's Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

As I indicated in the preface, there are very few works on the American war for independence that combine civil and military attitudes, activities, and relationships. The best works doing so are those by Higginbotham and Martin and Lender. Although Jonathan Gregory Rossie's Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), and Kohn's work address important aspects of the civil-military relationship, they are limited to the 1776-1777 and 1782-1783 periods, respectively. Charles Royster's A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979), although providing valuable insights into military attitudes, is limited

by the fact that it concentrates on the early years of the Revolutionary War.

The best sources for studying the civil-military relationship during the Revolutionary War are still the primary documents. This is particularly true with respect to the congressional-military relationship. Although there have been numerous books and articles written about Congress and its members during the American Revolution, few have adequately addressed questions relating to how Congress controlled and directed the military and how it responded to acts of military insubordination and threats of military tyranny. To answer those questions one must go back to the journals and papers of Congress and the letters of its members.

The journals of Congress contain a wealth of information about the congressional-military relationship during the war. Unfortunately, the one-volume index to the journals is of minimal usefulness. Thus, to fully exploit this source, one must patiently read over ten thousand pages. The official papers of Congress, which are available on microfilm, until 1978 were, because of their volume and complexity, difficult to use without an adequate index. In that year, the National Archives and Records Service produced a comprehensive five-volume index

which makes their use more accessible.[2]

Although Edmund C. Burnett's edition of the writings of the members of Congress is currently being superseded by a new edition, it is still the best single collection of the letters and diaries of the congressional members. The letters are particularly useful in the explanations given for congressional policies and actions. Such explanations are also included in Francis Wharton's edition of diplomatic correspondence, which contains, among other things, letters from Congress to its representatives abroad.[3]

Other collections of letters and diaries of members of Congress contain a wealth of information about the congressional-military relationship, as well as providing

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[2]Worthington C. Ford et al., eds. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 edited from the Original in the Library of Congress. 34 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904-1937); Kenneth E. Harris and Steven D. Tilley, comps. Index: Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1976); The Papers of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. 204 Reels of Microfilm (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1959); John P. Butler, comp. Index: The Papers of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1978).

[3]Edmund C. Burnett, ed. Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. Carnegie Institution of Washington Publication No. 229. 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-1936); Francis Wharton, ed. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889).

insights into the private relationship between the members of Congress and the military leaders. Most of these collections are well-known and utilized by scholars.[4] Among those that are not, and which can be used to advantage are the letters, diaries, and autobiographies of Elbridge Gerry, Benjamin Rush, Samuel Huntington, Caesar Rodney, Samuel Holten, John Fell, and Elias Boudinot.[5]

There is much significant information about congressional policies, attitudes, and activities in several secondary works. Among the more useful, with respect to a better understanding of the civil-military

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[4]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Adams, Ballagh, Boyd, Butterfield, Cushing, Ferguson, Hutchinson, and Syrett.

[5]C. Harvey Gardiner, A Study in Dissent, The Warren-Gerry Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: South Illinois University Press, 1968); George W. Corner, The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush: His "Travels through Life" Together with his 'Commonplace Book' for 1789-1813 (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American Philosophical Society, 1943); "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923); George Herbert Ryden, ed. Letters to and from Caesar Rodney 1756-1784 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press for the Historical Society of Delaware, 1933); "Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the Continental Congress, May 1778, to August, 1780," HCEI 55-56 (July 1919-April 1920): passim; Donald W. Whisenhut, ed. Delegate from New Jersey: The Journal of John Fell (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1973); Elias Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections of American Events During the Revolutionary War by Elias Boudinot; President of the Continental Congress, Commissary General of Prisoners in the Army of America during the Revolutionary War, Director of the Mint, etc. Copied from His Own Manuscript (Philadelphia: Frederick Bourquin, 1894).

relationship, are Edmund Cody Burnett's The Continental Congress (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941), Lynn Montross's The Reluctant Rebels: The Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1950), Jennings B. Sanders's Evolution of the Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), E. James Ferguson's The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961), and Herbert James Henderson's Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

The journals of the provincial congresses, committees of safety, legislative, and executive bodies, as well as the correspondence of the executive and legislative leaders, are the best sources for the state government-military relationship. A wealth of this material has been published, often being included in state record collections and archives.[6]

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[6]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bartlett, Bouton, Browne, Chandler, Clark, Hazard, Hemphill, Hoadly, Lincoln, McIlwaine, Saunders, and Walton. Also, Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 (Dover: James Kirk and Son, Printers, 1886); Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey (Trenton: Naar, Day and Naar, 1879); Minutes of the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey (Jersey City: John H. Lyon, 1872).

The state government-military relationship is, unfortunately, documented in very few secondary sources. Two which can be used to advantage, despite their age, are Agnes Hunt's The Provincial Committees of Safety of The American Revolution (Cleveland: Winn and Judson, 1904), and Margaret Burnham MacMillan's The War Governors in the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).

As the state official who most often dealt with the military, the chief executives were in a key position to direct and influence the military, as well as to be influenced by them. Thus, their correspondence is a very important source for understanding the dynamics of the civil-military relationship. Many of the chief executives have had their official and private correspondence published. The private correspondence is especially valuable, in that some chief executives, such as Joseph Reed and Thomas Jefferson, were very candid in their letters to the military.[7]

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[7]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Boyd, Browne, Chandler, Clark, Hastings, Hazard, Henry, McIlwaine, and Reed. Also, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786 (Newark: Newark Daily Advertiser Office, 1848); "Official Letters of Governor John Martin, 1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 1 (December 1917): 281-335; Matt B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781," PAAS, new ser., 36 (April 14-October 20, 1926): 231-352; Helen Lee Peabody, ed. "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49-50 (March 1954-June 1955): passim.

The public and private correspondence of the general officers of the Continental Army provides another valuable source for studying the civil-military relationship. Many of the general officers, including Washington, Greene, Lafayette, Sullivan, Clark, Irvine, Parsons, Stirling, St. Clair, McIntosh, Lee, and Huntington, have had, or are having, their letters published.[8] Unfortunately, three valuable collections have not been published. They are the writings of Knox, Lincoln, and Gates. They are, however, available on microfilm.[9]

Also meriting attention is the correspondence of the field grade and staff officers. In the writings of Samuel B. Webb, James McHenry, John Laurens, Philip Van Cortlandt, Alexander Hamilton, Timothy Pickering, Rufus Putnam, Ebenezer Huntington, Lewis Morris, Jr., and Alexander Scammell, one will find a wealth of material about the civil-military relationship. In part, this is because several of these officers, especially Laurens and Hamilton, were very

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[8]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Fitzpatrick, Showman, Idzerda, Hammond, James, Butterfield, Hall, Duer, and Smith. Also, Lilla M. Hawes, ed. "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799," GHQ 38-40 (June 1954-June 1956): passim; "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4-7 (1872-1875); "The Huntington Papers,' CHSC 20 (1923).

[9]Henry Knox Papers, MHS, 55 Reels of Microfilm; Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS, 13 Reels of Microfilm; and Horatio Gates Papers, Microfilming Corporation of America, 20 Reels of Microfilm.

opinionated, particularly with respect to the shortcomings of the civilian governments.[10]

The diaries and memoirs of several general and field grade officers, including Artemas Ward, William Hull, William Moultrie, Marinus Willett, Henry Dearborn, and Israel Angell, provide many interesting observations about, and insights into, the civil-military relationship. Probably the most valuable is Moultrie's memoirs, as it provides a wealth of information about the problems the military had with the South Carolina government throughout the war.[11]

The correspondence, journals, diaries, and memoirs of the field grade officers and enlisted personnel are a relatively untapped source for studying the military's attitude towards the American governments and people. Among those that can be used to advantage are the journals and

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[10]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Ford, Kite, Steiner, Simms, Judd, Syrett, Pickering and Buell. Also, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923); "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 433-512; "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1763 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 129-146.

[11]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Abbatt, Campbell, Moultrie, Willett, and Brown. Also, Edward Field, ed. Diary of Colonel Israel Angell Commanding the Second Rhode Island Continental Regiment during the American Revolution 1778-1781 (Providence: Preston and Rounds Company, 1899).

diaries of Ebenezer Hitchcock, Jeremiah Greenman, David How, Ebenezer Denny, William Feltman, and James Thacher; the memoirs of Alexander Graydon, Alexander Garden, and Joseph Plum Martin; and the correspondence of Herbert Wade, Robert A. Lively, Ebenezer David, Samuel Shaw, Enos Reeves, and the Beatty brothers.[12]

There are several secondary works on the military which can also be used to advantage as was mentioned in the preface and the beginning of this essay. Additionally, some older works still provide useful insights into the attitudes and activities of the military. They include Allen Bowman's The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Public Affairs, 1943), Louis Clinton Match's The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1904), Lynn Montross's Rag, Tag, and Bobtail: The

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[12]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bray, Dawson, Denny, Feltman, Graydon, Garden, Quincy, Scheer, Thacher, Wade, and Black; Also. William B. Weeden, ed. "Diary of Enox Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 87-134, 147-194, 207-231; John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 20-21 (1896-1897): passim; Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," ibid., 44, no. 3 (1920): 193-263; Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," ibid., 54, no. 2 (1930): 155-174.

Story of the Continental Army, 1775-1783 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), and Charles K. Bolton's The Private Soldier under Washington (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902).

The observations recorded by the foreign officers and diplomatics are a relatively untapped source for those studying the civil-military relationship during the Revolutionary War. Among those providing the most interesting observations and insights are the journals of Baron Ludwig von Closen and Claude Blanchard; the memoirs of the Marquis De Chastellux, the Abbé Robin, and the Prince De Broglie; the autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau; and the letters of Conrad Alexandre Gerard. Their observations and opinions, besides providing a unique perspective for studying the relationships between the American civil and military leaders, greatly add to our understanding of Washington's political and symbolic roles.[13]

A wealth of primary source material for studying the civil-military relationship is contained in various collections of published letters. Many of these are

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[13]For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Acomb, Balch, Chastellux, Robin, and Meng. Also, E. W. Balch, trans. "Narrative of the Prince De Broglie 1782," MAH 1, nos. 3-4 (March-June 1877): 180-186, 231-235, 306-309, and 374-380; James L. Whitehead, ed. "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau," PMHB 63-64 (April 1939-April 1940): passim.

well-known and utilized by scholars of the American Revolution.[14] Not so well-known, but containing many significant letters and other information, are Frederic R. Kirkland's Letters on the American Revolution in the Library at "Karolfred" (2 vols.; Philadelphia: privately printed, 1941; New York: Coward-McCann, 1952), Robert Wilson Gibbes's Documentary History of the American Revolution: Consisting of Letters and Papers Relating to the Contest for Liberty, Chiefly in South Carolina, from Originals in the Possession of the Editor, and Other Sources. [1764-1782] (3 vols.; New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853-1857), Gaillard Hunt's Fragments of Revolutionary History. Being Hitherto Unpublished Writings of the Men of the American Revolution, Collected and Edited, under the Authority of the District of Columbia Society, Sons of the Revolution (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1892), John Durand's New Materials for the History of the American Revolution translated from Documents in the French Archives and Edited (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1889), W. T. R. Saffell's Records of the Revolutionary War: Containing the Military and Financial Correspondence of Distinguished Officers 3d ed. (Baltimore:

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[14] For several of the better known collections see my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Commager, Force, Kellogg, Niles, Palmer, Sparks, and Thwaites.

Charles C. Saffell, 1894), and Dennis P. Ryan's A Salute to Courage: The American Revolution as Seen Through Wartime Writings of Officers of the Continental Army and Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

Several periodicals and historical society publications also contain a wealth of primary source material useful for studying the civil-military relationship. Many letters and diaries have been published in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Maryland Historical Magazine, The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, The Historical Magazine, The Magazine of History, The Magazine of American History, and the various publications of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Surprisingly, The American Historical Review, The Journal of American History, and The William and Mary Quarterly contain few articles or documents that contribute to our understanding of the civil-military relations during the American war for independence.

Over forty years ago in the preface to a book on democracy and military power Charles A. Beard observed that "To find in American literature a realistic discussion of this vital theme, it is necessary to go back to the Fathers of the American Republic," because "They had the advantage of poignant experience, and intelligence enough to see the

intimate relations between civil and military establishments."[15] In writing this dissertation, I have found that in a literal sense Beard was correct in his observation. The primary documents of the Revolutionary generation are still the best source from which to understand the American civil-military relationship, and in understanding it, having a clearer understanidng why the American Revolution was not undermined or subverted by military tyranny.

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[15]Silas Bent McKinley, Democracy and Military Power, new and enlarged ed. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1941): ix-x.

MANUSCRIPT REPOSITORY AND COLLECTION

SHORT TITLES AND ABBREVIATIONS

BPL	Boston Public Library Boston, Massachusetts
CHS	Connecticut Historical Society Hartford, Connecticut
CSL	Connecticut State Library Hartford, Connecticut
Feinstone Collection (Microfilm)	The Sol Feinstone Collection of the American Revolution American Philosophical Society Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
LC	Library of Congress Washington, D.C.
MHS	Massachusetts Historical Society Boston, Massachusetts
USMAL	United States Military Academy Library West Point, New York
WLCL	William L. Clements Library Ann Arbor, Michigan

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAPSS	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
AHR	The American Historical Review
APSR	The American Political Science Review
BDC	Biographical Directory of Congress
BPLQ	The Boston Public Library Quarterly
CHSB	The Connecticut Historical Society Bulletin
CHSC	Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society
CISHL	Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library
CNHHS	The New Hampshire Historical Society Collections
DH	Delaware History
GHQ	The Georgia Historical Quarterly
HCEI	Historical Collections of the Essex Institute
HLQ	Huntington Library Quarterly
HM	The Historical Magazine
HNH	Historical New Hampshire
JSH	The Journal of Southern History
LHQ	The Louisiana Historical Quarterly
MA	Military Affairs
MAH	Magazine of American History
MH	Magazine of History, With Notes and Queries
MHM	Maryland Historical Magazine
MHSC	Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society
MVHR	The Mississippi Valley Historical Review
NCHR	The North Carolina Historical Review
NEHGR	The New England Historical and Genealogical Register

NEQ	The New England Quarterly
NJH	New Jersey History
NYGBR	The New York Genealogical and Biographical Record
NYH	New York History
NYHSC	New York Historical Society Collections
NYHSQ	The New-York Historical Society Quarterly
PAAS	Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society
PH	Pennsylvania History
PMHB	The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
PMHS	Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society
PNJHS	Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society
RIH	Rhode Island History
RIHSC	Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society
RIHSP	Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society
SCHGM	The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine
SCHM	The South Carolina Historical Magazine
SCHSC	South-Carolina Historical Society Collections
TQHGM	Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine
VH	Vermont History
VHSC	Virginia Historical Society Collections
VMHB	The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography
WMQ	The William and Mary Quarterly

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